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This study examines unique features of the media transformation in Serbia 
2000-2006. How does reform of the media influence the process of transition 
from dictatorship to democracy? Do the media have any meaningful impact on 
tempo and character of change? My initial assumption (hypothesis) was that the 
media have significant influence and that their impact is considerable.  
 
Expectations that a new legal framework alone would automatically produce a 
democratic environment were wrong. This study demonstrates that the media 
cannot accelerate the transition process, nor bridge the gap in democratic 
culture, because the tempo and extent of the media reform is set by the political 
elite through political culture and institutions. Partially successful transformation 
of Radio Television Serbia into a public service broadcaster shows that mere 
introduction of regulatory models from mature democracies into a country 
without a democratic tradition does not guarantee desired results/outcomes.  
 
The role and impact of foreign actors in transformation of the Serbian media 
was different in comparison with Bosnia and Herzegovina, or Kosovo for 
example. In Serbia, as a sovereign country, the international actors were 
present in an advisory role, unlike in aforementioned UN protectorates, but were 
more actively involved than in other post-communist countries. 
 
Abundance of media outlets call for a new citizen - one who is more analytical 
and capable of putting together scattered pieces of information. Such a new 
citizen, fundamentally different from the old socialist subject, understands that 
even "gospel truths" are not absolute, and chooses own way how to engage in 
political life.  
 
There is no one grand theory of transition with prescribed steps and predicted 
outcomes that can accommodate different country experiences. Such a process 
is always local - reflecting political, cultural and ethnic features of the country in 
question. However, it seems certain that the changes in Serbia are irreversible.  
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A) WHY IS THE SERBIAN CASE SPECIFIC? 
 
To design, conduct and complete a meaningful scientific study, any researcher 
must think first why is his chosen subject specific and worth examining in 
comparison with other cases. My personal connections with Serbia, as my 
country of origin, and affiliation with the media as a former journalist, virtually 
guided me onto this topic. As a true Aristotle’s “political animal” during the 
turbulent times in Serbia's contemporary history, I was constantly forced to think 
and put in perspective the events that dramatically influenced not only my life, 
but the lives of many people in the Western Balkans1 region. 
 
As every journalist knows, the title (headline) comes at the very end – when the 
whole work is finished. In the beginning an author/journalist gives her/his work 
only a provisional title, until the work is completed, when the title materializes 
naturally. It took me a long time to give this work an appropriate heading - 
Political History of the Serbian Media in Transition (2000–2006), which explains 
its nature. The main title "Unrealistic Pledges - Deficient Result" summarizes 
the research findings, as much as my own perception of the process of media 
reforms in Serbia. 
 
From the beginning of this research project, I focused on transformation of the 
media in Serbia after the tectonic changes in October 2000 - but the outcome, 
as much as the title of such a work, was quite elusive early on. My academic 
journey lasted almost ten years. Working on a piece (for a newspaper, 
magazine, or academic study alike) without at least a provisional heading is like 
going on a boat trip without a compass. However, it wasn’t my confusion that 
                                            
1 
The use of term Yugoslavia (or ex-Yugoslavia) became almost unfashionable or politically 
incorrect during the 1990s once the constituent republics embarked on the road of independence - 
or some would say secession. It became necessary to coin a new term that would refer to the 
region and the states of ex-Yugoslavia, so Western Balkans is one of them. In strictly 
geographical context there is no clear border between Eastern and Western Balkans, so this term 
is exclusively a political construct. Slovenia, for example, does not want to be counted as a 
country of Western Balkans, while Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, 
Macedonia and Kosovo are considered Western Balkans. Eastern Balkans, logically refer to 
Bulgaria and Romania, while Turkey is geographically part of it, while in political sense is not. 
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stood in the way of clearly defining and naming the project. Trying to analyze an 
ongoing process is a difficult task – no matter who does it, and in which subject.  
 
The recent turbulent history of the media in Serbia (and the country itself) 
simply cried for an academic study. When I dug into the existing academic 
literature on post-communist media transition in Eastern Europe - Serbia was 
strangely absent. Even when the most prominent authors in this field, like Peter 
Gross, Karol Jakubowitz or Slavko Splichal write about countries of the South 
East Europe / Western Balkans and their transition paths, Serbia is either not 
considered, or only superficially mentioned in passing references. It seems that 
the years of Yugoslavia's and Serbia's political and economic isolation through 
formal UN sanctions had a peculiar impact on the international academic 
community. My impression was that the media scholars have carefully avoided 
any contemporary work about Serbia, although there was no formal restriction 
on such activity.  
 
“The twentieth century, which saw the development of the sound and 
screen media, also goes down in history as a century of struggle over the 
idea of the nation. Hobsbawm (1992) calls the years between 1917 and 
1950 “the apogee of nationalism,” as colonized nations struggled for 
independence and two world wars redrew national boundaries; the forces 
of globalization so prevalent since the 1950s worked to highlight the role 
of the nation-state in both spreading and resisting globalizing forces. The 
task of construction and preservation of national cultures and identities 
became centrally bound up in the work of media, which came under the 
direct supervision of the nation-state at many crucial junctures, 
particularly during times of war – hot or cold.” (Hilmes, 2010) 
 
The bulk of written work by international authors on Yugoslavia/Serbia during 
this period was journalistic output of varied quality2. Books written by journalists 
in general can be of limited academic value because they tend to reflect 
                                            
2
 For those interested in reading more about the 1990s conflicts in the Balkans from a journalistic 
perspective, I recommend books by authors like Tim Judah, Alan Little and Laura Silber, Misha 
Glenny, Eve-Ann Prentice, among others.  
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editorial policies and interest of their media owners, as well as commercial 
pressures to sell (Seaton, 2005). Additionally, members of the international 
diplomatic and military community3 who were involved in negotiations, policy 
development and implementation during 1990s produced many volumes of 
memoirs. However, not all of these books can be treated as reliable scholarly 
sources due to their highly subjective nature, although such works provide a 
valuable historical context, documentary references and time frame of actual 
events.  
 
On the other side, the Serbian academic community, stuck inside a country 
banished from international contacts, had troubles to secure its own welfare 
during the tragic years. Low salaries, political prosecution, deprivation of official 
academic contacts and exchanges, severely restricted international travel, 
cancelled subscription to academic journals and books, not only prevented the 
normal academic work at Serbian universities and institutes, but also 
condemned teaching and research to use of out-of-date and ideologically 
biased literature from the pre-1989 epoch. Some of the Serbian academics with 
international contacts managed to flee the country, while the vast majority could 
not.  
 
The process of transition in Eastern Europe after the symbolic fall of the Berlin 
wall in 1989 has fascinated political scientists coming from East and West alike 
throughout the 1990s, as evidenced in a relative wealth of academic literature. 
A leading British scholar on media and post-communist transformations, Colin 
Sparks (2008) calls it "transitology", with a bit of scorn. According to him, 
transitology represents a rather divergent body of political science literature, 
where authors tried to discover evidence and illuminate some general patterns 
of institutional and social development in states which had been living under 
dictatorships. Their post-dictatorial transition path, it was assumed, was leading 
                                            
3
 I personally recommend books by Lord David Owen, General Michael Rose and General Lewis 
McKenzie, former Chief Prosecutor of the ICTY Tribunal Karla Del Ponte, among others as honest 
accounts of their involvement in the region. However, examples of rather deceptive and self-
forgiving books are those by doctor/humanitarian/politician Bernard Kouchner, who is current 
French Minister of Foreign Affairs, General Wesley Clark, who after retirement unsuccessfully 
tried to run for US Presidency in 2004, former Finish president Martii Ahtisaari, who after 
retirement became chairman of the International Crisis Group and others. 
 
10 
towards ideals of parliamentary democracy in political terms and capitalist 
market economy. Such research paradigm was developed in late 1960s to be 
applied onto European military/fascist dictatorships4, then became useful in 
theorizing transition of South American5 dictatorships - later called the first and 
second wave of democratization. Some of the authors even considered using 
such a theoretical frame, inappropriately, for analyzing post-colonial 
development of African and Asian states. When the Berlin wall fell in 1989 and 
transformation of the former Soviet Bloc countries began, a prominent US 
political scientist called it "third wave of democratization" (Huntington, 1991). 
 
Sparks correctly argues that the outcomes of the so-called third wave of 
transitions failed to come up with grand theories and precise patterns, despite 
producing a lot of interesting case/country studies, research data and material. 
He questions the validity of the transitology approach in analysis of post-
communist societies, and their media in particular, clearly stating that 
transitology is in crises. He analyzes transitions in Poland, Russia and China 
and establishes that the political and economic transformations in these 
countries, although having a lot of similarities, do have very different paths and 
outcomes - defying common assumptions of transitology literature that each 
transition would lead to democracy in political terms and market capitalism in 
terms of economy.  
 
Sparks does not finish his criticism of transitology with questioning its basic 
assumptions, but goes even further to claim that such approach in research of 
the media in post-communist countries fails to convert rich empirical material 
into some kind of general (all-encompassing) theory:  
 "Since most studies of the mass media rest, either implicitly or explicitly, 
 upon the same assumptions, it is also the case that much of the writing 
 about media in post-communist societies has proved unable to theorize 
 the very interesting empirical material it has generated." (Sparks, 2008, 
                                            
4 
Capitalist countries like Spain, Portugal and Greece were examples. 
 
5
 Here the examples of capitalist countries with military/fascist dictatorships are numerous: 




The assumptions that Sparks is talking about are that after communist 
dictatorships the countries in question would enter (and eventually finish) a 
phase of transition to democracy (or liberal capitalism). And subsequently, after 
adequate legislative changes, the media in those countries, modelled according 
to the Western standards and expectations, would assume the role of "fourth 
estate"6. In addition to gathering and dissemination of information/news, it is 
commonly accepted that the media undertake and execute the role of 
watchdog, as well as agenda setting (Wheeler, 1997). However, notions like 
transition, democracy, democratization, as well as some of the 
organizational/legislative models for media systems like public service 
broadcasting (PSB) remain contested in academic literature. I will return to 
these assumptions and notions later in the chapter on theory. 
 
As an alternative, Sparks offers theory of elite continuity, as much more fitting 
paradigm for understanding post-communist transition in wider context, and not 
only in Eastern Europe. Other authors, like Dauderstadt and Geritts claim that 
"[t]here is no post-communist transition - but processes of change which take 
quite different directions, and which have dramatically dissimilar outcomes." 
(2000). I would personally agree with such position, which paves way for doing 
a specific case/country study of Serbia as previously unchartered territory in 
terms of research work and literature. 
 
As far as academic literature on Serbian transition, I have already noted that 
Serbia's case has been covered marginally, or almost completely ignored. Such 
state of affairs can be attributed to three factors:  
 a) Transition in Serbia started with a huge delay of 11 years, compared 
to other Eastern European countries;  
 b) It is still an ongoing process, with possibly a different outcome 
compared to earlier and completed transitions;  
 c) During 1990s access to Serbia and gathering of research material was 
                                            
6
 The term "fourth estate" was used for the first time by Thomas Carlyle in his work "On Heroes 
and Hero Worship" published in 1841. 
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not an easy task for international researchers due to ongoing civil conflicts and 
UN embargo on trade, so perhaps for reasons of (in)convenience and political 
correctness there was not much research conducted. It is interesting to note 
that the absence of Serbia from academic inquires and literature, which started 
in early 1990s, has changed very slowly since 5 October 2000.  
 
Once I chose to research the process of transformation of the Serbian media, it 
needed to be defined in terms of beginning and finish. To choose a starting 
point was relatively simple and logical – events of 5 October 2000 are the great 
dividing point in the life and history of Serbia and its citizens. Here I carefully 
avoid the word revolution in reference to the change of regime that took place in 
Serbia on 5 October 2000, since both the actual events and the conventional 
notion of revolution would require further clarifications and discussions, and this 
work is not about them. I originally thought that an appropriate end date for this 
academic inquiry would be December 2003, when the first post-communist and 
reform-minded government had to concede loss of support in the parliament 
and call extraordinary elections. Nevertheless, I realized that the work on media 
reform had only started during the 2000-2003 period, and its consequences 
could only be examined and understood in the next several years, while the 
country was governed by a coalition led by conservative nationalists7. This 
second post-Milosevic cabinet which also could not see out its full four-year 
term and called extraordinary election for the end of 2006 - which I finally chose 
for the closing point of my research. This year (2006) also came handy like a 
key division line in contemporary history of Serbia - as the year when 
Montenegro successfully held its independence referendum, ending its 88 years 
of state association and joint life with Serbia.   
 
By the end of 2006, it still wasn’t clear to most citizens of Serbia where the 
country was going. It was only obvious how difficult and elusive is the path of 
transition. In introduction to his book on social and media change in Central and 
Eastern Europe, Karol Jakubowicz adeptly notes:  
 "Perhaps the best way to describe what has happened in post-
                                            
7 




 Communist countries are to think of Columbus: he set out on an epic 
 voyage in hope of finding one thing, but ended up discovering something 
 altogether different. It is clear that people in Central and Eastern Europe 
 did not really know what 'Europe' looked like when then decided they 
 wanted to be part of it. In fact, they were chasing a dream, born out of 
 desperation with their lot under the Communist system." (2007) 
 
The nature of this research project is political history of the Serbian media 
changes/metamorphosis from October 2000 until December 2006 - from the 
legal/institutional perspective. For politicians, politically active citizens, 
journalistic profession and business the notion of change was always perceived 
and associated with swift and thorough reform of the existing constitutional and 
legal system, which was associated with the persona of the ousted president 
Milosevic. It is interesting, if not cynical, to note that Slobodan Milosevic had 
started his climb to power in mid-1980s by demanding reforms of the SFRY's 
constitutional order8, which was called "Titoist" after late Yugoslavian leader 
Marshal Josip Broz Tito9. Such, I would say naive, simplified and idealistic 
perception that legal norms alone transform and change social, economic and 
political relations and fabric in any state, have long tradition in Serbian national 
spirit and sentiment. It is perceived as a question of justice, or ultimate measure 
of legitimacy and legality (Stojanovic, 1997).  
 
This work is a case study, which attempts to render a meaningful picture of one 
still unfinished process. It is focused on relations and interaction between the 
domestic political actors - the national government, political parties, journalistic 
profession, media, citizens/voters - and the international actors. All of them - 
institutions and individuals - are part of the process that this research examines. 
At the same time, this work can be categorized as contemporary political or 
                                            
8
 The last constitution of former SFRY was adopted in 1974, following several constitutional 
reforms since the end of Second World War in 1945 when the communists took over the power 
from the previous royalist regime. 
 
9
 Josip Broz Tito (1892-1980) was communist anti-fascist guerrilla leader, who managed to 
liberate Yugoslavia from German occupation, while at the same time defeating internal political 
opponents - the royalist nationalists. He converted the pre WW2 unitary Kingdom Yugoslavia into 
socialist federal republic Yugoslavia, and led it from 1945 until his death in 1980. 
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politicized media history, attempting to place the Serbian case in perspective 
with experiences from other countries.  
 
Majority of former communist countries in Europe, and virtually all of them being 
ex-Soviet bloc states had embarked earlier on the road of post-communist 
transition - with different degrees of success, if the measure is creation of truly 
democratic media systems. However, it is important to note that this is not a 
comparative study of media systems, where I measure and evaluate the new 
Serbian media model/practice vis-à-vis other countries and their achievements 
and experiences. Certainly, a comparative perspective is necessary, but only as 
an auxiliary benchmark for studying and illuminating the Serbian results.  
 
I thought, incorrectly, as it turned out, that we knew what the (media reform) 
process would look like. This sense of set development that would emerge 
nevertheless depended on theories (that are “transition”) implying an inexorable 
momentum, came from the existing literature and empirical knowledge of 
transition. As it became slowly clear, Serbia was not like that. It was very 
different; it happened differently and by no means is the final outcome 
predictable, even at this point of time (Seaton, 2008).10 In more general sense, I 
agree with the philosopher Karl Popper (1991), a prominent critic of the Marxist-
Leninist ideology and practice, who correctly concludes that there are no set 
laws for social development and progress.  
 
At this point it is appropriate to look at other features that make transition of the 
Serbian media after 2000 distinctive in comparison to other East European 
states. First, Serbian transition started 11 years later than anywhere else in the 
former Eastern Europe, and in a post-conflict ambient, which was not the case 
with other former Soviet bloc countries11. Additionally, the process of 
                                            
10
 This view of the Serbian media reform process, with which I cannot agree more, is expressed 




 It is important to note, that despite being a socialist country, Yugoslavia was not a member of 
the Warsaw pact and was not considered Soviet bloc country. This was more a question of foreign 
policy and international relations, where Yugoslavia was a founding member of the Non-Aligned 
Movement. In terms of its political system, Yugoslavia was a socialist/communist country. 
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transformation was conducted in the presence and under the influence (or some 
would say with interference) of the international community and its institutions - 
which is much more noticeable and proactive than it had been the case in other 
countries.  
 
Following the Serbia's decade in the wilderness (1991-2000), the international 
actors wanted to help its transition - not for compassionate reasons or sympathy 
for a certain nation/state, but as an insurance policy against possible bloody 
conflicts that had marked the 1990s in the region of ex-Yugoslavia. When the 
inter-ethnic clashes in the former Yugoslavia began in 1991, European Union 
was not institutionally capable of managing and solving crises in its 
neighbourhood, neither it could articulate a common and coherent foreign 
policy. At that time, under outgoing Bush administration (1988-1992) and the 
early years of the Clinton administration, USA did not want to get too involved in 
the Balkans' bloodshed. However, it took decisive American initiative and 
engagement in 1995 to stop the carnage in Bosnia, after several EU-led peace 
initiatives proved futile over the course of years - ridiculed by the leading 
American weekly (Time, 31 Aug. 1992).12 Much later, during the 1999 Kosovo 
crisis, European Union finally became capable of handling crises (in conjunction 
with the USA) and managing post-conflict rehabilitation. 
 
The transition process in Serbia began at the time when the new media had 
become widely spread and available - something that was not the case when 
most of former East European countries began their transition in 1989. Finally, 
the long delayed and much anticipated Serbian transition started to unfold 
before the eyes of the international media and public in October 2000. Events 
like the 1999 NATO military campaign against FR Yugoslavia over Kosovo, the 
subsequent popular uprising against Milosevic in 2000, the assassination of the 
Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic in 2003, and the 2006 independence referendum 
in Montenegro certainly secured that not only Serbia, but the whole region 
received regular and global exposure on central news programme and features. 
                                            
12
 The article headline was "Munich All Over Again?", comparing the EU diplomatic effort with 





A1. Historical Context 
 
To achieve the declared research objective, it is necessary to provide a 
background sketch of the media and political environment before 2000–2006. 
By this I mean a historical account of the previous regime’s handling and using 
of the media prior to the “refolution"13 of October 2000. From a distance of 
several years, it is now possible to clearly see the features of pre-October 2000 
era, and write a more conclusive history of it - as a logical approach to the 
2000–2006 period.  
 
Since this research examines an ongoing process, it was also necessary to 
allow it some time to develop - before it could be contextualized and explained. 
To illustrate the transient nature of the environment in which the research was 
conducted, it is sufficient to point at transformations of the state(s) from 2000 
until 2006: When the last communist ruler Slobodan Milosevic was forced out of 
power on 5 October 2000, the name of the state was Federal Republic 
Yugoslavia (FRY). Than in February 2003, under the guidance of EU and its 
Commissioner for Security and External Affairs Javier Solana, the two-member 
federation was transformed into a loose State Union of Serbia and Montenegro. 
Its confederal charter had a provision that after three years both members could 
conduct referendums on independence. On 21 May 2006, Montenegro 
organized such referendum and by fulfilling the EU requirement to have at least 
55% of the votes in favour of independence, effectively made itself and Serbia 
separate/independent states.14 
 
However, I must stress that from the beginning of this research, I aimed it 
exclusively at Serbia, and not at FR Yugoslavia, State Union, or Montenegro. 
                                            
13 
This new word "refolution" is a term coined by the British historian Timothy Garton Ash in order 
to explain better the complex process of transition in former Eastern Europe, which is neither 
reform, nor revolution in their classical meaning. 
 
14
 It is worth nothing that until 21 May 2006 two former Yugoslavian republics (Serbia and 
Montenegro) effectively lived together in several forms of joint state since 1918.  
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The reason for that was that Serbia on its own amounted to approximately 94% 
of the now defunct federation (and later confederal union), in terms of human 
resources, GNP15 and territory, as well as in terms of its towering influence in 
the region. One could easily argue that such a huge disproportion in size was 
the very reason why Serbia and Montenegro could not find adequate forms of 
equal partnership and cooperation, despite sharing many cultural, religious and 
ethnic links and kinship. 
 
From April 2001 until June 2003, I held a full time position as political advisor 
with the OSCE16 Mission to FR Yugoslavia, which enabled me to have 
privileged communication with the leading political actors, and to collect 
valuable research data. In May 2004 I joined International Crisis Group17 as an 
analyst with their Belgrade office, and stayed there until its closure at the end of 
2005. Both of these international organizations are engaged in their own ways 
in providing guidance and support to FR Yugoslavia initially, then to the State 
Union of Serbia and Montenegro and finally to Serbia on their road towards 
stability, democracy, economic prosperity and future membership in the 
European Union. In such a context, my observation position and access to the 
relevant data and interlocutors for this research were rather extraordinary.  
 
A.2 Pledge to Overhaul the Media System 
 
It is widely accepted that the media are of central importance to the political 
process and participation in any democratic country. Such postulation belongs 
among those rarely disputed assumptions of the democratic theory, which 
media scholars don't feel obliged to discuss, since it puts the media and media 
studies in a position of a great importance. Mark Wheeler (1997, p. 3) points out 
in the introductory paragraph to his book on the relations between politics and 
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Source: The State Statistical Bureau annual report for 2005. 
 
16 
OSCE stands for inter-governmental Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, 
which is made up of 55 members - all existing European countries plus USA and Canada. 
 
17
 ICG is a leading international relations/foreign policy think tank founded in 1995, based in New 
York and Brussels, whose board members are mainly former ministers, parliamentarians, military 
commanders, distinguished scholars and philanthropists.  
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the media:  
 "The mass media provide powerful channels of information between the 
 political elite and the electorate. Traditionally, the press and broadcasting 
 act as proactive devices for encouraging the citizens to participate in the 
 democratic process. The mass media, by disseminating the full range of 
 political opinions, enable the public to make political choices and enter 
 the national life. Therefore, they are understood as important 
 mechanisms in ensuring the principles of modern democratic 
 societies." 
 
It is not surprising that in Serbia the media hold very important position too, both 
in the eyes of politicians and the electorate, especially when we think of how the 
media system had operated before 2000. In times prior to 5 October 2000, the 
nascent independent media18 had a crucial role in energizing and motivating 
disillusioned and passive citizenry to vent their anger and dissatisfaction with 
the regime in the streets, take their fate in their own hands and oust Milosevic. 
In his unscrupulous hold on power, Milosevic had pursued and lost wars, 
bringing only suffering, international isolation, national humiliation, poverty, 
endless abuse of own citizens and even NATO bombs onto his people. When 
after a decade of futile efforts the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS) finally 
managed to oust Milosevic and take over the state institutions, citizens 
expected that the media would automatically adopt the role which they have in 
democratic societies.  
 
But was that the case? Former partners and friends during the opposition times 
- politicians and journalists - had different ideas of their roles at the dawn of a 
new era. Their once shared interests and values suddenly diverged, and the 
romance between the former opposition politicians - now in power - and the 
newly liberated media was over. Both camps agreed that new époque required 
new regulation of the media sphere, but it seems that their ideas of how to do it 
were not shared, nor similar. The politicians from former opposition ranks, who 
                                            
18
 In addition to the existing myriad of state-owned and controlled media, as well as private media 
outlets belonging to the cronies of the regime. 
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finally got the reins of power in their hands, wanted to control and use the media 
much in the old-fashioned way that their predecessor had done (Bujosevic, 
Radovanovic, 2003). The media, on the other hand, expected total and 
unabated liberty to do whatever they wanted, and to receive some kind of 
tangible reward or benefit for the work done for democracy, while reporting the 
opposition’s views. 
 
Milosevic lost the federal presidency of FR Yugoslavia at the ballot box on 26 
September 2000. By refusing to acknowledge the loss he precipitated massive 
street protests and own downfall on 5 October 2000, when his notorious and 
trusted security apparatus abandoned him (Bujosevic, Radovanovic, 2003)19 
However, at that point the Serbian parliament was still in the hands of the 
"patriotic coalition".20 After deposing Milosevic, the victorious DOS alliance 
bullied the "patriotic coalition", shocked by unexpected loss of their leader, to 
agree to an extraordinary republican parliamentary election on 25 December 
2000.21 Only at this juncture was the victory against Milosevic institutionally 
complete, when the DOS, bolstered by wide support of the non-governmental 
sector, trade unions, independent media and professional organizations 
captured 176 out of 250 seats in the Serbian parliament - majority larger than 
two thirds22. 
 
Verbal pledges to democratic values by the new ruling elite, however, meant 
very little to voters/citizens. Following the fall of Milosevic in 2000, individual 
welfare and social standing of common people improved indeed, but far less 
than what the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS) was promising in the run-
up to the elections in order to enlist as many citizens as possible for ousting of 
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 Best account of the events of 5 October 2000 in Belgrade can be found in the book by leading 
Serbian journalists Dragan Bujosevic and Ivan Radovanovic.  
 
20 
It consisted of Milosevic's Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS), JUL (Yugoslav Left) party of his wife 
Mirjana Markovic, and Serbian Radical Party of Vojislav Seselj, which made up the anti-western, 
anti-democratic, coalition of forces that ruled Serbia throughout second part of 1990s.  
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 ICG Europe Briefing N°17, 19 Dec 2000 
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 Two thirds majority of MP votes was necessary for making constitutional changes, as required 
by the 1991 Constitution of Serbia. However, DOS coalition never used such rarely achievable 





Through the swift assistance of the Western world, the new DOS authorities 
were capable of supplying electricity, central heating, public transport and 
gasoline to the citizens during the winter of 2000/2001, something that was a 
major problem for the Milosevic’s regime after the 1999 NATO bombing. State 
salaries and pensions were not delayed for several months any more, but the 
overall standard of living did not improve to a great degree.23 
 
One of the main DOS election pledges24 to the citizens and their major partners 
was rapid overhaul of the media system within the first year of their rule. 
Everyone at that point agreed that the media must never again be (mis)used by 
any government for propaganda and that independence and self-regulation of 
the media sector were vital for the success of an emerging democracy. The new 
authorities immediately formed an expert group to draft a full set of media laws 
to be adopted by the parliament. Public service broadcasting (with BBC as its 
prime example) was declared by the experts and legislators alike as the 
preferred model, in conjunction with helping already emerging commercial 
(private) media sector. Privatization of the state-owned media outlets was also 




Six years25 after the demise of the old regime in Serbia, it was still not clear if 
democracy, market capitalism and their ideological values have prevailed over 
the nationalist discourse which Milosevic instrumentalized to perpetuate and 
legitimize his reign. The ideology which puts a nation above democracy and 
citizens found its new lease of life and continuity in conservative political circles, 
sceptic about pro-western orientation of Serbia. This effectively stalled the 
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 ICG Europe Report N°112, 15 Jun 2001 
 
24 
The pledge of swift media reform is found in the election action plan printed and distributed by 
DOS in the run up to the federal elections on 26 September 2000 and the republican elections on 
25 December 2000. 
 
25 
I refer here to December 2006, which I chose to be the closing date for my academic research. 
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reforms momentum, initiated by the first post-Milosevic cabinet.26 A great dose 
of uncertainty and mistrust in the pro-western orientation of the first post-
Milosevic government was especially present when the second post-Milosevic 
parliamentary elections held on 28 December 2003 returned results that gave a 
coalition of nation-centric and conservative political parties a majority in the 
parliamentary chamber.27  
 
The initial transition period (2000 - 2003) from the perspective of a common 
person, felt like swallowing a bitter pill.28 There was little personal and tangible 
gain to persuade a common Serbian citizen of the advantages of liberal 
capitalism and democracy. Needless to say, more than half of the work force in 
Serbia was employed in state-owned enterprises and the government 
administration – and they shared an impression that capitalism and privatization 
as one of its key ingredients would bring only misery and massive sackings. At 
the same time, the new elite was acting not very differently from the old one, 
with many of the old Milosevic era businessmen and politicians successfully 
joining the DOS ranks to maintain their positions29. Some of the reform 
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 ICG Europe Report N°154 , 26 Mar 2004 
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 The two leading parties in the second post-Milosevic parliament in the single-chamber 
parliament of 250 members were ultra national Serbian Radical Party, which captured 27% of the 
votes and 82 MPs, while second place went to conservative Democratic Party of Serbia, with 17% 
of votes and 53 MPs. The two leading progressive parties, the Democratic Party of the late PM 
Zoran Djindjic managed to gain 13% of the votes and 37 MPs, and former economic think tank 
G17+ secured 12,5% of the votes and 34 mandates. The remaining two parliamentary parties 
were conservative Serbian Renewal Movement, and the Socialist Party of Serbia of the 
imprisoned Milosevic, with 22 MPs each and approximately 7,5% share of the votes. A direct 
intervention of the international factors prevented the Radicals and Serbian democrats to form a 
two-party right wing nationalistic government. In a way, such intervention is similar to the events in 




 This refers to accelerated privatisation of once state-dominated economy, which as a rule of 
thumb means rise of unemployment and disappearance of deeply rooted socialist (non)work ethic 
and privileges, great reduction of the armed forces personnel and restrictions on once successful 
military hardware exports imposed by foreign powers, constant international pressure regarding 
cooperation with the International War Crime Tribunal in The Hague combined, with highly 
conditioning of promised aid packages and EU membership. 
 
29
 Two prime examples of former Milosevic's associates who successfully switched sides were 
Nebojsa Covic, former Mayor of Belgrade, and Dusan Mihajlovic, former Deputy Prime Minister, 
who both in addition to holding high political offices during 1980s and early 1990s became 
successful private entrepreneurs. Following political break-ups with Milosevic, they joined the 




measures/laws were passed by the parliament; others were delayed or stalled, 
despite initial enthusiasm and the large DOS majority, which started to melt as 
soon as they took power. 
 
The first post-Milosevic government (2000-2003) was good at international PR. 
The country was expressly re-admitted into most of international organizations 
and associations from which it had been expelled in the 1990s; it also attracted 
substantial foreign economic aid, and assured the international actors of its 
commitment to the cause of political and economic reforms, along with 
reconciliation with neighbours. Nevertheless, such policies and practice were 
based mainly on the persona and skill of PM Zoran Djindjic, rather then being 
honestly endorsed by all of his coalition partners and even his own party 
colleagues. Djindjic's cabinet was composed of two types of people – a minority 
of highly skilled experts, mainly from the field of economics, and the rest were 
political appointees who had little useful skills in governance, apart from strong 
desire to be in position of power for as long as possible. The loyalty of such 
people was not with the cabinet, ideology, or even their own party, but with their 
own personal gain. 
 
Continued political bickering within the ranks of the democratic political parties 
was present throughout the first three years of post-Milosevic Serbia. The 
assassination of the reform-minded prime minister, unsuccessful campaigns 
against corruption, dysfunctional judiciary and impunity of the Milosevic-era 
magnates30 had sent rather displeasing messages to the electorate. Shameless 
inclusion of old tycoons into the ranks of democratic forces, along with 
emergence of new tycoons associated with the new regime, numerous 
unsolved high-level scandals involving leading members of the government, 
certainly compromised the reform camp and made successful examples of new 
policies look pale. The first post-Milosevic cabinet led by the Democratic Party31 
                                            
30 
Incidentally, the most notorious and to the democratic public annoying personalities, former 
sidekicks and privileged business partners of Milosevic and his family, are Bogoljub Karic and 
Zeljko Mitrovic, owners of media empires BK Telecom, and RTV Pink, respectively. 
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When PM Zoran Djindjic was assassinated on 12 March 2003, he was replaced by his party 
vice-president Zoran Zivkovic, while the whole cabinet remained unchanged. The state of 
emergency which lasted 80 days was introduced following Djindjic's killing, a period during which 
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(as the backbone of the DOS coalition) could not sustain its reform agenda until 
the regular expiry of its mandate, and was forced into extraordinary 
parliamentary elections on 28 December 2003, one year ahead of schedule.32  
 
The government’s performance 2000-2003, along with the aforementioned 
circumstance and events produced a very confused voter – one who could not 
without hesitation rubber-stamp continuation of reformist program, and a voter 
who is rather sceptical about true intentions of the international actors to 
integrate Serbia into European Union in due time, pending continuation of 
reforms. The second post-Milosevic government (2003-2006) was a coalition of 
nationalists and neo-conservatives, all emerging from DOS, which used the 
next three years to stall and reverse initial results of Djindjic’s work, while 
reviving nationalism in a very old-fashioned Milosevic manner (Lyon, 2006). 
 
It is interesting to note that the so-called "Media legislation package", prepared 
by the expert group within a year of the Milosevic’s downfall, entered the 
parliamentary agenda with a delay, separated in five separate pieces of 
legislation and with further postponement in consideration and adoption. As 
usual in any parliamentary procedure, drafts were changed and amended 
(cynics would say diluted) before they were passed. The very first legislation, 
the Broadcasting Act was passed in 2002, but its implementation was 
impossible without the adoption of several other acts. During the state of 
emergency (March - April 2003) proclaimed after the assassination of Djindjic, 
the next two media legislations were passed - Public Information Act and 
Telecommunications Act. Access to Public Information Act was passed only in 
2004, but before that amendments to the 2002 Broadcasting Act had already 
been made. The Broadcasting Act was further amended in 2005 and 2006, 
which shows that the media regulation in Serbia was an object of daily "under 
and over the counter" trading between the parliamentary parties. Some would 
                                                                                                                                
severe restrictions on the media were imposed. Faced with a diminishing parliamentary majority 
and unable to pass any government proposition through parliament, Zivkovic resigned in October 
2003 and forced extraordinary elections on 28 December 2003. 
 
32
 As admitted by the outgoing Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Zivkovic, at a London School of 








In embarking on uncertain academic journey like a master’s thesis, a candidate 
must carefully come up with a topic that has several qualities: originality in a 
way that the actual subject does not cover already exhausted themes; to be 
researchable, but not too wide in scope (having in mind the required thesis 
format); exciting in a way that it attracts attention of fellow academics who may 
choose to criticize it and perhaps open further debates. Additionally, it also must 
have a real life dimension/theme that can relate to a casual reader. Without it 
such work is "l'art pour l'art fair".  
 
The next step is to formulate valid research hypothesis/questions (one or 
several) and then come up with research evidence (data), which can be tested 
or verified. The success of the work, its findings, credibility and relevance 
directly depend on the choice of research methodology. It took me almost two 
years to streamline the research topic, another year to formulate research 
question and match them with adequate methodology. 
 
 
B.1 Research Question and Hypothesis 
 
 
Since my research examines an ongoing process, it wasn't easy to define the 
principle hypothesis and research question to be tested/verified. Also, my 
choice of research subject requires an appropriate methodology, which would 
take into account a wider, historical and narrative context. The transition 
process in most other East European countries had started right after the fall of 
the Berlin wall in 1989. The 2004 acceptance of Slovenia, Czech Republic, 
Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and the three Baltic states (Estonia, Lithuania and 
Latvia) into full European Union membership signifies that such process has 
been completed (at least in these states). In the meantime, Romania and 
Bulgaria were also admitted in 2006 into full membership, despite not fully 
matching economic and legal criteria set by EU. Bearing all of that in mind, 
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there is a logical research question for the case/country study of the transition of 
media in Serbia:  
 
 Can the reformed Serbian media sustain democracy in making, 
 empower the citizens to become responsible and participating 
 voters, and prevent undemocratic developments in future? 
 
When the research question is formulated in such a way, both positive and 
negative answers can appear as results of the inquiry. Furthermore, possible 
answers to such question can be reduced to simple (binary) - yes or no. 
However, one need to note that it is the context and dynamics of the transition 
process that represent the true value of such research, and not the answer per 
se. The above stated question can also be re-formulated in several versions, 
depending of which dimension/angle of the process one wishes to focus on - 
media, democracy, socio-political impact, the role of the international actors, 
state-institutional, legislative, institutional etc. Another possible and appropriate 
variation of the research question can be posed in a following way: 
  
 Are the media an important catalyst in facilitating Serbia's effort to 
 bridge institutional and economic gaps/deficiencies and effectually 
 speed up the process of democratic transition? 
 
If the research questions are posed in such a manner, and an ongoing process 
is under scrutiny, there is no necessity to have a narrowly defined hypothesis 
that needs to be proven or discarded. My initial assumption (hypothesis) was 
that the media do have considerable influence on the transition process and 
vice versa. Transformation of the media is one of the aspects of general 
process of transition, but on its own it would not be possible.  
 
During the course of this research, several related issues appeared and 
imposed themselves to be considered in the context, such as the role of new 
media vis-à-vis traditional media. For example, when the process of transition in 
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former Eastern European countries began in 198933, internet, satellite TV, 
mobile telephony and other new media were not widely available. It is important 
to note that the Serbian emancipation from totalitarianism, between other 
things, was driven and certainly inspired by the advent of new media outlets and 
technology, which became generally available and cheap enough only around 
mid-1990s. 
 
The bulk of research data for this project were generated and collected through 
the use of interviews with experts and policy makers (so-called elite interviews 
conducted by the researcher exclusively for this work, as well as interviews 
given to media), polls and surveys, legal and policy analysis, document and 
record analysis, as well as analysis of the comparative literature on transition. In 
further enhancing the methodological “tool box” for this project – examining 
reform of the media sector in Serbia – it occurred to me that this type of 
research needs to be done as a case study. My choice of case study as the 
main analytical format for such topic was rather inevitable, if not the only one 
possible. The use of case study methodology should render in-depth picture of 
the research subject. The research aim is to find which features of the Serbian 
media transformation are unique, similar or completely different from other 
cases in transitology literature. Last, but not the least, this study needs to 




B.2 Scope and Limitations of the Research 
 
 
This research project was designed and developed in order to produce a thesis, 
as the requirement for completion of master’s studies at the University of 
Westminster. My chosen and approved research topic - Transition of the 
Serbian Media 2000-2006 - had to be moulded into the format set by the 
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 It is the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989 that is universally accepted as the symbolic beginning of 
transition in most East European countries. 
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university. Because of that the research scope, it was deliberately condensed to 
the case study of flawed transformation of RTV Serbia into public service 
broadcaster, which in my opinion adequately represent the overall process of 
transition of the media and the problems involved. 
 
“Even more than film, broadcasting appealed to governments throughout 
the world as a natural venue for both state control over a powerful 
domestic means of communication and an outward agent of information 
and propaganda. As a result, broadcasting was regulated, supervised, 
policed, and, in many cases, monopolized by the state to a greater 
degree than other forms of modern communication.” (Hilmes, 2010) 
 
Other types of media, like radio, newspapers, magazines, Internet-based 
portals etc. are present in passing references throughout this work, but sadly 
were not included in the main research frame, due to the aforementioned format 
restrictions and limited resources available to a single researcher. To embark 
on comprehensive inquiry of all types of media outlets would require many 
years of work and a large team of researchers. This is why the references to 
these types of media mainly come from secondary sources - work of other 
people and organizations.  
 
In addition to analyzing the main national media outlet, I also examine the 
adopted legal texts that regulate the process of media reform in Serbia after 
2000, as well as contribution of domestic and international actors that 
influenced the legislative process. Finally, in order to explain the context of the 
media reforms, I had to include political background and history, both before 5 
October 2000 and throughout the chosen time frame until the end of 2006. 
 
At this point it is important to clarify some of my historical interpretations of 
political events and actors involved in the Serbian transition process, which 
could be viewed as contentious or ideological. First of all, I was involved in the 
process in several roles - as a citizen of Serbia, as a member of the journalistic 
profession, as political advisor/analyst with OSCE and ICG, and finally as an 
academic observer/interpreter of the contemporary history in question. The first 
two roles carry certain ideological baggage, which can hardly be ignored or 
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erased, while the later two require a level of detachment and rigour to produce 
reports/texts that must be balanced and neutral. It is also important to point out 
that during my employment with the aforementioned organizations; I was 
involved in systematic observation and analysis of the Serbian transition 
process, which included active participation in writing of organizational reports 
on weekly, monthly and periodic basis.   
 
As someone who had grown up in an authoritarian society and was lucky 
enough to live abroad - receiving part of his education, along with political 
activist training - in advanced democratic societies, I had developed highly 
critical and articulated attitude towards any kind of dictatorship. Such 
experience shaped me as a citizen, as well as directing me into membership in 
several non-governmental organizations and subsequently making me an 
opposition political activist. In my private ordeal to bring long overdue 
democracy to my home country, I was a founding member of the two prominent 
anti-Milosevic political parties in Serbia - Democratic Party (DS) and Democratic 
Party of Serbia (DSS). I chose journalism as my profession, after learning the 
tricks of the trade during high school and university education in USA, in late 
1970s and early 1980s.  
 
When the political plight of the Serbian nation for democracy began in late 
1980s and early 1990s, I realized that membership in any political party, even in 
those of democratic persuasion, and the journalistic profession cannot go 
together. That prompted me to abandon party politics in 1993, and continue as 
a journalist/political analyst and later on as academic researcher of the 
fascinating interface between politics and the media. My background and past 
experience certainly guided me towards supporting the values of liberal 
democracy and to make me see the media as the fourth estate in contemporary 
society. 
 
I would like to underline here that this research work is not a comparative study 
of media in transition in post-authoritarian or ex-communist states. It is rather a 
specific case study of Serbia, whose trajectory is unique, but can be understood 
better if we introduce at certain points experiences from other countries. The 
only comparative aspect applicable here is to compare position and functioning 
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of the media system before and after transition. 
 
Although this research is a piece of contemporary political history, there are 
existing theoretical frames that can be useful in order to explain a historical 
process in an appropriate way. Existing body of literature on democracy, media, 
political culture and institutions provides general direction, while the writings on 
transition (or "transitology") and some recent developments like theory of elite 
continuity (Sparks, 2008), appear as concrete and useful frames in which the 





C.1 Qualitative Versus Quantitative Methodology 
 
The use of qualitative versus quantitative approaches represented the key 
methodological debate in social sciences for many years. At this point, I would 
like to express my personal reservations about use of quantitative methodology 
as the main tool for explaining social phenomena. More than 20 years ago, I 
had decided to abandon a master's degree program in International Relations at 
Western Illinois University when I disagreed with the course leader over the use 
of statistics as the key method. He had just discovered the joys of feeding 
statistical data into an early Apple/Mac computer and producing flashy looking 
pie-charts and graphs. I had equally been fascinated with computers and their 
possibilities, but I felt then as I feel now that statistical (quantitative) methods 
should not be primary analytical tools in social studies - be it International 
Relations, Media Studies, or any other discipline, because they do not 
adequately capture dynamic nature of human behaviour. 
 
On the subject matter of quantitative versus qualitative methodology Donald 
Warwick notes:  
 "Social scientists have long been divided over the respective merits of 
 quantitative and qualitative approaches to data collection. The symbolic 
 poles of the debate are usually represented by the methods considered 
 here. The general lines of argumentation are familiar enough: the survey 
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 (quantitative method - my highlight) is more "scientific" and produces 
 more "hard" data; participant observation (qualitative method - my 
 highlight) brings the social scientist closer to the front lines of research - 
 to the 'real people' - and catches details missed by more gross and blunt 
 survey instruments." (1973, pg. 189-190) 
 
Unlike natural phenomena and sciences, in social studies a researcher must 
understand context, local culture, or environment, all of which cannot be 
statistically measured in an adequate manner. Human nature and behavior are 
volatile and subjective - which does not mean they cannot be predicted, 
quantified or analyzed in a meaningful way. Nevertheless, I believe that 
quantitative methods, as used in natural sciences, are not the most appropriate 
for research of human nature, intangible and sometimes invisible phenomena of 
intellectual activity. It does not mean that quantitative methods can not be used 
at all, or be useful in some social sciences inquiries, but they have rather limited 
applicability and scope. 
 
Based on analysis of the history of science, Kuhn points out that “large amounts 
of qualitative work have usually been prerequisite to fruitful quantification in the 
physical sciences.” (1961, p.162). Qualitative research is, in many cases, 
instrumental to developing an understanding of phenomena as a basis for 
quantitative research. Similarly, quantitative research may inform, or be drawn 
upon in the process of qualitative research. Although it is common in social 
sciences to draw a distinction between qualitative and quantitative aspects of an 
academic investigation, I believe that the two types of methodology should not 
be excluding each other. As Warwick underlines, "Every method of data 
collection is only is an approximation to knowledge. Each provides a different 
and usually valid glimpse of reality, and is limited when used alone." (1973, p. 
190) (1973, p. 190) 
 
C.2 Case Study 
 
The case study methodology for a long time was an ugly duckling of the 
academic world. If we consider the underlying principles of research 
investigation in general, one can see that such treatment of case study was not 
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correct at all. Since social phenomena cannot be isolated and controlled in a 
manner of natural sciences' experiments, a need for a different research 
method arises - one that has a qualitative rather than quantitative dimension. 
The days of academic debates if case study can be valid and accepted as a 
legitimate research method are gone, and it has been accepted as adequate 
and appropriate in social sciences.  
 
As Bill Gillham correctly states: "Research is about creating new knowledge, 
whatever the discipline - history, medicine, physics, and social work. The raw 
material of research is evidence, which then has to be made sense of." (2000, 
p. 12) 
 
Main concerns of any research are always evidence and theory. However, one 
must never forget that evidence is more important than theory. It is necessary to 
analyze the evidence from a certain theoretical point, but it is important to note 
that evidence is of primary concern - theory only comes second. And if the 
theory does not accommodate the evidence - it is time to adjust, or replace the 
theory. In such a manner, scientific research delivers what it is meant for - 
development of current, or a completely new theory. By using the case study 
methodology, a researcher works inductively - from evidence towards well-
based theory. 
 
The problem arises due to different understanding of the concept of "evidence". 
Most people think of evidence in terms that is used in a court of law. An 
outcome of a legal proceeding depends on (physical) existence or uncovering of 
evidence, and testing (verification) of it.  
 
Gillham, however, argues that scientific evidence must not be equated with 
legal evidence, since it does not exist a priori, but is manufactured (by the 
researcher) for the purpose of research. The main source of evidence for 
natural sciences comes from laboratory experiments - something that is either 
impossible, or unethical to do in social sciences. It is difficult (or impossible) to 
extract the object of an inquiry from the environment, and also human and other 
social agents and actors extracted from the environment do not behave the 
same if removed from the ambient/context. 
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Because of that, it was necessary to devise different research methods, suitable 
for social sciences. Such different methods enable research into processes 
leading to results, rather than into "significance" of the results themselves 
(Gillham, 2000, p.11). In terms of philosophical base for accepting qualitative 
methods - case study being central here - there are three main points, 
according to Gillham: 
 1) Human behavior, thoughts and feelings are partly determined by their 
context. If you want to understand people in real life, you have to study them in 
their context and in the way they operate;  
 2) "Objective" research techniques - abstracted, controlling - can produce 
results that are artefacts of the methods used. An artefact is something that only 
arises because of the method that has been used (like controlled memory 
experiments in a laboratory or "opinions" given in a questionnaire). You get 
results, but are they "true" for the people concerned in the practice of real life?  
 3) How people behave, feel, think, can only be understood if you get to 
know their world and what they are trying to do in it. "Objectivity" can ignore 
data important for an adequate understanding.  
 
It is interesting to note how a contemporary textbook on methodology explicates 
the nature of qualitative methods (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005):  
 "Qualitative methods and research technique is a field of inquiry that 
 crosscuts disciplines and subject matters. Qualitative researchers aim to 
 gather an in-depth understanding of human behaviour and the reasons 
 that govern human behaviour. Qualitative research relies on reasons 
 behind various aspects of behaviour. Simply put, it investigates the why 
 and how of decision-making, not just what, where, and when. Hence, the 
 need is for smaller but focused samples rather than large random 
 samples, which qualitative research categorizes data into patterns as the 
 primary basis for organizing and reporting results." 
 
Howard Becker gives explanation of what are the four principle methods for 
gathering qualitative data: 
 ”Qualitative researchers typically rely on four methods for gathering 
 information: (1) participation in the setting, (2) direct observation; (3) in 
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 depth interviews, and (4) analysis of documents and materials.” (1996, 
 pp.53-54) 
 
C.2.1 Participation in the Setting and Direct Observation 
 
Being a citizen of Serbia and at the same time professional political analyst, as 
well as an academic researcher of the transition process, required from me an 
anthropological angle during the process of data collection and interpretation. In 
other words, I was both a participant in the setting, as well as an observer.  And 
such a complex and perhaps even conflicting position had certainly an impact 
on the collected data and interpretation. I would like to point here that use of 
case study methodology, participation in the setting and direct observation 
procedures/protocols draw on many features associated with ethnography as 
the main anthropological method. But the use of them does not change the 
nature of this research as a work of contemporary media history. Use of 
anthropology and its methods has given certain sort of academic legitimacy and 
validity to a field like media history - which is constantly criticized, if not mocked 
for its predominantly narrative nature and lack of firm or grand theory.   
 
As Jorgensen (1989, pp.157-158) points out, participant observation is defined 
as a field strategy, which incorporates interviewing of respondents and 
informants, analysis of various documents, direct participation and observation, 
as well as introspection. Participant observation produces qualitative data used 
in assembling and formulating the narrative base on which the research findings 
stand. In order to use such a field strategy, a researcher must make and 
constantly refer to his field notes, which will help him/her to connect and put in 
perspective all of the scattered and fragmented pieces of evidence found during 
the research. Field notes are typical artefact of ethnographic research, where 
strong emphasis is placed on exploring the nature of a particular social 
phenomenon, rather then setting out to test hypotheses about them (Atkinson 
and Hamersley, 1998, pp.110-111). Analysis of the collected data involves 
explicit interpretation of the meanings and functions of human actions, the 
product of which takes shape of verbal descriptions and explanations. With 
such approach, statistical analysis and quantification (or quantitative methods) 
play minor or supporting role. 
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In doing my field research and preparing to write up the dissertation, I did not 
keep a formal log of my activities, but rather relied on informal, irregular and not 
precisely structured field notes. While working with OSCE and ICG, I relied on 
the same notes which I subsequently used for my academic research and 
writing. For example in writing up longer narrative sections (especially Chapter 
2 and Chapter 6) and outlining my own interpretation of historical events, I 
extensively used my personal notes, diary entries and writings that I kept not for 
the purpose of this research, but to prepare myself for work as columnist of now 
defunct daily paper "Nasa Borba" and various appearances on BBC World and 
BBC News 24 programs. At the time I did not have a clue that one day I would 
attempt to write a master’s thesis and use my scattered notes for such purpose. 
Because of such more informal rather than proper academic way of keeping the 
notes and referencing the text, some portions of the work reveal my first 
profession - journalism - but hopefully do not disqualify my findings and 
conclusions.   
 
Informal consultations and discussions with colleagues from work34, as well as 
with former colleagues journalists were of crucial importance in forming my own 
views and interpretations of historical events. Hennessy (1996) asserts that 
material obtained in such a way does not need to be eliminated for lack of 
standard form and procedure in obtaining it.: "Some sources are private – does 
that mean they are unreliable? They can be checked by the researcher just like 
any other source." (1996, p.123) 
 
Most of these discussions and internal consultations helped me clarify my own 
views and interpretations, but as such (with no official record of them taking 
place) cannot be formally referenced in the text. Same applies to conversations 
with some insiders/informants35 whose valuable testimonies were given to me 
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 Here I mean diplomats working for OSCE, as well as the Serbian co-workers employed by 
OSCE in similar positions like mine. This also includes ICG staff members, who are mainly 
recruited from the ranks of diplomats, academics and politicians from all over the world. 
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 Here in particular I refer to two key insiders from the RTV Pink organizations, who cannot be 
named. Without their input and confidential information revealed to me writing on RTV Pink would 
not be possible. 
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on promise of full confidentiality - something that a journalist must practice as 
part of professional ethics, while academics have a duty to fully reveal their 
sources. Such conversations with insiders/informants cannot be classified as 
bona fidae research interviews, which were properly structured and listed. But 




Peter Hennessy (1996, p.123) reveals the value of interviewing for works of 
contemporary history: "Interviewing people leads to a commendable realism 
and contemporary history context-setting. History well done always depends on 
a host of companions – written, visual, oral, but talking with the people who 
were at the heart of events has been my greatest recourse – and pleasure." 
 
For this research, I have used two types of interviews:  
 1) Personal structured interviews with policy makers and experts, which 
are commonly referred to as "elite interviews". They were by far the best source 
of obtaining primary and original qualitative data.  
 2) The other type of interviews came from secondary sources – media 
statements and interviews given by the relevant government and professional 
individuals, which dealt with problems of the media and transition. 
 
The most valuable source of primary data was interviews that I had conducted 
with politicians, diplomats, lawyers, media managers, journalists, foreign 
correspondents and experts/advisors, lawyers and political analysts. For these 
structured interviews, I have devised a standard set of questions about the role 
of the media in transition, and posed them to chosen individuals, whose role or 
expertise was relevant for the research. The interviewees were individuals who 
had substantial direct or indirect influence over the actual events, those that 
shaped the transition process as participants, or were professional (expert) 
observers, or facilitators. Jean Seaton (2010) calls such individuals "players" 
and elaborates on the value of interviewing them:  
 "Interviewing the actors who have shaped significant events is what all 
 contemporary historians do, what all sensible politics experts do, what 
 any curious researcher might do, and of course – what journalists try to 
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 do the whole time. People who have been on the ‘inside’ of  events are 
 especially valuable – after all they were there – of course their 
 recollections may be colored by memory, or biased by their own interest 
 in the events, or limited by a privileged but nevertheless partial view, but 
 that in it itself does not invalidate them. At the very least it is evidence of 
 what they thought happened or indeed of their interpretations. But when 
 one account can be put beside another person’s view, or other kinds of 
 evidence then the first hand, players view is the most valuable and 
 insightful evidence." 
 
It is important to note that Interviews are as fallible or imperfect as (paper) 
documents - since documents just like interviews also need context to 
understand and are often product of interested (biased) positions. This is why 
Interviews need to be checked just like other (documentary) sources. The true 
value of interviews in matters of contemporary history is that interviewees 
usually know what went on behind the scene and what is not available in 
memos and documents (Seaton, 2010). 
 
When conducting interviews for this research, my concept was to motivate the 
interviewees through questions to give their personal views on the role of media 
in contemporary politics, the media reform process in Serbia, and the overall 
transition. The interviews were agreed through my professional and private 
contacts with the chosen individuals, and it seems that all of the participants 
understood the task and the purpose (academic study) very well. Most of the 
interviews were conducted in Serbian language. The quoted segments had 
been translated into English. Two interviewees were native English speakers 
but also fluent in Serbian, so I asked them to provide their answers in English. 
They were given the option to use the English translation of the questionnaire 
but both chose to answer the Serbian questionnaire in English.36  
 
Hardly anyone approached refused to give an interview, except those few who 
could not find time to do it. I asked them if they preferred to have a personal 
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The list of interviewees and the research questions can be found in the Appendix IV of this work. 
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interview with me, or to reply by e-mail to a questionnaire. Only two out of the 
ten interviews were done by the classical “tape recorder / transcript” method. 
The rest were done through exchange of e-mails, preceded or followed by one-
on-one talks. With direct written input from the interviewees, there were no calls 
for “authorization” or subsequent “clarification” – a standard method that 
politicians use when dealing with the media interviews. It is also worth noting 
that all of those who agreed to participate took their time to think about the 
questions and provide meaningful answers. With no risk of their words being 
quoted out of context, like when they speak for or in front of the media, they 
could afford to be frank, direct and insightful. 
 
One could argue that the number of elite interviews used for this research is 
relatively small (10) in order to be relevant. Originally, I hoped that I would have 
15 interviews, but due to busy schedules some of the people who I had on the 
list could not find time to be interviewed. I need to point out here that the 
names, positions and influence of the people chosen (and who accepted to be) 
interviewed justifies the decision not to have more. The actual content of their 
replies, their professional and political competence and eloquence, as well as 
thorough insight in the research subject are far more valuable than gathering 
data from large random sample of participants, or people who don't have 
adequate knowledge of the field. Here again I opt for quality rather than quantity 
- and elite interview is certainly one of the key tools of case study methodology. 
 
The number of questions posed to the interviewees is ten, but all of them were 
carefully designed and posed to initiate creative thinking and longer, structured 
answers. In other words, most of the ten questions were rather complex and 
could be treated as broad themes/topics which the interviewees were supposed 
to intellectually digest and come up with elaborate and not just binary (yes-no) 
answers. It is worth knowing that I never instructed them not to use simple yes-
no answers.  
 
Some of the questions would be eliminated in court proceeding as "leading" - 
but in this process they acted as a trigger to initiate expression of opinions 
which interviewees did not share with the researcher. Two persons who held 
high ranking policy making and implementing positions, did not hesitate to 
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express own controversial opinions, which in public, or in normal media 
interviews they would never convey. In a way, such answers showed 
confidence in researcher personally and his cause/mission. It also shows that 
the politicians are quite aware of what policy decisions and priorities they are 
following, despite having private opinions that are not exactly in accord with 
their public manifestations. On the other hand, the persons who hold non-
political positions, who act as experts or independent agents, never had any 
reservations about expressing their opinions. 
 
In addition to the elite interviews designed and conducted exclusively for this 
research project, I have also used many external interviews (conducted by 
journalists and available to the general public) connected to the subject of the 
inquiry. Using these secondary sources of data, I could obtain opinions and 
policy statements from relevant policy makers and/or experts who were not 
available for personal interviews.37 Such "outsourced" interviews used in this 
research are not found in the Appendix IV, but portions of these interviews 
which were quoted are properly identified and referenced in the text.  
 
One of those interviews, however, is of a special sort: It was given by the Head 
of OSCE Mission to FR Yugoslavia, Ambassador Stefano Sannino, to a RTV 
B92 journalist. However, while working for the OSCE, I had the task of editing 
and translating into English the original text (in Serbian), obtain the 
ambassador's approval, and sending the finalized text back to RTV B92 for 
publication on their English language web site. 
 
C.2.3 Analysis of Documents and Materials 
 
Analysis of documents and various printed (and electronically available) 
materials was used to achieve a contextual understanding of the policy and 
practice in environment within which the transformation of the Serbian media 
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was conducted. Relevant documents were obtained, their content verified and 
analyzed. Such documents include actual draft texts of legislations and adopted 
laws, policy statements, technical reports, media interviews, articles and 
features, as well as various expert reports commissioned by domestic 
government, professional accusations, donor organizations, NGOs and 
international actors.  
 
Most of the documents were generally available, but some of them were of 
internal nature written and circulated within a certain organization, like OSCE. 
Due to its inter-governmental and diplomatic nature, some of OSCE's memos 
and reports are not available to the public and carry "classified" stamp. As an 
employee of OSCE I had access to such documents, but it was not possible to 
quote them as proper academic sources. But most of the OSCE's policy 
documents and reports were made for and aimed at general public and not 
classified. 
 
At this point, I would like to clarify how I used documentary analysis, among 
other methodological tools. Once the dissertation outline was made, and 
provisional sequence of chapters established, I concentrated on finding and 
obtaining various documents that looked relevant for actual segments of the 
work.  
 
After reading the assembled materials I began to draft individual chapters, 
based on analysis of documents and other collected data. Actually, I used 
documentary analysis in two ways:  
 a) As an auxiliary method for developing research data and 
understanding the context in which the process of media transition is taking 
place. This means to extract and verify relevant research data from documents 
which were not originally meant for academic use - like policy documents, 
newspaper/media articles and reports, surveys, even interviews and opinion 
pieces; 
 b) As a main research method - To perform analysis of draft and adopted 
legal texts and norms. Such analysis of the legal content of norms, which is 
strictly limited to the actual texts, can be used to compare their real life 




It is important to note that legal analysis38 and documentary analysis of legal 
texts (norms) are not the same. There is a possibility that one could easily 
confuse these two terms (documentary analysis of legal text and legal analysis) 




Although I have expressed my reservations about the use of quantitative 
methods in social sciences, there were instances where the use of surveys and 
polls were appropriate. For example, it was certainly helpful for the research to 
have general data about the Serbian population vis-à-vis the media - 
consumption patterns, literacy and technology penetration. It was obtained 
through a public opinion poll. An example of survey/content analysis was media 
coverage during the first presidential election in Serbia.  
 
I have been directly and actively involved in the design and commissioning of 
the aforementioned poll and survey/content analysis, which I subsequently used 
in this research - while working with the OSCE. The findings from them are 
presented in entirety as Appendixes I-III to this work. In writing the chapters, I 
have also used and quoted portions from other (external) surveys. The results 
of such surveys are available to the academic community and general public 
mainly through the work of the Independent Association of Serbian Journalists 
(IJAS)39 and its commercial enterprise the Belgrade Media Centre. Several 
academic projects and studies concerning the media were commissioned and 
presented by the Media Centre, which has established itself as the main media 
research and policy think tank in Serbia. It is funded by many international 
donors. Additionally, the Belgrade Media Centre was the host to the joint group 
of experts and government representatives, which drafted the media legislation 
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 I have been IJAS member since 1994, making me eligible to use all the IJAS and Media Center 
resources, research facilities and data basis. 
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for adoption by the Serbian parliament.   
 
Several specialized domestic and international organizations conduct surveys in 
Serbia on a regular basis, for academic and commercial reasons. In the context 
of reforming Serbia's media system to serve its citizens and emerging 
democracy, several inter-governmental organizations (UNDP, OSCE, Council of 
Europe, USAID, EU commission) regularly commission academic researches 
and surveys that are available to the public. Additionally, many international and 
domestic NGOs (Open Society Institute, IREX, Freedom House, Helsinki 
Committee for Human Rights, Reporters without Frontiers etc.) also conduct 




D) THESIS STRUCTURE 
 
 
Once the title and research objective have been laid down, it is necessary to 
outline the thesis structure – in terms of its parts/chapters and organization. 
This research project is broadly organized in four parts:  
 
Part I - Background and History (Introduction, Chapters 1-2);   
Part II - Times of Confusion (Chapters 3-6); 
Part III - Conclusion (Chapter 7). 
 
Following the introduction to the research, where I discuss how and why I chose 
to focus on the Serbian media transition process, as well as how it is different 
from other similar cases. Then I move on to the research design, with 
formulation of the research question/hypothesis, as well as to outline scope and 
limitations of this project. It is followed by discussion of the chosen research 
methodology. Finally I give outline of the thesis structure. In chapter 1 I present 
and discuss a selection of relevant literature used as theoretical and intellectual 
foundation for this work. Then I address the analytical frame of this research, 
where relevant theoretical concepts and practical angles are considered.  
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The history portion of the work starts with Chapter 2, which deals with the media 
system before the great change of 5 October 2000. This historical account 
examines the practice of the state broadcaster Radio Television Serbia (RTS) 
as the paradigm and backbone of the old media system. In many ways attempts 
to reform RTS and convert it from a state-owned and politically-controlled outlet 
into a public service broadcaster epitomizes the whole reform process of the 
Serbian media. 
 
The Chapter 3 starts with preparations for a major media system overhaul. It is 
followed by discussion of the notion of public service broadcasting (PSB). Then 
I move on to legal and political analysis of the media legislations passed during 
the first post-Milosevic cabinet (2000–2003), which laid foundation of the new 
media system. In the third section of this chapter, I examine introduction of the 
Broadcasting Council as an independent regulatory body. Then I move on to 
critically evaluate the attempt to transform Radio Television of Serbia (RTS) into 
a public service broadcaster. 
 
The Part II of the work, entitled The Times of Confusion begins with Chapter 4, 
which examines the influence and role of the international factors in the Serbian 
transition process. Chapter 5 represents a case study of the first post-Milosevic 
presidential elections. This event (presidential election), which took place more 
than one year after the process of transition had begun, illustrates how the 
media performed rather successfully in a new environment, despite the fact that 
the new media legislations were still not in place. In other words, the way the 
media operated during the presidential campaign was based on gentlemen’s 
agreements and in expectation of proper regulation. This chapter, unlike others 
in this work, is based mainly on quantitative data, and represents the earliest 
finished segment of this thesis. 
 
One more "pure history - no theory"40 segment of this work, Chapter 6, is 
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 By this I mean text which does not contain theoretical concepts, but instead establishes factual 
and political background and time frame for other case study chapters. 
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entitled 40 Days That Shook Serbia. It illuminates the second41 major turning 
point in current Serbian political history – the assassination of the reformist 
Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic, the state of emergency that followed it and the 
implications these events had on the media. Djindjic's death had such a large 
impact on the process of transition in Serbia, that it certainly warrants a 
separate narrative chapter.  
 
The third and final part of the thesis discusses the problems of media reform in 
Serbia is Chapter 7, which summarizes the findings of all previous chapters and 
individual case studies. Here are the issues I address in the final chapter: 
 - Legislative process and analysis of the adopted media regulatory acts, 
and its implementation; 
 - Can foreign models of regulation and practice be successfully 
implemented in Serbia? Here I also underline the rule of law as prerequisite for 
new political institutions and culture to successfully replace the old one.   
 - The work of the Broadcasting Agency’s Council as the regulatory body 
and unsuccessful transformation of Radio Television Serbia into public service 
broadcaster; 
 - Achievements and shortcomings of the Serbian experience, in 
comparison with other Eastern European and post-communist countries. 
 
In the closing chapter of my research, I try to address and answer the research 
questions – if the new media regulation and practice have created an 
environment in which a deficit in democratic culture of Serbia can be bridged, 
the transition process completed, and hope of affluent and democratic future for 
its citizens become realistic.  
 
Finally, I try to outline the contribution of this case study of the Serbian media in 
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 CHAPTER 1 
 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE AND ANALYTICAL FRAME 
 
Selecting appropriate literature to provide the intellectual and theoretical 
backbone for a research project is a complex task, as much as it is to 
streamline the topic and pinpoint research(able) hypothesis. At the same time, 
this is a personally rewarding experience, because locating and reading 
relevant books and publications is the fun part of the work. It can also be a 
never-ending story, since a researcher constantly runs into more and more 
fresh and applicable general literature, even if the literature on Serbia is not in 
great supply. The selection of literature reviewed here is the result of the 
candidate's subjective choice, input from supervisors, suggestions from the 
supervisory board and recommendations from colleagues - journalists and 
academics.  
 
This research, as a work of political history, is a critical account of the 
transformation of the Serbian media from 2000 until 2006. Such path leads 
through domain of several scientific disciplines: contemporary and media 
history, media studies, theory of democracy, international relations, legal and 
policy analysis. In such a context, the selected literature may seem rather 
divergent, but this would be a superficial judgment. For scholars from the field 
of media and communications, all of the aforementioned scientific disciplines 
fall within their remit. Media studies on their own would not have depth and 
scope to properly examine the complex interface between the media and 
politics, especially in the context of transition from a socialist dictatorship 
towards democracy. 
 
At this point, I find it rational to classify the selected literature into four distinct 
categories: 
 (1) History-related books/publications; 
 (2) Literature that discusses democratic and media theory; 
 (3) Comparative studies of the transition and role of international 
 actors; 





An additional category could be literature on research methodology, but I have 
decided against giving it a separate section for practical reasons1.  
 
However, many chosen books transgress my simplified classification and 
could figure in more than one category, or do not fit comfortably into one. In 
each of the tentative categories, I have chosen several relevant works to 
review and discuss, although not all of them have the same value for this 
research project.  
 
At this point I would like to point out that a lot of relevant and valuable books 
and magazine articles covering transition of media in former Eastern Europe 
have been published since 2008, the year when I finalized my research and 
writing up of the thesis. In subsequent revisions of the manuscript, I have 
included references to these new writings, but I have not included them in the 
literature review chapter. My work examines period between year 2000 and 
2006 and the choice of the literature discussed reflects the publications that 
were available at the time. Lastly, my selection of the literature is just a 
fraction of relevant and meaningful readings on the subject - it is far from 
being definitive, exhaustive or comprehensive. 
 
1.1 Historical Dimension 
 
It is logical to start discussion of the selected research literature with a volume 
that chronologically represents beginning of the transition process in former 
Eastern Europe. "Revolutions For Freedom - The Mass Media in Eastern and 
Central Europe" is a work edited by Al Hester and L. Earl Reybolds from the 
University of Georgia (USA).  
The authors/editors took it upon themselves to compile a book of essays by 
several academics who visited some (not all) of the countries of former 
Eastern Europe2 right after the fall of Berlin wall in 1989, to critically evaluate 
their media systems and potential for change. A noble cause indeed, but their 
                                            
1 The literature on research methodology is quoted and discussed in the Introduction and Chapter 1. 
 




findings have very limited value. This is because the ethnographic material 
and data collected in the field clearly show several shortcomings: Superficial 
understanding and limited knowledge of the countries visited; Careful tip-
toeing by the authors around the lines of US foreign policy vis-à-vis those 
countries; Cold war pre-conceptions about the countries in question by the 
authors and their visible restraint in challenging local officials and their 
ideological line. 
If we consider that this collection of essays originates from the times 
immediately after the 1989 events and symbolic end of the cold war, it is 
understandable that there was a kind of confusion about the future direction of 
transitions, for which there was neither precedent, nor available academic 
literature. 
As a contrast, the most analytical and thorough historic account of the process 
of transition around the former Eastern Europe is "History of the Present – 
Essays, Sketches and Dispatches from Europe in the 1990s", written by 
historian Timothy Garton Ash, an eminent British intellectual and the Oxford 
University fellow. This work is written in a very accessible, almost journalist-
like language. Ash’s essays are accounts of his numerous trips to the former 
socialist countries during the turbulent 1990s - from Poland in the North of 
Europe, to the states of former Yugoslavia and Albania on the Southern tip of 
the continent. With typical British keen interest and thorough understanding of 
political, historical and culture-driven environments and many complex issues, 
Garton Ash displays a remarkable sense of balance, sympathy and 
impartiality, usually not associated with either journalists, or politicians working 
in these regions. 
 
In the final chapter entitled Envoi, Garton Ash3 explains his own motives and 
mission: 
“I hope a few truths about Europe emerge from these mirrored images 
of coloured fragments, constantly rearranged into different patterns as 
time’s  hand twists the tube. Perhaps one truth is that Europe is itself a 
                                            
3 This is one of only two chapters of the book that is not essay or dispatch from the field, but rather an attempt to summarize the experience and draw 





kaleidoscope. The real Europe, I mean – a jagged, diverse continent of 
more than 600 million individual men and women, speaking more than 
50 languages, living in more than 35 states, making food, love and 
politics in countless subtly different ways.” (Garton Ash, 2000, pg. 466) 
It would be wrong to view Garton Ash's book through traditional academic 
typology/classifications. His writing is neither history, literature, journalism, 
sociology, nor cultural or political study in the classical sense. On the other 
hand, it is all of them. The eclectic method used by Garton Ash is more of an 
artistic nature, but when applied to the wide-ranging field of social sciences, 
one would call his approach interdisciplinary and certainly appropriate for such 
topic. A social scientist is more like an impartial, honest observer of social 
processes and dynamics, a careful custodian of many relative truths, who 
synthesizes a general picture from all the collected fragments.  
 
Inserting a journalistic “human interest” and “proximity” dimension into his 
writings have certainly helped Garton Ash in making his book accessible to 
wider audiences. It is just a writing technique/style, which has nothing to do 
with the depth and validity of his analysis. One could certainly not dismiss the 
work of Garton Ash as non-academic and purely narrative. On the opposite - it 
is an enlightened way how to interweave narrative and well-grounded 
interdisciplinary analysis into a non-traditional work of history, based on the 
existing theories and intellectual paradigms. Or exactly the same what this 
research project is hoping to achieve. 
 
Garton Ash records individual human stories and events featuring real people 
to paint a wider picture of states and societies in which his characters exist 
and function. Then he goes on to generalize about inter-state (international) 
relations, European politics and the world order. He is a proponent of a “new 
liberal order” for Europe, one that is slightly different from the type advocated 
by current EU structures and political leaders. Garton Ash claims that the EU 
integration process had the wrong priorities – monetary union (incorporating 
not even all current members of the EU), rather than the creation of a liberal 
order for the whole of Europe - one that would pave the way for the gradual 
inclusion of all the European states into the EU structure. In the light of 




Garton Ash's assessment is that it is not the order that he personally hoped 
for, but it is far from being a lost or wrong cause.  
 
Garton Ash writes about fascinating historical events in the former socialist 
world in the last decade of the 20th century. Some of them were positive and 
emancipating experiences, but others like the demise of the former 
Yugoslavia and subsequent wars in the region have been frustrating and full 
of human suffering, unnecessary violence and destruction. He argues that 
none of the (tragic) events were inevitable, and that at every stage there were 
other options available, but such paths were not taken. He says that in 
extraordinary moments of history political leadership is more important than in 
ordinary times: The personal leaderships of Vaclav Havel or Arpad Goenz 
were at moments decisive. In the opposite direction, so were those of Vladimir 
Mechiar, Franjo Tudjman and Slobodan Milosevic (Garton Ash, 2000, pg. 
468). 
 
As a historian, Garton Ash is trying to put general perspective into his 
fieldwork findings, compare it with the events of the past, and possibly 
propose some solutions for a future order in Europe. He claims that the new 
emerging European order has no name yet. Attempts to call it “Paris Europe”, 
after the 1990 adoption of the Declaration for a New Europe by all the OSCE4 
member states, is inadequate. Judging by the EU’s inability to manage major 
crises like the one in former Yugoslavia, Garton Ash argues that the current 
European order could better be called “Washington Europe”, since it was 
impossible to stabilize the region for several years, without yet another 
intervention of the USA. 
As a political realist, Garton Ash admits that a history of the present must 
acknowledge its own limitations. Systematic conclusions need a greater 
passage of time. Then, as someone who has a considerable reputation of an 
expert on European political affairs and has written a lot for many influential 
media outlets and publications, he has a rather cynical view on the real impact 
of his work:  
                                            
4 OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) is a regional inter-state organization, formerly known Conference for Security and 





“If you think you have influenced policy as a commentator, it is an 
illusion anyway. All commentary is a kind of blowing in the wind. When 
the wind is blowing in the same direction, as it was for me at the end of 
1980s, you may imagine that it is your breath that is bending those 
trees. When the wind is blowing against you, the spit comes back in 
your face. Nonetheless, I still have a personal sense of failure.” (Garton 
Ash, 2000, pp. 469-470) 
How does the writing of Garton Ash fit into research about the transition of the 
Serbian media? The New Europe that Garton Ash is hoping for and that 
emerges from the events he has meticulously recorded, is based on the 
paradigm of liberal democracy as the highest value, one that is shared by all 
the European nations, including Serbia. And the process of transition in Serbia 
has one final destination – full membership in the European Union, something 
that has remained a rather elusive and distant goal to this date.  
 
The citation where Garton Ash expresses reservations about the possible 
impact of his writings on policies is a topic for the ongoing debate about the 
relation between (political) power and the media. In any case, it proves the 
point that the media, politics and citizenship in Europe, or anywhere else in 
the contemporary world, are inseparable ingredients of everyday life.  
 
Misha Glenny's "The Balkans, 1804 - 1999: Nationalism, War and the Great 
Powers" is a popular reference book for anyone interested in complicated 
Balkan history, which never reflected the needs and strivings of the region's 
nations, but echoed the power-play and trade-offs between the Great Powers. 
Glenny tries to tip-toe over a minefield where mythology meets history and 
propaganda throws fog over facts, with mixed success. His greatest expertise 
is on Serbian, Bosnian, Greek and Kosovar affairs, while on a wider regional 
context of Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Croatia and Slovenia, his analysis is 
not so thorough. As a journalist-turned-historian, Glenny sometimes does not 
take an equal distance from the actors (powers) and their policies to preserve 
an impartial and scholarly neutral viewpoint. In such situations, he accepts at 
face value some of the actors' interest-driven justifications of their 




available work of that kind - especially for someone interested in Serbia and 
its contemporary history. 
In terms of background material for understanding Serbia, its recent history 
and current road to its troubled transition, Tim Judah's book "The Serbs: 
History, Myth and the Destruction of Yugoslavia" is extremely useful. Judah 
provides an outsider’s view with a fair and balanced ethnographic insight into 
the Serbian national mentality, development of political thinking and practice. 
He digs deep into Serbian mythology,5 which has replaced the real history. He 
exposes fallacies, manipulations and the demagoguery of contemporary 
political actors in Serbia. Notably, Judah's expertise on Serbian affairs comes 
from his numerous visits and extended stays in the region, coupled with 
personal acquaintance with senior political and diplomatic figures, both 
domestic and international. Since the author is not an academic, but a 
journalist/political analyst, the method of Judah's research and writing cannot 
be embraced without certain academic reservations, but his keen eye and 
sharp analytical mind certainly warrant respect and consideration in the rather 
subjective field of political history. 
At the half-time mark of my research timeline stands the annual report/book 
"Freedom of the Press 2003" published by Freedom House. This publication 
represents an indispensable survey of the media’s independence around the 
globe, and FR Yugoslavia/Serbia has a separate country feature. The 2003 
edition/report shows clear advancement compared to the pre-2000 period, but 
still classifies Yugoslavia (Serbia) rather low on their global scale of press 
freedom. The 2007 Freedom House report/book is the final time line of my 
research6, where the findings on Serbia demonstrate the progress (or steps 
back) in the process of transition.  
Freedom House is a non-profit, non-partisan organization based in the USA 
and supported by American officialdom, many individual philanthropists and 
corporate sponsors. Its mission is to support democratic changes worldwide, 
monitor freedom and advocate democracy and human rights. Every year this 
                                            
5 The myth that completely overshadows and replaces the distant and contemporary history of Serbia is connected to Kosovo. In 1389, the Serbian 
Christian count Lazar and his gentry fought (and lost) against the Turkish sultan Murat's army at Kosovo Field. This tragic event is often considered 
(and misused) as the main juncture of Serbian past and future. 
 




organisation publishes a survey of media freedoms around the world. James 
H. Ottaway Jr., chairperson of the World Press Freedom Committee asserts: 
“The Freedom House annual survey of the status of press freedom 
around the world is the most accurate and consistent analysis of that 
most  fundamental human right, without which democracy, the rule of 
law, and free markets cannot exist. It is the most useful reference guide 
for international government officials, business executives and press 
freedom advocates.” 
Since the 1980s, Freedom House has monitored press freedoms in close to 
200 countries, and its findings (with individual country ratings) are widely 
utilized by academic and political circles as unbiased and trustworthy. The 
organisation has developed own methodology of surveys (used by its field 
contributors) that is deemed helpful in comparative media research. One can 
argue or dismiss the academic merit of methodology and marking system 
used by the Freedom House in compiling their country reports, but their 
reports certainly have significant influence among policy makers and 
subsequently in the media, which carry such findings to the general public.  
 
1.2 Citizenship, Media and Democracy 
 
Considering the Serbian case of transition through the discourses of media 
and democracy is appropriate, while knowing that the legislative reform of the 
Serbian media system was intended to reflect successful functioning models, 
institutions and systems.7 The Serbian transition is happening under the 
guidance and influence of international actors.  
 
What strikes me is that it is rarely pointed out that both media and democracy 
are part of a much wider discourse - citizenship. Without active and competent 
citizens, there is no democratic order. In that sense, several works on 
citizenship have been inspirational to me - while establishing the theoretical 
foundation for this research.  
                                            






Michael Schudson’s "The Good Citizen" (1998) is a detailed historical account 
of how American citizenship and democracy have evolved from the times of 
constitutional fathers until nowadays. John Street examines theoretical 
aspects of media practices in contemporary politics in his "Mass Media, 
Politics and Democracy" (2001). These two works provide a general 
theoretical context for and inspiration for my own case study of the Serbian 
media.  
On the other hand, John Lloyd's book "What the Media Are Doing to Our 
Politics" (2004), a very British account about how the media managed to 
acquire enormous power and misuse it, serves as a good example of where 
could a continuous outcry for media independence lead, even in mature 
democracies. Nevertheless, when Lloyd makes comparisons of the notion of 
an independent and free press in different democratic countries (Britain, 
France, Italy, Sweden), it turns out that such idea is far from uniform. 
Journalistic practices and cultures in those countries differ a lot – so, equally, 
the role of the media within the socio-political environment is different.  
 
Slavko Splichal's 1994 volume "Media beyond Socialism" is probably the most 
thorough theoretical contribution on the media in former socialist countries 
before and during the transition, and his Slovenian (ex-Yugoslavian) 
perspective and background is certainly very relevant in considering the 
Serbian case. Splichal has contributed some general observations about the 
nature of the transition process that were true not only early on, but are 
certainly valid nowadays: 
"The shift towards Western type(s) of political democracy certainly 
influenced the media, as did installation of some principles of 
marketplace, but in a number of important dimensions the media 
remained essentially unchanged." (Splichal, 1995, pg. 147) 
Splichal also notices that in the Western world policymaking regarding the 
media is driven by economic factors and technological developments, while in 
ex-communist countries such matters still belong to party politics and trading, 
especially when the broadcast media are in question. The politicians in ex-




benefits rather than understanding and utilizing them as commercial/market 
outlets. 
 
However, Splichal is optimistic about future developments in ex-communist 
countries. He concludes his book with the expectation that development of 
new media systems in East-Central Europe can bring new opportunities for 
media democratization and valuable experience for all the countries that still 
have to initiate democratic process. When Splichal wrote this, it was certainly 
true not only for FR Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro, including Kosovo), 
but also, for example, Bosnia and Albania. 
 
One of the most powerful analysis of a media caught between capitalism and 
socialism comes from Colin Sparks in his 1998 study (in collaboration with 
Anna Reading) "Communism, Capitalism and The Mass Media". Sparks 
combines historical analysis with political economy to draw sometimes rather 
bold conclusions/generalizations about the future of the critical project – the 
leftist movement. Sparks' conclusions are applicable to any ex-communist 
country and its media during and/or after transition:  
"If one lesson from the study of the collapse of communism is that only 
a narrow line divided our rulers from theirs, and that line was easily 
obliterated in the marriage of convenience that followed 1989, then 
another lesson is that it is impossible to notice the line between media 
workers here and media workers there, either before or after the fall of 
communism. They wanted, and want, the same things as media 
workers here want." (Sparks, 1998, pg. 193) 
 
Sparks correctly notices that the revolutions of 1989 carried a lot of joy and 
celebration in the beginning, but enthusiasm for changes and advantages of 
living and working in "democratic capitalism" soon began to evaporate when 
the masses were faced with privatization of state enterprises, massive job 
losses and a sharp drop in living standards. Even media workers and activists 
did not expect such changes for worse when they were dreaming of freedom 
and emancipation from state ownership and control of their outlets. In his 
more recent writings, Sparks (2008) elaborates on how ex-communist elites 




and maintain positions of power and economic influence in the post-
transitional societies. In that sense, one must notice that Timothy Garton Ash 
was right to name the changes of 1989 as "refolutions", rather than 
revolutions. 
 
1.3 Ever Changing Content of Citizenship 
 
It is interesting to note in Schudson’s work how much the American notion of 
citizenship and democracy is based on different intellectual traditions and 
foundations. In Europe, the predominant discourse of democracy, citizenship 
and participation is firmly located within the so-called “public sphere” 
paradigm. It has been developed by German philosopher Jurgen Habermas 
(1962/1989). Habermas belongs is a second generation member of the post-
Marxist “Frankfurt School” – intellectual foundation of contemporary leftist 
movements. Habermas's public sphere paradigm has become the 
domineering topic of numerous academic debates on citizenship, democracy 
and media, inspiring an enormous body of research and written work.  
 
In America, however, an arguably successful and functioning model of 
democracy has been in operation for over two hundred years, and its 
intellectual roots are still firmly tied to the philosophy and writings of so-called 
constitutional fathers, a group of politicians, who successfully fought for the 
independence of the United States of America from the British empire, and 
who went on to draft the US constitution in 1776. The spirit and intellectual 
heritage of Jefferson, Madison, Franklin, Washington, Adams and others has 
not only been permanently inscribed in the American constitution and 
subsequent Bill of Rights, but is still present and living through jurispendence 
of the Supreme Court and other lower courts, which are entrusted with the 
current reading of basic legal principles laid out in the aforementioned 
legislations.  
 




Europe, the USA and elsewhere are,8  it seems that all the models in current 
practice put citizenship in focus, and make it the highest virtue and value of a 
democratic society.  
 
However, according to Schudson, the content of citizenship has changed over 
the years: In the long parade from colonial Virginia or colonial New England to 
a secret ballot in a California garage, American notion and content of 
citizenship has changed dramatically. There have been three distinct eras 
since the colonialists first arrived, each with its own virtues and defects, and in 
the past forty years we have entered a fourth era. (Schudson, 1998, pg. 5) 
 
Most contemporary media and democracy theoreticians claim that the so-
called “informed citizen” is an ideal, as someone who is interested in civic 
duties, follows political affairs, has reasonable access to sources of relevant 
information and actively participates in the working of a democratic system. 
And then most of them complain how the level of participation, measured 
through various parameters like voters’ turnout for elections, drops constantly 
in contemporary democracies. Some like Pippa Norris (2002) even go so far 
as to call this “civic malaise”, and express alarm that democracy is 
endangered and that the consequences of a diminishing participation of 
citizens can be dire. 
 
As the focal point of his book, Schudson puts forward a notion of “rights-
bearing citizen”, as a model of citizenship in contemporary society. Unlike 
others, Schudson claims that the notion of “informed citizen” which arose 
during the Progressive Era is not adequate for the new era. It needs to be 
replaced by a “rights-bearing citizen”, a concept that is in tune with 
contemporary developments in how citizens participate and engage in political 
life. He claims that the level of participation of citizens in political life has not 
declined, but that the political system of representative democracy, where 
political parties have the main role in speaking on behalf of citizens, has been 
outdated. Schudson argues that citizenship is reflected in political life through 
                                            
8 Democracy as the intellectually most desirable model of managing state affairs is not confined to Europe or the USA. There are functional and 
successful democracies outside Europe and North America, most notably in India (the largest democracy by number of participating citizens), Japan, 





many other civic and interest groups, NGOs, and institutions rather than 
political parties. In that way the number of civic causes and interests to which 
a “rights-bearing citizen” is committed and spends time on is much greater 
than in the era when political parties dominated civic life.  
 
In that sense, Schudson argues that the obligation of a citizen to know enough 
to participate meaningfully in state affairs is defined rather minimalistically. 
Citizen should be monitorial rather than informed, meaning that she/he must 
be capable of scanning the environment, be alert to developments and have 
an idea of wide variety of relevant topics, in order to possibly act or get 
mobilized about them. In that sense, Schudson agrees with the “father of 
American journalism” Walter Lipmann, who said that if democracy requires 
omnicompetence and omniscience from its citizens, it is a lost cause. 
 
Another common topic among media scholars is the so-called the “dumbing 
down” of the news. The work of the Serbian media scholar Snjezana 
Milivojevic “Tabloidization of the Serbian Press” is also focused on this theme. 
It is not only the case with the traditional printed press, but also with news 
carried by electronic media, especially TV as the medium that depends on its 
visual component more than on the narrative. Schudson, again, takes a 
different viewpoint then the rest, putting it into the context of “monitorial 
citizen”, as opposed to the “informed citizen”. His line of reasoning implies that 
a citizen does not have to hear everything in detail, but depending on the 
content of headlines (or “soundbites”) on offer can decide if his attention for a 
particular subject should be activated, or remain only marginally alert. Such 
view opens the door and provides the opportunity for the types of media that 
are slower and have more thorough nature - to have own raison d'être, niche 
audience and successfully compete for the attention span and wallets of more 
demanding consumers. 
 
Types of media outlets offering differing content (producers and providers) are 
in harmony with the views of Marshall McLuhan9. To go back to the issue of 
                                            
9 Canadian sociologist and media philosopher Marshall McLuhan claims that the new media are not necessarily replacing the old ones, but making 
them find their true meaning and place. Such "division of labour" provides space and opportunity for co-existence of various types of media, where 
each one has its own purpose and specific role. Such claims counter popular (unsubstantiated) belief that emergence of new media by definition 





the “monitorial citizen” vis-à-vis “informed citizen”, Schudson refutes the 
common outcry of print journalism that regularly criticize the broadcast media 
for being only a headline service, because a headline service is exactly what, 
in the first instance, citizens require. 
 
Schudson claims that it is wrong to compare contemporary citizenship with the 
models of the past, and especially the ancient Greek ideal of city-based 
democracy. Each re-organization of political experience had its own virtues 
and defects. "I do not join the common practice of beating up on our own era 
because it fails to live up to the standards of another day." (Schudson, 1998, 
pg. 9) 
 
It is a consequence of a simple fact that the rules of the political game have 
obviously evolved over our history. To underpin his radical criticism of 
traditional ways of looking at life and civic participation, Schudson writes: 
 "Comparisons of this sort lack both a sense of history and a sense of 
 sociology, an understanding of the complex coherence of a society at a 
 given time… We can gain inspiration from the past, but we cannot 
 import it. None of the older models of authority and of citizenship will 
 suffice. We require citizenship fit for our own day.” (Schudson, 1998, 
 pg. 9) 
In the above quote, Schudson synthesizes the true value of anti-traditionalist, 
forward looking philosophy and practice - which reflects the spirit that made 
America the most powerful economic power and political leader of the world. 
Such an articulate value-oriented discourse is sadly missing from 
contemporary Serbian political discourse, debates on transition, 
understanding of democracy and citizenship. Obsession with mythology, past 
and tradition, as observed by Tim Judah, are still at the forefront of the 
Serbian political scene. 
 
To appreciate the rich, entertaining, compelling and extremely well researched 
and argued work by Michael Schudson, it is necessary to have an all-round 
perspective of history, politics, sociology and the media system of the USA 
from its early days until today. Schudson’s work is not just a simple history 





illustrated with many vivid examples from life and theoretical accounts of 
leading scholars. It allows practitioners and theoreticians coming from other 
intellectual environments and traditions to evaluate and draw on the American 
experience of democracy, for better or worse. In a case when one is a witness 
to a process of establishing standards, mechanisms and values of democracy, 
such work can also be regarded as a practical manual on how to do it. 
 
As prominent American academic, sociologist and political commentator 
belonging to the leftist intellectual discourse, Todd Gitlin notes in his review of 
“Good Citizen”  - Schudson gives a shrewd argument that democracy is not 
free-fall, that it's Golden Age (whenever that was) has not been irrevocably 
sealed within the cathode-ray tubes. In that sense, Michael Kammen, 
professor of American heritage at Cornell University10 suggests that 
Schudson’s book should be a mandatory reading for all cynics and sceptics 
who assume that meaningful participation in the polity is now beyond our ken.  
 
Schudson’s views on the role of a citizen in the democratic process are 
recapitulated in the following words found at the end of his book: 
 “When without jeopardizing life, liberty, or conscience, and without 
 subjugating or demeaning private life, people can speak freely, 
 deliberate collectively, and work together in hope, political democracy 
 will have achieved its aspirations.” (Schudson, 1998, pg. 313) 
 
1.4 Serbian Authors and Literature on Media and Transition 
 
Works of Serbian authors like Rade Veljanovski, Snjezana Milivojevic, 
Slobodan Djoric, Toma Djordjevic, or Dusan Masic testify about society's need 
for emancipation from the regulation, habits and patterns of living under 
dictatorship. The first priority is to establish a stable legal/institutional 
framework that guarantees individuals (citizens) unobstructed access to 
information in order to participate meaningfully in democratic life. Long periods 
of living under dictatorship have crippled theoretical debates and limited them 
to discussions of how to obtain freedom. Until now nobody has tried to 
                                            





develop the new notion of citizenship in Serbia - or what to do with newly 
acquired freedoms and how to proceed further. 
 
By reading the available literature on media and democracy, we can conclude 
that the nature of citizens' needs in mature democracies and in one in the 
making (Serbia) are not much different. What is different is the 
institutional/legal framework that enables citizens to perform and consume 
their proclaimed democratic rights, duties and entitlements. 
 
Rade Veljanoviski, former journalist and general manager of Radio Belgrade, 
was member of the first post-Milosevic government's working group, which 
drafted the so-called "Media Laws Package". Veljanovski relinquished his 
career of media manager for an academic one, joining the Journalism 
department of the University of Belgrade's Faculty of Political Science. His 
strong belief in the theoretical concept of public service broadcasting of BBC 
tradition and its applicability in Serbia is reflected in his book "Public Radio 
Television in Service of Citizens". It is the first academic work in Serbia that 
actually introduces and discusses the PSB concept, attempting to explain its 
advantages not only to the academic community and students, but to the 
politicians, media workers and general public. None of these groups had a 
clear idea of what PSB really means and brings, but had only picked up on its 
connection with BBC. The British public service broadcaster is considered, not 
only in Serbia, as quintessence of impartial and unbiased news/political 
programs, and provider/producer of top class scientific, educational, sport and 
entertainment programming. 
 
In transition from a media worker into an academic, Veljanovski in his book 
did answer the crucial question: How a well-developed and argued theoretical 
concept can be converted into an adequate (implementable) legislation? I 
suspect that he should have chosen to be a politician instead in order to solve 
such a difficult task. His book was published in 2005, when the legislative 
work on the new Serbian media system was almost completed and when it 
was apparent that the adopted norms did not reflect exactly the theoretical 





The key work of Snjezana Milivojevic that I used to underpin my research, in 
addition to several other books and publications, was her contribution to the 
Television Across Europe - a major media policy study commissioned by the 
George Soros' Open Society Institute in 200411. Milivojevic was responsible 
for the research and findings in Serbia. Her research report was not only an 
integral part of the whole pan-European project, but her Serbian case study 
was translated into Serbian and published as a separate volume.  
 
Milivojevic is a very meticulous and thorough researcher, whose methodology 
is primarily based on a wide scope of quantitative field data, which she then 
puts into perspective. With a duty to stay within the set methodological and 
theoretical frame of the whole Television Across Europe project, Milivojevic 
has produced a work that will for many years stand out among other Serbian 
media scholars' works for its precision, theoretical clarity and understanding of 
the international academic terminology and organisation. Milivojevic's 
comprehensive report covers not only television, but all types of media and 
problems of transition.  
 
Unlike Veljanovski, Milivojevic did not have ambition to be part of the 
government's working group preparing the new media legislation, but 
remained strong critic of the legislative work. After being nominated by IJAS 
and subsequently elected as an expert into the newly formed Broadcasting 
Council in 2003, Milivojevic promptly resigned after its inaugural session - and 
kept her immaculate academic reputation. She immediately realized that 
supposedly independent regulatory body was under heavy political influence, 
with some other members being illegally elected.  
 
The work of Slobodan Djoric called "The White Book on Serbian Broadcasting 
1990-2000", published in 2001 is certainly not of great theoretical value, but 
rather chronicles the misuse of the broadcast media in Serbia during the 
                                            
11 The first edition of this study published in 2005 covered 20 European countries, raging from mature democracies like France, to emerging 
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Milosevic era. Djoric held an administrative position with RTS12 during that 
period. He meticulously recorded all of the manipulations and illegalities of the 
authorities, during the times when the new media began to emerge in Serbia 
like mushrooms. In 1993 Djoric was one of the founders of ANEM, alternative 
media association in Serbia. After the changes in October 2000, Djoric 
became a member of the new government's working group on media, and 
subsequently served as a member of the Broadcasting Council. 
 
Several books of the leading 1970s and 1980s Serbian communicologist 
Tomislav Djordjevic, professor at Journalism department of the University Of 
Belgrade Faculty Of Political Science, belong to the old school of Marxist 
media theory. By the time the new media system in Serbia was about to be 
launched, professor Djordjevic was retired; his theory of information was 
outdated and not useful in drafting new legislations. Despite that, his works 
remain often quoted in works by other Serbian authors. 
 
One of the founders of Radio B92, journalist Dusan Masic, has authored a 
book entitled "Waves Over Serbia" (2006), which chronicles the history of the 
most famous Serbian independent media outlet. His emotional, but precise 
and detailed account of the B92's journey through the dark epoch of the 
Milosevic rule while becoming a personification of the Serbian struggle for 
democracy, has another quality - very articulated and ideologically grounded 
position.. Masic's work sheds light on the values and reasoning of a group of 
people that had founded the maverick station, as well as how they in stride 
devised their survival strategy during the times of prosecution.    
 
In general, Serbian academic output on the media in transition is still rather 
small in quantity to present different approaches and open meaningful 
debates. The handful of authors whose work is worth discussing are most of 
the time engaged in explaining and defining basic paradigms, institutes, 
notions and terminology of the new era. For most of the 1990s the academics, 
as much as the media profession could only crave for the new era of 
                                            
12 According to the 1990s regulatory system of the media in Serbia, RTS had a duty to authorize development of new media outlets - both state-





democracy and freedom for the media, which in current phase of the Serbian 
transition is still far from being accomplished. This is why it is still rare that 
academic discussions, theoretical and philosophical arguments are 
exchanged, or different ideas and angles of certain problems considered. At 
least academic contacts and exchanges with other countries are now 
intensive and numerous, while Serbian universities, institutes and libraries can 
subscribe to fresh international literature. Many young people who had spent 
the recent dark era of Serbian history abroad are coming home with degrees 
from prestigious universities, plenty of literature and own research experience, 
academic and business contacts, as well as practical knowledge that a 
country in transition needs.  
 
1.5 Changed Face of Contemporary Politics 
 
As much as the concept and content of citizenship has changed over the 
years - the way how politics and politicians function is also constantly 
undergoing modifications. The media, especially those depending on and 
using new communications technologies and outlets, have direct impact on 
how politicians operate and communicate with the public. 
 
John Street’s volume “Mass Media, Politics and Democracy” is a work on 
media and communications theory in its pure sense. It provides a fresh and 
thorough assessment of all aspects of the representation of politics by the 
media, and of the media’s role in politics. It is full of fitting examples from 
comparative political practice around the world.  
 
The history of the relationship between politics and the mass media has to be 
understood as the product of particular institutional forms, which shape the 
media. Comparisons of national broadcasting systems reveal considerable 
variations in the role assigned to the state and the type of regulation to which 
media organizations are subject, whether measured in terms of control of 
content, opportunities for access to the airwaves, or the structure of libel 
legislation. (Street, 2001, pg. 10) 
 




acknowledges that the nature of modern politics has profoundly changed, 
making politicians look like show business personalities. He argues that the 
transformation of the media and politics is such that traditional boundaries 
marking where politics ends and entertainment begins no longer hold. 
However, such a conclusion should only be made about the “packaging” of 
politics, not about its true content. Moreover, this is certainly a global 
phenomenon. Street claims that modern politics is moulded to fit the medium, 
but the medium is not just a mere tool at politicians’ disposal.  
 
If we want to understand the character of political communications, obviously 
we need to note changes in the contemporary media corporation. The two are 
linked (Street, 2001, pg. 2).  Here, Street to a degree goes along with authors 
like Robert McChesney, Edward Herman and Colin Sparks, who claim that the 
logic of capitalism, economy and profit drives the media agenda. Still, Street is 
not a “political economy determinist”, refusing to endorse views claiming that 
the global media moguls and governments of leading countries (i.e. the USA 
and UK) are part of the world capitalist complot to fool voters and hijack the 
political systems for their own selfish ends.  
 
Street is also not a pessimist, nor too sceptical about the mutating face of 
contemporary politics. He accepts it as a reality of the constantly changing 
post-modern and globalized world. It does not mean that the future of politics 
is bleak, superficial and devoid of any meaningful agenda. Politics will always 
be about the policies advocated by certain parties and their representatives. 
Here Street is in agreement with Schudson - both authors assert that the 
centre of political activities has shifted from being under the dominance of 
political parties, towards individual citizens.  
 
Through the advent of new (and relatively cheap) communication technologies 
and tools (ICT)13 citizens can (if they opt to do so) organize themselves in 
various ways to pursue their special interests, form action/lobby groups, and 
wield awesome power to influence the political sphere, according to their 
needs and beliefs. At the same time, Street examines and refutes the popular 
belief that the Internet is the future of democracy, and that ICT can save 
                                            




democracy from its current state of degradation and faltering citizens/voters 
participation. He suggests that such predictions are too ambitious or 
misguided, and that political uses of new media are not inscribed in the 
technology itself, but in the interplay with the political order into which they are 
introduced. 
 
The culture of politics claims Street, as with all forms of culture, is a product of 
a complicated set of interests, regulations and institutions, which organize, 
reproduce and police that culture. What is certain, just as the relationship 
between politics and the mass media has changed dramatically in previous 
decade is that it will continue to evolve in the future. Rather than dismissing 
such a state of affairs as a sign of cultural and political decline, we should 
understand it first as part of a wider set of factors and changes.  
 
Before any definitive judgments can be passed, one has to understand the 
causes of a phenomenon and not be obsessed with its symptoms. At the 
same time, we need to scrutinize the phenomenon before quickly moving to 
condemn it. The nature of politics has indeed moved on, but the task of 
political scientists and media scholars is to follow it, while keeping all kinds of 
debates going. 
 
It is not an easy task to pin down precisely Street’s stand on the interface 
between the mass media and democracy. He avoids taking sides in many 
controversial debates and issues in the field, but rather chooses to rise above 
all and cut across the spectrum. To follow his arguments, one needs to 
understand the constantly developing nature of the subject. The paradigms 
and interpretations of certain phenomena are only of a transient nature, and of 
temporary value. In that sense, Street’s developmental approach is quite 
appropriate, and definitely anti-traditionalist. At the same time, he is a cautious 
proponent of progressive discourse, which sometimes suffers from over 
enthusiastic expectations raised by its key proponents. 
 
When we compare Street's clever but cautious interpretation of the ever-
changing picture of the media/politics interface to John Lloyd's rather 




monster-like, self-obsessed threat to (our) politics, one can conclude that 
there is no need for such panic. The forms of presenting and framing politics 
in the media, and the media running political content are changing, but it is not 
plausible to believe that the media had stolen the power from the political 
actors. 
 
In my opinion Lloyd's concerns are exaggerated - since the result of the BBC's 
handling of the Gilligan affair, the resignation of its chairman Greg Dyke and 
subsequent Lord Hutton report proved an ultimate victory for the politicians, 
despite the fact that the government had been caught blatantly lying and 
"spinning". After the scandal the Labour government even went on to secure 
third successive mandate in the 2005 general election, proving one fact that is 
also true in Serbia: The position of the media and their struggle for 
independence against government is of marginal interest to the voters. This 
topic preoccupies media professionals, academics and perhaps some 
politicians, but usually does not touch the citizens.  
 
In a constant struggle for power between politicians and the media, it seems 
that the voters sided with the politicians rather then the watchdog of 
democracy (BBC), despite having all the relevant information on the events 
that led to the dispute. Similar occurrences happened in Serbia - when the 
electorate ignored media warnings about politicians' mistakes, corruption and 
lying. The case of the Serbian Minster for Capital Investments (2004 – 2008) 
Velimir Ilic14, a rather primitive demagogue, notorious for physical and verbal 
abuse of the media in front of the cameras, shows that his personal approval 
ratings and popularity always skyrocketed when he initiated one of his now 
“trademark” rows with the media. 
 
1.6 Comparative Perspective 
 
 
The inclusion of comparative perspective into this research work is necessary, 
                                            
14 During the October 2000 protests that finally resulted in Milosevic's demise, Velimir Ilic was mayor of the city of Cacak. He organised groups of 
local thugs who travelled to Belgrade, equipped with bulldozers to remove police road blocks. He was the only DOS leader whom late PM Zoran 





since the experience of other countries in transition, which started a decade 
before Serbia, could provide benchmarks against which one can measure the 
results of Serbian transition.  
 
However, it should be used only as an auxiliary tool, since there is no 
insurance policy that would guarantee that normative and empirical models 
that operate in some countries would prove useful and applicable in others 
(Hallin-Mancini, 2004, pg.15). "Comparative studies provide an important 
check on the generalizations implicit in our concepts and force us to clarify the 
limits of their application," states Reihnard Bendix (1963, pg.535) 
 
The process of transition has many dimensions. The legislative dimension 
means to harmonize and update the national legislature of the former socialist 
countries with the EU legislatives. The economic dimension is to achieve such 
efficiency and organization of national economies that would enable each 
candidate state to compete successfully with other member states on the 
common market, without expecting subsidies and lowering of the Union’s 
standards. 
 
However, there is also a kind of intangible, cultural and human dimension to 
studying comparative experiences. Sharing similar democratic cultural values 
and standards is part of that, something that is hard to measure and put on a 
precise schedule. If nothing else, reading and discussing works on transition 
from other ex-communist countries can be intellectually illuminating for 
participants in the process of transition - not only for politicians/legislators, but 
also for citizens and scholars. 
 
By far the most influential comparative perspective of contemporary media 
systems is provided by Daniel Hallin and Paolo Mancini, in their 2004 book 
"Comparing Media Systems". It is important to note that this book was not 
written in order to discuss phenomena of media in transition around former 
Eastern Europe, but mainly through comparison of the media systems and 
practices in mature democracies (USA, Canada and Western Europe). Hallin 
and Mancini come up with four common dimensions of various media systems 




 1) Media markets; 
2) Political parallelism, or a measure and nature of ties between the 
media and political actors (parties); 
 3) The level of development (autonomy) of the  journalistic profession; 
 4) Modes and level of intervention by the state into the media sector. 
 
Not exactly belonging to the "transitology" movement, Hallin and Mancini 
provide quite useful typology of three media models found in democratic 
societies: 
 a) Polarized Pluralist; 
 b) Democratic Corporatist; 
 c) Liberal 
 
When these three theoretical models are positioned against the four 
dimensions enabling comparative perspective, the patterns of variation 
between the media systems are found in the following table:15 
 






Development of Mass Press Low High High 
Political Parallelism High High Low 
Professionalization Low High High 
State Intervention High High Low 
 
In evaluating usefulness of their typology of contemporary media system, 
Hallin and Mancini write that the Liberal model has global influence, because 
of strong impact of neoliberal ideology and globalisation in the world, which 
continue to diffuse liberal media structures and ideas. This model, according 
to the authors, may be particularly useful in understanding developments in 
Latin America, which has been under the influence of North America (Hallin, 
Mancini, 2004, pg. 305). They believe that the Democratic Corporatist model 
                                            






will have strong relevance in studying media development in Eastern and 
Central Europe, in countries that share a lot of the same history - like Poland, 
Czech Republic, Hungary and the Baltic states. Additionally, this model may 
be useful in analysis of some Asian media systems.  
 
Finally, even though that the authors are aware that the Liberal model has 
dominated the media studies (and "transitology") as the key normative model 
against which other systems have been traditionally measured, they think that 
the Polarized Pluralist model would be most applicable to other media 
systems as an empirical model of the relation between media and political 
systems. Hallin and Mancini also point out that their models need to be 
substantially modified if used as inspiration in designing new media systems, 
based on detailed research of the specific (local) political and media culture 
(Hallin, Mancini, 2004, pg. 306). Despite having some reservations, Colin 
Sparks (2008) in his annotations on the four comparative 
dimensions/categories used by Hallin and Mancini, points out that it makes 
sense in the interest of developing a common body of knowledge, to follow 
them as far as (it) is practicable in different environments that we (may) wish 
to consider. 
 
In concluding chapter of their work, Hallin and Mancini note: 
"Media systems, no less than the party systems to which they were in 
most  cases closely connected, were strongly shaped by the same 
social conflicts and by the institutions and cultural patterns that 
emerged out of them. This  does not mean that the past entirely 
determines the present, or certainly that change does not take place. 
But there are clear relationships between patterns of historical 
evolution going back to the beginnings of modernity  and the media 
system patterns that prevail today." (Hallin, Mancini, 2004, pg. 301).  
 
Such conclusion is correct, coming from researchers that have studied 
numerous and varied cases and systems.  
 
American author Monroe E. Price has published several works dealing with 




other authors is that his approach is based on international relations and 
policy perspective. His writing also shows how theoretical work of some 
American scholars is directly influenced by US foreign policy and its makers. 
In his academic writing Monroe Price does not even try to conceal his strong 
links with government agencies, policy and decision makers.  
 
His 2002 book "Media and Sovereignty - The Global Information Revolution 
and Its Challenges to State Power" recapitulates his not exactly neutral and 
unbiased view of the world, the role of (his) government, sovereignty of states 
and international media systems. Price is not only an academic, but also in 
demand consultant/expert who had worked on media reform in Bosnia and 
Kosovo. Both were parts of former Yugoslavia, and share the common fate of 
suffering from ethnic conflict in the 1990s, leaving them with a legacy of being 
UN protectorates. The conflicts in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo 
involved FR Yugoslavia and Slobodan Milosevic, who was a distinct 
contributor to the fermenting of ethnic hatred and wars, and was subsequently 
sent to trial before the UN Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in The Hague.16 
Although Price is in favour of outside interference to mould media systems in 
countries that do not have stable democracies or democratic culture, he also 
admits that such policy can often be counter-productive. This is because even 
well-intentioned foreign interventions in the sphere of media usually lack 
understanding of local culture and political habits, when implementing foreign 
theoretical models and legislations. 
 
More directly connected to the subject of transition, and applicable to the 
Serbian case, is the 2002 volume "Media Reform - Democratizing the Media, 
Democratizing the State", edited by Price in association with Beata 
Rozumilowicz and Stefan Verhulst.  
 
However, the experience of preparing media legislations and their subsequent 
implementation in Bosnia and Kosovo does not have much in common with 
the way it was done in Serbia. It is mainly because Bosnia and Kosovo do not 
                                            






function as sovereign states. Both have elected parliaments, but as 
international protectorates where UN organs impose legislation, they only 
rubber-stamp the models imposed from above (abroad)17. The Serbian 
legislators, however, still have sovereign powers to amend draft legislations, 
although foreign actors/experts are involved in the process of drafting. The 
actual texts of legislations in Serbia are, therefore, not directly dictated by the 
international actors. The result of such non-compliance and perhaps 
stubbornness of the Serbian legislators is the new media system - which is 
"neither fish, nor girl"18. Such behaviour by the Serbian lawmakers keeps the 
country rather distant from EU-set standards not only in the media sphere, but 
also in terms of the whole legal system. A candidate state needs to adjust its 
legal system to be synchronized with EU's in order to be considered for 
membership.19 
 
In the closing remarks of "Media Reform - Democratizing the Media, 
Democratizing the State", Price pinpoints the nature of the transition process, 
as well as the academic methodology from which his theoretical standing 
comes from: 
"The inferences we sought to draw are based on a combination of case 
studies, analysis of the literature, and collection of experience. 
Additionally,  our goal has been to enhance the comparative approach 
and to provide a context in which the idea of ‘media reform’ can be 
more meaningfully  analyzed." (Price, 2001, pg.268) 
 
Price goes on to conclude that the very nature of media reform is changing as 
technology and democratic practices change, too. The result is that dynamics 
of political and media reform (transition) are virtually incalculable. It is 
interesting to note that despite his rather negative attitudes about Serbia, 
                                            
17 At the time of writing, Kosovo was under UN protectorate. In February 2008, Kosovo declared formal independence from Serbia, which has been 
recognised by less than half UN member-states. The question of the Kosovo independence is still legally disputed by Serbia, and the ruling of the 
International Court of Justice on the matter will be passed sometimes in 2010.  
 
18 A Serbian folk proverb says that something is neither fish nor girl, when its true nature is vague. 
 
19 At the time of writing (September 2008) the Serbian parliament has approved the Association and Stabilization Contract with the EU, after almost a 
year of delay and another change of government. It means that Serbia can become an EU membership candidate sometime in 2010, providing that 
the condition of cooperation with the war crimes tribunal is successfully fulfilled. The main sticking point is capture and extradition of the fugitive 





Monroe Price’s work has been translated and published in the Serbian 
language - "Enabling Environment for Free and Independent Media" (TV B92, 
Belgrade, 2001). It is a handbook for journalists, researchers and legislators, 
reflective of the fieldwork in the Balkans that Price and his associates 
undertook during the 1990s. 
 
By far the most comprehensive comparative work on transition is a pan-
European study "Television in Europe: Regulation: Policy and Independence", 
commissioned in 2004 by the Open Society Institute's media programme. I 
have already discussed the Serbian segment of this major study (written by 
Snjezana Milivojevic) in the section on the relevant literature by Serbian 
authors. 
 
1.7 Relevance of the Romanian Case 
 
From the available body of research and studies of media transitions in 
Eastern Europe, I realized that the Romanian trajectory has most in common 
with the Serbian case. There are several reasons for this. The two countries 
are neighbours, so they share similar history and religious/cultural heritage. In 
terms of economy, Serbia was far ahead of Romania at the end of 1980s 
when the Romanian transition began. Nevertheless, after the ousting of 
Milosevic (and ten years of lost wars and unprecedented economic decline), 
Serbia started its own transition path approximately from the same position 
where Romania was in 1989. Many people in Serbia compare the fate of 
former Romanian dictator Nicolae Ceausescu and his wife Elena with the 
Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic and his wife Mirjana - with a sick sense 
of disappointment that the Serbian ruling couple has escaped the brutal 
revolutionary justice that had been swiftly served on the Romanian leader and 
his spouse. 
 
However, there is one major difference between the Romanian and Serbian 
experience in post-communist transformation of their media systems: 
Romania’s transition happened in the era when the new media were not 
existent or widely spread, and their existence in Serbia’s case was crucial to 




automatically impose the Romanian trajectory onto Serbia.  
 
A case study of the Romanian media transition, "Mass Media in Revolution 
and National Development: The Romanian Laboratory" by Peter Gross gives 
an account of the media before and after the revolution in 1989. The 
Romanian case has many unique features and contexts that cannot be 
converted into some kind of blueprint for transition towards democracy in 
other post-communist societies, including Serbia. But some of its trajectories 
and patterns of change, including behaviour of the media profession in newly 
created setting are very similar to those in Serbia. 
 
It is fascinating how some observations by Peter Gross about the role of the 
media and its correlation with politics during the Romanian transition sound so 
true, vivid and valid - like they were written with the Serbian case in mind. His 
book was published in 1996, four years before the downfall of Milosevic and 
the symbolic beginning of the Serbian transition, and in the seventh year of 
Romania’s post-Ceausescu life. 
 
Gross immediately warns that prognosticating on the outcome of such a 
process is never easy, especially in East-Central Europe, where transition is 
complicated by the unpredictability of current development and the ever-
present volatile legacy of the past. He points out that the growth of the mass 
media in Romania has been spectacular, yet the quantity has not been 
matched by quality. His main remark goes along the lines that uncritical 
application of Western models of mass media and journalism in Romania, 
their societal roles and solutions to news media problems were problematical, 
and thus produced only marginal and limited success. Gross argues that 
existing studies of development and/or transition from traditional to modern 
(and mass media in particular), provide little help in understanding or 
explaining the actual process, neither give any coherent model for the post-
communist societies.  
 
In retrospect, there are many valuable lessons that can be learned from the 
Romanian case and Gross elaborates fifteen: 
 1) Undemocratic “democracy” is served by partisan journalism, a 




understanding of democracy by the media owners, workers and political elites 
are not the same as in the West; 
 2) Mass media are not-so-important institutions. In this lesson, Gross 
acknowledges the importance of the media for the success of Romanian 
transition, but claims that the media can not be the single most important 
variable that affects the speed and nature of the process; 
 3) News media have been transformed from lapdogs to attack dogs. 
The need to simply inform, thus serving the notion of the watchdog or so-
called fourth estate, was lost in the exuberance of freedom, in egos and in the 
zeal, anger and goals of emerging socio-political battles; 
 4) Attempts at defining journalistic responsibility and media roles by 
laws carry a sense of déjà vu. The Romanian example demonstrates that the 
debate over regulation and re-regulation in broadcasting is a controversial 
issue, rife with possibilities for manipulating radio and television. Academics 
from other post-communist countries, like Splichal (1994) and Jakubowicz 
(2005) demonstrate that these issues are common in all transitional societies; 
 5) Local media are more useful than national media. Here Gross 
argues that the race for transformation (and influence over) national media, 
made it impossible to shape them into truly democratic tools. This is unlike 
less developed and financially less attractive local media, which have great 
potential to claim a pivotal role in aiding the transitional process; 
 6) The wrong premises guided the introduction of Western journalism. 
The rush of Western aid, aimed at facilitating Romanian transition towards 
democracy, although well intentioned, was based on the false assumptions of 
aid-providers. They mistakenly thought that Romanians shared the same 
values of democracy, freedom of press and the way the media should 
operate. So the aid effort was designed to be more technical (in providing 
modern equipment) and to provide training for its use; 
 7) More is not better. A sudden avalanche of journalistic freedom and 
citizens’ possibilities to obtain information from numerous sources does not 
automatically mean a better and more democratic society. It can create 
confusion and cynicism, rather than stimulate active citizenship. 
 8) Retooling is a family affair. Here Gross states that the re-education 
of the journalist profession for the new era of democracy had to go via an 




western-style journalism practices; 
 9) Training is necessary for leaders as well as for the rank and file. 
Again, here are exposed the shortcomings of the many seminars and trainings 
provided by the West to editorial staff, and which failed to include the rank and 
file of the Romanian journalistic profession. Because of this, the old habits, 
biases, traditions and educational background of the lower level media 
workers prevailed over new values that were supposed to be introduced by 
the re-educated editors, producers and publishers; 
 10) Education of media consumers is also necessary. Another example 
of wrong assumptions made by those who went to help the Romanian 
transition: Audiences, not only media producers/workers, need to be 
developed and educated to absorb the newly expanded media output – both 
in political and commercial terms; 
 11) Employment insecurity and the absence of an elite press to serve 
as a standard make professionalism difficult. This lesson from Romania is 
another consequence of the explosion of the number of media outlets. The 
advent of freedom and number of job openings in the media do not stimulate 
nor value quality, but make the market of professional media workers rather a 
circus arena; 
 12) Technology does not improve journalism. Again, here we have a 
case that technology does not per se improve the quality of the media. The 
packaging cannot be confused with the content and even the poorly educated 
consumers can tell the difference. Technology certainly makes the process of 
gathering news more fast and efficient, but the content still must have priority 
and a certain level of quality; 
 13) The transitionary concept of the media is a mixture of many 
concepts.  Since there is no coherent formula for how to conduct the transition 
of society, the method used in Romania was a mixture of methods, trial and 
error and experimentation. The only general characteristic was that the 
process was inevitable and slow, while its outcome was not certain; 
 14) The economic and management dimension of the mass media has 
been relegated to the back burner. The absence of educated and skilled 
media managers/operators made the process even more unruly and 
improvisational, with nepotism, amateurism and lack of organization common 




media outlets made the Western aid programmes even more difficult to be 
focused and adequately targeted; 
 15) The transition proceeded along well-known lines. Despite all of the 
above-mentioned shortcomings and problems, the media certainly contributed 
to the overall process - no more and no less than in similar post-communist 
societies. The variety in the level of achievements in different countries can 
only be attributed to their levels of development before they embarked on the 
road to democracy. 
 
It seems that Gross is torn between embracing the tradition and culture of his 
native country in transition and the Western concepts/values of democracy 
and media that are gradually, but inevitably, assimilating Romania’s media 
system and practice. From his work it is clearly visible that reconciliation of 
those two rather different and divergent value systems is the very core of the 
transition process. It is this rift between expectations of the West and the 
deeply rooted national identity and pride of Romanians that makes the 
process of transition towards democracy so controversial and painful. This is 
not only the case in Romania, but also in virtually every nation caught in the 
process. Forces of globalization and democratization (Giddens, 2002), 
however, seem to be working regardless of the expressed consent or 
resistance of the nations in question. 
 
1.8 Summary Overview of the Literature 
 
The literature discussed in the previous section provides analytical tools and 
frames, which represent the theoretical foundation of this research project. I 
believe that such selection of literature, no matter how subjective and focused 
on the Serbian case, could be referential for an inquiry about mass media and 
democracy in any contemporary society in transition. Perhaps one day this 
could be helpful when countries like Belarus, North Korea or Cuba embark on 
the transition path - being the last remaining outposts of the old communist 
world that has gradually disappeared since 1989. 
 
By far the most valuable perspective, analytical frames and interesting field 




of two outstanding authors who originate from Eastern Europe, but have made 
distinguished academic careers in the West - Karol Jakubowicz from Poland, 
and Peter Gross from Romania.  
 
In 2003 volume "Business as Usual - Continuity and Change in Central and 
Eastern Europe", which he co-edited with David Paletz,  Karol Jakubowicz in 
the opening chapter attempts to summarize all theoretical approaches, 
debates and angles in discussing social and media changes in the 
aforementioned region of the world. From the very beginning Jakubowicz tries 
to navigate through many often over-lapping theoretical models of transition in 
general, critically evaluating the enormous body of literature and authors. 
Jakubowicz calls them schools of "transitology". After establishing that not one 
model can deal with the process of transition fully and completely (Wnuk-
Lipinski, 1995, pp.14-15), Jakubowicz finally states that socio-psychological 
and institutional approach, as proposed by Leszek Balcerowicz (1996) seems 
to be particularly suited for examining the role of the media in process of 
transformation and change in the media themselves (Paletz, Jakubowcz, eds. 
pg. 23). 
 
In the next part of the chapter Jakubowicz reduces many approaches to 
changes in the media to four main ones, and goes into detailed explanation: 
 1) Prescriptive / Normative Approach; 
 2) Functional Approach; 
 3) Comparative Approach; 
 4) Institutional Approach. 
 
With the normative approach, Jakubowicz refers back to his earlier work from 
1999:  
"It has been rejected, resulting in confusion, as there is no real 
agreement between the political class, the media, and the general 
public concerning some aspects of media definitions, and as a 
consequence concerning  normative media theory and the media 
regulatory regime. Because of this, the real patterns of media operation 
fail to satisfy just about everyone. The gap between theory and practice 






In discussing the functional approach, Jakubowicz describes it as an element 
of the normative approach, which concerns itself mainly with defining 
necessary and desirable changes in the role which media perform in society. 
On the roles that the media perform in society, Jakubowicz points towards 
views of Jurgen Habermas, Peter Gross and Virginia Gheorgiu, among others. 
However, he warns that the actual performance of the media can result both 
in functional and dysfunctional effects in terms of all the roles or expectations 
elaborated by the aforementioned authors. The functional approach should 
take into consideration the assumed and expected functions / roles and those 
that the media perform in reality as a result of their actual performance. 
(Jakubowicz, 1999, pg. 29) 
 
When comparative approach in transition of the media is used, a researcher 
uses two sets of circumstances, as a frame of reference. The most obvious is 
historical approach, comparing the media systems before and after transition. 
This one in particular is well suited for my research of the Serbian media in 
transition. If we define transformation of the media as a process, comparative 
approach could illuminate it from the starting point, until the chosen cut-off 
point. Jakubowicz summarizes this approach in the following way: 
 "The comparative approach would therefore consist in analyzing 
 developments in Central and Eastern European media with a view to 
 seeing which of these processes are at what stage of advancement 
 and how they are unfolding." (Jakubowicz, 1999, pg. 31) 
 
Finally, Jakubowicz discusses the institutional approach towards media in 
transition. He points at McQuail's (1994) position, which views media 
institutions as operating at the centre of three overlapping areas of influence - 
economics, politics and technology. McQuail, as well as several other authors 
emphasizes the questions of ownership and media economics, and their 
impact on the media operations. This is in line with the eminent Polish 
economist, politician and academic Leszek Balcerowicz (1996), whose 
institutional approach applied on transformation of the media system requires 




institutional structures and finally promotion of new institutionally determined 
social mechanisms - that is a process of social communication in conditions of 
freedom of speech and of the press. Hamelink (1995) correctly notes that 
institutional approach towards changes of media system requires a rather 
large body of law and regulation. 
 
The logical question that needs to be addressed after considering approaches 
to transition of media systems is when transition is over. Jakubowicz responds 
that it depends on the definition of the process of transitions and its goals 
(Jakubowicz, 1999, pg. 35). And depending on the approach one had chosen, 
the answer to this question has several variations. It seems fitting to start with 
the Balcerowicz's (1996) definition of transition as a "shift from one stable 
state of society to another potentially stable state." However, once a new 
stable state of society and the media has been achieved, no matter what such 
state is, as Jakubowicz notes, transition will be over. At that point what needs 
to be evaluated is the difference between the old system and the new reality, 
while measuring the remaining distance from the ideal model envisaged in the 
original chart of changes (Jakubowicz, 1999, pg. 39). 
 
In the previous section of this literature review, I have discussed and 
extensively quoted from Peter Gross' 1996 book "Mass Media in Revolution 
and National Development: The Romanian Laboratory", which analyses early 
phase of transition of the media system in Romania. I chose to do so since the 
social and cultural background, as well as political culture of Serbia were very 
similar. Therefore, the Romanian experience is relevant and applicable in the 
Serbian case much more than reflections and results from any other former 
East European country, including experiences from Slovenia and Croatia, who 
had also emerged from SFR Yugoslavia. At this point I would like to move 
onto Peter Gross' later work, "Entangled Evolutions - Media and 
Democratisation in Eastern Europe", which attempts to summarize20 complex 
relations between media, civil society, political culture and democratization 
throughout former Eastern Europe after more than a decade from the start of 
transition.  
                                            





"In the historical blink of an eye represented by the first post-
communist  decade, the media of Eastern Europe did not live up to 
their expected role  as appropriate, effective facilitators of 
democratization. Yet, despite their less-than-professional journalism, 
their systematic, personnel, and legal problems, and their failure to 
conceptualize a well-defined and commonly accepted role, they 
registered progress on all fronts, from informing and facilitating 
political change to moulding public opinion and setting agendas." 
(Gross, 2003, pg. 158) 
 
Peter Gross is sceptical about outlining typologies and theorizing on 
transformation of the media in Eastern Europe 1989-2000, as well as 
prognosticating, or perhaps speculating on their future development. He 
correctly notes that such typologies and prognostications are all reasonable 
and predicated on particular visions of political, social, legal and economic 
evolution. However, Gross underlines that all of them are derived from 
Western perspective (Gross, 2003, pg. 168) 
 
He goes on to conclude that the on the road to achieving the ideals of liberal 
democracy - something implicitly assumed, but as we have seen vigorously 
questioned by authors like Sparks (2008) - as the goals of transition, the main 
impediment may be countries' non-democratic political cultures, and inability 
or refusal of their political and media leaders to provide the necessary 
leadership (Gross, 2003, pg. 170). 
 
Gross' book, based on a wealth of field material - interviews with journalists 
and politicians, sociological and political data from national surveys and media 
audience studies - ends in a conciliatory tone, and with strong accent on the 
value of individual and societal freedoms achieved, which the media need to 
promote no matter in which country they operate: 
"The media should reflect and serve their "imperfect" democracies, 
animated by idealism, but without illusions, prizing individual and 
societal freedom above all else." (Gross, 2003, pg. 174) 
 




books provide possible answers to many controversial and debatable issues 
that arise during transition process. In shaping own process of media 
transformation, newly emerging democracies like Serbia can certainly draw on 
many intellectual sources: Splichal's thorough understanding of East-
European culture; tradition and institutions before and after the transition; 
historical developments of American citizenship, so vividly elaborated by 
Michael Schudson; current historical accounts of the transitional process in 
the region as impeccably analyzed and contextualized by Timothy Garton 
Ash; on very cosmopolitan and universally applicable theoretical 
considerations of John Street. Hallin and Mancini's typology and four 
dimensions provide a researcher with tools to compare their subject of study 
with other cases - establish and put in perspective similar and divergent 
features. 
 
Jakubowicz's writings on nature of the transition process in Eastern Europe 
and comprehensive discussion of many different angles, theoretical positions 
and options that one can use are of unprecedented value for a researcher. 
Finally, Gross’s account of the changes in Romania and the role of the media 
in transition perhaps have the greatest relevance for Serbia - as much as his 
general overview of entangled evolutions that media transitions truly are.  
 
 
2. ANALYTICAL FRAME OF THE RESEARCH 
 
 
Before I turn to the actual research work and contextualization of the collected 
field material, it is necessary to address several theoretical concepts/notions 
that will be used throughout the work. Some of them are controversial and 
continuously debated in academic literature, but without engaging in such 
debates, I need to put forward workable definitions of such concepts, which 
are used in my research. Otherwise, the whole research edifice is standing on 
the shaky ground without a proper foundation. By clarifying these notions in 
advance, they become assumptions on which a researcher can base his work, 
without having to endlessly discuss them, focusing the actual work on the 




approach towards the research topic, since several possible angles may be 
used.  
 
2.1 Democracy, Transition and Political Culture 
 
One of the most controversial and contested notion in political science is 
democracy. As George Orwell (1940) has cynically noted, "Those who wish to 
defend a regime, whatever its nature may be, will call it democracy". 
Democracy as self-description has been claimed by all sorts of societies, from 
the countries of the West, to the socialist republics of the former Soviet Union 
and present day China (Scammell, 2000). 
 
After reviewing many competing definitions of democracy, I would define it as 
a political system (or type of government) either carried out directly by the 
people (direct democracy) or by means of elected representatives of the 
people (representative democracy). This would be a type of institutional 
definition - linking the notion of democracy to a system, which is a set of 
institutions. Even though there is no specific, universally accepted definition of 
'democracy' (The Economist, 2007) there are two principles that most 
definition of democracy include. They are equality and freedom, according to 
the Greek philosopher Aristotle (2009). These principles, as reflections of 
democracy, are observed if all citizens are equal before the law, and have 
equal access to power, and freedom. As such, they are secured by legitimized 
rights and liberties, which are generally inscribed and guaranteed by a 
constitution (Dahl, Shapiro, Cheibub, 2003). 
 
In the most simple and conventional sense, democracy is deemed to be a 
political system in which majority of given population exercises power, argue 
Raboy and Dagenais (1992). However, they also suggest a different 
approach: Democracy can be considered as a set of values which include 
equality, social justice and political mechanisms for people to participate 
meaningfully in making the decisions that affect their lives. All of these values, 
virtues and entitlements of citizens to meaningfully participate in governing 






These states (dictatorships) were run by one monopolist political party, group 
or individual in authoritarian way. In an authoritarian political system, majority 
of citizens were excluded from participation in political life. This is also the 
reason why people living under dictatorships had legitimate grievances 
against their rulers and eventually rose against such unjust political system 
and the individuals who governed them. 
 
There are several variants of democracy, according to Nordenstreg (2000): 
 a) Direct or participatory democracy based on active citizens and 
republican government;  
 b) Liberal or representative democracy based on elected officers 
pursuing the interests of citizens; 
 c) one-party democracy based on a pyramid structure of delegative 
relationships; 
 d) Cosmopolitan democracy, going beyond the nation state and 
extending to regional and global levels.  
 
The second variant (b) refers to most cases of democracy in operation today. 
(Jakubowicz, 2007). It is usually referred to as liberal democracy. The term 
"liberal" in "liberal democracy" refers to adherence to the ideology of political 
liberalism (Wiredu, K., Abraham, W.E., Ifeanyi, A. I. 2006). Liberal 
democracies feature constitutional protections of individual rights from 
government power (Blackwell Dictionary of Modern Social Thought, 2003, pg. 
148), which were first proposed during the Age of Enlightenment by social 
contract theorists such as Hobbes and Locke. 
 
Many use the phrase "democracy" as abbreviation for liberal democracy, 
which may include additional elements such as political pluralism, equality 
before the law, the right to petition elected officials for redress of grievances, 
due process, civil liberties, human rights, and elements of civil society outside 
the government.  
 
With democracy defined in terms of values, in addition to a mere political 




now move on to describe what is the true content and meaning of post-
communist transition, including the Serbian case.  
 
Transition can be formulated as the process of institutional and legal 
transformation from one form of governance (socialist/communist dictatorship) 
to a new one, which is called democracy. If we accept such formulation, 
democracy becomes the final station, or goal of the transition process, with its 
characteristics, both in institutional sense and in terms of values that the 
notion represents. 
 
Most of the authors, who belong to the "transitology" school, focus solely on 
the political dimension of the process. They judge the process of transition by 
measuring how far along the imaginary trajectory towards democracy a 
country in question has advanced (Sparks, 2008). However, the critics of such 
simplified view of transition note that the process is far more complex, 
affecting not only the political system of a country in question, but its social 
fabric too.  
 
If we try to dissect the content of the transition process, it has at least two 
distinct layers: one is political, which is commonly referred to as 
democratization, and the second one is economic, usually referred to as 
marketization. As a consequence, the original "transitology" paradigm, based 
solely on political component of the process, had to be amended to 
incorporate the economic dimension, too. This led to conclusions that these 
two parallel layers are interdependent and even theoretically impossible to 
separate (Przeworski 1991). In that direction, the revised "transitology" 
paradigm calls for evaluating certain country's progress towards democracy 
through measuring its achievements in democratization and marketization - as 
two inseparable and directly dependent components of the overall process.  
 
As Karol Jakubowicz (2007) correctly notes, extensive literature on 
relationship between democracy and the media focuses on what could be 
described as chicken-and-egg question - whether it is the evolution of 
democratic institutions that enable free media, or whether it is free media that 




Scammell (2000) comments that media inquiry relies overwhelmingly on the 
classic liberal conception of democracy, but democratic theory rarely 
addresses the role and functions of media. Scammell stresses that the 
roles/functions of the media are the key components of the democracy and 
media relationship. The three principal roles of the media in democratic state 
are informational, representational and watchdog. She then puts forward 
several models of democracy, pointing out that each has different 
requirements (or perhaps expectations) from the media. Scammell follows 
typology of ideal models of democracy devised by David Held (1995): 
 - Classic liberal; 
 - Direct democracy (socialist); 
 - Competitive elitism;  
 - Pluralist;  
 - Neopluralist; 
 - Libertarianism (New Right); 
 - Participatory democracy. 
Each of the above models of democracy has a corresponding set of media 
duties.  
 
According to Scammell, an informational role for media exists in all democratic 
theory and models, and there is no argument about this. Certain variations in 
informational duties exist in connection with the manner of representation in 
democracy. In general, the more direct the democratic system is, the less the 
need for media to perform tasks of representation. Participatory models stress 
the media's informational role more than others. However, various models of 
democracy and theories differ when discussing the watchdog duty. At this 
point, I would not go into further discussion of various types of democracy and 
role of the media, only acknowledging the most important theoretical 
standpoints and treating them as base assumptions on which my research is 
standing.  
 
A leading critic of the transitology school of thoughts, Colin Sparks (2008), 
argues that it fails to provide a satisfactory account of political and economic 
development, either at the general level of political science, or in the narrow 




China and Russia, where transition developments have been different. First of 
all, the happy ending - liberal democracy reminiscent of political systems in 
"originator countries"21 - is not a guaranteed outcome of the process. Then the 
two aspects of the process, democratization and marketization, do not 
necessarily advance at the same pace, nor have to be interlaced. Cases of 
improvement and deterioration in the overall process and in its separate 
segments are possible and have been evidenced. Authors like Carothers 
(2002) demand that theory and practice need to accept that unfinished 
transitions, or middle ground between authoritarian past and developed 
democracies, are the most common political condition of former Eastern bloc 
countries and in the developing world. 
 
As an alternative to the mainstream (or "transitology") thinking about transition 
of the former Eastern European countries, Sparks offers own "Theory of elite 
continuity". It starts from social and economic factors, and considers the 
political arrangements as simply one mechanism for the exercise of social 
power amongst several. Sparks (2008) early on expressed a view that: 
[...the events in Central and Eastern Europe in 1989 constituted 
political revolutions, but that they did not constitute social revolutions 
since the same institutions (police, army, broadcasting, etc) continued 
in the new order, and there was a strong continuity in personnel. On 
this basis, it  was argued that the events could best be seen in terms of 
elite continuity and that the political revolution was necessary in order 
to create the  conditions that allowed the old collective bureaucratic 
elite to transform itself into a new, individually property-owning, elite (in 
other words, a classical capitalist class).  
The political revolution, by allowing a plurality of parties in all cases, 
and what is unquestionably an electoral democracy in many cases, 
permitted the use of political power to transform state property into 
individual property, either through legitimising previous act of 
appropriation, granting exclusive and lucrative rights to individuals, or 
through privatization schemes that favoured the existing elite.] (Sparks 
2008) 
                                            






Institutional continuity in most transition countries, as one of the principal 
pillars of the elite continuity theory, is easily evidenced and visible. This is 
especially true with the media. Influence over state-owned broadcasters, like 
RTS in Serbia, remained essential to the political system, and the key print 
media, like dailies Politika and Novosti, which kept substantial share of the 
market and circulation numbers. At the end of this research, we will see if the 
theory of elite continuity is adequate to explain the outcome of the Serbian 
media transition. 
 
According to Price and Krug (2000, pg.4), "at some point in every transition, a 
free and independent media sector is vital." They go on to demonstrate that 
prerequisite for such media sector is what they call "an enabling environment", 
made of extensive legal framework to safeguard the freedom of the media, but 
before anything else commitment to the values of democracy and free media. 
They correctly underline that the law alone, or assistance (of material or 
intellectual kind), hardly ever play role in determining if the media are 
independent, pluralistic and free. What defines the outcome is a close 
interaction between legal-institutional and socio-cultural factors, interplay 
between legal norms and how they are interpreted and implemented, how 
they are respected and received (Price and Krug, 2000, pg.6). Good media 
regulations on their own do not create enabling environment. What Price and 
Krug de facto suggest is that successful transition, including reform of the 
media systems as precondition and key component of democracy, directly 
depends on favorable environment, or how I prefer to call it - political culture.  
 
Here we need to briefly address another political science's eternally debated 
concept/paradigm - political culture. British author Dennis Kavanagh (1993) 
defines political culture as "A shorthand expression to denote the set of values 
within which the political system operates". American political scientist Sidney 
Verba (1963) who first introduced this notion into academic debates, 
describes political culture as a "system of empirical beliefs, expressive 
symbols, and values, which defines the situation in which political action takes 
place." According to Lucian Pye (1995, pg. 965-969), political culture is how 




because people can disagree on ideology, but still have a common political 
culture. 
 
According to level and type of political participation and the nature of people's 
attitudes toward politics, Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba (1963) outlined 
three pure types of political culture: 
 a) Parochial - Where citizens are only remotely aware of the presence 
of central government, and live their lives near enough regardless of the 
decisions taken by the state.  
 b) Subject - Where citizens are aware of central government, and are 
heavily subjected to its decisions with little scope for dissent. In general, this 
type of political culture is congruent with a centralized authoritarian state 
structure. 
 c) Participant - Citizens are able to influence the government in various 
ways and they are affected by it. The individual is oriented toward the system 
as a whole, to both the political and administrative structures and processes. 
This variant of political culture is congruent with a democratic political system 
(order). 
 
From the preceding considerations of political culture, it transpires that each 
democratic society as the whole, with all actors and institutions that participate 
in political life, need to have certain shared beliefs and values about how the 
system should function. If we briefly return to the value-defined notion of 
democracy (Raboy, Dagenais, eds. 1992), which include equality, social 
justice and political mechanisms for people to participate meaningfully in 
making the decisions that affect their lives - then we see the symbiotic 
connection between these two notions. Of course, in authoritarian states, the 
political culture is not shared by all the actors involved in political life, but 
instead is imposed from above by those who hold reins of unconstrained 
power. Going back to the transition paradigm, it becomes clear that 
transformation of state and society from authoritarian into democratic, requires 
not only legal changes and development of (missing or inadequate) 
institutions, but also adoption of same or similar values of democracy - or 





I will leave here this brief overview of democracy, transition and political 
culture concepts with words by Peter Gross:  
"To become stable democracies, the nations of Eastern Europe must 
transform themselves by adopting certain beliefs, attitudes, habits, 
behaviors and values universally essential to the birth and sustenance 
of democracy." (Gross (2003, pg. 3) 
 
 
2.2 Institutional Approach Towards Serbian Transition 
 
The final undertaking of this researcher before actually submerging in the 
ocean of field data and evidence is to choose an approach or angle, which is 
appropriate for analysis of transition of the Serbian state and its media system 
from 2000 until 2006. If we postulate that the process of transition begins with 
change of governing structure through parliamentary election, it follows that 
legislative work of the new parliament should be viewed as a path to achieve 
changes through the existing institutions. 
 
In the case of Serbia, it took the opposition political parties more than 10 
years of participating in deficient elections, rigged and manipulated by the 
authoritarian regime, before they could finally take over power. From the very 
beginning of this struggle, the accent was on institutional change of power 
(through elections), as opposed to violent overthrow of the regime through 
popular revolution.  
 
Symbolically, the final drop that overfilled the glass was the extraordinary 
federal (presidential and parliamentary) elections, called more than a year 
ahead of schedule for 26 September 2000. In the run-up to the election, 
Milosevic once again chose to use many times successfully tested strategy of 
monopolizing all the state institutions and misusing the state media for 
manipulation and propaganda. Much to the regime's surprise, such strategy 
could not work any more. Labelling the opposition as traitors and paid agents 
of NATO, who had bombed Serbia the year before, sounded ludicrous to a 




supported Milosevic's nationalism that detonated the ex-Yugoslavian conflicts 
in 1991. 
After surviving 77 days of NATO's bombing campaign in 1999, which was 
preceded by a decade of lost wars, economic calamity, international economic 
sanctions and state-generated hyperinflation, the citizens of Serbia could not 
tolerate more lies and propaganda that the Miloseic's media shamelessly 
carried. The citizens supported the united opposition DOS in such 
overwhelming numbers, that no rigging, or false counting could save the old 
regime. When Milosevic refused to acknowledge loss of the elections, the 
people took it to the streets and ousted him.  
 
However, this was not a case of revolution, but a form of negotiated power 
transfer, which took place when the Milosevic's security apparatus decided to 
abandon him and secure for themselves new lease of life at the dawn of a 
new era (Bujosevic, Radovanovic, 2003). 
 
The takeover of the federal institutions22 was soon followed by the 
extraordinary republican parliamentary election in December 2000, which the 
united anti-Milosevic front DOS won in an overwhelming manner, with capture 
of 176 out of 250 seats in the chamber. This time DOS had adequate access 
to the media during election campaign, as well as the control over counting of 
ballots. So this was the final part of a legitimate and institutional transfer of 
power, which symbolically marked beginning of the transition process in 
Serbia. The old legal and institutional system was taken over by the new 
political forces that promised urgent structural reforms, but did not opt for 
revolutionary abolishment of it. 
 
With the overshadowing legacy of dictatorial regime in Serbia since the end of 
Second World War, it is quite clear why using institutional approach seemed 
to be the only choice for political forces that presented themselves as 
"democratic". However, institutional and legalistic approach towards 
                                            




transformation of the Serbian state became a mockery, when the victorious 
DOS coalition immediately started to fragment - and the work on transition 
became hostage of daily political bargaining and trade offs. 
 
2.3 Definition of ‘Institution’ 
 
At this point it is necessary to define what an institution is. As Peters states, 
the word institution is loosely used in political science to mean everything from 
a formal structure like a parliament, to very amorphous entities like social 
class, with other components of the socio-political universe, such as law and 
markets, also being defined as being institutions. In sociology it is often used 
interchanging with the term ‘organization’ (Peters, 1999, pg. 283).  
 
March and Olsen have a different definition of institutions. According to them 
institutions should rather be understood as a collection of norms, rules and 
understandings, and perhaps most importantly routines. They define 
institutions as: 
 “Collections of interrelated rules and routines that define appropriate 
 actions in terms of relations between roles and situations. The process 
 involves determining of what the situation is, what role is being fulfilled, 
 and what obligation of that role in that situation is” (March, Olsen, 
 1989, pg. 21). 
 
Reform of institutions or building of new and better social, political and 
economic institutions is generally considered to be the central problem that 
transitional societies face, as they emerge from their post-authoritarian and 
post-communist pasts. Institutions establish standards, both normative and 
cognitive, as to what is considered normal, what must be expected, which 
rights and duties are attached to which positions, and what makes sense in 
the community or social domain to which an institution is answerable 





Serbia, within former SFR Yugoslavia, was characterised by domination of 
state-controlled economy and single-party political system until late 1980s. 
The 1990s, after demise of SFR Yugoslavia, were characterised by a very 
different economic and political environment, which failed to develop either 
democratic political institutions, or market institutions. Indeed, that period was 
a specific form of post-modern dictatorship (Prodanovic, 2000), which was 
different from any other in the world. The main characteristic of this system 
was gradual weakening and decay of the existing state institutions and 
transfer of power from state institutions to private hands.  
 
Offe argues that institutions play two major roles - perceptive and functional. 
The perceptive role means that “good citizens make good institutions, and 
good institutions are ‘good’ to the extent they generate and cultivate good 
citizens or the ‘better selves’ of citizens, who at least get ‘used to’ and ‘feel at 
home’ in those institutions, develop a sense of loyalty, and come to adopt the 
cognitive expectations and moral intuitions from which the institutions 
themselves derive” (Offe, 1996, pg. 200).  
 
The functional role of institutions is called ‘congruent socialisation’, which 
assumes that institutions will function properly. If institutions are established 
properly and widely supported, they ‘fly by themselves, due to the invisible 
operation of an autopilot’ (Offe, 1996, pg. 200). Furthermore, Offe argues that 
both those function are necessary as criteria for the existence and viability of 
institutions, internal socialisation and external effectiveness, or the 
consolidation of beliefs, on the one hand, and purposive rational or strategic 
action on the other. 
 
Stability of institutions, however, comes at the cost of rigidity (Offe, 1996). 
Democracy can only work under a framework of rights that are protected by 
independent courts, and must be immune from own contingencies. Crucial 
problem of transition from communism in former Eastern Europe is the lack of 
necessary rigidity for stability of institutions. Regimes that attempted to 




reasoned choice, as every actor has strong reason to believe that it cannot 
rely on institutional parameters, since they are subject of sudden changes.  
 
According to Offe (1996), there are two major factors that create institutional 
stability. The first is a degree of freedom that institutions leave to individual 
behaviour and choice, and the more liberal the regime those institutions 
impose upon agents, the less vulnerable they will become to disloyal or 
attempted innovation. The other stability factor is the mechanism that 
institutions have in the form of rules for changing institutions (Offe, 1996). In 
Serbia, both of the conditions necessary for institution stability had not been 
fulfilled. There was neither freedom of choice, nor mechanisms for institutional 
protection (Offe, 1996). However, the success of newly built institutions is 
likely to depend more on people’s trust, compliance, and patience in enduring 
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THE FALL OF TV BASTILLE 




The state broadcasting corporation, Radio Television Serbia (RTS), had a 
dominating position among all the electronic media in Serbia long before the 
last communist ruler Milosevic rose to power in 1987. In this chapter I examine 
the role of RTS during the 1990s, when it functioned as the old regime’s “iron 
fist”, its gradual moral and professional decline and instrumentalization. In the 
subsequent chapters, I will discuss the need of institutional and legal 
transformation of RTS into a modern, public service broadcaster, following the 
change of regime on 5 October 2000. Choosing the appropriate model which 
fits the concrete circumstances and political environment was pre-requisite for 
such thorough reform. Achieved results, problems encountered and actors 
involved in transformation of RTS are discussed in subsequent chapters.  
 
Although the great winds of change in 1989 swept through the whole former 
Eastern block in almost domino fashion, these colossal historic events had a 
rather different impact on former Socialist Federal Republic Yugoslavia (SFRY). 
Immediately after the fall of the Berlin wall, almost all former Warsaw Pact 
countries embarked on the road of transition towards democracy, while SFRY, 
formerly an example of a moderate and successful socialist country, non-
member of the Warsaw Pact, disintegrated and completely collapsed in 1991. In 
the aftermath of such events, several new countries emerged: Slovenia, 
Croatia, Macedonia, Bosnia & Herzegovina. Serbia and Montenegro stubbornly 
held on to the name Yugoslavia and became a two-member federation, which 
survived until 2003. The emergence of new states from SFRY was not peaceful 
and democratic, but a  rather tragic and dramatic process, which engulfed the 
region in series of civil wars, huge loss of human lives and suffering, along with 




I chose to research Serbia and its media system for several reasons. Apart from 
being unique in comparison to other post-communist countries in transition, 
Serbia is the largest state of ex-Yugoslavia, with central geographical position, 
largest population and a great number of ethnic Serbs living outside its 
borders.1  
 
Dispersion of Serbs outside Serbia and concern for their post-Yugoslavian fate 
was the reason why the Serbian state, instead of having a peaceful divorce with 
former federal partners, opted for the use of force in settling the outstanding 
issues.2 Disputes and even armed conflicts ensued.3 This messy “divorce” 
between former SFRY member-states, provinces and nations came to its final 
step with still controversial independence of Kosovo in 2008. The process of 
SFRY's decomposition took 17 years to complete.4 However, the rights and 
wrongs of this highly politicized and acrimonious process are not part of this 
research, although understanding its complexity holds the key to exploring the 
transition of Serbia and its media - how they functioned during turbulent 1990s 
and later after the 5 October 2000 changes.   
 
It was rather predictable and obvious that the transition in Serbia (including its 
media system) could not be fully completed in a rather short period after the 
change of regime in 2000. For example Slovenia, a very advanced post-
socialist country that started its transition as early as 1991 and in May 2004 
became a full member of EU, still has not completed the process of 
transforming its media system. In 2005, a state referendum was held in 
Slovenia to determine the future of its public service broadcaster.  
                                               
1 Serbia with its two autonomous regions Vojvodina and Kosovo made up approximately 40% of former SFRY in terms of territory and population. 
 
2 A peaceful dissolution of a former federal state took place in Czechoslovakia, which became the Czech Republic and Slovakia. 
  
 
3 In June 1991 Slovenia declared its independence from Socialist Federal Republic Yugoslavia and by the end of that year gained international 
recognition, alongside Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia, who also opted out of the federation. Such exit from the federation wasn’t 
peaceful, but rather triggered series of inter-ethnic clashes and civil wars, which took international community several years to contain and stop.   
 
4 Following the 1999 NATO military intervention against FR Yugoslavia, the Serbian autonomous province Kosovo was put under UN protectorate. 
In 2008, with the support from major Western countries, Kosovo declared independence, against protests of Serbia. This is the last remaining 





Established as a state-owned (and party controlled) propaganda outlet, RTS 
had more or less similar history, practice and development as other Eastern 
European state broadcasters until the fall of the Berlin wall. Other republican 
broadcasters in SFRY also functioned along the same lines and principles 
(Djoric, 2002). One cannot say that party-controlled broadcasting system was 
democratic, since it never gave opposing views and political forces any room. 
Oddly enough, apart from political affairs, in many ways RTS produced content 
normally associated with genuine public service broadcasters: quality 
educational and scientific programs, ethnic minority programs, non-commercial 
dramas, national heritage features, culture and classical music. RTS was well 
financed through mandatory subscription, equipped with modern hardware, and 
employing educated and competent staff in every department - from news, 
network of regional correspondents and facilities, to production, advertising and 
market research units. RTS did not have any competition from private (or other 
government-owned) broadcasters. (Djoric, 2002) 
 
Each of SFRY's six republics had their own state broadcasters, with RTV Novi 
Sad and RTV Pristina (in Serbia's autonomous regions Vojvodina and Kosovo) 
working as sub-divisions of RTS. On the federal level there was no central 
broadcasting company, but only Yugoslavian Radio Television (JRT) as an 
association of republican broadcasters, with no original programming, nor own 
transmitters. JRT was used for purchase of international programming 
(especially sport and entertainment events) distributed in all six republics, and 
for representing the whole country internationally. The only domestic JRT 
program was annual choosing of the Yugoslavian entry for the Eurovision song 
contest, hosted and produced every year by a different republican broadcaster.  
 
Because of such dominant position that RTS held, its transformation into a 
public service broadcaster can be viewed as the central issue of the whole 
media sector reform in Serbia. In the same manner, transformation of RTS into 
public service broadcaster was also one of the key reflections in overall 
transition of Serbia towards democracy. For the Serbian opposition (citizens, 
political parties, non-governmental organizations and civic groups, emerging 
independent media sector) RTS throughout Milosevic's rule (1987-2000) 
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represented the main symbol of tyranny and instrument of governance, whose 
main function was state propaganda and lies. As Natasa Milojevic noted in the 
interview for this research: 
 "Regardless of the personality of the ruler, or the period of rule, the 
 media in Serbia were means of governance used by the governing 
 structure... If  the question is whether the media are tool of governance, 
 or preserving the power, the answer is both." 
 
Similar to other East European countries, opposition and pro democracy circles 
in Serbia towards the end of 1980s transformed into newly established political 
parties.5 All of them aimed their criticism at ruling Socialist party’s monopoly 
over RTS, and derided its Belgrade headquarters at no. 10 Takovska Street as 
"TV Bastille". This was done in remembrance of the French revolution, when on 
14 July 1798 the disenfranchised citizens took over the Bastille fortress, 
overthrowing the king and abolishing dominance of the gentry. "Reformed" 
Serbian communists6 in the shape of Milosevic's newly established Socialist 
Party of Serbia (SPS) formally allowed multi-party system, but never 
relinquished control of RTS.7 Such strategic advantage over political 
competitors enabled them to keep the power even after the first multi-party 
elections held in 1990.  
 
2.0.1 Orwellian Years (1990 - 1995) 
 
The first massive anti-Milosevic demonstrations in Belgrade took place on 9 
March 1991, when tens of thousands of citizens gathered on the Republic 
Square and marched on TV Bastille, demanding the resignation of RTS general 
manager Dusan Mitevic. At that time SFRY was still a functioning entity, and 
Milosevic (president of Serbia) asked the president of SFRY (Borislav Jovic) to 
                                               
5 First political party to be formally registered in Serbia, after the communists lifted their political monopoly after the fall of Berlin wall in 1989, was 
Democratic Party. Many others quickly followed.  
 
6 After the fall of the Berlin wall, Milosevic realized in 1990 that he must change the name of his party form Communist Alliance of Serbia into less 
suspicious sounding Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS). 
 
7 In September 1987 Milosevic became President of the Communist Party of Serbia, but later took state functions/titles, like president of Serbia, and 




authorize use of federal armed forces (JNA)8 against demonstrators. With 
approval from other federal presidency members from Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Macedonia, an elite JNA tank unit assisted 
the Serbian police to dispel the protests with brute force, tear gas and water 
cannons - at the price of two lost lives, hundreds of injured, dozens of arrested 
protesters and great material damage to the city of Belgrade. (Lazic, 1994) 
In subsequent disintegration of SFRY, which started only a few months later in 
June 1991, when Slovenia9 and Croatia formally declared independence, JNA 
had the role of a major perpetrator The history of conflicts in former Yugoslavia 
(1991-1995) always associated JNA with Milosevic and Serbia, although very 
few accounts mentioned that the citizens of Serbia and its capital Belgrade were 
the first victims of JNA's "patriotic work", before the arms of people's army were 
aimed at other non-Serb nations of former SFRY.10 
 
TV Bastille (RTS) under Dusan Mitevic's11 direction followed the old communist 
tactic in covering the mass unrest: Initially RTS chose to ignore the events in its 
news programs. Only with a great delay it was reported that several hundred 
anti-state protesters had illegally gathered in Belgrade and that the state organs 
reacted in an appropriate manner to restore order and apprehend the culprits.  
 
According to RTS, hooligans and thieves who used the opportunity to commit 
                                                                                                                                         
 
8 JNA stands for Yugoslav People's Army, which was under federal jurisdiction. Its command structure (General Staff) was always carefully 
balanced between generals hailing from all Yugoslavian nations.  
 
9 The political leadership of Slovenia and intellectuals circles realized that SFRY is not going to be transformed into democratic post-communist 
country in early 1980's. For many years, they were proposing political reforms that were refuted by conservative communist leaderships in all other 
Yugoslavian republics. Because of that, the Slovenians carefully prepared a reserve scenario - secession from SFRY. Appearance of Milosevic only 
reinforced them in pursuing this plan and made it achievable much quicker than anyone could have dreamed of. 
 
10 Slovenian and Croatian declarations of independence from SFRY in June 1991 initiated short but bloody period of armed clashes between 
Slovenian and Croatian authorities and JNA, which suddenly became regarded as occupying force on what once was its home territory. A 
temporary cease-fire agreement was signed, leading to the September 1991 conference in London, where former British Foreign Secretary Lord 
Peter Carrington tried to find a lasting and peaceful solution for disintegration of SFRY. However, due to inability of the European Union to handle 
major crisis, along with US lack of interest in this matter, led to failure of the conference and eventually to collapse of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 
1992 and three-way civil war that lasted until the end of 1995. 
 
11 Mitevic was previously a journalist/reporter with RTS political news department and editor of the main evening news, rising to the position of 
general manager as a high-ranking member of the Central Committee of the Communist Alliance of Serbia. From 1987 until 1991, he was also a 





burglaries and theft headed the protesters. Even Milosevic realized that such 
Orwellian news coverage of the mass protests in Belgrade were only irritating 
the citizens and doing more damage to his case. So in a few days after the 
protests, Mitevic was replaced at the helm of RTS by Milorad Vucelic, a leading 
journalist and nationalist intellectual from the weekly magazine Nin. He went on 
to become Milosevic's close friend and vice-president of the Socialist Party of 
Serbia. Vucelic's way of handling RTS was even more ruthless and 
propagandistic. RTS became the chief instrument of intolerance, war mongering 
and nationalism during the 1991 - 1995 civil wars in former Yugoslavia.  
 
Vucelic did not come from the "old communist" stock, but was rather a modern, 
shrewd operator. He master-minded Milosevic's (fake) makeover from the 
communist apparatchik of the 1980s into post-communist 1990s leader, quasi-
democrat and protector of the Serbian nation and its interests - endangered by 
illegal secession from SFRY by former federation members Slovenia, Croatia, 
Bosnia and Macedonia. TV Bastille was not only the key instrument in this 
transition, but remained the main ideological tool of the regime. After secession 
of former SFRY republics, TV Bastille stirred, fuelled and directly incited ethnic 
conflicts outside Serbia (Croatia and Bosnia) in order to legitimize itself.  
Curiously enough, the sacked RTS director Dusan Mitevic went on to become 
one of the key anti-Milosevic figures. (Djukic, 2001)  
 
Slobodan Milosevic (1941 - 2006) came to power in September 1987, and ruled 
Serbia until 5 October 2000. His rise and fall was closely related to the (mis)use 
of the media. Milosevic seized power by removing his party mentor Ivan 
Stambolic through a carefully planned inter-party coup in September 1987 
(Doder and Branson, 1999).  
 
A crucial point in this was prior installation of his loyalists as directors/editors-in-
chief of state-owned media apparatus. Radio Television Serbia (RTS) was its 
“crown jewel”, along with the two most influential state-owned newspaper-
publishing companies, Politika and Novosti. Once Milosevic controlled the 
media - he could discredit Stambolic in public and his subsequent removal was 





only a technicality. "Manufactured" and planted news stories and editorials in 
Milosevic's media prepared the ground for his ruthless move against moderate 
and widely respected reform-oriented communist leader Ivan Stambolic.  
 
Thirteen years later, when Stambolic was considered as a possible opposition 
candidate to stand against Milosevic in 2000 presidential elections, he was 
abducted and savagely murdered by the members of the Milosevic special 
police unit. His body was found only in 2003, when the members of the special 
police force were arrested following the assassination of Prime Minister Zoran 
Djindjic. 
 
At the core of the Serbian Communist Party infighting in 1987 was the debate 
on the Kosovo problem. Kosovo is a Serbian autonomous province where inter-
ethnic relations between Albanians and Serbs were tense and uneasy even 
during blissful Titoist years (1945-1980), long before Milosevic appeared on the 
political scene. Stambolic advocated a conciliatory, diplomatic method and 
cooperation with other SFRY republics in treating Kosovo, while Milosevic was 
proponent of heavy-handed approach, based on use of force (police and 
military). The moderate leaders of the Serbian Communist Party Ivan Stambolic 
and his associate Dragisa Pavlovic, who pleaded careful and non-violent 
approach in handling the Kosovo problem, were removed by Milosevic and his 
hard line supporters. It turned out that bullying was not an acceptable method 
not only for Kosovo, but also not for touchy inter-republican relations within 
SFRY. The political rise of Milosevic actually coincided with demise of SFRY. 
(Doder and Branson, 1999). 
 
In the new post-cold war realities following the fall of the Berlin wall, the old 
multi-ethnic, multi-religious federation SFRY, needed thorough political and 
economic reforms to survive. However, despotic, nationalistic and heavy-
handed Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic was not an acceptable and 
trustworthy partner for other Yugoslavian republics and their leaderships, 
especially because they had their own legitimate aspirations and agendas. 
Moreover, his towering figure and influence over the Serbian minority in Croatia 
only generated the tide of nationalism in the second largest Yugoslavian 
republic, and eventually led to the election of another former communist-turned 
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extreme nationalist Franjo Tudjman as president of Croatia in 1990.  
 
Democratic reforms with a promise of economic prosperity were proposed by 
the last elected prime minister of SFRY Ante Markovic (1988-1991). His work 
was a last minute attempt to salvage the faltering federation and it did not 
succeed. Not only Milosevic, but also Croatian president Franjo Tudjman and 
Slovenian president Milan Kucan also opposed Markovic's plan to save SFRY, 
although each for his own reasons. Milosevic wanted to save SFRY, but on his 
own terms and under his domination.  
 
In his effort to foil Milosevic's monopoly over RTS, in 1990 Federal Prime 
Minister Ante Markovic initiated the start of YUTEL - a federal television news 
program independent from political input of the Yugoslavian republics and 
leaders.12 Unfortunately, this was a short-lived effort, since YUTEL was soon 
forced to move its premises from Belgrade to Sarajevo and broadcasting time to 
very late hours (Carole, 1998). 
 
It was the media, and especially RTS, that paved the way for Milosevic to 
become the Serbian leader. However, during 13 years of Milosevic's rule the 
political and media environment in and around Serbia dramatically changed. 
First, monopoly of the Socialist party was broken with emergence of the 
opposition parties, and Milosevic's credibility was severely dented when he 
could not prevent the demise of SFRY, but rather accelerated it. Second, the 
majority of Serbian citizens initially supported armed conflicts with its former 
partners in SFRY in which Milosevic drew in Serbia with his nationalistic rhetoric 
- but only briefly. The citizens quickly realized that their sons, husbands and 
brothers were being sent to fight and die in now foreign countries, for 
unnecessary, unclear and wrong reasons. Additionally, a dramatic drop in the 
standard of living was the price that the citizens had to pay for these wars.  
 
                                               
12 YUTEL program was produced by a group of experienced political journalists and editors from all republics of SFRY. Its broadcasts were carried 
by republican broadcasters, since YUTEL did not have their own frequencies and transmitters. This is exactly why Milosevic, Tudjman and others 
could suffocate it through directing their republican broadcasters to push YUTEL's evening news broadcasts to late hours, when a few people could 




By the time that the citizens of Serbia realized where Milosevic was heading, it 
was too late. It became obvious to most people, as well as to the emerging 
political opposition that Milosevic’s regime would never step down in a peaceful 
way, or through elections, and would cling on to power until the bitter end. 
Unfortunately, it took ten years and the NATO's military intervention over 
Kosovo in 1999, which inflicted further suffering and death on Serbia, to 
precipitate Milosevic's fall. 
 
The remains of SFRY - renamed into the Federal Republic Yugoslavia (FRY) in 
1992 and consisting of Serbia and Montenegro - were placed under UN 
sanctions and trade embargo in May 1992 because of its involvement in the 
Bosnian conflict.13 As a result - Milosevic's economy with predominantly state-
owned enterprises came close to a standstill and sources of state finance dried 
up. "Magic solution" was found in state-sponsored pyramidal bank schemes14 
and the printing press of the national bank, which worked overtime and 
generated hyperinflation of unprecedented scale. In 1993 and 1994 Serbian 
currency Dinar's devaluation surpassed the Great Depression era in Germany 
(1928-1930), which enabled Adolf Hitler to rise to power. The price of a loaf of 
bread was higher than a bag full of banknotes. Average salary in Serbia 
dropped from £300 per month in 1990 to £3 per month in those years.15  
 
In order to secure financing of its propaganda machine RTS, the regime 
replaced subscription, which people could avoid paying, with unpopular 
mandatory tax collected through the electricity bill. 
 
Some estimated 500,000 citizens of Belgrade, mainly young and educated 
moved abroad throughout the 1990s - to escape military draft and to find a 
                                               
13 During 1992-1995 UN trade embargo against Yugoslavia, Milosevic and his financial advisors devised an elaborate scheme how to use off shore 
banking facilities on Cyprus in order how to bypass the embargo. A special division of the Belgrade Bank was incorporated in Nicosia, which 
administered the finances of the country under embargo. Throughout that period Cyprus was not member of EU, and its laws allowed such money 
laundering schemes. 
 
14 There were two major (Dafiment and Jugoskandik) and several smaller quasi-private banks that had the blessing from the top of the regime to 
collect savings from citizens, promising them huge interest in excess of 10 percent per month. In times of hyperinflation and no work or hope in 
besieged, isolated Serbia, many citizens had no choice but to get involved in such pyramidal schemes and eventually loose their life savings. 
 




better and safer life far away from Milosevic's totalitarian ghetto.16 These people 
were not those affected by the armed conflicts in Croatia and Bosnia (refugees, 
displaced, destitute and ethnically cleansed persons), but those who did not 
approve of the way how their country was governed and saw no perspective, 
nor alternative.  
 
The early 1990s were the beginning of a major technological breakthrough, 
dawn of a new media era - internet, computers, mobile telephoning, and cheap 
home satellite reception equipment. The media sector worldwide has grown 
enormously, and not only in terms of number of outlets, available channels and 
devices. Suddenly there was plurality of private owners - something that was 
not possible only a few years earlier when Milosevic seized power. 
Nevertheless, the Serbian ruler and his inner circle of advisors, entangled in 
conflicts both in “near abroad” (Bosnia and Croatia) and internally in Serbia, did 
not notice, nor understand these drastic changes. Milosevic’s model of 
governance was based on tight control of the state media outlets, and 
dissemination of heavy doses of propaganda onto the citizens through the 
channels of the controlled state media. However, he was caught unprepared by 
an avalanche of technological advancements, which enabled a sudden increase 
in numbers of private broadcasters and publishers, both on the national and 
local level. This is when the new media outlets began to grow like mushrooms 
after rain, and it became impossible to control them through old-fashioned 
socialist party mechanisms. 
 
In 1993, there were around about one hundred registered private radio and TV 
stations in Serbia, and their number grew to more than 1,200 by the year 2000 
when Milosevic was finally ousted (Djoric, 2002). They were mainly small, local, 
makeshift radio and TV stations, with amateur equipment and unskilled staff. 
Nevertheless, they were competing for the eyeballs and ears of citizens, 
offering them wider choice of programs and no insult on their intelligence, as 
opposed to the rigid state-owned propagandist machinery of RTS and daily 
                                               
16 Accoriding to the data from the Federal Statistics Office, some 50,000 people from Serbia alone moved to the United Kingdom alone, while USA, 
Canada and South Africa were at the top of the favorite settlement destinations. Before 1991, the whole Yugoslavian (citizens of all six republics) 




newspapers like Politika and Novosti. 
 
It is worth noting that two major media empires were born in 1994. Milosevic's 
associate, Bogoljub Karic17 (a Serb from Kosovo) started his BK TV, along with 
the first analogue mobile telephony service (BK Telekom) and internet provider 
(Eunet). Zeljko Mitrovic, a former rock musician and recording studio owner 
from Belgrade, befriended the federal minister of telecommunications, and used 
this contact to acquire a temporary license for TV and radio station, which soon 
developed into a nation-wide broadcasting company. Mitrovic was not initially 
politically connected, but once his TV programming acquired high ratings and 
he realized how lucrative advertising revenue can be - there was only one way 
to proceed - to become part of the political establishment, as some kind of 
insurance policy for his business. He chose to pledge his allegiance to 
Milosevic's wife ultra-leftist party Yugoslav Left JUL18 and at one point became 
their federal MP. 
 
Initially, Milosevic allowed new and small private media to develop, thinking that 
he would actually have more outlets for his propaganda. Fortunately, the old 
style of intimidation, control and feudal loyalty to the ruler did not work in new 
surroundings because of the sheer number of media outlets. It was so great that 
there were not enough enforcers/gatekeepers to monitor and control them. 
According to the media laws from late 1980s and early 1990s, RTS as the state-
owned broadcaster had a duty to give its recommendation/opinion for new 
broadcasters to begin their transmissions. In other words, RTS was forced to 
help and nurture its own competition. New private broadcasters with national 
coverage (RTV Pink and TV BK) rented transmission antennas/equipment and 
masts from RTS, and even lured many of their underpaid but highly 
experienced staff members to join their ranks for much better remuneration. The 
frequencies were given to these two “state-associated” private entrepreneurs on 
                                               
17 Karic is the chairperson of BK Group of companies, where his three brothers and one sister act as directors. The Karic family hails from Pec 
(Kosovo) where their small manufacture of agricultural tools in early 1980s was a "pet project" of the Yugoslavia government, because it showed 
that Albanians and Serbs could live and work together. Bogoljub Karic was quick to build on their newly found fortune and political connections, and 
by late 1980s moved his business base to Belgrade.  
 
18 JUL (Yugoslavian Left) was ultra-leftist party of Milosevic's wife Mirjana Markovic, who unlike Milosevic's "moderate" SPS advocated radical 




a trial basis, from a range of spare frequencies controlled by the military and 
police.    
 
The technical aspect of broadcasting (management of the spectrum, allocation 
of frequencies, certification of transmitters etc.) was under federal jurisdiction. 
At that time FRY wasn't really an orderly and functional state, but a rump of the 
old federation, with the remaining two members not quite happy with such an 
arrangement. In terms of managing the emerging media outlets, the republican 
authorities were in charge of content, which the new media operators would 
have. The Federal Ministry of Telecommunications (FMT) was understaffed and 
incapable to function properly. This created a situation where enforcement of 
technical norms and standards was impossible. Such situation enabled 
entrepreneurs with political connections to start their broadcasting operations on 
temporary/testing licenses, which were easily obtainable from FMT for the 
regime loyalists. However, very soon other entrepreneurial individuals realized 
that in fact there was no enforcement of temporary licenses and started 
hundreds of local pirate broadcasting outlets in every city of Serbia, without any 
paperwork. The regime was only interested if the new broadcasters did not 
transmit news programs that opposed their official line, as set by RTS. As a 
result - most of the new broadcasting outlets stayed far away from politics and 
news programs, and only offered sport and entertainment.   
 
In exchange for such "not rocking the boat" policy of new broadcasters, the 
regime's apparatus did not enforce the use of the spectrum, neither charged a 
single Dinar19 for its use. During the times of economic calamity and 
hyperinflation, the tax authorities did not bothered to collect statutory tax from 
these business activities. The regime and its cronies were too busy using the 
war situation (1991-1996) and the UN embargo for smuggling, illegal laundering 
of money and amassing personal fortunes. The state budget and its welfare 
obligations (meaning salaries for state employees and pensions) were financed 
by printing tons of inflationary banknotes, which in some days lost up to 1,000 
percent of their nominal value (Dinkic, 1997). Collection of taxes in 
                                                                                                                                         
 




circumstance like that was more expensive than the revenue collected. 
Because of that, enforcement of laws was not the regime's priority, nor agenda. 
Their concern was only social peace and no distraction from lucrative 
"businesses".  
 
Newly created media outlets broadcasted entertainment; pirated foreign movies, 
international sporting events and even hard-core pornography.20 All were 
welcome as purveyors of social peace. Citizens were ripped off through 
hyperinflation, standing in lines to obtain bread, milk and gasoline, sent to die 
abroad as reserve soldiers, deprived of adequate electrical power supply and 
central heating, gasoline for their cars - but had a free world of illusions through 
entertainment, sports and pornography to keep them happy and in their homes, 
not on the streets protesting. 
 
Under Milorad Vucelic as General Director of RTS (1991-1995), the state 
broadcaster not only remained TV Bastille, but became something like the 
Orwellian Ministry of Truth. Over one thousand staff members (editors, 
journalists, producers, technical and other support personnel) who did not agree 
with how RTS operated as the regime's propaganda outlet, were suspended, 
sacked or sent on indefinite unpaid leaves. They were replaced with Socialist 
party loyalists, people who were not ashamed or afraid to broadcast crude lies, 
hate speech and nationalist propaganda, with no qualifications, nor moral 
scruples.  
 
Aleksandar Timofejev, renowned Serbian journalist, remembers this era in a 
following way21: 
“These were crazy times. Listening to or watching state media was like 
reading fiction books or watching fiction films. It wasn’t about reality at all.” 
 
                                                                                                                                         
 
20 Majority of the content was obtained illegally by new broadcasters through re-broadcasting of foreign satellite programs and without payment of 
any copyrights or licenses. 
 
21 Timofejev’s statement is part of the research interview granted to Vera Franz in May 2001, for her master’s degree thesis on Radio B92, 




At the same time, after several years of poor management, international 
isolation and trade sanctions, RTS became eroded not only in terms of human 
resources, but also materially. Its production and transmission equipment was 
outdated, competent maintenance and production staff had left, and the state-
enforced financing (collection system) began to dry-up, because of 
hyperinflation. The available advertising revenue started to shift gradually 
towards private broadcasters like RTV Pink and BK TV. Vucelic personally got 
involved in some dubious financial dealings, and eventually was sacked.22  
 
At the end of 2005 the war in Bosnia ended. After having been initiated in 
Dayton, Ohio on 21 November, the full and formal peace agreement was signed 
in Paris on 14 December 1995 (daily Politika, 15 Dec. 2005) by Milosevic, 
Tudjman and Bosnian president Alija Izetbegovic, and witnessed by French 
Jacques Chirac, U.S. President Bill Clinton, UK Prime Minister John Major, 
German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and Russian Prime Viktor Chernomyrdin. 
Depleted RTS had a new task to depict Milosevic now as the indispensable 
peace broker, whose "wisdom and historic vision" was vindicated. Citizens of 
Serbia knew how untrue this was. 
 
2.0.2 Eggs, Pots and Pans (1996-1997) 
 
After the Dayton peace agreement, Milosevic was for a while treated by the 
international actors as the main partner in securing peace in the Balkans. Trade 
sanctions against FRY were lifted, and diplomatic relations with Belgrade 
restored. It is peculiar that the International Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia, 
established by the UN as early as 1993, did not indict Milosevic for his role in 
wars 1991-1995, since the political directive from the Contact Group23 was that 
                                               
22 As a general director of RTS Vucelic entered co-production of the movie Underground, by the award-winning director Emir Kusturica. Co-
producer was a private Belgrade based company Komuna. After several years of shooting and editing, with more than 10 million pounds of state 
money spent, the movie was finally finished with the cash infusion from a French production company. The movie won the Golden Palm award at 
the Cannes film festival, but Vucelic was sacked by Milosevic's wife, and dismissed as SPS Vice-president. Immediately he became chairman of 
Komuna's board - which in any other place would be conflict of interests and would lead to criminal prosecution for embezzlement of state funds.    
 
23 Contact Group is informal group of countries involved in finding diplomatic solution for conflicts in ex-Yugoslavia. It includes five countries: United 




he was the key-player in the region for securing lasting peace in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. His indictment, however, came in the middle of the 1999 NATO's 
bombing campaign against FR Yugoslavia over Kosovo, again more as a 
measure of political pressure and a policy tool, rather that a matter of impartial 
course of justice.  
In 1996/1997 Milosevic's dismal domestic human rights record, embezzlement 
of Serbian state finances, curtailment of political freedoms and obstruction of 
political opposition did not matter much to the international community. 
Milosevic was even given blessing to sell 49 percent stock in the Serbian 
Telecom in 1997 to the consortium of Italian and Greek state telecoms for one 
billion dollars. His trusted broker/advisor in this deal was British bank Nat West 
Investments.24 The funds from this sale were never fully paid into the Serbian 
state budget, but rather siphoned to Cyprus and on to other tax havens (Dinkic, 
1997).  At the time of writing (winter of 2007/2008), traces of these clandestine 
and illegal operations are still not fully uncovered.25  
 
The political opposition and citizens in Serbia were appalled by such "key-
player" treatment of Milosevic by the international factors. They thought that 
following the lost wars in Croatia and Bosnia, at the price of economic 
devastation of citizens and national economy, Milosevic was at the brink of 
falling. The aforementioned sale of the Serbian Telecom had given Milosevic a 
renewed lease of life. In a way, many freedom and democracy loving people of 
Serbia, who had suffered under Milosevic's tyranny for eight years, felt betrayed 
and abandoned by the international community. In spite of many years of 
citizens’ protests, demonstrations and peaceful resistance to the ruthless 
regime, Milosevic remained in power. 
 
At the beginning of this new post-Dayton phase of rule, in early 1996 Milosevic 
was confident that he can could continue to go on like that, with all the cards in 
his hands: international recognition; money from the sale of Telecom; 
                                               
24 At the time Nat West Investment was headed by Lord Douglas Hurd, former British Foreign Secretary. 
 
25 In March 2007 TV B92 aired several episodes of its award winning investigative program "Insider" that tried to uncover tracks of the 1990s 




domination over Yugoslavian Army; obedient and ruthless special police and 
state security; weak and disillusioned domestic opposition; continued control 
over RTS and other state-owned media.  
 
However, Milosevic could only operate through provoking a conflict of some 
kind - internal, or external. In such circumstances he would invent an enemy, 
use RTS and other obedient state media to vilify the opponent, and than create 
an image of a decisive action after which he would emerge victorious. The 
formula worked in 1987 when he ousted Stambolic, than in 1990/1991 when he 
expelled "traitors" Slovenians, Croats and others from SFRY, in 1991 when he 
quashed anti-government demonstrations in Belgrade, during the Bosnian 
conflict (1992–1995) when he defended Serbdom against imaginary Islamist 
insurrection in the heart of Europe, aided by the Vatican.26 In such “patriotic 
work”, communist-turned-nationalist Milosevic was supported by the ultra 
conservative Serbian Orthodox Church.27 Systematic generation of rather vulgar 
nationalism by the church and its dignitaries has not stopped even after the 
changes of 5 October 2000 (Ramet, 2006). 
 
But in 1996 the strategy of creating, pursuing and exploiting conflicts gradually 
began to fail Milosevic. The political environment had drastically changed. First, 
on the internal front: The impoverished citizens could not take Milosevic's lies 
any more and watch his family members, political allies, goon squads and 
cronies amassing huge capital and becoming bona fidae capitalists by ripping 
off the state and national resources before their very eyes. Also, the situation in 
tiny Montenegro, Serbia's junior partner in FR Yugoslavia, had drastically 
changed. The political party from Montenegro that helped Milosevic in 1992 to 
keep the rump FR Yugoslavia going, Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS) split 
in two factions.28 One was led by Milosevic's trusted sidekick Momir Bulatovic, 
                                                                                                                                         
 
26 Obsession with Vatican and its (non-existent) influence over world politics is very common topic in Serbia, mostly due to the primitive and 
paranoid views of the Serbian Orthodox Church, which is in dispute with Catholicism for a millennium.  
 
27 Conservative nature of the Serbian Orthodox Church is demonstrated through stubborn use of the scientifically wrong Julian calendar, which is 
running two weeks behind the official (internationally accepted) Gregorian calendar. 
  
28 Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS) is the legal successor of former Communist Party of Montenegro, and just like SPS in Serbia, it changed 




who was the president of Montenegro, while Prime Minister Milo Djukanovic led 
the other. Djukanovic realized that it was time to distance his politics and 
country from Milosevic and lead Montenegro towards independence. 
Djukanovic defeated Bulatovic in the next year's presidential election and 
eventually led his country of 650,000 to full independence from Yugoslavia in 
2006.29 
 
Another great change of the environment was the advent of cheap satellite 
reception equipment available to individual households, mobile telephones and 
computers with modems and access to the Internet. It meant that the ruler did 
not own the truth about the world any more - even if he tried his best to control 
all the state and private media outlets. Both domestic and the world news 
became generally accessible, with very little effort and at minimum cost to any 
person who wanted to grasp it. When the dissemination of propaganda, 
especially through Radio Television Serbia, continued before and after the 1996 
elections, it only got Milosevic deeper into trouble with his subjects.  They had 
enough of crude state propaganda and lies and could see now the world in a 
different way. In addition to notorious RTS, the citizens of Serbia had 
alternatives. 
 
Foreign news programming, like CNN, Sky News, BBC World Service, Deutche 
Welle, Radio France International, Radio Free Europe and Voice of America 
were easily picked up through thousands of home satellite receivers.30 Such 
technological breakthroughs were eagerly embraced by people, who for many 
years could get nothing but the regime's lies. Additionally, the international 
community made an effort to produce programming that targeted Serbian 
audiences with special broadcasts in Serbian language, as the aftermath of war 
and part of the stabilization process in Bosnia. Some of the Serbian language 
services/broadcasts were newly established, while some that had existed 
                                                                                                                                         
 
29 In February 2003 two-member Federal Republic Yugoslavia was transformed into temporary confederation named State Union Serbia and 
Montenegro, which in May 2006 was dissolved after the successful independence referendum in Montenegro. 
 
30 For example, BBC World Service radio program in Serbo-Croatian language and Slovenian existed for decades, but following demise of SFRY it 




before were expanded in length, number of broadcasts, number of transmitters 
and staff that was preparing them. However, former Prime Minister of Serbia 
(2003-2004) and Mayor of Nis (1996-2000), in the interview for this research, 
believes that the foreign language programming and possibilities of Internet did 
not play a crucial role in emancipation of the Serbian citizens and articulation of 
anger against the regime, which initiated the events of 5 October 2000: 
 "Nowadays, six years after October 2000, the number of Internet users 
 and consumers of satellite TV in Serbia is still limited. During the Milosevic 
 era, this was even worse. Television (domestic broadcasting) has the 
 information supremacy over all other media, and the person who 
 influences the programming of a certain TV station, especially news 
 programs, directly creates public opinion. This is the case with the largest 
 number of citizens, who are prone to manipulation. It used to be like that, it 
 is now, and I suppose it is the same everywhere else." 
  
After dismissal of RTS director Milorad Vucelic in mid-1990s, a rather 
unsophisticated Milosevic's appointee, Dragoljub Milanovic headed RTS. He 
was brought into RTS from the daily "Politika Ekspres", where he for many 
years edited the crime page, because of his insider's connections with the 
police. Originating from Kosovo, Milanovic did not have class, intellectual power 
and skill of "spin-doctor extraordinaire" Milorad Vucelic to resurrect the already 
compromised and technically depleted state broadcaster. Milanovic's only 
quality was absolute obedience to the boss, and in exchange for loyalty he was 
allowed to employ in RTS hundreds of his unqualified Kosovar relatives, friends 
and cronies. The number of employees at RTS exploded, while persecutions 
and dismissals of the in-house opponents continued. Milanovic even made his 
wife Ljiljana a presenter of the main evening news. Most of the professional 
staff members had been expelled or suspended, finances from the 
subscription/tax decimated, advertising revenue was poor because of the 
devastated economy. It caused RTS to reduce its output to political bulletins 
and re-runs of the pre-1990s culture, education and entertainment programs.  In 
terms of programming and production, RTS quality was poor. 
 
The first visible sign of the Milosevic's changed fortunes came in November of 
1996, when the regime called federal and local elections. Fading RTS continued 
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to disseminate lies and propaganda, openly favouring ruling SPS and their 
parasite partner JUL, while systematically disqualifying opposition parties. 
However, the citizens/voters, opposition and civic groups and political parties 
could not be fooled any more. For successful campaigning and their bid to oust 
Milosevic, they now had new independent media at their disposal to spread the 
word, gain and exchange information, organize actions. The very nature of the 
new media outlets was not easily controllable, and things began to turn against 
Milosevic and his party commissaries installed as gatekeepers in RTS and other 
traditional state-owned media outlets.  
 
The official publication of the 17 November 2006 election results were delayed, 
because it turned out that Milosevic and his allies were beaten, especially in 
major urban centres like Belgrade, Nis, Novi Sad, Kragujevac, Cacak, Kraljevo 
etc. In the second largest Serbian city of Nis, the election officials from SPS 
were caught red-handed staffing the ballot boxes with unaccounted supplies of 
ballot paper, and disqualifying ballots cast in favour of the opposition.31 This 
was the point where the local media came to the forefront, to change the course 
of history forever. A local TV outlet in Nis called Belle Amie, owned by a dodgy 
entrepreneur Vitko Radomirovic, started live reporting from polling stations and 
streets, where citizens began to gather expecting results. The word of mouth 
that SPS is loosing badly against democratic opposition coalition called 
Zajedno32 spread like a lightening, along with reports of unfair game by SPS 
and ballot rigging.   
 
TV Belle Amie was conveniently operating from the top floor of the tallest 
building in Nis, hotel Ambassador, situated on the city's main square. This is 
where a mass of protesters began to gather and keep vigil, awaiting official 
announcement that the communists lost power and must step down - for the 
                                               
31 The opposition representative in the local election commission was young lawyer Biserka Zivkovic from Democratic Party. She caught and 
exposed SPS representatives in fraudulent activities. In September 2000 elections that precipitated Milosevic's fall, she once again represented the 
opposition in the Federal Election Commission and once again caught them cheating. In the first post-Milosevic cabinet of Zoran Djindjic, she went 
on to become Government Secretary for Legislation. 
 
32 The word "zajedno" in Serbian language means "together". The Serbian opposition has always been notoriously divided, even when the goal 
was to topple the common enemy. In 1996, leading two parties of the anti-Milosevic block were Democratic Party (President Dr Zoran Djindjic) and 
Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO) formed an uneasy election coalition Zajedno. Junior partner in Zajedno and peacemaker between two rival 




first time since 1945, when they seized power from the royal regime which 
collapsed and disintegrated during the German occupation 1941 - 1945. 
Curiously enough, Belle Amie's owner was one of the people who got temporary 
license to broadcast as a favour from previous RTS director Milorad Vucelic, 
and was never associated with any kind of dissent against the Milosevic regime. 
Vitko Radomirovic, TV Belle Amie's owner, was considered rather one of those 
who directly benefited from connections with the Milosevic regime33. Also, Nis 
was one of the Milosevic strongholds during the early 1990s and did not react at 
all to the protests in Belgrade on 9 March 1991. Nevertheless, five years later 
the wave of protest against the dictator started from Nis and spread like a forest 
fire all over Serbian cities.  
 
The dictator and the state officials in charge of election proceedings would not 
admit defeat. Clumsy handling of the election fraud by the SPS in Nis, which 
was exposed by the opposition representatives in election boards, narrowed the 
turf for the regime, preventing it from using force to stop the protests. Another 
interesting process started to evolve: following example of TV Belle Amie from 
Nis, several small private broadcasters in other provincial parts of Serbia dared 
to begin airing real, uncensored news and cover mass protests in the streets of 
their towns, risking reprisals from the Milosevic apparatus, but clearly signalling 
the beginning of a new era. Two major private TV stations, RTV Pink and BK 
TV did not dare to follow the example of small local broadcasters, because their 
owners had much bigger stakes (state-wide coverage, huge advertising 
revenue) and interests to protect. They were located in Belgrade - too close to 
the Milosevic's levers of power.34 In securing post-Milosevic future, they did join 
the ranks of the opposition, but more than three years later, when it was just a 
matter of days or hours until the end of the old regime. 
 
Soon a kind of a stalemate situation developed: The regime was reluctant to 
                                                                                                                                         
 
33 The reason why Radomirovic decided to switch sides was that his political mentor Milorad Vucelic, was removed from RTS and Socialist Party of 
Serbia on orders of Milosevic’s wife Mirjana Markovic. 
 
34 During the course of 1996-1997 street protests, according to Bogoljub Karic, owner of the BK Telecom group and operator of the countries first 
and largest Internet providing franchise Eunet, he received a phone call from his next door neighbor, President Milosevic, demanding to shut down 




accept defeat in the election. Their representatives perpetrated fraud and 
manipulation, but did not have the courage to intervene against the citizens and 
opposition parties who peacefully protested for days and weeks without 
stopping in the streets of all major Serbian cities (Lazic, 2000). The regime also 
did not have adequate resources to use force, since the protest was not in one 
city, but everywhere. In the past, protests had usually been held in Belgrade for 
a day or two, and would eventually run out of steam. This time the mass 
protests and various street festivities lasted for a full 100 days, throughout the 
winter of 1996-97, Christmas, New Year and Serbian Christmas and New Year, 
until the spring of 1997. They became not only a sign of defiance, but the 
reclaiming of freedom and civility in an unprecedented way.  
 
Some other developments surprised the regime. Chief of the General Staff, 
General Momcilo Perisic (1993-1998)35 told the students and protesters that he 
would never authorize use of military against peaceful civic protests, and stood 
by that promise. Mayor of Belgrade Nebojsa Covic, a skilful and ambitious 
Socialist party operator, thought by many to be future successor of Milosevic, 
decided to resign because the regime would not accept election defeat. Both 
men had frequent and direct meetings with Milosevic in the course of their work 
and realized at that point that the dictator has completely lost his sense of 
reality and that his reign would end soon. Unfortunately, it took another four 
years for that to finally happen, and both General Perisic and Nebojsa Covic 
joined the opposition ranks, participated actively in the 5 October 2000 events, 
and served as deputy prime ministers in the first post-Milosevic cabinet of Zoran 
Djindjic.  
 
During one hundred days of street protests against election fraud, throughout 
Serbia in winter of 1996/1997, the RTS’ main evening news broadcasts at 19:30 
were eagerly greeted by the citizens with unprecedented noise, produced by 
banging forks and spoons against pots and pans from their home windows and 
balconies - a symbol of disgust. For every day of street festivities in Belgrade, 
                                                                                                                                         
 




opposition activists would have a protest stroll/march through the downtown, 
passing by and around various institutions of the state, booing and cheering. 
The RTS headquarters in Takovska Street were always on the marching 
itinerary, and passing protesters would throw eggs at it. 
 
The winter 1996/1997 protests in Serbia drew the attention of the international 
media, not only as a protest against one of the world's most infamous autocrats, 
but because its variety of forms and length (over 100 days) made it an 
unprecedented media spectacle. Milosevic had his hands tied and could not 
react with force, because of his recently acquired image as the key broker of 
peace in the Balkans. He desperately wanted to move away from four previous 
years of international isolation and UN sanctions. At the same time, with such 
international media coverage of protests in Serbia, the world leaders could not 
afford to play an ostrich game of putting their heads into the sand and not 
reacting to unacceptable electoral fraud by Milosevic, whom they recently 
promoted into a bona fidae partner. Therefore, no matter how much Milosevic 
disliked international input into his "domestic" affairs, he accepted mediation 
from Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), a body that 
regularly monitors election procedures in its member states. Felipe Gonzales, 
former Portuguese prime minister, was appointed as the OSCE's special envoy 
to visit Serbia, to inspect the voting materials and speak with both sides in order 
to bring the crisis to a peaceful end. 
 
The Gonzales report was published on 27 December 2006. As the special 
envoy, Felipe Gonzales reported to the OSCE chairperson that the political 
crisis in Serbia was caused by the dramatic break-up of the former Yugoslavia, 
war in the neighbourhood, grave economic situation, problems that come with 
the process of transition. Nevertheless, he added that "there are other 
elements" involved. Those other elements include "structural failures of the 
election system which allowed forgeries of/or changes of the will of the people" 
and "obstacles facing independent media and serious obstacles in gaining free 
and equal access to the public media" (OSCE, 1997)   
 
Nevertheless, the regime tried to spin the content of the Gonzales report and 
make it look favourable. The speaker of the Serbian Parliament, Dragan Tomic, 
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a leading member of SPS, said: "The report refuted the worst false accusation 
launched against Serbia from abroad recently" (Politika, 5 Feb 1997). He did not 
elaborate such accusation. Independent weekly magazine Vreme's columnist 
Roksanda Nincic wrote following about the way state media covered the 
Gonzales report:  
"On December 27, while protesters were shouting Victory, Victory in 
Belgrade, RTS reported that the OSCE had recognized only the leftist (pro 
Milosevic) coalition victory at the elections. Politika daily published the 
Gonzales letter under the title: Decision to Be Taken Within Yugoslavian 
Institutional System, a formulation Gonzales never used once. The 
editorial conclusion drawn in daily Politika’s New Year’s edition is that 
Gonzales is completely siding with the Serbian authorities and that even 
the Clinton administration lent support to that kind of report. "  
 
It became obvious that the regime would not accept defeat even after 
diplomatically formulated, but rather direct findings and recommendations of the 
OSCE special envoy. The title of the above mentioned Politika piece "Decision 
to Be Taken Within the Yugoslavian Institutional System" was de facto spelling 
of the Milosevic's exit strategy from the mess that he had created. It meant that 
the Supreme Court of Serbia would make the decision on election results and 
allegations of fraud. In normal states, the highest judicial instance is respected 
and independent institution, but that was not the case in Milosevic's Serbia, 
where judges were appointed to serve the puppet master's orders, not the 
interest of justice, law or the public. In this case, the lower courts turned down 
the claims by the opposition coalition Zajedno, and the appellate judicial 
instance was dragging its feet to give the final verdict, in an attempt to buy more 
time until the demonstrators give up, which they did not.  
 
On 5 February 1997, Milosevic decided to back down and put an end to 
protracted street protests and situation that which he could not solve by any of 
the old tricks. From his office of the Serbian President, he sent a letter to the 
Serbian Parliament, demanding adoption of the so-called lex specialis which 
would give opposition Zajedno victory in disputed cities, because the judicial 
system up to that point wasn't capable of solving the case. He decided to lay 
blame on others, and come out once again as the nation's saviour. The 
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manoeuvre was done "within the Yugoslavian institutional system" - something 
that paints him as a legalist and proponent of democracy.  
 
Columnist Nenad Stefanovic cleverly noted in Belgrade's AIM news service: 
“In Milosevic's interpretation of Tito's political "skill", this is how it all looks: 
First, you beat up and bathe with water guns the "fascists" in the streets, 
and then you invent a law with which you admit to these same "fascists" 
that they have won in the elections.” 
 
In late February 1997, the Serbian Parliament adopted lex specialis36 and the 
city halls of Belgrade, Nis, Kragujevac, Novi Sad, Cacak and other major cities 
were now in the hands of opposition. To use a special law to bypass already 
going court proceedings is certainly against the spirit of legality, since it 
abrogates the whole legal system.  
 
Zoran Djindjic, leader of the Democratic Party became the first non-communist 
mayor of Belgrade since the Second World War. According to the strangely 
worded text of the lex specialis, it only concerned the results for local 
assemblies/city halls, although the elections were held for the federal parliament 
of SR Yugoslavia. It sounded almost schizophrenic that the local elections went 
to the opposition, while the same citizens/voters at the same time cast their 
ballots in favour of Milosevic's block of parties on the federal level. However, the 
opposition politicians were more than happy to accept this little piece of power 
in city halls, and did not pursue this matter further. Serbian parliament was not 
contested in the November 1996 election, so Milosevic retained the reigns of 
power. Apart from the annoying loss of the local councils/city halls - he 
continued to control the federal parliament and executive structures. 
 
The street protests stopped, and Serbia returned to normality, although the 
political ambient had changed forever. With one foot in the door, the Serbian 
opposition got some real institutional power base in city assemblies, and could 
continue to exercise pressure on the fading dictator. In terms of media - many of 
                                               
36 In legal terminology, this means a special legislation/law that is used only once to solve a specific issue. Laws in general are supposed to create 
a general framework for human behavior and set general patterns/norms, so this is why "lex specialis" is used exceptionally.  
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bigger Serbian cities owned local radio and TV stations, which central 
authorities in Belgrade could not prevent any more from broadcasting news and 
truth. So maverick station like Belgrade's Studio B, RTV Pancevo, Municipal TV 
Nis, Municipal TV Kragujevac and others even began re-broadcasting foreign 
and Serbian language news bulletins from BBC World, Voice of America, Radio 
Free Europe, Deutche Welle, RFI etc. Additionally, privately owned media 
outlets in "liberated cities" could broadcast own news with more courage, in 
addition to re-broadcasting of external and commissioned news programs. 
 
 
2.0.3 TV Bastille Burning (1998-2000) 
 
The remaining three years of Milosevic's grip on Serbia (1998-2000), including 
the 77 days of NATO’s military intervention over Kosovo in 1999, were only 
preparations of for the public to turn a new page of freedom and democracy - 
something that the rest of Eastern Europe did in 1989. Through charities like 
George Soros' Open Society Fund, independent Serbian media began to 
receive aid in various manners: from donations of equipment, education and 
training for personnel, funds for production of their own programs, even staff 
salaries. Western governments also devised and implemented many programs 
and grants to aid independent journalism and media in Serbia, as support to 
infant democracy in making.  
 
The Milosevic regime did not like this and tried to prevent it in many ways, but 
the genie had escaped from the lamp, and return to the old era of total control 
over media and political life was impossible. Still, SPS-dominated Serbian 
parliament passed the draconian Public Information Act in 1998, which was 
used by the executive branch - Ministries of Information and Interior - to 
discipline and punish budding independent media. Federal Ministry of 
Telecommunication tried with little success in 1998 to bring some order into 
broadcasting and management of the spectrum through public tender for 
allocation of frequencies and broadcasting licenses (Djoric, 2002). The 
procedure was rigged in a way to allow media outlets that were cooperating with 




In reality, the sheer number of new media outlets prevented the authorities from 
controlling them, and individual acts of intimidation, fines and equipment 
seizure/confiscation by the state organs could not change the course of the 
events. Even those broadcasters who unsuccessfully filed documentation for 
allocation of frequencies were not taken off the air and continued working. 
 
The citizens and opposition parties could not accept Milosevic's despotic way of 
running the country any more. Memories of war, their country's isolation under 
UN sanctions, and economic hardship during the period of hyperinflation were 
too fresh. Continuation of the status quo was not acceptable for the vast 
majority of population, apart from the privileged few around the dictator and his 
security apparatus. On the other side, the new media explosion of mid 1990s 
made useless the old tools of monopoly over truth and information, which 
dinosaurs resembling organizations like RTS still used  
 
It became crystal clear in 1998 that Milosevic desperately needed another 
conflict and must invent a new enemy in order to offset his loss of respect, 
credibility and influence on the domestic scene. The opportunity was there - the 
tensions in Serbia's autonomous province of Kosovo have been present since 
the end of the Second World War. Initiating and riding the wave of Serbian 
nationalism, Milosevic actually exploited the Kosovo problem to oust previous 
Serbian president Stambolic and seize power back in 1987. In 1998 Milosevic 
felt that with Kosovo he had a trump card in his hands to change his political 
fortune and stabilize his rule over Serbia. It turned out that it was the last card 
he had in the game that was already lost. 
 
When deciding to escalate the Kosovo question in 1998, Milosevic did not 
realize that Yugoslavia, Balkans and the world were much different from1987 
when he came to power. In 1987 the Kosovo problem was an internal matter of 
Serbia and Yugoslavia, but in 1998 it was an international problem. The fall of 
the Berlin wall had ended the cold war and the bi-polar world of two contending 
super-powers, and the world had been transformed into environment with a 
single super power (USA). SFRY had disintegrated into five states, through 
bloody civil wars in Croatia and Bosnia, which required decisive intervention of 
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international actors to calm down. During that period (1991–1995), Milosevic 
had earned a reputation of a nasty offender and villain who must not be trusted. 
He even managed to lose traditional support of Russia, when in early 1990s he 
had supported a failed communist attempt to oust President Boris Yeltsin.37 
After mishandling of the 1996/1997 protests in Serbia over election fraud, 
Milosevic not only had domestic opposition against him, but also lost every bit of 
international credibility he gained as the signatory and guarantor of the Dayton 
peace accord.  
 
Additionally, the 1980s and 1990s were completely different eras in terms of 
development of both traditional and new media. Great technological 
advancements and subsequent arrival of new media of the 1990s made the 
world a true global village (McLuhan, 1964), meaning that treatment of ethnic 
minorities were no more internal affairs of one state. Continuous maltreatment 
of his own citizens (Serbs and Albanians alike) perpetrated by Milosevic during 
his time in power was well documented and covered by the international media.  
 
During the last period of Milosevic's rule, RTS or TV Bastille was one of his last 
remaining governing tools, in addition to police and state finances.  RTS not 
only hit the lowest professional level in its history, but paid the ultimate price for 
serving the dictator. On 24 April 1999, during the 77 days of military intervention 
against FR Yugoslavia over Kosovo, NATO airplanes bombarded the 
headquarters of Radio Television Serbia in Belgrade. The Canadian-based web 
portal Serbian News Network (SNN) reported the carnage in the following way: 
"[...This deliberate aerial assault was one of the most controversial of the 
entire bombing campaign. Sixteen employees of RTS, mostly young 
people, died when a single NATO rocket hit the building Belgrade. Many 
were trapped for hours, only communicating over mobile phones. The 
television station went to air 24 hours later from a secret location. The hit 
remains one of the most controversial events in the 11 weeks of NATO air 
raids against Yugoslavia in 1999. The victims of the bombing were: 
Tomislav Mitrovic, Ivana Stukalo, Slavisa Stevanovic, Ksenija Bankovic, 
                                               
37 Russia refrained from stopping NATO’s 1999 campaign against FRY over Kosovo. The Russians refused to supply powerful and modern SS-30 




Jelica Munitlak, Milovan Jankovic, Dragan Tasic, Aleksandar Deletic, 
Darko Stoimenovski, Nebojsa Stojanovic, Slobodan Jontic, Dejan 
Markovic, Milan Joksimovic, Branislav Jovanovic, Sinisa Medic, Dragorad 
Dragojevic.]" (SNN Daily Report, 2 May 1999) 
 
The attack on RTS happened around 2:00 a.m. when the news staff was not 
there, and only technical personnel were present - by order of director Dragoljub 
Milanovic, and under threat of dismissal. This bombing of a non-military target in 
the middle of downtown Belgrade and the death of innocent RTS staff members 
remains morally and legally debatable to this day. Even the hard-core 
opponents of Milosevic, who protested against the way how he used RTS for 
propaganda and lies, did not approve of NATO's decision to bomb it. Especially, 
as it did not stop RTS from broadcasting form reserve locations and transmitters 
within hours.  
 
In my 1999 master’s degree thesis "The Media In A Post Modern War - 1999 
Yugoslavia Versus NATO Conflict" I wrote several paragraphs about the 
bombing of RTS, and I find it appropriate to include them here - not in order to 
discuss the legality of such action, but rather to point at the ways how this tragic 
event was spinned and used for manipulation of truth on both sides of the 
conflict. The governments of NATO countries were as guilty of manipulations 
with their national (public service) broadcasters, as much as Milosevic 
instrumentalized RTS. 
“During the Kosovo crises, voices from inside the British government 
expressed dissatisfaction with reports by BBC’ senior foreign editor John 
Simpson. He was reporting (Serbian) government views, but was 
interviewing plain civilians on the streets of Belgrade, whose defiant 
attitudes the unidentified British government insiders, apparently, did not 
like. The main complaint was “that Mr. Simpson does not sufficiently 
underline that his reports are being watched by the Yugoslavian censors”. 
At one point, John Simpson, a veteran of nine different wars throughout 
the world, outraged by such criticism by unidentified sources, went so far 
to tell that his report was seen by the official censors, but had not been 






"With such pretext, it was no surprise when NATO bombarded the central 
television studios of Radio Television Serbia (RTS) in the heart of 
downtown Belgrade. The attack followed a written promise issued by 
NATO to the International Association of Journalists that they would not 
target the studios. They said only transmitters would be hit, since they 
might have military use." (Stojanovic, 1999)  
 
However, Clare Short, a British cabinet member and MP immediately justified 
such act by saying: “The [RTS] propaganda machine is prolonging the war and 
is a military target”.38 The sad score of 16 dead and many wounded was human 
tragedy and treated as “collateral damage”39, which happened during the 77-
day campaign. 
 
It would be inconsiderate to make tragedy of media workers more important 
than any other war tragedy. However, the consequence of the attack on RTS 
headquarters was cultural and global information tragedy: John Simpson (BBC), 
Tim Marshall (Sky News), Brent Saddler (CNN) and other foreign TV crews 
stationed in Belgrade could not send their reports any more. Not because of 
censorship, but because the technical facilities of RTS were used for feeding 
the news to the world. The reports coming from Belgrade from journalist like 
Robert Fisk (The Independent), Tom Walker and Eve-Ann Prentice (The 
Times), to name a few brave and highly professional print journalists, were 
talking about human casualties and huge damage to the civilian objects, 
something that NATO spin-doctors wanted to hide and play down. However, 
without powerful TV images, they did not have the same impact. Even the RTS 
satellite broadcast, aimed at the Yugoslavian ex-patriot community worldwide 
was taken off the air several days into the bombing campaign, in a breach of a 
valid (and paid in advance) rental contract with a private company, because 
                                               
38 Interview given to BBC news on 25 April 1999. 
 
39 The term “collateral damage” for loss of innocent lives through the actions of NATO during the Kosovo conflict was coined by the NATO 




such orders came from Washington.  
 
If RTS was indeed a key tool of the Milosevic regime for brainwashing citizens, 
why did 20% of the homes in Yugoslavia (Federal Statistics Office, 2000) at that 
time had satellite dishes or cable that carry international news programs? It 
seems that the decision-makers in Washington and other NATO capitals, who 
approved bombing of RTS, did not bother to read reports about events in 
Belgrade from 1991. If they had done, it would be clear that RTS - TV Bastille 
had discredited itself so much that it did not have much influence, credibility or 
impact on the citizens of Serbia - apart from weather bulletins. The main claim 
of the NATO spokesman Jamie Shea that Milosevic is hiding the truth from his 
people was false, but rather a clear case of spin-doctored news planted by 
politicians aimed at their domestic audiences.  
 
After the bombing of FR Yugoslavia ended on 8 June 1999, following 
Milosevic's agreement to pull out his forces from Kosovo and allow the UN to 
administer the province, RTS once again tried to portray him as peacemaker, 
and someone who bravely stood against NATO. The Yugoslav military was 
allowed to pull out its personnel and equipment from Kosovo without formal 
surrender, so TV Bastille used the opportunity to proclaim that as another great 
victory of President Milosevic.  
 
The real reason why the Yugoslav Army came out of this conflict with minimal 
loss of personnel and equipment is that there was no direct head-to-head 
confrontation with NATO forces, but only an air-campaign.40 The Yugoslav air 
force, with its outdated planes did not even attempt to engage in dogfights with 
the NATO squadrons. Its ground air defence could not do much about most the 
advanced NATO equipment.41 Since there was no confrontation, loss or 
capitulation - RTS in its customary Orwellian manner proclaimed victory. In 
                                               
40 Officially, NATO lost only one B-1 (invisible) Stealth bomber, which was hit by accident and downed in Serbia. A handful of other planes were hit, 
but made it back to their bases, without loss of pilots or aircraft.  
 
41 The pullout of Yugoslavian Army from Kosovo was regulated by the Kumanovo Technical Accord, signed on 6 June 1999, which was the 
precondition for the UN Security Council resolution no.1244. This resolution still nowadays serves as the legal base for UN administration of 




reality, Serbia was badly devastated by 77 days of bombing, its road 
infrastructure obliterated, and many industrial objects flattened. RTS lost most 
of its transmitters, including the symbolic TV tower on mount Avala near 
Belgrade. Attempts by RTS to proclaim victory and to lay blame for loss of lives 
and damage on NATO were laughed at by the citizens of Serbia. Everyone 
knew the truth and who was responsible for war and damage, except that 
person and his inner circle, who started believing in their own lies.  
 
The atmosphere in Serbia after the NATO bombing in 1999 looked ripe for 
change. The regime's attempts to rebuild the country were inefficient, since its 
financial resources were exhausted. The state electrical power grid was working 
with great difficulties and could not supply enough electricity for heating of 
homes and industrial production, so in the winter of 1999/2000 power cuts were 
long and annoying the population already at the brink of economic survival. 
Average salary was around £30 per month, while industrial output in Serbia was 
at around 40% of output in 199042. State-owned enterprises had approximately 
75% of total capital, while their share in GNP was 30%. The small private sector 
with only 25% of total capital produced 70% of GNP. In addition to those 
economic figures, the population of Serbia also diminished for around one 
million people from 1991 until 2002.43 The citizens had enough of the dictator 
and his rule, which had brought onto them only misery and suffering. But the 
opposition political parties in Serbia were still divided and quarrelling among 
themselves. Instead of focusing on bringing down the regime, their game was 
about securing positions in post-Milosevic Serbia, and getting a share of power 
and privileges.  
 
The international community wanted to help Serbian people to get rid of the 
dictator who committed horrendous atrocities in Kosovo, and had to be stopped. 
Additionally, the international community also wanted to convince the Serbian 
citizens that the bombing wasn't aimed at the Serbian nation, but at the regime. 
                                               
42 Annual statistics data from the Serbian Statistics Bureau for the year 2000. 
 
43 Source for the figures above is the Statistic Bureau of Serbia, which conducts population census every ten years. The last population census in 




With Serbian political parties constantly bickering, it was difficult to find a 
reliable partner to lead the way. This is where a new political movement, but not 
a party, called Otpor44 surfaced, as a leader-less, authentic grass-root, informal 
entity. It consisted mainly of young people who could not tolerate any more the 
life under dictatorship, terrible perspective of continued decay and humiliating 
life in Serbia. They were joined by liberal intellectuals and even older people 
who realized that opposition political parties were obsessed with themselves 
and could not initiate the change.  
 
Once Otpor started doing many manifestations of resistance, civic unrest and 
protest against the regime all over Serbia in early 2000, the whole public gained 
confidence to get up and do something. When the regime wanted to crack down 
on this unregistered (and in that way illegal) organization, it was faced with a 
major difficulty: Otpor was not a party, had no official membership, nor program, 
no address, no phone number, apart from habit of gathering in apartments of its 
activists and city cafés. Occasionally, the police would confiscate some posters, 
badges, posters, buckets with glue and brushes - but there were no leaders to 
be prosecuted, just activists who could be only charged with misdemeanours. 
Western governments realized that they finally had a partner worth supporting 
in order to help Serbia become a democratic country. Activists of Otpor were 
given aid, training and advice on how to build up the momentum.45   
 
The opportunity to oust the dictator in a legal way, through elections, came in 
July 2000, when Milosevic one year ahead of time, called federal presidential 
elections. He wrongly believed that his people loved him for the victory against 
NATO and great achievements in rebuilding the country - at least that was what 
RTS was telling the public. Elections for federal president and federal 
parliament were to be held on 24 September 2000, and Milosevic thought that 
bitterly divided opposition could not do much. Nevertheless, he underestimated 
the power of Otpor, who managed to energize disillusioned citizens to come out 
and vote, as well as bring together bickering opposition to unite against 
                                               
44 Otpor in translation from Serbian means “Resistance”. 
 
45 Because of constant prosecution of all opposition activities, training programs for Otpor activists was provided in Montenegro and Hungary, 




Milosevic on one coalition ticket. 
  
Zoran Djindjic and his Democratic party became the backbone of the DOS 
(Democratic Opposition of Serbia) coalition of 19 parties and movements46. 
Their candidate to run against Milosevic wasn't Djindjic, considered too modern 
and pro-Western for the taste of an average Serbian voter. The joint candidate 
was Vojislav Kostunica, leader of the conservative Democratic Party of Serbia, 
which did not play a major role in 1996/1997 events. Vuk Draskovic, leader of 
the Serbian Renewal Movement, the leading Serbian opposition party of the 
early 1990s did not join DOS, for two reasons. First - his party was engaged in 
some kind of cohabitation with Milosevic from 1997 until 1999, when Draskovic 
even served as Federal Deputy Prime Minister. He was sacked by Milosevic on 
the eve of 1999 NATO campaign, and in summer of 2000 when DOS coalition 
was being forged, he was widely considered compromised. Second - Draskovic 
miraculously survived two assassination attempts in 1999 and in summer of 
2000, ordered by Milosevic, and was not psychologically fit to run, while 
demands of his party comrades tabled to the other parties in bid to fully 
integrate the opposition were considered too costly. 
 
The great showdown between Milosevic and DOS went according to a 
predictable scenario: DOS had upper hand, TV Bastille was reporting another 
great victory of the beloved president, and SPS activists at polling stations were 
trying to do their usual tricks of rigging. When official results were supposed to 
be published, DOS cried foul - and the matter was referred to "the institutions of 
the system", as in 1996/1997.  
 
First instance was Federal Election Commission, staffed with Milosevic's 
"permanent non-party affiliated members" and a few party affiliated delegates 
(from both DOS and SPS-led coalition). Exit polls and observers indicated very 
high voter turnout and absolute victory of Kostunica, but preliminary results from 
                                                                                                                                         
 
46 DOS was a very wide and ideologically quite diversified coalition of 18 parties, which only had in common desire to remove Milosevic. Once they 





the Federal Election Commission were delayed and misleading. Such behaviour 
triggered large-scale street protests all over Serbia, because people had 
enough. The protests continued and intensified in the next ten days. This time 
police did not dare to interfere. Milosevic pulled the last trick out of his hat and 
brought Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov to Belgrade to mediate. He tried 
to convince DOS to accept a second round of election in two weeks time, with 
just Kostunica and Milosevic running. The results from the Federal Election 
Commission acknowledged that those two candidates were leading, but neither 
had an absolute majority. Since results from the Federal Election Commission 
were false, DOS leadership flatly refused the Russian initiative and called a 
march on Belgrade for 5 October 2000. 
 
When the long caravans of angry protesters against yet another election fraud 
from virtually every major city of Serbia started to pour into the streets of 
Belgrade from early morning of 5 October - it was obvious that this time there 
would be no "lex specialis", or intervention from police to save the dictator. It 
turned out that even the state security structures (police) realized that the 
dictator has reached his sell-by date and that it was time for them to secure a 
future for themselves through not attacking the protesters and establishing the 
lines of communication with the DOS leadership (Bujosevic, Radovanovic, 
2003).   
 
Several hundred thousand protesters from all over Serbia swamped the city and 
the central gathering point was the huge plateau in front of the Federal 
Parliament building, where the Election Commission sat. The protesters 
stormed, ransacked and set the building on fire, met only by rather timid and 
sheepish response from the police, whose forces were positioned around and 
inside all major government institutions. The next target was TV Bastille - 
determined citizens marched on the dreaded building in Takovska no. 10, just 
around the corner from the parliament building. It was defended by the police 
and RTS' own security personnel, against the angry crowd led by a bulldozer of 
now legendary opposition figure Joe. The dreaded fortress RTS had fallen into 
the hands of protesters. Editor-in-chief of political programs, Milorad Komrakov, 
second in command after director Milanovic, was caught by the angry mob and 
beaten up, along with a few other RTS announcers who for years shamelessly 
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read lies and propaganda. Milanovic escaped at the last minute through a 
secret underground passage, before the TV Bastille was set alight. By late 
afternoon now liberated RTS was broadcasting from its detached production 
facilities in Kosutnjak, far away from the city centre and the headquarters that 
were set alight. The new personnel were brought in - made of those who were 
expelled from RTS and volunteered to return to their old firm and help its new 
beginning.  
 
On 6 October 2000, at the presidential office, Milosevic recorded a short 
statement carried by RTS' main evening news, acknowledging the following: 
“Institutions in charge have informed me that Vojislav Kostunica has won 
the presidential election and that I am going into retirement, which will give 
me a lot of time to play with my grandson Marko". 
This statement fell short of admitting defeat and surrender, but it meant that 
Milosevic has finally accepted the reality and was about to vacate the office and 




From the history of RTS / TV Bastille 1987–2000 it is visible how this key state 
media outlet and its dominant position was instrumentalized and misused by the 
Milosevic and his regime to come to power, maintain their rule and cling on to it 
way after their time was up. The story of RTS proves once again how state 
control over media is dangerous and undemocratic practice, which is possible 
only in dictatorships, where citizens are reduced to frightened subjects, political 
process frozen and institution of civic life marginalized. However, it also shows 
how free spirit of citizens cannot be shackled, no matter how large doses of 
propaganda and intimidation are administered through subordinated media.  
 
At certain point, the one who had relied on and authorized dissemination of 
blatant lies started to believe in own illusion, losing touch with reality, which 
he/she did not like anyway. That was exactly the breaking point, where the 
citizens and newly emerging alternative media outlets had enough of 
information terror, material poverty and deprivation of dignity – and ousted the 
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autocrat. The burning of TV Bastille and beating up of some of its key 
propagandists47 on 5 October 2000 was not only a symbolic gesture of 
purification, but also an act of liberation on behalf of all the citizens who were for 
so many years subjected to the RTS produced and dispensed lies. 
 
The independent media, together with Otpor and various civic (non-
governmental) organizations were crucial in energizing the Serbian public to 
rise against the regime. They were partners with the opposition parties in 
achieving freedom after 55 years of uninterrupted communist rule. One of the 
first and most valuable achievements of the citizens and the opposition parties 
on 5 October 2000 was liberation of the TV Bastille – RTS.  
 
At this point, it is necessary to look at what had been promised by the new 
authorities in regard to reform of the Serbian media system, and especially RTS 
as its backbone: 
 
 Complete and quick legislative overhaul of the media system: Drafting 
of new regulation would be done in partnership between professional 
organizations, NGO and under supervision of foreign experts before the 
parliament places it on the agenda and adopts it. Proposed and 
informally accepted time frame for drafting of what was commonly 
referred "the set of media legislations" was one year; 
 
 Transformation of the state-owned broadcaster RTS into a modern 
public service broadcaster. Immediate abandonment of the forced 
tax/subscription through electricity bills;  
 
 Other state-owned media outlets (either on federal, state or local level) 
would be privatized as soon as possible, and forced to compete on the 
market; 
 
 Restrictive 1998 Public Information Act would be repealed immediately, 
                                               
47 RTS General Director Dragoljub Milanovic was later tried and convicted for death of 12 RTS staff members during the 1999 NATO attack, 




and the media (and individuals) fined during its implementation 
compensated; 
 
 Temporary ban on all new electronic media going on-air, until a proper 
regulatory body is established, (analogue) spectrum plan made and 
transparent tender procedure for frequency allocation implemented. All 
those who illegally usurp frequencies (start broadcasting after this ban) 
would be disqualified from future tenders;  
 
 Introduction of the third mobile telephony operator in order to foil 
monopoly situation where Telecom Serbia controlled both existing 
mobile operators; 
 
 End Telecom Serbia's monopoly in fixed/landline telephony, internet 
providing – with an intention to transform it and eventually fully privatize; 
 
 The journalistic profession (and all other professions connected to the 
work of media) should become self-regulated and establish own codes 
of conduct, professional ethic and standards. 
 
Unfortunately, the events and enthusiasm of October 2000 did not mean 
immediate realization of idealistic dreams of democracy and bliss for all. The 
roots of the past had been planted deeply in every corner of the society, and a 
change in political and media culture was necessary for success of liberal 
democracy in making. Unfortunately, it takes long time to achieve structural 
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From the moment the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS) climbed to power 
in October 2000, comprehensive reform of the media sector was one of the 
priorities in the modernization of Serbia and the project to make it a liberal 
democracy. A promise to adopt comprehensive “Media laws package” was part 
of the DOS pre-election program. Later on, it turned out that not all of the 
politicians associated with DOS were truly committed to their election manifesto 
and its promises: 
 "Some of the politicians were serious about the media reform, but some 
 were not. The same can be said about other parts of the DOS election 
 program. "1   
In this chapter, I discuss the preparations and work of the expert group, which 
drafted the texts that after parliamentary procedure became the base of new 
media legislation in Serbia. The next section of this chapter addresses the 
theoretical concept of public service broadcasting, as the chosen model for 
transformation of the state broadcaster RTS. Then I analyze ideological and 
legal nature of the adopted acts. The next segment of this chapter deals with 
the introduction and work of the Broadcasting Council, which was introduced 
into the Serbian system as an independent regulatory body, but failed to act 
accordingly. Finally, I examine how the transformation of Radio Television 
Serbia (RTS) into a public service broadcaster (PSB) did not meet the expected 
target.  
 
                                               




3.0.1 Preparations for Legislative Reform 
The new DOS government convened in November 2000 a working group of 
media and legal experts, as well as representatives of non-governmental 
organizations, with the task of preparing draft texts of the so-called “Media Laws 
package”. The package consisted of: Public Information Act, Broadcasting Act, 
Telecommunications Act, Freedom of Information Act2 and Advertising Act.   
 
Such composition of the working group was a good sign of cooperation and 
mutual respect - government, journalistic profession and the civil sector working 
together in the process of drafting legislation. Deputy Prime Minister Zarko 
Korac, professor of Psychology at the University of Belgrade and an 
experienced TV personality3 was responsible for coordinating the work of the 
group, and once the drafts were finished for presenting them to the government 
and parliament for adoption. The Federal Minister of Telecommunications, Boris 
Tadic,4 proclaimed in December 2000 a temporary freeze on new broadcasting 
permits until new regulation was in place (VIP, 29 Dec 2000). Tadic promised 
no legal action against broadcasters who had already been on the air, even if 
they were illegal, and guaranteed that such outlets would be given preferential 
treatment once the allocation of frequencies was considered according to the 
forthcoming regulations. Some 1,200 media outlets5 were broadcasting in 
Serbia in October 2000. 
 
The working group was expected and briefed to produce drafts of 
“contemporary media regulation” – drawn from the best comparative regional 
                                               
2 Actually this act in Serbian is called “Zakon o slobodnom pristupu informacijama od javnog znacaja”, which in English 
translation is “Free Access to Information of Interest to the Public Act”. In practice this legislation is referred to as 
Freedom of Information Act. 
 
3 Throughout the 1980s Dr Korac was a popular presenter of TV Belgrade educational programs, long before he got 
involved in politics. During the 1990s, however, Korac was “persona non grata” on RTS because of his opposition 
credentials. 
 
4 Boris Tadic became Federal Minister of Telecommunications in October 2000, then became Serbian Minister of 
Defense in 2003, and finally in June 2004 was elected as the first post-Milosevic President of Serbia. He was re-elected 
again in 2008. Tadic became president of the Democratic Party (DS) in January 2004. 
 




and European experience and models. Two inter-governmental organizations, 
the Council of Europe (CoE) and Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (OSCE) and their permanent missions in Belgrade, provided expert 
advice and support to the working group in the process of drafting. Despite 
hopes from the media profession and citizens that the cluttered (broadcast) 
media scene could be rearranged relatively quickly, the work of the expert 
group was not exactly swift, exposing major differences in concepts and 
opinions from the political sphere.  
 "From the very beginning of DOS it became obvious that the new 
 government wished to maintain state control over the media. This was 
 obvious in their alterations of the proposed media laws, as they 
 attempted to maintain state control."6 
 
Part of the public expectation was that the Milosevic-associated media outlets 
that prospered during 1990s, like Zeljko Mitrovic’s RTV Pink, Bogoljub Karic’s 
BK Telecom and Marija Milosevic’s7 TV Kosava would be scrutinized by the 
new authorities. People felt that such broadcasters should be punished for 
illegally obtaining frequencies, not paying license fees, and tax evasion scams 
that made their owners multimillionaires at the expense of the state, while the 
media which had opposed the regime were constantly pursued and prosecuted. 
 
At the same time, independent broadcasters like Radio B92 and numerous 
regional and local stations8 expected to finally legalize their status, frequencies, 
and coverage, something that had been “mission impossible” for them in the 
past. They believed that once the new rules were set, the market forces would 
punish or reward the competing players. Very few thought that he Serbian 
economy, severely depleted after 13 years of Milosevic's rule and with GNP 
reduced to African levels, could generate enough revenue for commercial life of 
                                               
6 James Lyon, Head of the International Crisis Group office in Belgrade (2000-2007), quote the interview given for this 
research. 
 
7 Marija Milosevic is the daughter of Slobodan Milosevic. 
 
8 There were two competing associations of regional broadcasters in Serbia, the B92-led ANEM (Association of 




as much as 1,200 existing broadcasting outlets. Even the handful of 
broadcasters operating on the national frequencies could not know if the 
advertising revenue and the market could sustain their existence. 
 
3.0.2 Why British Regulatory Model?  
 
During the years of rule by Slobodan Milosevic, members of the country's civic 
society (intellectual, academic and opposition political circles) were dreaming of 
the day when Serbia will finally start its own transition journey. After the events 
of 1989, when the former Soviet block nations finally emerged from the decades 
of darkness, it seemed that emancipation of Serbia would follow in mater of 
months, or weeks. But unfortunately, it took almost 11 years and the whole 
tragic decade of 1990s. During this time in waiting, the members of the civic 
society were not sitting idle, but were discussing and contemplating future - 
through informal exchange of ideas, different conferences and gatherings, 
writing of academic studies and papers, writing for various domestic and foreign 
publications, preparing drafts of legislations for future parliament. The 
international actors were also keen in supporting, educating and developing the 
future political elite of Serbia, and provided numerous research grants, 
academic exchanges, scholarships for talented students, and internships for 
opposition parties' activists.  
 
So when the time for change in Serbia finally came, the quantity of intellectual 
production, concepts and even written material regarding comprehensive legal 
and institutional reform of the devastated country was huge. In terms of the 
media reform, the most quoted and appreciated regulatory model was British. 
The 1996 Platform on Media Reform, put forward by the Independent 
Association of Serbian Journalists (IJAS) to the public and opposition parties 
was the first step to anticipate future (Veljanovski, 2009). By 5 October 2000 
and the change of regime, several NGOs and civic groups already had fully 
developed legislative proposals for the reform of the media system - The 
Belgrade Centre for Human Rights, Yugoslavian Committee of Lawyers 
(JUKOM), Association of Independent Electronic Media (ANEM), IJAS and its 
subsidiary Belgrade Media Centre. Their collective initiative and proposal 
actually prompted the new authorities to form the working group for drafting the 
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new regulations, and many experts from the aforementioned NGOs were invited 
to join, along with the representatives of the state. 
 
Fascination with the British media, especially the BBC, has a long tradition in 
this corner of the world, going back to the times of the Second World War. In 
those days the BBC Radio broadcasts, including the ringing of Big Ben - 
Chimes of Freedom9 - symbolized the dream of liberation in German-occupied 
countries of Europe, including Kingdom of Yugoslavia. While Yugoslavia was 
occupied, its monarch and his government were operating from exile in London, 
and again, the BBC transmissions were the only way in those days for the 
citizens of an occupied country to hear their leaders, as well as for the leaders 
to communicate their ideas and work to the people, as Misha Glenny (1999) has 
written in his book about history of the Balkans.  
 
After the Second World War, Yugoslavia became a socialist republic, following 
the Yalta agreement in 1945, when the victories Allied powers - USA, Great 
Britain and USSR divided zones of influence in new Europe. During the course 
of the war, the royal government of Yugoslavia gradually lost support from 
Britain and USA, so the communist anti-fascist leader Marshall Tito ended up 
not only liberating the country from Germans, with a decisive support from the 
Red Army, but winning the bitter civil war against the royalists (Glenny, 1999). 
During the next 46 years of the socialist Yugoslavia's life (1945-1991), BBC 
World Service Radio remained the principal voice of the free world for its 
citizens, in addition to broadcasts by the Voice of America, Radio France 
International, Radio Free Europe and Deutche Welle. However, the global 
dominance of the English language and Anglo-Saxon culture was the key factor 
which made BBC much more popular than broadcasts in other languages. 
 
The BBC World Service Radio news broadcasts in English, and in native 
languages of many countries around the world, were and still are part of the 
                                               




Foreign Office's policy and paid from its budget10. But the production of high 
quality scientific, education and entertainment TV programs by BBC was one of 
the most successful British export products, which even the ideological 
opponents - socialist authorities of SFR Yugoslavia - did not proscribe, but 
instead bought for showing on domestic state-owned TV stations. For ex-
Yugoslavian viewers even non-BBC productions like Thames, Granada and ITN 
represented the seal of quality and had distinct British cultural flavour, leading to 
the general fondness towards British TV and its intrinsic values.  
 
In the run up to the actual beginning of drafting and adopting new regulatory 
system for the media in Serbia, the decision to accept the British model was 
made more on sentimental reasons, rather than on understanding the true 
nature of it. It seems that such claim was equally valid for the political actors, 
and for members of the media profession, experts and general public. There 
was no debate, nor opposing opinions on this issue. 
 
3.0.3 Public Service Broadcasting 
 
When the British Broadcasting Corporation (radio) was founded in 1922, it was 
a private (limited) company, and only in 1927 it became public company through 
adoption of the Royal Charter. Television service was added to the BBC 
programs in 1936. (Veljanovski, 2005). Its first General Director Lord Reith 
summarized the BBC's purpose in three words: educate, inform, and entertain. 
This remains part of the organization's mission statement to this day. It has also 
been adopted by broadcasters throughout the world, becoming a paradigm of a 
non-commercial service founded by state for the benefit of its citizens, 
controlled by the citizens and mainly financed by the citizens through taxes, or 
mandatory subscription.  
 
In the United Kingdom the term "public service broadcasting" (PSB) refers to 
broadcasting intended for the public benefit, rather than for purely commercial 
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concerns. PSB and commercial broadcasters in UK are regulated by the law, 
whose implementation is overseen by an independent regulatory body Ofcom. 
The existing laws require that particular television and radio broadcasters fulfil 
certain duties, as part of their license to broadcast. All of the BBC's television 
and radio stations have the so-called public service remit, including those that 
broadcast digitally. 
 
In the preface to the Serbian translation of the Toby Mandel's book "Public 
Broadcasting" it is written that the central idea of public service broadcasting is 
serving the needs and interests of the public. This main purpose is reflected in 
terms of ownership, financing and programming of such broadcasting 
organizations. "Public broadcasting represents the public sphere where 
discussions are carried, various ideas exchanged and information 
disseminated, which is of crucial importance for functioning of democratic 
society. In that sense, such broadcaster is public, works for public and in the 
name of public." (Mandel, 2001, pg. 2) 
 
Discussing the background that enabled formation of the specific British 
organization of the media system, Serbian communicologist Miroljub Radojkovic 
points at long tradition of parliamentary democracy: "All of that11 produces 
specific arrangements for control of the information/communication system, 
which is perceived as provision of any other public service deemed crucial for 
the society." (Radojkovic, 1984, pg.140). This analogy with other public services 
underlines the principle of access/provision for all citizens, and some form of 
public financing of such services. 
 
Before we examine the concept of public service broadcasting (PSB), its 
meaning and content, we need to establish where and how it actually came into 
use. The public service broadcasting is an artefact coming from political culture 
and practice of contemporary democratic societies. It represents one of 
organizational models through which citizens in representative democracies can 
fulfil their communication needs, enabling them to participate meaningfully in 
                                               




public life. All of the aforementioned notions like political culture, representative 
democracy, citizenship, communication needs and public life are here treated 
as predetermined (and unchallenged) postulations and staples of liberal 
democracy - a type of socio-political order.  
 
Paddy Scannel (1990), one of the leading proponents of public service 
broadcasting from the University of Westminster notes: "The essence of public 
television, according to Lord Reith, was to enhance formation of educated and 
well informed public opinion, as the key component of the political process in 
mass democracies." 
 
In the introduction to this research project, I have clearly stated that further 
discussions of many contested paradigms from classical and contemporary 
political theory are not its purpose. However, several of such notions need to be 
used12 in order to proceed. The concept of liberal democracy, which 
incorporates and/or includes all of the above mentioned controversial notions, 
has been previously named as one of several possible models of organizing 
socio-political life and relations in a certain state. When we discuss the process 
of post-authoritarian transition, liberal democracy is treated as the final 
destination, or idealized and chosen/preferred outcome of such process. 
 
It is also not sensible to open here another inexhaustible debate on relations 
between democracy and the media. I will just acknowledge once again that the 
media and provision, circulation and dissemination of impartial and unbiased 
information to and among citizens living in contemporary states are pillars of 
representative (liberal) democracy. This is where and why an organizational 
model for satisfaction of communication needs, like public service broadcasting, 
appears.  
 
Just like for many other concepts/paradigms of political science, there is no 
prevailing definition of public service broadcasting. Many authors and 
institutions have tried to define it through inventory of its main characteristics 
and duties. Public service broadcasters generally transmit programming with 
                                               




the idea to improve society by informing viewers. It is organized by the state for 
the benefit of its citizens (at their expense), but at least in theory PSB is 
envisioned as independent from the state's interference/influence. The purpose 
of commercial media outlets, on the other hand, is to provide popular content 
that attracts large audience, maximizing revenue from advertising and 
sponsorship. For this reason, the ideals of public service broadcasting are often 
hard to reconcile with commercial goals.  
 
At this point, it is appropriate to propose a catalogue of the PSB's defining 
characteristics or duties. I have chosen six main ones, based on Eric Barendt's 
(1997) classification and further modified by Toby Mandel (2001, pg. 7). The 
actual order of characteristics is mine. 
 1) Neutral / unbiased / impartial provision of news; 
 2) Independence from the state and commercial interests; 
 3) Universal service coverage across the given territory; 
 4) Concern for preservation and nurturing of nation's identity, community 
 and cultural values; 
 5) System directly funded by the corpus of users - i.e. license fee in 
 the case of the BBC; 
 6) Catering for all interests and tastes, including racial and linguistic 
 minorities. 
 
Public service broadcasting may be nationally and/or locally operated, 
depending on the country and the station. In some countries, PSB is dominated 
by a single organization (such as the BBC in the UK and the Australian 
Broadcasting Corporation in Australia). On the other hand, some countries have 
multiple public broadcasting organizations operating regionally (such as in 
Germany) or in different languages (Brown, 1996). 
 
Public broadcasters do not rely on advertising as the key source of revenue. 
This enables public service broadcasters to produce not exclusively profit-
oriented programs, like public affairs shows, documentaries, and educational 
programs. Public service broadcasters not chasing ratings like commercial 
broadcasters opens door to the criticism that they are unresponsive to what 
their viewers want, but also to the positive claim that they can explore issues in 
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greater depth and with more complexity than what is possible in commercial 
media. By doing so, they promote cultural contents that have social values not 
supported by markets. (Veljanovski, 2005) 
 
Proponents of liberal democracy argue that PSB supports democratic order, 
since public service broadcasters can engage in investigative journalism - in its 
"watchdog" role. In mature democracies, public service broadcasters are not 
under influence or pressures from political parties or the government of the day. 
This is especially true where PSB is financed by licensing fees, so theoretically 
they are not dependent on the government for any of its funding. (Veljanovski, 
2005). 
 
After this brief outline of what PSB stands for, and why the British model has 
been chosen in Serbia as the foundation of the new media system, we can now 
move forward to analyze the actual legislative output after during the 2000-2006 
period. 
 
3.1 IDEOLOGY AND THE NEW LEGISLATIONS  
 
In drafting the media regulation for a new democratic Serbia, the working group 
had to agree on and lay down the values that would determine the very nature 
of future legislation. Once this matter of ideology was resolved, the actual 
drafting looked like a mainly technical undertaking. 
 
The very first media legislation passed by the Serbian parliament was the 
Broadcasting Act in July 2002. The ruling DOS coalition was already divided, 
and the adoption came during the temporary absence of Kostunica’s 
Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) from parliament, due to a major dispute 
regarding mandates with their DOS coalition partners. (VIP News, 27 Jul 2002)  
 
Nevertheless, the Broadcasting Act, as a predominantly political and only 
marginally technical legislation meant to regulate the electronic media, could not 
commence its life. The appointment of members of the Broadcasting Council as 
the implementing agency was put off for another nine months, due to political 
misunderstandings among DOS members. Also, such an act could only function 
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in conjunction with the Telecommunications Act, which was its technical 
counterpart legislation.  
 
The adoption of the Telecommunications Act had to wait another year for the 
change of jurisdiction – from federal to republican, when it finally fell to the 
parliament of Serbia once the old federal (FRY) bodies ceased to exist. The fact 
that the Telecommunications Act was passed during the state of emergency in 
Serbia was just a coincidence, since it had been placed on the parliamentary 
agenda before the assassination of Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic. 
 
The Public Information Act was envisaged as one of those foundation laws, 
which enable citizens to be informed in an appropriate way, stipulates the duties 
of a democratic government in keeping citizens well informed, and lays down 
standards for the journalistic profession. Such legislations are typical for the 
continental legal tradition, as opposed to the common law system, which 
refrains from over-regulation.13 Its nature is ideological, because it defines the 
values of a “democratic society”, and attempts to secure the environment for 
democracy to function. It is bewildering that the Serbian parliament adopted two 
important media laws (Public Information Act; Telecommunication Act) and 
finally elected members of the Broadcasting Council during the state of 
emergency (13 March-23 April 2003). The answer why then and not before or 
after, is within the domain of political opportunism and marketing. 
 
To determine ideological content of the adopted legislation, we need to dissect 
their introductory articles. The question of order is also important and such 
analysis needs to start with the Public Information Act, although it was passed 
as the second from the so-called “package” in April 2003. Then one needs to 
examine the Broadcasting Act, which had been adopted a year earlier (2002), 
and finally turn to the Telecommunications Act, which was passed two days 
after the Public Information Act. The Access to Public Information Act and the 
Advertising Act (the last two pieces of the “package of media laws”) were 
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passed with a further delay of two years. These acts are not included in this 
analysis, since they represent a logical extension of the already ideologically 
defined system.  
 
3.1.1 Public Information Act 
 
The Public Information Act contains roughly one hundred clauses, including 
many procedural norms. The Article 1 stipulates that this act regulates the right 
(of a citizen) to public information. This right is defined as freedom to publicly 
express an opinion, as well as the rights and obligations of actors professionally 
engaged in informing the public. The right to public information covers freedom 
of expression, freedom to collect, examine, publish and disseminate ideas, 
information and opinions, freedom of printing and distribution of newspapers 
and other publications; freedom to produce and broadcast radio and TV 
programmes; freedom to receive ideas, information and opinions, and finally 
freedom to establish public information outlets and publishing companies.   
 
Such legal definition of public information seems to be encompassing and 
adequate to cover all of its possible variations and types. Public information is 
defined in Article 2 through unobstructed (free) access to facts and news for the 
citizens. This legal guarantee of unobstructed access is provided in the interest 
of citizens, without restriction (censorship). Interference of state and its organs 
is prohibited, either through direct acts, or through acts of undue 
influence/control over technical means for printing, broadcasting, or distribution 
that can endanger unrestricted (free) flow of ideas, information or opinions. This 
article establishes the mandate and duty of the judiciary system (courts) to 
solve disputes about freedom of information as an urgent matter. 
 
Definition of information is given in Article 4. It covers ideas and opinions 
relevant to the public, and sets the limits of such entitlement, regardless of the 
way information is obtained. In spite of possible understanding of such definition 
as the legal base for censorship, in my opinion the Article 4 adequately defines 
information – at least in a legal tradition like Serbian - based on the continental 
law system. Stipulations of Articles 5 and 6 regulate protection of groups with 
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special needs (ethnic and other minorities, handicapped etc.), and foreigners. 
Monopoly over any type in providing public information is strictly prohibited by 
Article 7, while Article 9 defines restricted right to privacy of government figures, 
due to the overwhelming interest of the public.  
 
A legal definition of what constitutes a publication including newspapers, 
magazines, radio and TV programs, agency services, and Internet information 
pages/services is found in Article 10. Such definition covers all means that 
through words, images or sound carry information, ideas and opinions meant for 
public distribution and consumption for unlimited number of users. Any domestic 
or foreign individual or enterprise can start a publication under Article 13. This 
article also bans the government and its agencies (from municipal to central 
level) from being the founder/publisher of publications if it is financed solely or 
mainly from public funds. However, broadcasting enterprises are exempt from 
this provision. In Serbia there are many state-owned media outlets, especially 
belonging to municipalities and not only in broadcasting. A time limit of one year 
was set by Article 90, forcing the state-owned media either to be privatized or 
cease trading. In subsequent implementation of this clause, the government 
and legislators extended this time limit several times, and at the time of writing 
(September 2008), privatization of municipal (state) media outlets still remains 
unfulfilled. 
 
Article 14 proclaims distribution (dissemination) of domestic and foreign 
publications as free and unrestricted. At the same time, Article 15 prevents 
distributors from refusing to disseminate any publication, apart these for purely 
commercial reasons. Distributors are prohibited to set economically 
unreasonable conditions for distribution. These clauses were inscribed into the 
new legislation as a direct consequence of the communist era restrictions, 
which were used as legal ground by the previous regime to prevent distribution 
of opposition minded publications, as well as foreign newspapers, magazines 
and books14. 
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The basic rights and duties of the journalist profession are covered by Articles 
20–24, with an idea to provide for self-regulation of journalists, editors and their 
professional association. The following group of articles (25–32) regulates 
special rights and obligations in the process of public information. They include 
temporary keeping of published materials, right of public offices and individual 
citizens to require a copy of the publication within set time limits. These norms 
also govern how presumption of innocence (until the court passes a verdict) 
must be treated in media coverage, provide protection of minors, prohibit hate 
speech and public displays of pornographic material.  
 
Regulations on the rights of individuals about whom information has been 
published are contained in Articles 33–80. This includes publication of 
information on private life, private correspondence, right to reply and correction, 
principle of equality of published information and correction/reply to it. These 
clauses prohibit editorial intervention and comments on reply/correction; set 
time limits on publication/refusal of reply/correction; secure right of individuals to 
demand publication of the end of criminal proceeding (not guilty verdict, trial 
dismissal etc.); right to compensation as a result of incorrect public coverage. 
Finally, these provisions outline liability of the publication, editor and journalist. 
 
To conclude analysis of the Public Information Act, I would like to observe that it 
creates an environment for unrestricted, but regulated public information flow. It 
adequately addresses most of the issues discussed in theory and practical 
debates on freedom of the media. The only norm that may be deemed as 
unnecessary and relict of the old era is Article 81, which endorses the notion of 
supervision of implementation of the Public information Act. The supervising 
authority is stipulated as “republican organ in charge of public information 
matters” - which is the Ministry of Culture and Media.  
 
It seems that such a supervision clause reflects a certain dose of suspicion 
towards the media. It keeps open a possibility for interference in the 
autonomous work of the media. However, Article 81 does not give the ministry 
any specific powers to do anything. Such “supervision” has no meaningful 
instruments for punishment/sanction. In other words, the ministry can observe 
and have an opinion, inform the cabinet or public about it, but cannot order any 
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media outlet or independent regulatory body to do anything. Such legally 
impotent supervisory clause produced several public disagreements between 
the Ministry of Culture and the Broadcasting Council, especially over 
broadcasting licenses. In the end, apart from the minister’s public outcries, the 
council’s decisions could not be overturned by acts of the ministry.15 
3.1.2 Broadcasting Act 
The first article of this act outlines what is the object of regulation: conditions 
and modes in which broadcasting is conducted, in accordance with international 
conventions and standards; establishment of the Serbian Broadcasting Agency 
and institutions of public broadcasting service; sets conditions and procedures 
necessary to obtain licenses for broadcasting of radio and TV programs; and 
finally provides regulation of all other issues involved in broadcasting.  
 
Ideological aspects of the act are outlined in Article 3, which proclaims that 
regulation is based on the following principles: 
 Freedom, professionalism and independence of the broadcasting 
media as guarantees for democratic development and social harmony; 
 Rational and efficient use of the broadcasting spectrum as a limited 
natural resource; 
 Censorship and/or influence of any kind aimed at broadcasters is 
forbidden, providing independence of work for their journalist and 
editorial staff; 
 Full affirmation of civic freedoms and rights, and especially freedom of 
expression and plurality of opinions; 
 Implementation of internationally accepted norms and principles of 
broadcasting, and especially those dealing with observance of human 
rights in the area of broadcasting; 
 Impartiality, prohibition of discrimination and full transparency of 
procedures governing procedure of granting broadcasting licenses; 
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 Giving support to the development of broadcasting and creativity in 
radio and TV production sector of Serbia. 
 
To properly understand and make sense of the act’s specific terminology, 
Article 4 defines 15 key terms and notions used in the act: 
 
1) Broadcasting – general notion for radio and television as electronic 
media of mass communication, achieved by analogue or digital transmission of 
text, speech, sound, still and moving images forming programming units for 
public consumption done over radio waves or through cable distribution system 
to adequate receiving units. 
2) Radio frequency – the basic physical parameter of electromagnetic 
waves, or radio waves that transmit freely through the space, and whose 
conventional values are within the range of 3 KHz to 3000 GHz. 
3) Zone of coverage – area around transmitter in which the minimal 
requirement of the signal intensity is higher than the other signals, making the 
reception possible without interference. 
4) Service coverage – area around transmitter where quality reception of 
the signal is realistic; Service coverage in reality is always smaller than the zone 
of coverage. 
5) Intended zone of service – geographical or administrative area for which 
the broadcasting service is meant. Intended zone of service, depending on 
needs, is the sole service zone, or the sum of service zones of different 
transmitters carrying the same signal (when transmitters are networked). 
6) Radio/TV network – two or more transmitters or relays (or combination) 
carrying the same programming simultaneously. 
7) Networking – establishment of temporary radio or television network 
through ground, cable or satellite links between two or more transmitters, in 
order to directly carry the programming. 
8) Broadcasting organizations (“broadcaster” in further reference) – 
individual or company registered for production and transmission of radio and 
TV programming, who in accordance with this act possesses adequate 
broadcasting license. 
9) Public Broadcasting Service – production, buying, processing and 
transmission of informative, educational, cultural/art, children’s, entertainment, 
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sports and other radio and TV programming of general interest to the public. 
Such activity is meant especially for support of human and civil rights, exchange 
of ideas and opinions, cultivation of political, inter-ethnic and religious tolerance, 
sexual equality, and for preservation of national identities. 
10) Independent productions – radio and TV programming meant for 
broadcasting and produced by individuals or companies registered for such 
activity, but who do not transmit the programming. 
11) Advertisement – promotional message aimed at representing and 
drawing attention at certain product, company or service, or in other words 
persuading a consumer to use or buy such product or service. 
12) Advertising – transmitting of advertisements for compensation (money 
or something else). 
13) Sponsorship – any type of participation of an individual or a company 
not involved in broadcasting (transmitting or production) business, or audio-
visual production, or involved in financing radio or TV programming for the 
purpose of promoting its name, reputation, brand, activity or products. 
14) Telesales – radio or TV presentation of usage or other value attached 
to a certain product or service in order to enhance sale of it. 
15) Cable distribution system (CDS) – mainly cable telecommunications 
network used for distribution of radio and TV programming, and for other 
telecommunication services. 
 
An independent body – Broadcasting Council – is given power to run the 
broadcasting affairs (Articles 6-37), which is a regulatory model borrowed from 
the UK and some other Western European countries. Unfortunately, from its 
first day of existence in 2003, the Broadcasting Council was far from an 
independent and impartial regulator, due to flaws in its election and 
accountability procedure. 
 
The Broadcasting Act in Articles 68-75 also outlines so-called “General 
Programming Standards”, applicable to all broadcasters and covering: station 
identification rules; networking; access to most important events; own language 
transmitting; original production; quotas of independent programming; and 




A large portion of the Broadcasting Act (Articles 76-96) defines public service 
broadcasting as the key concept inspired by the British (BBC) model. The idea 
behind choosing such a model was to lay a foundation for a comprehensive 
overhaul of the state-owned broadcaster Radio Television Serbia (RTS). I would 
add here another reason why such model was chosen: tradition of the old 
socialist state broadcasters included many features of PSB in terms of providing 
quality programming of culture, national heritage, non-commercial art, classical 
music and jazz music, sport, education, news bulletins for national minorities 
etc... The major difference between the old state broadcasters and the new 
PSB would be in news and political programming where there is no monopoly of 
one party, and (formal) independence from state organs and institutions.  
 
Article 78 of the Broadcasting Act spells out the duties assigned to public 
service broadcasters, as opposed to commercial ones: 
1) In addition to general programming standards outlined in Article 68, 
broadcasters must secure that the programming produced and transmitted, 
especially those of news nature, would be protected from any influence of the 
government, political organizations, or “centres of economic power”; 
2) They must produce and transmit programming for all the segments of 
society, without discrimination, especially bearing in mind the specific social 
groups like children, youth, minority and ethnic communities within area of 
service coverage; 
3) They must follow the language standards, not only of the dominant 
population, but also the ethnic and national communities within area of service 
coverage; 
4) They must secure fulfilment of cultural identity (language, alphabet etc.) 
programming needs of the population, as well as the ethnic and national 
communities; 
5) Secure programming time allocated for coverage of citizens 
associations and non-governmental organizations; 
6) During times prior to elections, broadcasters must secure free and 
equal promotion of all the political parties, coalitions and candidates whose lists 
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have been verified for federal16, republican or local election, while they are 
prohibited from broadcasting paid adverts if they are not connected to an 
election campaign; 
7) They must secure in their annual programming plans to broadcast a 
certain quota of independent productions, which must be commissioned through 
public tenders; 
8) If recommended by the Broadcasting Regulatory Agency, broadcaster 
must produce and transmit teletext service, either their own, or independently 
produced; 
9) They must secure use of the latest technological devices and 
equipment in preparation, production and transmitting of programming, and 
according to adopted time scale and plan make preparation for switch to digital 
broadcasting; 
10) They must observe traditional, spiritual, historic, cultural, humanitarian 
and educational role of religious organizations in society; 
11) They must cooperate between themselves and exchange 
programming that is of interest to the citizens of Serbia. 
 
Although the British model of public service broadcasting was used as the base 
for drafting the legislation, not all of its key features were faithfully copied. The 
main difference being is financing of pubic service broadcasters, which allows 
PSB to have (sell) commercial advertising time - which is not the case in Britain. 
On BBC1 and BBC2 TV channels, there are no commercials. Allowing 
advertisement-based financing for PSB, which is also financed through 
subscription, equals granting it privileges in comparison with commercial 
broadcasters (Veljanovski, 2005). By having an opportunity to seek advertising 
income, PSB takes away part of the available advertising revenue, from which 
commercial broadcasters are supposed to make a living.  
 
Strict prohibition of commercial advertising is a unique feature of the British PSB 
model. In comparative practice of public service broadcasting in former Eastern 
Europe, there are examples where PSB is allowed to sell advertising time and 
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supplement its revenue. But in order to prevent the privileged broadcaster 
(PSB) from suffocating the commercial competitors, it is necessary to set clear 
limits how much advertising time it may carry.  
 
The Serbian Broadcasting Act has allowed the designated PSB broadcaster 
Radio Television Serbia (RTS) to use up to 10% of broadcast time (or 6 minutes 
per hour) for advertising. The commercial broadcasters, on the other hand, 
have legal restriction of up to 20% of broadcast time (or 12 minutes per hour) 
for advertising. I will return to this striking disbalance of the allocated advertising 
time and its consequences shortly, after I briefly recapitulate another important 
issue regulated by the Broadcasting Act.  
 
Articles 97-103 deal with prevention of illegal concentration of media ownership, 
which is a common feature of most contemporary legislation in Europe. The 
presence of such norms reflects the concern of legislators over possible threats 
to democracy, which is a universally present topic in political, legal and public 
discourse of most functioning democracies. Whether the adopted norms of the 
Serbian media system are adequate, comprehensive and without loopholes - it 
is a question not only for legal theory, but also for political discussion. The 
normative part looks sound at first sight, but the implementation in Serbia is 
always problematic, especially with a newly established regulatory body, the 
Serbian Broadcasting Council.17 
 
The Advertising Act was originally set to be part of the “Media Laws package”, 
promised to be considered and adopted within one year after the October 2000 
changes. It was adopted as the very last part of the "Media Laws Package" only 
in September 2005, without much discussion in parliament or in public, since it 
was treated as just an auxiliary and complementary act in the already defined 
media system. 
 
Basic norms regulating allocation of advertising time were included in the 
Broadcasting Act (Articles 104-112). These norms require special attention, 
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because they de facto define functioning of the Serbian public broadcasting 
system and its relation vis-à-vis commercial broadcasters. The main sticking 
issue here is total duration of advertising segments during broadcasts. 
According to the adopted legislation, public service broadcasters can use up to 
10% of the time18, with certain restrictions, while commercial broadcasters can 
use up to 20% of the time. It is an extremely high allocation for both, which 
makes programming disrupted and fragmented, turning away listeners and 
viewers. The UK regulation governing the maximum advertising time for 
commercial broadcasters sets it at three minutes per hour, or 5%, while PSB 
can only use no more than two minutes per hour to publicize its own programs 
on non-commercial terms (Veljanovski, 2005).  
 
There are several problems with such allocation of advertising time. First of all, 
such a great amount of time for both PSB and commercial broadcasters leads 
to dominance of state-wide broadcasters, who can pick up not only large 
corporate clients, but even medium-sized and local advertisers, since there is a 
vast amount of seconds to be sold. This spells death for regional and local 
media, who cannot find even small advertisers. With no potential economic 
base, this makes privatization of the media outlets owned by regional and 
municipal authorities, as the law has stipulated, something like a "mission 
impossible".  
 
Under excuse that the former state broadcaster RTS needs additional funds 
(not only income from subscription and/or state budget's appropriation) in order 
to develop and achieve transformation into PSB, the government's expert group 
which drafted the text, and subsequently the legislators who adopted it, made a 
decision to allow PSB commercial advertising. Such choice was based on 
comparative practice of other post-authoritarian states, and did not face 
criticism from either public or international experts and consultants who were 
present during the preparation process. Since majority of the general public, as 
much as the Serbian MPs, do not know what are the standards of PSB 
elsewhere, nor they have ever lived in an environment where TV program is 
                                               




completely free of advertising - they allowed such a flawed stipulation (to allow 
advertising on PSB) to become a law without any opposing voices. 
 
The mistake was made in allowing so much time (10%) to the designated PSB. 
Six minutes of advertising over one hour is disruptive for any type of 
programming, making viewers lose interest and change channel. The legislators 
correctly implemented the existing practice that commercial broadcasters 
should be allowed twice as much as PSB. But when PSB has six minutes per 
hour, which is already annoying and intolerable for continuity of any program, 
then the option to have 12 minutes per hour of advertising is not only wrong, but 
useless. No sane advertising agent or programming official would have 12 
minutes of advertising per hour on his/her channel, since the viewing numbers 
would be permanently destroyed. 
 
Additionally, such a lenient allocation of advertising time could lead towards 
depreciation of advertising prices in general, which means prolonged 
undermining of commercial broadcasters - making them poorly equipped, 
professionally incapable and underpaid. At the same time, this cannot make 
former monopolists like RTS more efficient, neither forward looking, but turns 
them into defenders of their privileged position - with income coming from both 
subscription and commercial sources. Commercial broadcasters, on the other 
hand, might not be able to afford capital investment for development and better 
salaries for their staff. 
 
It seems that the Serbian legislators actually got confused between the two 
different organizational models for the broadcast media - public service 
broadcasting and the commercial model. In the long run, the allocation of 
advertising time which has been adopted can only perpetuate the dominance of 
RTS over commercial broadcasters, which are forced to compete in the 
commercial arena, but not on equal terms. 
. 
Perhaps the optimal solution was to allow PSB to have no more than 100 
seconds per hour for advertisements, and the commercial broadcasters up to 
300 seconds (or less than 10% of time). It would make commercial seconds 
more valuable for both PSB and commercial broadcasters, allowing them to 
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keep the largest corporate clients and sponsors, while the program would not 
be so fragmented and at risk of losing the eye balls of the audience. At the 
same time, more balanced distribution of the advertising revenue would enable 
regional and local broadcasters to develop their marketing strategies and 
capture clients who cannot afford the national advertisement, nor need it for 
their products or services. 
 
The remaining stipulations on advertising found in the Broadcasting Act are 
drafted in accordance with standards found in other contemporary media 
systems. These norms give adequate protection to consumers and minors, 
prevent interference of sponsors in programming and prohibit political adverts 
outside election campaign periods. 
3.1.3 Telecommunications Act 
The Telecommunications Act was finally passed in April 2003, following delays 
and change of jurisdiction. The legislation sets technical standards and provides 
competition under equal conditions for all operators. It also defines procedures 
and technical requirements for allocation of licenses to use (commercially 
exploit) limited natural resources, such as the frequency spectrum. The 
Telecommunications Act regulates “universal service” – a standard set of 
telecommunication services that must be generally available, as well as 
compatibility and inter-connectivity between various types of telecom networks 
and operators. One of the main features of this act is the set of principles for 
allocation of frequencies to interested operators and media (broadcasters).  
 
The principles for regulation of telecommunications are defined in Article 3 of 
the Telecommunications Act: 
a) Securing of adequate conditions for development of the telecom sector 
in Serbia; 
b) Protection of users’ (consumers’) interests; 
c)  Providing conditions for fulfilment of (telecom services) users’ interests; 
d) Enhancing of competition, efficiency and value-for-money in 
conducting/providing telecom services; 
e)  Securing maximum quality of telecom services; 
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f)  Securing network inter-connectivity and compatibility under same and 
mutually acceptable conditions; 
g) Securing rational and efficient exploitation of the radio frequency 
spectrum; 
i) Synchronization of telecom services with the international practices, 
standards and technical norms.  
 
In Article 4, the Telecommunications Act spells out 50 terms and notions 
applicable to the telecom sector. Since the act is of a mainly technical nature, 
these 50 terms represent an accurate translation of international standards and 
notions. 
 
The Telecommunication Agency (RATEL)19 as the regulator was to be formed 
immediately after the adoption of the Telecommunications Act, but as usual in 
Serbia, its formation was delayed.20 Its first task was to draw a plan for 
allocation of available frequencies and it took RATEL around one year to 
finalize the plan, since it must be coordinated with the international 
telecommunications governing bodies. 
 
Frequencies for electronic media are awarded through a two-tier procedure. 
First the Telecommunications Agency approves a telecom license for a certain 
frequency, based on technical requirements. Then the Broadcasting Council 
awards a broadcasting license, based on submitted programming scheme and 
requirements. Licensing of broadcasters in Serbia only began in 2006, and 
again became a highly politicized and controversial matter. 
 
Since “international standards and contemporary practice” were proclaimed as 
guiding principles in drafting new media legislation, it is odd that the Serbian 
Telecom’s monopolistic position was inscribed in the new law. However, it was 
established that such a monopoly would be only temporary, until the end of 
2005. This came as a result of sale of 49% stake in Serbian Telecom in 1997 by 
                                               
19 Acronym RATEL stands for Republican Agency for Telecommunications. 
 




the government of Slobodan Milosevic, who granted foreign investors21 such a 
privilege - guaranteed until 2005. But when this legally sanctioned monopoly of 
Serbian Telecom came close to expiry, its management demanded that the 
government and legislators should grant them an extension on the grounds that 
it would increase the company’s value in the run-up to privatization. Three years 
later (2008) Serbian Telecom still enjoys its monopolistic position, while full 
privatization has not happened. 
 
Unfortunately, the Serbian Telecommunications Agency (RATEL), as a 
regulator, did very little to curb the monopolistic behaviour of Serbian Telecom, 
which in the past several times acted illegally against the interests of its 
competitors and end-users. Recent complaint (2006) of the Serbian Association 
of Internet Providers, who could not force Serbian Telecom to act in an 
unobtrusive and lawful way, despite court orders and verdicts shows that 
monopolistic behaviour is alive and well in Serbia.  
 
RATEL’s strange behaviour became even more controversial and created a 
public outcry in July 2008, when the regulator issued an order (without any legal 
basis, or public consultation) to all providers of the Internet to install at their own 
expense equipment that the government’s security services could use (without 
obtaining a proper court order) to eavesdrop on Internet traffic. The Association 
of Serbian Independent Media (ANEM) and all of the country’s non-
governmental organizations and civil rights movements protested vigorously 
and issued a protest statement on 27 July 2008:22 
“By issuing these directions, RATEL has exceeded its authority: the 
privacy of communication can be limited only by law, and not by the way of 
sub-legal enactments. This direction does not include any provisions on 
the protection of Serbian citizens' privacy, and it does not mention that 
Internet service providers are allowed to give information on their 
subscribers and their communication to state authorities only on the basis 
                                               
21 In 1997 Greek Telecom had bought 20% and Italian Telecom 29% share of Serbian Telecom. The Serbian 
government bought back the Italian share in 2003, becoming again majority owner. 
 





of a court decision. On the contrary, by the way of these directions, RATEL 
gives the keys to Serbian Internet to the Security and Intelligence Agency, 
at the expense of Internet service providers themselves, i.e. their 
subscribers. This kind of limitation of civil rights and freedoms would have 
been alarming even in the most developed democracies, and even more 
so in Serbia, whose security agencies were politically abused for decades. 
“ 
 
Following an avalanche of protests, RATEL backed down and withdrew this 
controversial order, saying that they did not want to breach privacy laws, but 
were concerned only with technical aspects. In any other democratic country, 
such an “independent regulatory” body and its members would be expected to 
resign for such gross incompetence and illegal order that infringed on 
constitutionally guaranteed civil rights and freedoms.   
 
3.2 FLAWED MAKEOVER OF RTS 
 
Attempt to reform Radio Television Serbia (RTS) and convert it from a state-
owned and politically controlled outlet into a public service broadcaster (PSB) in 
a way epitomizes the whole reform process of the Serbian media. The new 
legislative framework adopted in Serbia from 2002 on, provided an opportunity 
to achieve a long overdue overhaul of RTS. However, solemn reform promises 
of the political actors, their legislative output, as well as understanding the 
nature of the PSB model, were not exactly in harmony.  
 
In her country report on Serbia, made for the Open Society Institute’s pan-
European study “Television Across Europe”, Snjezana Milivojevic exposes the 
initial problems of RTS’s transformation: 
“The Broadcasting Act foresaw the transformation of RTS into a public 
service broadcaster by 30 January 2003 at the latest. However, as this 
proved impossible, RTS has been operating in a legal limbo since 
February 2003. It cannot be considered a public service institution, but is 
also no longer a state-owned and controlled broadcaster. It will remain 
impossible to proceed with the transformation without a fully effective and 
legally established broadcasting council – that is the Republican 
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Broadcasting Agency Council – and properly appointed RTS management 
and governing bodies.” (Milivojevic, 2006) 
 
Here we stumble across the first obstacle in implementation of the newly 
passed legislation. The independent regulatory body (Republican Broadcasting 
Agency’s Council) – as envisioned by the drafters of the Broadcasting Act – 
during the parliamentary proceedings changed its nature and became different 
in terms of its composition (appointed members), as well as in its nature. Its 
proposed provisions of independence were curtailed, while the number of 
members increased with additional appointees with political backgrounds.  
3.2.1 The Broadcasting Council – Instrument of Obstruction 
When the Broadcasting Act was eventually passed in July 2002, parliament 
could not agree about the names of the council members, and effectively 
obstructed the inception of the Broadcasting Agency’s Council for the next nine 
months. Once the members were formally appointed,23 it turned out that some 
of them were not eligible, and the legal procedure was not followed in a proper 
way.  
 
As an act of protest against illegal the inception of the regulatory body, media 
law expert Vladimir Vodinelic and media scholar Snjezana Milivojevic 
immediately resigned from the Broadcasting Council’s membership. Such 
scandal did not prevent controversial former director of the Belgrade 
University’s Radio Index Nenad Cekic and several of his associates from 
becoming members of the already compromised regulatory body and acting like 
it had full respect and credibility. When asked about the concept of having an 
independent regulatory body for broadcasting in Serbia, former Prime Minister 
Zoran Zivkovic frankly admitted in the interview for this research: 
                                               
23 Appointments were made during the state of emergency after the assassination of Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic 




“That farce is something that we reluctantly accepted to implement 
because of pressures from EU. In many mature democracies governments 
still regulate the media scene.” 
After the composition of the government changed in 2004 and Vojislav 
Kostunica’s conservative cabinet took over from Zoran Zivkovic, Cekic and the 
Broadcasting Council remained in their positions. Following the 2004 and 2005 
amendments of the Broadcasting Act they were re-appointed, but now as 
nominees of the DSS and their coalition partners.24 Their failure to bring order 
into broadcasting, as promised by the politicians in 2000 and required by the 
Broadcasting Act from 2002, and failure to initiate proceedings for the allocation 
of frequencies and broadcasting licenses until 2006 was not good enough 
reason for the Serbian parliament to question the Council’s work and 
composition.  
 
Snjezana Milivojevic claims that such behaviour of the lawmakers indicates 
political reluctance to set up independent regulatory structures. The government 
and parliament tried instead to preserve their influence over the media by 
prolonging the dubious legal and market conditions inherited from before 2000 
(Milivojevic, 2006). With such a compromised Broadcasting Council, and its 
president Cekic attuned and keen to comply with whispers from his political 
puppet masters, it was easy to do so. Even when the Broadcasting Council 
finally began to carry out its mandate in 2006 – considering and approving 
applications for national broadcasting licenses – it again turned into several 
scandals.25  
                                               
24 This researcher got personally sucked into the controversies over membership in the Broadcasting Council twice. In 
2003 a group of non-governmental organisations unsuccessfully proposed me as a candidate for membership, based on 
my academic credentials. In 2005 I was again proposed as a candidate to the parliamentary committee in charge of 
media by the former journalist and SDP MP Ljiljana Nestorovic. At that time I was working as analyst with the 
International Crisis Group. I got “green light” from the ICG’s headquarters in Brussels for possible appointment, since 
another ICG was a member of the Broadcasting Council in Kosovo. The reaction of the committee members from the 
Serbian Radical Party (SRS) and Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) was that “foreign spies and George Soros’ 
protégés” cannot hold any public offices in Serbia. 
 
25 A nation-wide radio broadcasting license was granted to now privatized Radio Index, although it was only a local 




The decision to award a national broadcasting license to newly established 
outlet like TV Avala, owned by Milosevic’s former advisor and magnate Danko 
Djunic, who had no media experience or background whatsoever, created much 
turmoil. On the other hand, several applications, like the German media 
operator RTL's, to have a state-wide franchise in Serbia were dismissed on 
dubious formalistic grounds. Another suspicious decision of the Council 
awarded was to give a single frequency and broadcasting license to two outlets 
– TV Kosava and one more brand new operator, Happy Television. After the 
events of October 2000, TV Kosava, originally founded by the Milosevic’s 
daughter Marija changed owners, despite an explicit legal ban proclaimed by 
the Federal Ministry of Telecommunications. The identity of TV Kosava’s new 
owner was never revealed, although many suspect that RTV Pink mogul Zeljko 
Mitrovic is behind it. Since TV Kosava could not fulfil the legally prescribed 
programming requirements for a national broadcasting license, a compromise 
was found through awarding half of the broadcasting time to Happy TV, which 
proposed to produce an exclusively children’s content during daytime. The 
owner of this outlet is former television and film producer Bojan Maljevic, while 
his actress-daughter Bojana is editor-in-chief. Similar sharing of a single 
frequency exists in European media practice with Cartoon Network and Turner 
Movie Classics - who share the same satellite/cable channel.26  
 
More than two years (2008) after awarding the national broadcasting licenses 
on rather dubious criteria, no one publicly questions such decisions any more. 
The notoriously slow and partial Serbian judicial system has kept the curtain 
down on any legal challenges. Any public criticism of the council’s work or 
decisions coming from the media outlets that felt unfairly treated, from the 
journalism profession, academic or NGO circles were vehemently dismissed by 
the regulator’s president and his deputy as unlawful attacks on their 
independence. In the minds of Mr. Cekic and his team, such independence 
became an unlimited license to do whatever they wished, equal to divine 
                                                                                                                                         
Broadcasting Council had connections with the station in the past, although they formally relinquished them when they 
were appointed to the regulatory body. 
 




impunity for their acts. In reality, it only proved how much the council and its 
president were dependent on the political will of their masters. After Democratic 
Party (DS) returned to power following parliamentary elections in 2008, the 
council’s president wanted to re-establish his position as the government’s 
reliable media commissar. On his own initiative, Cekic initiated an attack on 
RTS through a paid advert, calling for the replacement of the broadcaster’s 
governing body. To the contrary of his expectations, Cekic was left without 
political cover. The advert of the Broadcasting Council was recalled as a 
procedural mistake and Cekic was demoted to ordinary member of the council, 
while the representative of the Serbian Orthodox Church was promoted as its 
new president. 
 
By the summer of 2008, the Broadcasting Council had still not finished the 
process of licensing the regional and local broadcasters in Serbia, something 
that was due to be done within one year after the adoption of the 
Telecommunications Act (in 2003).  
3.2.2 RTS as National Instead of Public Service Broadcaster 
Immediately after October 2000, RTS was put under a new management 
appointed by the DOS coalition, with the task of preparing the state-owned 
media giant for a forthcoming transformation. “New management” actually 
meant bringing in the old RTS personnel who had been purged during the 
1990s by Milosevic’s directors Vucelic and Milanovic. The new general manager 
was the former evening news anchor Aleksandar Crkvenjakov, while the 
position of the editor-in-chief of the news and political programs was given to 
another “old guard RTS” journalist, Gordana Susa, who in the meantime had 
become director of an independent TV production/enterprise. The rationale 
behind such a decision was that those people had an insider’s knowledge of 
how the old RTS machinery functioned. And this was just a temporary measure, 
since the new legislative framework for the transformation of RTS into a PSB 
was eagerly awaited by both the general public and the media profession.  
 
A debate how to reform RTS among the DOS leaders who considered 
themselves as knowledgeable about the media immediately began. Vice-
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Premier Zarko Korac was in charge of the government-expert drafting group, 
which favoured and formally pushed for the PSB model. Former Television Novi 
Sad journalist and the leader Vojvodina Reformist Party (member of DOS) Mile 
Isakov27 agreed, but warned that the only way for such a transformation to 
succeed was to fire everyone employed by the RTS, advertise for new positions 
and re-hire only those individuals who had not been compromised during the 
Milosevic’s years. Such a model succeeded in France when their state 
broadcaster was transformed into PSB.  
 
As a former journalist and the president of the Vojvodina’s Independent 
Journalists Association, Isakov certainly knew better than the psychologist 
Zarko Korac. However, Korac’s influence prevailed28 - and all of the people who 
had worked in RTS during the 1990s remained, including the notorious editor of 
the political programs Milorad Komrakov29.  
 
The view of Mile Isakov was ridiculed as too radical, and he joined the Djindjic’s 
cabinet too late to stop Korac from imposing his own views on the media reform 
and transformation of RTS. Unfortunately, the unsuccessful transformation of 
RTS has shown whose opinion was correct. The question of lustration, or 
cleansing of the state structures from non-trustworthy holdovers, haunts the 
Serbian transition to this day. It is not only the case in the sphere of media, but 
in all other aspects of governance and administration. Extremely watered-down 
and symbolic gesture like the 2003 Act on Lustration only perpetuates the 
prevailing political culture in Serbia of avoiding internal confrontations at all 
costs (B92 News, News, 31 May 2007).30 However, such a phenomenon 
                                               
27 TV Novi Sad was a regional (Vojvodina) subdivision of RTS and Mile Isakov worked there for 20 years, until he was 
fired in 1994 because of his anti-Milosevic views. Isakov was one of the DOS leaders, but joined the government as 
Vice-Premier only in 2002, following a re-shuffle of the first Djindjic’s cabinet. 
 
28 Korac's political party Gradjanski Savez was as marginal as Isakov's, but Korac had backing of PM Djindjic, who was 
his personal friend from high school days. 
 
29 However, Komrakov did not work in the news operations any more, but was detetched to work as a clerk at RTS' 
antenna and broadcasting premises, outside Belgrade.  
 
30 In 2003 The Lustration Act was passed by the Serbian parliament, but the commission in charge of this issue was 




deserves a separate study, beyond the scope and limits of this work. In my 
view, such empty, half-hearted and purely symbolic acts of political theatre 
support Colin Spark's (2008) claims of elite continuity in former-socialist 
countries. 
 
In the meantime, international aid to RTS came in the form of donations for new 
equipment, as well as extensive training of its old and new staff provided by 
BBC professionals and other foreign experts. The OSCE’s Mission to FRY even 
detached one of its media experts to sit permanently at RTS headquarters to 
assist the process. Once the new Broadcasting Act was passed in 2002, it 
looked as the scene was ready for restructuring of RTS. However, as pointed 
out earlier in this chapter, the Broadcasting Act could not be enacted until its 
technical counterpart - Telecommunications Act - was adopted a year later. 
After the assassination of Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic in March 2003, followed 
by the state of emergency and temporary censorship and media restrictions, the 
cabinet of Djindjic’s successor Zoran Zivkovic did not have much time until the 
December 2003 extraordinary election. The elections meant a drastic change of 
political climate in Serbia. The reformist spirit of the fast-paced, liberal 
philosopher-turned politician Zoran Djindjic was replaced by the slow, 
nationalistic, backward looking and clerical conservatism of Vojislav Kostunica, 
who remained the Serbian prime minister for the next four years31.  
 
Not only in terms of media reform, but also in the overall process of legal, 
economic and social transition, Serbia was drastically slowed down. The 
conservative government verbally endorsed continuation of reforms, while in 
reality impeded it, wasting time on inflammatory debates about patriotism, the 
position of Serbs in Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo; obstructing cooperation with 
the ICTY at The Hague and playing the old Milosevic game of quasi-patriotic 
resistance to the Western powers. ICG's report on Serbia from May 2007 
                                               
31 Kostunica’s first cabinet was formed in March 2004, and lasted until April 2007. In his second term, he lasted only 
one year, when the governing coalition dissolved over the issue of handling Kosovo independence. In May 2008, 





rightfully carried headline "Serbia's New Government: Turning from Europe 
Europe" (ICG Briefing no. 46, 2007).  
 
The resurgence of Russia as an economic and political super-power during 
Vladimir Putin’s presidency, after the period of decay under Boris Yeltsin, only 
reinforced Kostunica and his allies to further divert and delay the process of 
transition and preparations for future EU membership.  
 
How much the new government cared about the transformation of RTS into a 
public service broadcaster was evident when Aleksandar Tijanic, former 
Minister of Information under Milosevic and close adviser to tycoon Bogoljub 
Karic, was appointed as the general director of RTS. A capable and intelligent 
journalist, Tijanic was always known for his strong links with the old regime’s 
security apparatus. Although Tijanic was formally unqualified for the job,32 for 
Kostunica and his conservative friends Tijanic had the best informal 
recommendation for the job - he had a major falling out with Zoran Djindjic 
during the early 1990s, while he was part of the Democratic Party’s early 
marketing team. From that period originates Tijanic’s personal loathing of 
Vladimir “Beba” Popovic, who was Djindjic’s chief “spin doctor”. It was Popovic 
who as the head of the government’s Bureau for Communications personally 
oversaw and ordered the measures of media censorship during the state of 
emergency in 2003. At one point Tijanic was afraid that his adversary Popovic 
would get him arrested during “Operation Saber” for his vitriolic criticisms of 
Zoran Djindjic prior to the assassination. Once the political balance shifted, 
Tijanic got his appointment and immediately engaged in acts of personal 
vendetta against Popovic and his business enterprises.33  
 
Although the Broadcasting and Telecommunications acts as a regulatory frame 
had been passed before Kostunica took over and the Broadcasting Council was 
finally staffed, the long overdue process of RTS’s transformation did not start.     
                                               
32 Tijanic only finished secondary education, which in the journalism trade is not a sin per se. However, the law requires 
certain (university level) qualifications from individuals who are appointed to state positions of such rank as general 
director of Radio Television Serbia.  
 




 “Rather than turning the State broadcaster RTS into a public service 
broadcaster, It (the new government) envisages RTS as Serbia’s “national 
television”. In practice, this means state television by another name. This 
reveals a misunderstanding – if not a rejection – of the very idea of public 
service broadcasting.” (Milivojevic, 2006) 
This is how Snjezana Milivojevic described understanding and implementation 
of PSB concept by the RTS’s new general director and his political mentors. 
 
One of the first popular moves of the new government after October 2000 was 
abolishment of the mandatory subscription for RTS, which Milosevic’s regime 
collected through electricity bills. In such a way, it was not possible to escape 
from paying a subscription, unless one wanted to get cut off from the electrical 
supply for non-payment. Dissatisfaction with RTS during the 1990s was so 
great that abolishment of the subscription in 2000 was greeted by the citizens of 
Serbia as a gesture of well-deserved punishment for the years of RTS’s 
uncritical propaganda and war mongering. For the next five years, RTS 
remained financed directly from the state’s budget, and to a lesser degree from 
its own advertising activities. 
 
The conversion of RTS into a public service broadcaster also meant re-
introduction of license fee required by the law to start in the summer of 2004. By 
November 2005 when the collection of the license fee was set to begin, the 
citizens could not see that any meaningful steps had been made towards 
transformation. RTS was still a very much state-owned and politically influenced 
outlet, whose general director was formally unqualified for the job and its 
Managing Board full of trusted political appointees, instead of non-partisan 
experts. Additionally, the legislators once again amended the Broadcasting Act 
in 2005 to postpone the transformation of RTS into a PSB until 30 April 2006. It 
gave RTS time for internal restructuring and separation of RTV Vojvodina as a 
regional PSB, but the collection of subscriptions commenced six months earlier.  
 
The only legal requirement that RTS hesitantly fulfilled as a gesture of 
transformation was relinquishing its Channel 3 on 1 May 2006. That frequency 
was subsequently allocated to a commercial station by the Broadcasting 
Council. The stipulation of the Broadcasting Act that RTS must also divest its 
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ownership of RTS Records was never observed, or as an old Serbian proverb 
says – dead letter on a piece of paper.  
 
Snjezana Milivojevic (2006) correctly noted how after years of not paying for 
television, and with the strong presence of commercial channels, the public was 
unhappy to accept the license fee again, without first seeing value for the 
money. The promised establishment of a genuine public service broadcaster 
was not delivered, RTS remained state-influenced, if not controlled any more, 
and its finances were not transparent to the public, as PSB must be according 
to the letter of the law. Instead, Aleksandar Tijanic could publicly boast about 
his football-style transfers of TV presenters from other commercial stations for 
undisclosed salaries, while the old RTS staff was kept on minimum pay. Tijanic 
managed to regain lost share of viewers in a commercial race with RTV Pink 
and RTV B92, but at the expense of producing non-commercial and educational 
programming. Such types of content are exactly what a proper public service 
broadcaster has a legal duty to deliver. A proper public service broadcaster, 
among other obligations, has a legal duty to provide transparent accounts of 
funds collected from the subscription and commercial sources, as well as its 
expenditure.  
 
The transformation of RTS into a PSB was made - but only in its formal name 
and official registration with the Republican Agency for Business Registries 
under the rather awkward entry: “Media Public Service of Serbia”. This formal 
and certainly not substantive makeover of RTS was accompanied by a new 
visual identity and series of identification clips that tried to persuade the Serbian 
population of RTS’s new European style and structure. 
 
With the change of government in May 2008 and Kostunica’s departure, the 
public expected that Aleksandar Tijanic would be one of the first figures 
associated with the previous cabinet, and Milosevic before that to be replaced. 
Unfortunately, advisers of the Serbian President Boris Tadic, who's Democratic 
Party (DS) took over from Kostunica’s Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS), 
protected Tijanic. One can only wonder if he remained the general manager of 
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RTS as an outstanding media manager and expert, or because of his lucrative 




Despite delays in the drafting and prolonged adoption of five key legislations 
from 2002 until 2006, Serbia got a relatively modern and permissive normative 
framework for the media to operate. On paper, the aforementioned legal acts 
could provide an adequate environment for the media to exist, compete and 
support the process of Serbian transition towards democracy. However, the 
practical implementation of these legal documents is problematic, due to the 
nature of political actors/agents present.  
 
Verbal pledges on democracy and a quick transformation of Serbian society 
and the state after its dictatorial past, proved to be pure demagoguery on behalf 
of those who craved to replace Milosevic. On the surface, the DOS coalition 
which after its October 2000 victory splintered into reformist and conservative 
wings, campaigned against Milosevic’s flawed domestic and foreign policies, 
continuous election frauds, leadership cult, undemocratic control of the media 
and persecution of political rivals. In reality, one party’s (Socialist Party of 
Serbia) political monopoly was replaced by several competing options – which 
is only the bare beginning of democratic change.  
 
For a state and society to become truly democratic, it requires much more than 
regular and honestly executed elections and power handovers between political 
actors. The ruling philosophy and psychology of the legislators and the 
executive branch must also change. The political actors should not be obsessed 
with staying in power at any cost, but to advocate and implement a system of 
democratic values and beliefs as the foundation of a successful, peaceful and 
                                               
34 The current Mayor of Belgrade and the head of Democratic Party’s Belgrade organization Dragan Djilas, owns the 
largest advertising agency in Serbia (Direct Media / Ovation), and also produces several top-rated reality TV shows 
carried by RTS. During the previous Kostunica cabinet (2007-2008) Djilas held a position of a minister in charge of the 
National Investment Plan. President Tadic’s personal adviser Srdjan Saper owns the Serbian franchise of the 
international advertising agency McCann-Ericsson. Both Djilas and Saper never relinquished control of their private 




prosperous society. They also must have courage to lead the state and its 
citizens through a phase of unpleasant economic reforms, at a risk of falling 
from grace and going into opposition.  
 
Asked to comment on constant changes and amendments to the new media 
regulatory system, Belgrade correspondent of the German news program 
Deutche Welle, Ivica Petrovic expressed the following opinion: "It is a proof that 
the media laws are being adapted to suit the politicians, and not to the needs of 
those (journalists) who must operate under such legal stipulations. Additionally, 
it is also a proof that even new institutions in Serbia are not democratic in their 
nature, especially the parliament. When we have all of this in mind, we can 
make a judgment of the true extent of democratization in Serbia."35  
 
To implement any legal system, it is necessary to have competent, independent 
and efficient judiciary. Serbia, which is not a unique case among the former 
socialist countries, did not have such judiciary before 2000 and following the 
October 2000 changes is still far from having it. If there is no legal remedy 
against acts of the government, or its representatives - no responsibility for 
illegal and damaging acts of those to whom welfare of the state and its citizens 
is entrusted through elections – then development of democratic society is not 
possible. The key flaw of the Serbian transition does not lie with the media and 
their still not attained position as the Fourth estate (Carlyle, 1841). Once the 
DOS coalition captured power, it failed to start the reform from square one – 
deeply compromised, inefficient, corrupt and politically dependent judiciary.  
 
Since the disputes among the coalition partners started as soon as they rose to 
power, it seems that both sides (reformists and conservatives) wanted to 
preserve certain convenient levers of power (the previous regime’s security 
apparatus and judiciary) in order to gain the upper hand over the rivals. 
Because of that, the parliament and the legislative work on the new legal 
system became peripheral in their internal power battles. In later stages of post-
Milosevic political developments, both leading parties (DS and DSS) of the 
                                               




defunct DOS coalition found it appropriate to enlist secret or open support of the 
former dictator’s political party SPS – as long as it merely served their purpose 
of capturing power, or remaining in office. The ideology or values did not matter 
any more. 
 
In terms of the media, the system was slowly and hesitantly improved, to a 
minimal degree enabling relatively fair and unbiased work during election time 
and government changeovers. The designated public service broadcaster RTS, 
and large commercial broadcasters are left to find own ways of survival, but not 
in accordance with the theoretical normatives and ideals promised before 
ousting of the authoritarian regime. The much heralded and subsequently 
flawed transformation of RTS into a public service broadcaster is a fair reflection 
of changing power relations and interest machinations among the rivals on 
Serbia’s political scene. Or, if we accept Colin Sparks' (2008) interpretation of 
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MEDIA REFORMS BETWEEN 
DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL ACTORS 
 
4.0 INTRODUCTION 
In the first part of this chapter, I go over domestic and international political 
environment and actors involved in the run-up to the events of 5 October 2000. 
The second part of this chapter deals with the presence, input and influence of 
various international actors in the Serbia's transition process, and its media 
segment – from inter-governmental structures, foreign governments, to 
international professional associations, non-governmental organisations and 
commercial investors in the media.  
 
In the final part I discuss the activities of domestic political and other actors in 
connection with the media reform process. In conclusion of this chapter, I argue 
that neither domestic nor international actors, for different reasons, took all 
possible steps to assist and guide the promised reform of the Serbian media, 
which was quite possible and certainly necessary after 5 October 2000.  
 
4.0.1 Politicians and the Media  
 
Long before the dramatic events of 5 October 2000 and the change of regime in 
Serbia, opposition political actors in Serbia, as well as their international 
sponsors and supporters, agreed that democratizing the media through 
comprehensive legislative reform is conditio sine qua non in order to secure 
successful transition towards democracy. As explained in Chapter 3 of this 
work, Milosevic’s rise to power in late 1980s was engineered through old-
fashioned socialist monopoly and control over the state media. Such method of 
authoritarian rule, where tight control of the state-owned media was one of its 
key tools, gradually became ineffective in the second part of 1990s. It coincided 
with the world-wide explosion of new media technologies and private 
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entrepreneurship in the media sector, for which Milosevic and his commissaries 
could not devise efficient control or subordination mechanisms.  
 
In addition to political actors, emerging independent media and non-
governmental/civic organizations were at the forefront of a wide, all-inclusive 
opposition front that fought against the regime and eventually succeeded, after 
almost a decade-long struggle. In a way, the political opposition and 
independent media became partners in endeavour not only to change the 
regime, but also to normalize and democratize Serbia, which effectively became 
left out of the new, post cold war European order.    
 
Milosevic rose to power in September 1987, and was virtually politically 
unchallenged until 1991, when his belligerent bullying nationalism brought 
former SFR Yugoslavia to the brink of disintegration. The very first meaningful 
demonstration of political opposition to Milosevic came on 9 March 1991. Under 
pressure from more than 200,000 protesters in the streets of downtown 
Belgrade, Milosevic used Serbian riot police and (federal) army tanks to dispel 
demonstrations (Glenny, 1996). For such a move he obtained tacit approval of 
the federal (SFRY) collective presidency1. It is worth noting that the protesters in 
the streets of Belgrade on 9 March 1991 rallied against “The Bastille” -  which is 
a symbolic the nickname which the opposition used to deride state broadcaster 
Radio Television Serbia (RTS) - demanding replacement of its general manager 
and the abolition of one party’s control of state-owned media2. 
 
The reasons why it took the Serbian opposition so long to oust the autocrat 
were fragile structure of the opposition forces, political inexperience, lack of 
resources and coordination, as well as personal rivalry among several 
opposition leaders. Internal bickering between several contenders to the post-
Milosevic leadership not only weakened the opposition political front, but also 
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 This first showdown with the opposition in Serbia happened before SFR Yugoslavia began to 
disintegrate in June 1991, when Croatia and Slovenia declared independence. The failure of 
this protest proves that the opposition forces in Serbia were quite aware of forthcoming calamity 
that would destroy the federation, but did not have adequate political skills and means to 
change the course of events.  
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had a demoralizing effect on citizens. Additionally, it prevented the outside 
(international) actors from identifying credible partners within the Serbian 
opposition ranks and providing them with adequate support (Glenny, 1996). 
 
The advent and general spread of relatively cheap new media and related 
technologies3 in mid 1990s also changed the media environment, where the 
state could not tightly control and manage flow of information any more. The 
outdated state apparatus became incapable of preventing citizens from 
receiving, exchanging and disseminating independently acquired news and 
information. Such significant change of the media environment also paved the 
way for renewed opposition efforts to challenge Milosevic’s rule, now in 
conjunction with emerging new media. The floodgates were lifted, and it wasn’t 
possible to suppress and manage the information flow through old techniques of 
control and propaganda. Journalist Ivica Petrovic, Belgrade correspondent of 
German radio station Deutche Welle, sees this process from his own angle:  
 "Possibility to hear, see or view different opinions was certainly very 
 important for political emancipation of Serbian citizens. Majority of 
 them,  unfortunately, could very slowly progress towards political and 
 media maturity, because of the long tradition of accepting information 
 from the state media outlets as gospel truth. However, the 
 communications technology boom of the 1990s, which affected even 
 the very closed and isolated society like Serbia, managed to  decentralize 
distribution of information and opened space for expression  of critical 
thinking."4  
 
Five years (1991-1995) of civil wars that engulfed and destroyed former SFR 
Yugoslavia, which Milosevic and his regime initiated, had brought suffering, 
misery, humiliation and isolation to Serbia and its people (Silber, Little, 1997). 
Although these conflicts had not been fought on the Serbian soil, Milosevic used 
the country’s material, economic and human resources to pursue his policy of 
support to the native Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia. The other ex-Yugoslav 
                                               
3
 Here I mean computers with modems, Internet, satellite dishes, mobile telephony with its 
roaming capabilities and services like SMS etc. 
  
4
 Quote from the interview given by Ivica Petrovic for this research project. 
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nations, despite the suffering inflicted on them, felt that the pain and sacrifices 
during the times of civil war were necessary and justified in order to achieve 
national emancipation and independence of their new states.5  
 
The common feelings of frustration and humiliation carried by most citizens of 
Serbia, as well as miserable life conditions, were the foundation on which 
opposition political forces could build their anti-Milosevic strategy, although their 
actual political programs were rather divergent – from right wing royalists and 
nationalists, to moderate democrats and left-leaning modernizers. The dramatic 
fall in living standards, loss of jobs, constant currency depreciation, collapse of 
the banking system and breakdown of formerly well-organized social and 
welfare services could only unite all kinds of political forces against the regime 
which devastated its own country.  
 
The next major confrontation between Milosevic and the Serbian opposition 
came in late 1996, when the ruling Socialist Party was caught in blatant election 
fraud. This time, more experienced, resourceful and underpinned through an 
alliance with the emerging new media outlets, the Serbian opposition held street 
protests all over Serbia for more than 100 days (Lazic, Nikolic, 1999). The result 
was a draw. Milosevic could not brush aside such a massive and persistent 
nation-wide protest, and under international pressure agreed to relinquish 
municipal assemblies to the opposition. Additionally, he did not admit the loss of 
the federal assembly and maintained all the reins of power at the republican 
level. However, as a consequence of such split result, the opposition forces for 
the first time had an institutionalized power base (cities and municipalities). 
Through operating several major Serbian towns and municipalities (Nis, Novi 
Sad, Kragujevac, Kraljevo, Cacak etc.) the opposition forces could further 
undermine and annoy the regime in Belgrade. This opportunity was also used 
by the opposition to train and develop their own staff for managing state affairs 
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 Disintegration of SFR Yugoslavia was a process from which all six former federation members 
became independent states, some through bloody civil war, some in a more peaceful manner 
and within different time frames – from 1991 until 2006. This process, with its rights and wrongs, 




in future, when the change on federal and republican level is achieved (Lazic, 
Nikolic, 1999). 
 
A wide-ranging change of the regime was not accomplished at that time, but its 
authority and powers were significantly diminished, its ruling techniques 
became ineffective and financial and human resources substantially weakened. 
Some of Milosevic’s trusted associates and advisors6 began to jump the ship, 
realizing that the end of his reign was coming and it was time to secure their 
political future, as much as it was necessary to preserve their personal wealth in 
the new era.  
 
Another three and half years passed from the spring of 1997 when the 
opposition took over the municipal assemblies, until 5 October 2000 when the 
change of regime was finally achieved. And it took 77 days of NATO bombing 
campaign against Serbia in spring of 1999 to precipitate the dictator’s fall7. 
During this conflict the citizens of Serbia experienced war in their own yard, 
something they were spared from during the early 1990s civil wars in Slovenia, 
Croatia and Bosnia, in which Milosevic’s regime was involved. Not only that 
Milosevic had lost another war that the Serbian nation did not need, nor 
endorse, but through enslaved state media he tried to portray the loss of 
Kosovo as a victory (Politika, 9 Jun 1999). 
 
The United Nations Security Council Resolution No.1244 and Kumanovo 
Agreement singed in June 1999, called for a ceasefire and full withdrawal of the 
Serbian forces and administration from Kosovo. These documents were 
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 Socialist Mayor of Belgrade Nebojsa Covic, viewed by many as future Milosevic’s prime 
minister for his managerial skills, resigned during 1996/1997 street protests, and offered his 
insider’s knowledge of how the regime operates to his new political allies. Another example was 
Chief of the General Staff, General Momcilo Perisic. He refused to use military units to dispel 
1996/1997 street protests, and in 1998 advised Milosevic against use of force against the 
Albanian insurgency in Kosovo, which prompted his dismissal. Kosovo Serb tycoon Bogoljub 
Karic, who amassed his fortune during the Milosevic years in construction, banking, mobile 
telephony, Internet providing and TV industries, tried to depart from his mentor, but faced with 
state pressure on his empire stayed on board. Although he initially survived change of the 
regime in 2000 and kept much of his assets, in 2005 Karic finally got under criminal prosecution 
for his past sins and fled Serbia.     
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carefully worded to avoid explicit pronunciation of their real nature - capitulation. 
They were presented by RTS and other state media as Milosevic’s peace 
initiative sanctioned by the United Nations. Such cynical lying completely 
outraged the citizens of Serbia, who were facing life in a physically and 
economically crippled country, with destroyed roads and bridges, shortages of 
food, medical supplies, electricity and heating oil, African-level salaries and 
living standards. Not to mention over one million refugees and “internally 
displaced persons”8, who could find little comfort from being forced to live in 
“Mother Serbia”. 
 
Serious and institutionalized support of the so-called international actors for the 
anti-Milosevic front of political parties, independent media and non-
governmental organizations came only after they won their first minor, but 
sweet, victory in 1997 by taking over the municipal assemblies. Before that, only 
isolated, mainly private sector efforts, like the one led by billionaire 
philanthropist George Soros and his Open Society Fund and Institute, were 
aimed at educating new political elite and the media for life in post-Milosevic 
democratic Serbia (Soros, 2006). Open Society’s pro-democracy and 
educational activities were not aimed exclusively at the region of ex-Yugoslavia, 
but were present in all countries of the former Eastern Block since the fall of 
Berlin wall in 1989.9 Many international organizations like Amnesty International, 
International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, Human Rights Watch and 
Freedom House keenly watched and reported political developments in Serbia 
and engaged in various programs and activities, directly, or through their 
Serbian partner NGOs. 
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 This rather cynical term was devised in order to identify people who were forced to move out 
of the Serbian province of Kosovo. This is to distinguish them from people who had fled from 
Croatia and Bosnia, which are independent states, so people from there are labeled “refugees”. 
Most of them are of Serbian ethnicity, although a lot of Roma people shared the fate of Serbian 
“internally displaced” and “refugees”. In terms of social status of such people in Serbia, there is 
practically no difference.  
 
9
 As part of Soros-sponsored program for young leaders from ex-Eastern European countries, I 
was chosen in 1993 to participate in a six weeks long seminar “Democracy After Communism” 
held in Budapest, Hungary. For the duration of the seminar, I was sharing a room with the 




4.0.2 Partners for Change 
The heroics of 100 days street protest during winter of 1996/1997 in Serbia not 
only resulted in the first small but sweet victory of the Serbian opposition, but 
also drew international attention at the importance of pro-democracy movement 
and necessity to provide it with support, training and resources. Several non-
governmental organizations and professional journalists associations devised 
various aid packages/programs for the emerging independent media in Serbia. 
Numerous international seminars, round table discussions, consultations and 
symposiums were organized amongst academics, policy makers and media 
professionals in order to map the democratic future of Serbia, with 
recommendations and legislative models proposed.  
 
Governments of leading Western countries (USA, Britain, Germany, France, 
Italy, Canada, Holland etc.), however, chose to support Serbian pro-democracy 
movement rather late. Until the opposition’s limited election success in 1996, 
Milosevic was viewed by the Western governments as the key player and ally 
for securing peace in Bosnia, no matter how unpleasant such “business partner” 
was.  
 
In order to foil Milosevic’s information monopoly, Western governments 
expanded their external news broadcasting operations aimed at Serbia. Voice 
of America, BBC World Service, Deutche Welle and Radio Free Europe 
changed their schedules to include Serbian language bulletins and hired 
Serbian journalists - in direct proportion with the spreading of conflicts in the 
Balkan (Goldsworthy, 2005). They also increased the number and power of 
transmitters and re-broadcasters around and in Serbia. In such way Milosevic’s 
domination over Serbian media was successfully foiled, with citizens having 
choice between crude state propaganda and international news not only in 
foreign languages but also in Serbian. 
"BBC needed more then ever Serbian voices like mine. A belief on which 
expansion of the Serbian programming was done - that common people 
would wake up as soon as they receive impartial information and abandon 
the previously held positions, that had been formed under the influence of 
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their evil leaders – seemed based too much on intrinsic goodness of the 
human race.” (Golsdworthy, 2005, pg.166)    
 
However, re-broadcasting of foreign stations and accepting aid in equipment 
and training was a risky activity for the emerging independent media in Serbia. 
In November 1998, the regime passed infamous Information Act, which 
outlawed re-broadcasting of foreign programs and gave the Serbian Ministry of 
Information extraordinary powers to prosecute “unpatriotic” media outlets. 
Verdicts against independent media were passed within 24 hours from 
indictments through swift magistrate court procedure and without legal remedy 
that would suspend verdicts pending appeal. Broadcasting equipment was 
confiscated and draconian fines as high as £200,000 were imposed with 
mandatory collection from business accounts, or against company's property – 
at a time when a journalist’s salary was as high as £15 per month. In the run up 
to the Kosovo conflict, the regime wanted to pacify voices of reason and dissent 
(Curguz-Kazimir, 2001). But the times have changed and, despite constant 
prosecution of independent media administered by the Ministry of Information, 
judiciary and police, many brave individuals and outlets dared to defy the 
regime and continue to work and fight.10 
 
Colin Sparks underlines a clear distinction between the media in bourgeois 
democracies and authoritarian regimes through how they allow the media 
systems to function: "The direct and extremely close supervision of the mass 
media, and the extent to which the whole range of the mass media is part of a 
single socio-political project, are two factors that mark totalitarian societies out 
sharply from bourgeois democracies.” (Sparks, 1998, pg.27) 
 
The reason why some of the emerging independent media outlets could operate 
despite the Ministry of Information’s persecution was remarkable. By early 2000 
in Serbia there were more than 800 broadcasting entities, mainly local and far 
away from Ministry reach (Djoric, 2002). The independent media outlets in and 
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around Belgrade were under great pressure indeed, but already in Nis and Novi 
Sad, second and third largest Serbian cities, there were tens of broadcasters, 
which were not officially registered, nor within the Ministry’s iron grip. The 
deeper one went into provincial Serbia; there were more and more local 
broadcasters that the central authorities did not know about.  
 
At this time, Radio B92 organized ANEM network of independent stations 
around provincial Serbia, and enabled wide dispersion of unbiased and 
professionally prepared and presented news. The dreaded ministry did not have 
the human or technical resources to monitor rogue broadcasters. Additional 
difficulty for policing budding new media outlets was jurisdictional confusion – 
the frequency spectrum (allocation and monitoring) was in theory within the 
federal jurisdiction of FR Yugoslavia, while the Serbian (republican) Ministry of 
Information was in charge of ideological matters (the broadcast content). Such 
divided jurisdiction in practice meant confusion and chaos, which was difficult to 
sort out for several years after the change of regime and the arrival of 
systematic regulation (Djoric, 2002). Inside the state that had been under 
international pressure for many years, with majority citizens opposing the 
regime and whose governing structures were not independent in the execution 
of their duties and competencies, it was rather difficult to police the maverick 
media, despite threats of heavy fines, confiscation of equipment and closures. 
 
From 15 until 17 May 2000, the British Association for Eastern and Central 
Europe (BACEE), a Foreign Office supported think-tank/charity, convened a 
session of its New Serbia Forum in Budapest, Hungary, to examine the 
problems in the media sector. The purpose of the New Serbia Forum, which 
had several sessions and topics from 1999-2001, was to map the democratic 
future of Serbia through discussions among Western policy makers and 
diplomats, experts/academics on the one side, and the Serbian opposition party 
leaders, non-governmental sector representatives and media professionals on 
the other side.  
 
Following the New Serbia Forum’s session on the media, a work group 
prepared a summary report of the discussions and policy recommendations. 
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This report, published only a few months before the 5 October change of the 
regime, analyzed the state of affairs in the Serbian media, and also suggested 
the direction for comprehensive reform. 
“The participants agreed that it will be essential to have an effective 
institutional framework to guarantee the independence of both the public 
broadcasting service and the independent media from state interference.”11  
 
Two aspects of media/government relations were highlighted by the Serbian 
media experts as especially critical - the distribution of licenses and 
frequencies, and the overall control of the public broadcasting service. 
Subsequent developments from 2000 until 2003 and since have proved them 
right. The regulatory model for broadcast media, suggested by the international 
experts and immediately adopted by the Serbian media professionals was 
public service broadcasting, was based on the BBC practice. 
“Pro-democracy media experts agree that a new government should 
introduce legislative and institutional reforms to transform RTS into a truly 
public broadcasting service, and guarantee the freedom of independent 
media.”12   
 
The experts and media professionals pointed out that "... new government will 
need to consider how best to ensure a vibrant and high quality media in a 
competitive commercial environment.13 However, certain reservations were 
expressed by both international and Serbian participants in regard to politicians’ 
commitment to initiate and pass urgently the new legislative framework for the 
media. 
 
Serbian media professionals, experts and opposition politicians participating in 
the panel agreed that in order to initiate and pass new media legislation, a 
substantial lobbying and educational effort should be directed at both opposition 
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 Quoted from: The New Serbia Forum, Conference Report on the Media, British Association 










political parties (future government) and at citizens. The choice of an adequate 
regulatory model must come from public deliberations between political actors, 
media professionals and citizens, as well as a thorough understanding of its 
concepts and values. The forum also concluded that the journalism profession 
must change in order to cater for new, democratic environment. Changes could 
be achieved through adoption of a new professional code of ethics and self-
regulation of the profession. 
 
By the time the changes came, there were several expert drafts/proposals on 
how to overhaul the Serbian legal system, starting from the constitution and 
including a set of media-related laws. It is worth noting that the Western support 
for democratic political forces in Serbia also included commissioning and 
funding of draft legislation from domestic expert groups, non-governmental 
organizations, professional associations and think-tanks. Young political 
activists from Serbia were given practical training and financial support in order 
to prepare for the forthcoming events14.  
 
When in the summer of 2000 Milosevic unexpectedly15 called federal and 
presidential elections for 24 September, the opposition political parties, non-
governmental organizations and independent media were ready for the final 
showdown. The notoriously fragmented Serbian opposition political parties 
finally united, inspired by the new civic movement Resistance16. The Democratic 
Opposition of Serbia (DOS) was formed and committed to take over power from 
Milosevic, through election and not through violent means. Ideological 
differences and party calculations were temporary put aside, and a simple anti-
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 American National Democratic Institute (NDI) and International Republican Institute (IRI) were 
given task and funding by the US government to train and educate Serbian political activists.  
 
15
 His term wasn’t expiring for another year, but Milosevic wanted to surprise the opposition and 
ride on the wave of post 1999 bombing reconstruction of the country. He wanted to present 
reconstruction as his achievement, forgetting that the 1999 calamity was caused by his ill-
advised handling of the Kosovo crisis.  
 
16
 Civic movement Resistance was a grass-root initiative from mainly younger opposition 
activists in Serbia, who got disillusioned with permanently bickering opposition political parties. It 
wasn’t formally registered, nor centrally structured organization, and as such was a complete 
mystery to Milosevic’s secret police. It operated through completely independent cells in various 




Milosevic manifesto adopted. Comprehensive constitutional and legal reform 
was its main feature and declared priority, with solemn promise that 
comprehensive media reform would be imminent – as one of the cornerstones 
of emerging democracy. 
 
Cooperation and partnership between the Serbian opposition parties and the 
independent media, forged during a decade (1991–2000) of fighting against 
dictatorship, looked like an unstoppable wave of change that would submerge 
and wash away the dark clouds that had covered the Serbian sky for such a 
long time. With guidance and generosity from the international supporters of all 
kinds (governments, private charities, various professional associations etc.), 
Serbia was about to reclaim its place in the European family of democratic 
nations.   
 
4.1 INTERNATIONAL INVOLVEMENT - BLESSING OR CURSE 
 
 
The international actors were involved in preparation of the reforms in Serbia 
long before the events of 5 October 2000, with various motives, policy priorities 
and means – delivering expertise, different forms of financial aid, technical help 
and training programs. Monitoring the reform process for some of them had 
strictly political meaning, for others scientific exercise and professional 
challenge, and for some of them commercial prospect, or even handy public 
relations opportunity. 
 
The long expected change of the regime was finally achieved on 5 October 
2000. The victorious DOS coalition forced extraordinary republican 
parliamentary elections on 24 December 2000, which were necessary to secure 
a governing majority in Serbia and complete transfer of power. By winning 176 
out of 250 seats in the Serbian parliament, DOS secured more than two-thirds 
majority17 necessary for constitutional change. Dr Zoran Djindjic, the leader of 
Democratic Party, became the first non-socialist Prime Minister of Serbia since 
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the Second World War. The horizon for comprehensive legal and institutional 
overhaul of the Serbian state seemed open. 
At the beginning of the new era for Serbia, enthusiasm, dedication and 
optimism was visible at all levels – from international actors, domestic political 
parties, non-governmental sector, and professional associations - all the way 
down to the citizens. Everybody could feel and experience the new air of 
freedom of expression and participation in political life for the first time since the 
Communist party in 1945 extinguished all traces of the past democratic 
practice. 
 
The international community was eager to welcome the emerging democracy 
into its ranks, and several weeks after 5 October 2000 FR Yugoslavia was re-
admitted into United Nations (UN), Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (OSCE), Council of Europe (CoE) and numerous other international 
organizations and associations which suspended or refused FR Yugoslavia’s 
membership during the 1990s. The three aforementioned inter-governmental 
organizations opened their field missions in FR Yugoslavia in order to facilitate, 
assist and monitor the transition process. Many other foreign governmental 
agencies, professional associations and non-governmental organizations also 
established local offices in Serbia, bringing their programs, expertise and funds 
in order to show the citizens of Serbia that a decade in isolation was over and 
that the sanctions and exclusion measures were aimed against the dictator and 
not against the population.18 
4.1.1 Support versus Intervention 
The nature of international involvement in reforming post-Milosevic Serbia is 
something that needs to be critically examined. Since this research is aimed 
primarily at the media and their role in the process of transition towards 
democracy, I would like to discuss the international involvement in reform of the 
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 Many Western governments decided to implement their own aid and assistance programs. 
For example, United States International Development (USAID) agency came in with various 
local governance, community reconstruction and educational programs, alongside several EU 
agencies and programs; British government commissioned BBC professionals and experts to 
train and advise local broadcast media; Dutch government funded Press Now foundation; Japan 




Serbian media in terms of helping or obstructing democracy in making. By doing 
so, it should be easier to understand the effects of this involvement, and the 
limits of the achieved results. 
 
There were two possible approaches or positions that the international 
community (or actors) could have taken in the Serbian media affairs after the 
events of 5 October 2000 - direct intervention, or indirect (on-demand) support. 
Monroe Price and Mark Thompson, leading proponents of international 
intervention in media sector, consider such action as one of the tools for forging 
peace in states that had been involved in military conflicts (Price, Thompson, 
2002)  
 
In introduction to their book, Price and Thompson claim that not enough 
academic work has been done on the engagement of the international factors 
with the local media in conflict affected countries: “Much less study has been 
devoted to the relationship between the international community and local 
indigenous media before, during and after conflict.” (Price, Thompson, 2002)  
 
Referring to the early 1990s interventions in Bosnia and Cambodia, followed by 
the late 1990s international involvement in Kosovo and Rwanda, Price and 
Thompson admit that “[...As information management became central in the 
run-up to wars and in post-conflict reconstruction, a decade of costly 
experiments commenced]”. In my opinion - not always with enlightening results.  
 
Although these authors have bona fidae academic credentials, both have rather 
pragmatic views on intervention in the matters and affairs of other states, no 
matter how dysfunctional (or undemocratic) they are. Working under the 
auspices of US State Department,19 inter-governmental organizations like 
UNPROFOR and foreign policy think tanks like the International Crisis Group20 
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 Monroe Price is American scholar with close connections with US administration, enabling 
him to obtain financing for his various projects that give intellectual foundation for policies 
pursued by his government.  
 
20
 Mark Thompson is a British author, who held senior positions with UNPROFOR and 




certainly do not make their writings impartial and agenda-neutral. Even attempts 
to describe and define “Information intervention”, giving it theoretical foundation 
fall short. In their own words:  
 “The term is novel, with no automatic meaning assigned to it; rather, 
 there is a set of practices or conditions from which a tidy definition has 
 yet to emerge.” (Price, Thompson, 2002)  
  
In translating it to the language of ordinary people, Price and Thompson are 
simply toying with a quasi-scientific notion like “information intervention” purely 
to justify (foreign) policies which they favour, or have attached interests. 
 
After the ousting of Milosevic, virtually all of the international actors involved 
agreed that an interventionist approach in handling Serbia (and its media) was 
neither acceptable, nor practical option any more. That included even those 
governments who engineered21 or enthusiastically22 supported NATO’s 1999 
legally dubious intervention against FR Yugoslavia over Kosovo23.  
 
The new political leadership in Serbia had been supported in their plight to 
overthrow Milosevic and once it was achieved, they were subsequently given all 
kinds of moral and material support to embark on the road to transition. At this 
point, direct foreign involvement (or intervention) was gradually transformed into 
on-demand support. For such a change of approach, the implementing 
bodies/organizations were replaced, too. Instead of direct involvement and 
exposure of certain states and military alliances (like NATO), inter-governmental 
and other international organizations took centre stage.  
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backed by Great Britain, France, Germany and Italy, which are informally reffered to in 
diplomatic circles as "The Quint".  
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 On the other hand, some of the NATO members, like Greece, did not show great enthusiasm 
in intervention against FR Yugoslavia, demanded by USA. Their reputation of good neighbors 
who understand complexities of Serbia – Kosovo relation as not black and white was constantly 
challenged by NATO top brass and their loyalty to the alliance questioned.  
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 The 1999 NATO’s military intervention was not sanctioned by the UN Security Council, which 
was conveniently bypassed in the decision-making process. However, the ceasefire and post-






Here we need to divide the international actors into three distinct categories: 
1) Inter-governmental organizations; 
2) Non-governmental and professional organizations; 
3) Individual governmental programs/agencies. 
By doing so, it is easier to examine mandates, means, agendas and goals of 
the international actors, in order to determine the scope of their influence on the 
process.  
 
In the first category, there were two inter-governmental organizations that 
became involved in the process of media reform – Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and Council of Europe (CoE). Following FR 
Yugoslavia’s accession into full membership in late 2000, both organizations 
signed bilateral agreement with the new Yugoslavian authorities to establish 
field missions in FRY from March 2001. The presence of these missions was 
designed to give host country advice and support in post-conflict rehabilitation, 
building of institutions, training for civil servants and parliamentarians, expertise 
in drafting of all kinds of legislation and to monitor the reform progress. The 
United Nations (UN) also established a field mission on the ground, represented 
through its specialized economic development program (UNDP). 
 
The concept of the OSCE’s and CoE’s engagement (or “terms of reference” in 
diplomatic parlance) was agreed in advance between those two organizations 
and the government of FR Yugoslavia.24 It meant that, unlike in Bosnia and 
Kosovo, these organizations were deployed not to interfere and intervene into 
the affairs of a sovereign member state, but to be called upon for pro bono 
advice, support and guidance when and if the host government asked for it. The 
mutual understanding was that such presence can be only beneficial for FR 
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 Despite removal of federal president Slobodan Milosevic from power on 5 October 2000 it 
became clear that FR Yugoslavia’s tiny republic Montenegro does not intend to participate in the 
federal structures any more, and would seek its own independence. Because of such 
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Yugoslavia and that the missions’ work would be politically neutral, unbiased, 
balanced and in good faith.  
The OSCE Mission to FR Yugoslavia25 established in 2001 employed around 30 
international and more than 100 domestic staff members, working to fulfil its 
mandate, while its Media department employed three international 
members/experts, in addition to domestic personnel of 10 people. Despite such 
a great number of dedicated staff members and substantial financial provisions 
contributed by the OSCE's central budget, the results were rather appalling. The 
mission’s Media department sent its staff members to sit and watch the process 
of transformation of RTS through trainings and seminars, which were 
outsourced from other organizations (like the BBC) and contributed marginally 
with donations of new equipment. The OSCE Mission’s staff members also 
participated in sessions of the Belgrade Media Centre’s Legislation Work 
Group, which was preparing drafts for submission to the parliament. This is how 
Nebojsa Spaic, former Director of the Belgrade Media Centre described 
involvement of OSCE in reform of the Serbian media: 
“[…The head of the media program of the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe, Giovanni Porta, was intensely involved in the 
preparations for setting up of the (Broadcasting) council, then resigned 
and accepted a senior managerial job with TV Pink in Bosnia. TV Pink is 
still broadcasting nationally in Serbia without a license, while the 
Broadcasting Council remains in idle mode. As Pink accumulates financial 
and political power, the organizational and financial transformation of the 
national broadcaster (RTS) into a public service has not even started, and 
it is steadily going under.” (Spaic,2004) 
 
The only visible contribution of the OSCE mission’s media department was a 
daily digest (in English and Serbian) of media-related events in Serbian media, 
distributed through the Belgrade Media Centre on their web site. Such an 
exercise certainly did not facilitate media reform, but only showed to the 
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paymasters in Vienna26 and other capitals of donor countries that some kind of 
work was being conducted.  
 
It is obvious that usefulness and influence of the OSCE’s mission in the reform 
of the Serbian media was rather limited, since the bureaucratic nature and 
operating mode of such an organization constrained its efforts, despite having 
substantial financial and human resources designated for such work. Field 
experience of various OSCE international experts and “seconded personnel”27 
from work in Bosnia and Kosovo proved useless - because inter-governmental 
organizations (UN and OSCE) have powers to govern and impose their will in 
Bosnia and Kosovo, rather than advise local authorities. Since more or less the 
same people were engaged by OSCE for its mission in FR Yugoslavia, their 
actual contribution was marginal.  
 
At the end of his term in Belgrade, Ambassador Stefano Sannino, Head of 
OSCE Mission to FR Yugoslavia (2001–2002), chose vague diplomatic 
language to describe the issue of media reforms:  
“The situation created during the Milosevic period was extremely 
complicated and needed to come to an end and, in a way, be settled. 
There was a need to support the transformation of RTS into a public 
broadcasting service, to provide a legal framework for the whole media, 
and to provide a degree of independence. The Broadcasting Act 
specifically is an advanced law, especially when compared with many 
other pieces of legislation in other countries of the region and Europe in 
general. The text that was originally drafted by the working group is 
different in the section you have mentioned concerning the composition of 
the (Broadcasting) council since it provided more room for representatives 
of the civic society. But we have to be intellectually honest - no one is 
absolutely independent since even the representatives of civic society 
                                               
26
 Vienna is where OSCE has its headquarters. 
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 This term comes from the diplomatic practice and refers to individuals who are employed by 
their state ministries of foreign affairs, who are dispatched to work for various inter-
governmental organizations or bodies. They remain responsible to their ministries, rather than to 




have their own opinions and preferences when it comes to party affiliation. 
So, if this was the overall agreement of the political forces in the country 
then I think, once again, the outcome was positive because it provides this 
legal framework. It could have been better…maybe. But then this is also 
part I think of the internal democratic control of society.”28  
 
When asked about the unresolved situation regarding the continuing limbo in 
which independent broadcasters in Serbia remained almost two years after the 
change of regime and the slow adoption of the media legislation, Sannino 
commented:  
“I think that the independent media in Serbia have to reconcile itself with 
the idea that the role of the independent media is not just to fight against 
someone, but to provide a service for society and to be able to compete in 
an open market economy. This is the other point – how to now transform 
those media into qualitative, competitive systems.”29 
 
The Council of Europe (CoE), unlike OSCE, maintained only a limited field 
presence in Yugoslavia/Serbia, with a small staff (less than 10 people) whose 
work method was based on monitoring and referring the relevant issues to the 
organisation’s headquarters in Strasbourg where they have adequate human 
and material resources. In terms of the media reform, CoE did not employ 
dedicated media specialists in their Belgrade office.  With such narrow scope 
and limited resources available for field work, the CoE mission in FRY mainly 
engaged in giving (legal) expertise and opinion to the bodies (governmental or 
professional) who were engaged in drafting of reform legislation, in addition to 
hosting various Serbian governmental and non-governmental delegations and 
individuals on study trips to Strasbourg. 
 
When we examine the impact and influence of international actors on the media 
reform process in Serbia, it is appropriate to add to the category of inter-
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governmental organisations the Delegation of European Union (EU). Although 
the EU cannot be classified as inter-governmental organisation, neither as a 
super-state, it maintains a diplomatic mission at ambassadorial level, just like its 
individual member-states. The issue of the EU’s unified and/or coordinated 
foreign policy is not a subject of this research, but lack of theoretical and policy 
clarity on this matter confuses not only political actors in Serbia, but also actors 
within EU ranks.  
 
The question of future EU membership of Serbia and the conditions and 
necessary preparations for accession can be viewed as part of the overall 
transition process. The proximity of the EU and this uncertain and vague 
prospect – EU membership – is the most controversial and polarizing issue 
debated in Serbian post-Milosevic politics. It also represents the dividing line 
between political forces associated with the previous regime (against EU 
membership) and those who took over after 5 October 2000 (pro EU 
membership). However, nine years after the demise of Milosevic and his 
politics, it seems that political forces in Serbia nowadays are re-positioning 
themselves, and not along the old lines. For example, Milosevic's party SPS is 
since 2008 junior partner with Democratic Party (DS) in what is called pro-
European coalition. 
 
In terms of presence, influence and support to the reform of the media in 
Serbia, EU has played the role of a key donor. Coordinating various programs 
of its member states, or implementing own initiatives through dedicated funds, 
the EU has contributed more than 17 million Euros since 2000, according to the 
Head of the EU Commission delegation in Serbia, Jose Lloveras (B92 news, 16 
Oct. 2007). Since the EU delegation in Serbia does not have dedicated program 
officers, the implementing institution for media affairs is European Agency for 
Reconstruction (EAR). Ambassador Lloveras also stated that the EU 
Commission’s report30 on Serbia especially stressed improvements in the field 
of media. The EU also sponsored a major staff training program provided by 
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BBC experts. Their professionals will train 250 employees of RTS from 
November 2007 until April 2010. This donation is funded by EAR with 900.000 
Euros (Danas, 17-18 Nov. 2007, pg.5). 
 
The second category of international actors involved in the Serbian media 
reform process is various non-governmental and professional organizations. 
Their presence and work is directly dependent on financing provided by 
governments or private sponsors, to whom they submit their programs for 
funding. Such organizations are ideal implementing partners for inter-
governmental organizations and individual governments unwilling to get 
involved in the details of program implementation and follow-up. Organizations 
in this category are: IREX-Pro Media, Freedom House, Westminster Foundation 
for Democracy31, Press Now, Foundation for Peace and Conflict Resolution, 
Baltic Media Centre, Danish School of Journalism, Open Society Institute, 
Friedrich Ebert Foundation32, Konrad Adenauer Foundation33, etc34.  
 
The professional expertise and involvement of the aforementioned 
organizations was aimed mainly at training and educating Serbian journalists, 
organizing conferences, conducting scientific studies, business-related research 
and other activities that supported development of media. The very fact that so 
many international organizations expressed interest in getting involved in 
various aspects of the media reform reflects the importance of the media in both 
the political and economic life of Serbia and the region. An example of 
philanthropic involvement, which led to subsequent commercial venture, is the 
case of George Soros. His Open Society Fund and Institute have been present 
in FR Yugoslavia/Serbia since mid-1990s, through various educational and 
media-related programs. Here is how George Soros writes about his personal 
involvement in setting up charitable foundations around the world, aimed at 
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 British charitable foundation associated with the Labor Party. 
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 German foundation associated with the Social Democratic Party (left-wing). 
 
33
 German foundation associated with the Demo-Christian Party (right-wing). 
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 The list of such organizations is not exhausted, but contains those whose presence and work 




promoting the values of open society, as he had understood the legacy and 
teachings of his mentor at the London School of Economics, Karl Popper: 
 "[...I offered scholarships in the United States to dissident intellectuals 
 from  Eastern Europe, and this was the program that led me to establish 
 a foundation on my native country Hungary, in 1984.] [...I went to 
 Moscow in 1987 as a tourist, and ended up setting a foundation on  the 
 Hungarian model, with Cultural Foundation of the USSR as my partner.] 
 As the Soviet empire disintegrated, I continued to set up foundations 
 in other countries.] [...By 1991, I had a network of foundations covering 
 more than twenty countries. I never bothered to explain what I meant by 
 open society. People understood instinctively that it meant the opposite 
of  the closed society from which they wanted to free themselves.]" (Soros, 
 2006, pg. 54-57) 
 
Research data and market knowledge gathered through Soros-funded media 
projects were also used as a basis for investment. After the change of regime in 
2000, one of Soros’ commercial arms became major stakeholder in Serbian 
Broad Band Company (SBB), the country’s largest cable operator.35 Rupert 
Murdoch’s News Corporation, certainly not a charitable organization, 
successfully used much of the publicly available research data and published 
findings to prepare an application for a national broadcasting frequency for its 
Fox Television franchise in Serbia. 
 
The third type of international actors involved in the Serbian media reform 
process includes agencies and programs belonging directly to governments of 
individual countries. Some of the foreign countries prefer to express solidarity 
with the Serbian people and institutions by managing their own assistance and 
support programs. Countries like Norway and Japan, for example, are not part 
of EU, which coordinates different programs and donations from its member-
states. It is part of a public diplomacy that some countries conduct in order to 
make themselves distinguished from other international donors.   
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4.1.2 Obstruction of the Media Reform 
After 5 October 2000, a consensus existed among representatives of DOS, 
journalists and non-governmental sectors in Serbia to start immediate reform of 
the media system. Such (extremely rare) agreement in Serbian political practice 
was beyond any question in the days following demise of Milosevic. The new 
DOS authorities nominated their own federal ministers of telecommunications 
(in charge of broadcasting spectrum) and information (in charge of foreign 
media accreditation), as well as an interim republican minister of information. 
This interim minister served only until the 24 December 2000 elections, after 
which the infamous Milosevic’s Ministry of Information was abolished.  
 
Not wanting to waste any more time, on 7 November 2000 all the parties 
interested in swift reform of the media convened at the Belgrade Media Centre, 
for a round table symposium on the subject. This event symbolically marked the 
beginning of the real work. More than 100 participants attended the round table, 
along with representatives of the international community. In an unprecedented 
manner, all three incumbent ministers36 participated in the proceedings, and 
generously accepted the proposition to form a working group that would start 
drafting a set of media laws to be presented to parliament. This working group, 
under the auspices of the Belgrade Media Centre, consisted of representatives 
from the journalism profession, media scholars, legal experts, government 
representatives37, as well as international consultants and observers. The 
findings and conclusions of the round table served as the guidelines for the 
working group’s future activity.38 
 
Analyzing the problems of the Serbian media in transition, the round table 
participants concluded that they can be divided into four categories/baskets:  
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 Interim Serbian Minister of Information Biserka Spasojevic; Federal Minister of Information 
Slobodan Orlic; Federal Minister of Telecommunications Boris Tadic. 
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 Various government ministries dealing with the media were represented in the working group 
by civil servants. 
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 1) general problems;  
 2) legal framework;  
 3) journalism profession;  
 4) education.  
In order to properly discuss each of the “baskets”, the round table plenary 
gathering was divided into sub-committees, which each produced a separate 
report and recommendations, presented at the final joint session. All 
participants agreed that future media regulatory acts must be drafted in 
accordance with comparative European and regional practice and models, but 
adapted in a way to accommodate the Serbian socio-political environment.      
 
Once the so-called "Media Working Group" started its work, it planned to 
complete consultation, discussions and drafting within one year. And indeed, 
finding adequate regulative models and formulating draft legislation was done 
according to the initial expectations, but the next step – getting these drafts on 
the parliamentary agenda, proved a rather difficult challenge. The so-called 
“package of media laws”, contained five separate acts: 1) Public Information 
Act; 2) Broadcasting Act; 3) Telecommunications Act; 4) Access to Information 
of Public Interest Act; 5) Advertising Act (S. Stojanovic, 2005). The first one was 
adopted more than a year after its submission, the next two were passed by the 
parliament during the state of emergency in 2003, following the assassination of 
Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic, the fourth one was passed in late 2004, while the 
last one was not passed until 2006.  
 
It was not the actual slow tempo of adoption that was problematic, but the 
content of acts that eventually became official regulation. Many of crucial draft 
stipulations and solutions presented to the parliament by the Working Group 
were substantially changed and some were dropped, much to the surprise of 
the professional media and legal circles. The Broadcasting Act was amended 
three times from the time of its adoption in 2002 until 2006.  
 
 “Good spirit of the Serbian opposition”, cartoon artist Predrag Koraksic Corax, 
whose brilliant work published in daily Danas and weekly Vreme inspired and 
enlightened the anti-Milosevic struggle, grumbled in late 2000 that there would 
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be no work for him after the changes. Fortunately, he was quickly proven 
wrong. Soon after politicians of the DOS rose to power, they forgot about 
“partnership” with the independent media and non-governmental sector, forged 
during times of struggle against Milosevic. Along with that, the politicians forgot 
their pledges to quickly deliver new media regulation as a corner stone of an 
emerging democracy. Instead, they engaged in what they do best - internal 
partisan quarrelling, instrumentalization of state-owned media for own 
purposes, attempts to enlist private media for their causes, advancing their own 
priorities over public interests.  
 
Natasa Milojevic - with her politician’s hat on - elaborated39 on the true nature of 
relations between former partners, politicians in power and the media: 
“The media and politicians - partners in revolution, yes! But the guillotine 
must start working sooner or later – I refer here to the French Jacobin 
leaders, Maximilien Robespierre and Jean Paul Marat. There is always 
good excuse, reason or opportunity to create a new ideology: OK, you are 
the heroes, but now get lost, back to your work and earn your money - that 
is if you know how to do it. From the media angle, this sounds like this: We 
have brought you up, fought against the regime and its monopoly, and 
where is now our reward – monopolistic position? Nevertheless, it is only 
normal and natural to think in such a way for actors in pre-political society, 
which is morally and educationally dilapidated. Should that be accepted? 
No! Was it possible to do it in a different way? Yes! Would Zoran (Djindjic) 
still be alive if he knew how to decipher messages from the media? Most 
likely yes!” 
 
Such development prompted Veran Matic, the founder and CEO of RTV B92, to 
publish an open letter to the Serbian public on the occasion of the first 
anniversary of the regime change. Matic rightfully criticized the new Serbian 
authorities: 
“One of the first immediately noticeable results of the political changes of 5 
October 2000, was opening up of the state and quasi-state broadcasters 
and print media in Serbia to the representatives of former opposition block 
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 Quote from the interview given by Natasa Milojevic for this research. 
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and NGO sector. High hopes raised in the aftermath of the October 
changes - that the media field would be efficiently and swiftly reformed in a 
just manner, that political influence on the media would be largely 
eliminated - have nonetheless proved to be overly optimistic. Quite the 
contrary, twelve months after the political changes it appears that more 
substantial system changes have bypassed the media sphere.”(Matic, 
2001)40 
 
However, even the pro-democracy leaning public did not understand why Matic 
was so critical and attributed such harsh words to envy at competitor like RTV 
Pink, with whom his station could not compete on level terms. But Matic was 
completely right and principled, and he was not referring specifically to his arch-
rival RTV Pink. Delay in passing of new media regulation perpetuated RTV 
Pink’s market domination, inherited from the Milosevic era, preventing 
development of a real media market. The same applied to the further 
postponement in reforming the state-owned RTS, which remained a party-
dominated instrument, and not a proper public service broadcaster, as it was 
promised to be.  
“Even more worrisome is the suspicion that utter absence of any changes 
in the media field is not the result stemming from the concurrence of 
adverse circumstances but conscious determination of the new people 
now wielding political power in the country to retain certain mechanisms 
formerly used as a convenient vehicle by the Milosevic regime to exert 
pressure on the media.” (Matic, 2001)    
 
It turned out that the new ruling elite in Serbia had different priorities for and 
understanding of the media in democratic society from their former “partners”. 
Before engaging in internal bickering and power struggles, the DOS made sure 
to give the public some kind of pretence that they were doing something about 
the media. Immediately after taking over the power, the new authorities decided 
to abolish the mandatory RTS subscription fee, collected by the National 
Electrical Company. Then, following induction of the new republican cabinet of 
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Zoran Djindjic, the Serbian Ministry of Information was disbanded, and its 
competences were transferred onto the Ministry of Culture. Additionally, all the 
media outlets fined by the previous regime for non-compliance with the 1998 
Information Act, were given their money back and confiscated equipment was 
returned. In another act of pure demagogy, none of the 1,000 plus unlicensed 
broadcasters were closed down, pending passing of the new regulation, which 
did not materialize for another few years. Even the proclaimed moratorium on 
opening of new broadcasting outlets before new regulation is passed was not 
enforced. 
 
By taking all of the aforementioned “public pleasing” measures, the new 
authorities achieved three goals:  
1) Buying enough time to procrastinate real media reform;  
2) Neutralizing outcries by the media profession and NGO sector that the 
 promised media reform was derailed and sabotaged; 
3) Divided and turned at each other competing media outlets.   
 
People were too busy sorting their own lives in the new transitional political and 
economic environment, so no citizen’s action on behalf of the media profession 
and NGOs could realistically succeed. “Dangers from delayed and 
compromised reform of the media” certainly was not an attractive or 
understandable banner for the public to rally behind. Because of such cunning 
tactics used by the new authorities, Veran Matic’s outcry not against RTV Pink 
but against delayed reforms could not find much support.  
 
However, despite delays in adopting the media legislations, and parliamentary 
amendments to the proposed legal texts, position of the media in Serbia has 
dramatically improved in comparison to the Milosevic era. According to the 
Freedom House's annual scores of media freedom around the world, Serbia in 
1999 had score of 81, just above Turkmenistan and below Belarus, while in 
2006, after six years of reforms, received score of 40, just one point behind 
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Croatia, five points above Bosnia and Herzegovina and nine above Macedonia, 





If we carefully examine the actual work done on transformation of the Serbian 
media system after the changes of October 2000, it is obvious that the actions 
were protracted, adopted legislations rather diluted, and their implementation is 
still far from successful. In this chapter, we have identified the domestic and 
international actors who were involved in the reform process, their pledges and 
tactical approaches. It is appropriate now to evaluate their results. 
 
At this point, it is obvious that media reform expectations were different for 
politician, citizens and the media, since their interests in this matter were not the 
same. From the post-Milosevic political practice, we can see that politicians 
ignore to accept the media as the fourth estate, but continue to consider and 
use them as mere propaganda means. For them, the media are just convenient 
promotional outlets, if not the governing tools they were during Milosevic’s 
times. In that sense, abstract (and empty) pledges to transform the Serbian 
media system into a democratic one were cheap way of presenting themselves 
as modern and proactive political actors. In reality, all of the politicians on both 
sides of the spectrum42 tried to establish working relationship with certain media 
outlets (electronic, or print), which they could treat as allies or encourage to be 
supportive to their goals. The new political order established after 2000, 
however, forced politicians to accept that plurality of media outlets means that 
old school of control over media output is not possible any more, and that there 
will always be some “unfriendly” media outlets. This is the reason why the new 
political elite relegated media reform to the bottom of their priorities, deliberately 
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slowed down the legislative process, and, for the outside view of the domestic 
public and international actors, more or less faked the reform. 
 
International actors who became involved in the restructuring of the media 
system in Serbia, on the other hand, had poor understanding of local political 
culture and habits. Their insistence to adopt “public service broadcasting” model 
for transformation of Radio Television Serbia (RTS), was certainly principled 
and appropriate. As such, this initiative was supported by the Serbian 
professional journalists. In practice, when the international actors were 
supposed to lobby for this matter and support it, it turned out that they did not 
have adequate mechanisms at their disposal.  
 
The matter was made even worse when it turned out those different inter-
governmental and other organizations, which promoted and aided 
transformation of the Serbian media, were led on the ground by individuals 
coming from different Western countries whose media models and traditions 
were democratic, but slightly different. John Lloyd (2004) compares media 
practice in France, Britain, Italy and Sweden. He exposes how understanding of 
professionalism and democratic media can vary from country to country in 
environments of different sensibility and culture. Yet, all of those countries are 
certainly mature and functional democracies. To illustrate this point, applied to 
the Serbian case, I bring the example of the OSCE Mission’s Media 
department. Established in 2001, it was originally led by an Italian, then by 
French, and lately by a British/Serb expert. As the heads of this department 
were changing, so did the institutional attitude and priorities of the OSCE's 
Mission in providing support to the new media system in Serbia.  
 
Additionally, involvement and influence of the international experts has been 
also plagued by half-hearted, uncoordinated and rather confusing instructions 
from their capitals, which always try to control their national experts seconded to 
inter-governmental and other organisations. Because of that, experts in the field 
depend on day-to-day policy requests from their capitals, rather than engaging 
in the long-term improvement of the Serbian media system. This is why the 
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results of the international involvement in transformation of the Serbian media 
system were rather limited.  
 
The media profession in Serbia also has to bear its own share of responsibility 
for limited results of the reform process. Despite having two professional 
associations (at war with each other since the Milosevic era), the profession did 
not engage in public lobbying and promotion aimed at both politicians and 
public to explain the desired normative models and standards. Having spent 
most of the 1990s in material poverty and under prosecution by the former 
regime, the media profession in Serbia quickly embraced numerous individual 
and corporate aid and training programs given by the foreign donors – and 
enjoyed the small material benefits coming from that - forgetting the big picture 
and the necessity to fight for higher values within their own profession.  
 
Education of politicians and citizens by the media profession on how to 
understand, accept and function in a new democratic media environment was 
not done properly. Occasional seminars and round table discussions organized 
by the professional associations were mainly held in-house and for the 
members, with support and solidarity from foreign colleagues and funded by the 
already mentioned inter-governmental and other organizations. Nevertheless, 
such discussions and their proceedings failed to reach wider public and explain 
the need for the media reform, along with theoretical and practical problems 
associated with it.  
 
This is why the journalistic profession could not enlist the general public to help 
them when the politicians deliberately slowed down and sidetracked the reform 
of the media. “Tycoonisation” or “de-tycoonisation” of the Serbian media - a 
much discussed and hot topic among Serbian journalists - requires not only 
pressure from the journalistic profession on the legislators, but also need active 
support and engagement of both civic society and general public. Only a wide 
front of active and articulate citizens, advised and helped by the media 
profession, can exert adequate pressure on the political elite to legislate and 
implement meaningful media laws, which would secure an adequate 
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  Case study: 
 




The first major test of new political, media and social realities following the 
events of 5 October 2000 came in autumn of 2002, when Serbia held its first 
post-Milosevic presidential election. This chapter examines the work of the 
Serbia’s media during this presidential elections.1 The election had two failed 
cycles, on 30 September and 8 December 2002, but in terms of establishing the 
standards and practice of procedurally fair elections - it was successful 
 
As much as the media had been instrumental in precipitating the change of 
regime in Serbia, it is crucial to establish if the media execute their duties and 
role in an emerging democracy, especially if they function as the fourth estate 
(Carlyle,1841). During the period leading to an election, it is possible to see the 
media at work – if they cover the candidates and campaigns in a fair, balanced 
and deliberative manner, or they take sides and fail democratic standards they 
are supposed to set and observe in democratic societies.  
 
The first post-Milosevic presidential election in Serbia, could also be viewed as 
a kind of litmus test, indicating if the society in transition is on the path towards 
democracy, or the old patterns of political practice still prevail. It was interesting 
to see where were the Serbian media two years after the demise of the former 
                                            
1
 This chapter in particular is chronologically the very first finished piece of the whole research, 
since it was written for, and originally presented at the London Doctoral Symposium1 held at the 
University of Westminster on 12 December 2002. In preparing this chapter for inclusion in the 
final version of the thesis five and half years after its writing, I tried to preserve it as it was at the 
time of presentation. Only a few minor changes were made in reference to points in time, and 
some linguistic adjustments of present to past tense. Its findings about the role of the media in 
2002 presidential elections are preserved without any change. 
 
 213 
regime, and if their practice at the time could be viewed as progress, or 
conversly if the "early fruits" of their transformation were yet not adequate to 
warrant a “democratic” label. For example, for the first time in the history of 
Serbia this election featured a live, televised duel between two presidential 
candidates. 
 
A public opinion poll, conducted in November 2002, conducted on behalf of the 
OSCE Mission to FR Yugoslavia,2 shows that the citizens of Serbia at the time 
had adequate sources of information to form their voting preferences, as 
opposed to the pre-2000 era. Charts 1, 2 and 3 paint picture of the Serbian 
electorate as well-informed, salient in the use of the media at their disposal, and 
with refined tastes and interests in various segments of social life. In general, 
despite relative material poverty, the electorate in Serbia was more than 


























                                            
2
 Full results are found in Appendix III. 
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Chart 2 
4.8 16.6 29.3 47.8
14.4 34.3 48.7
26.7 40.7 21.2 10.8
22.8 47.4 21.1 8.4







Would you say that you acquire information from:



























 In general, do you pay attention to news about:




During the 2002 presidential election a new legislative framework for media had 
barely been established - with the passage of the Broadcasting Act as the very 
first of the so-called “media regulation package” on 18 July 2002. I argue here 
that despite unfinished legislative/normative frame and still non-exitent 
regulatory bodies, the media performed well, emulating the role of media in 
mature democracies. If there were some minor deficiencies, not different from 
shortcomings and criticism of the media in old democracies, they could not 
tarnish an overall positive evaluation  
 
However, such a statement requires a warning. The two leading DOS parties, 
Democratic Party (DS) of Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic and Democratic Party of 
Serbia (DSS) of the Federal President Vojislav Kostunica, were treating this 
election as a transitory, and did not field their strongest candidates. According 
to their understanding of the political momentum, the scene was not yet ready 
for the decisive battle between the former partners, and this presidential 
election was used to test their strenght, ability to design and manage 
campaigns, as well as to prevent possible resurgance of the canditate from the 
extreme right – Serbian Radical Party. The rules that were valid at the time of 
this election required  turnout of “50 percent plus one” from all the registered 
voters for the results to stand. With such a high treshold, both parties knew that 
it would be very difficult to elect a president, without abolishment of such 
requirement.  
 
At the time of writing I worked full time as political advisor with the Organisation 
for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), with its mission to the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). This gave me a unique perspective over the 
electoral process, since my employer/organisation had the mandate not only to 
monitor elections, but to oversee and facilitate the whole process of transition in 
political, legal, economic and cultural sense. In the run up to the 2002 
presidential election, the OSCE mission initiated and commissioned monitoring 
(content analysis) of the media.3 In addition to that, the Mission also 
                                            
3




commissioned and designed a public opinion survey entitled “Media in Serbia”4, 
which produced plenty of useful quantitative general data on the media, political 
and economic environment in Serbia. I used the findings of these two OSCE-
commissioned projects were as evidence to augment my findings in this 
chapter.5 Additionally, most of my analysis and arguments in this chapter are 
derived from own notes and reports I was making at the time for internal use at 
OSCE Mission. However, my conclusions do not reflect official positions and 
statements of the OSCE and its mission in FRY. 
 
5.0.1 Political Background 
 
A leading Serbian media scholar Snjezana Milivojevic in an interview for a daily 
newspaper briefly described history of the Serbian media during the 1990s in 
the following terms:  
“Freedom of the media is one of the greatest democratic and social 
achievements, the only tool that the public has in order to control political 
power, government. We in Serbia had chance to see what happens when 
the inter-society communications were blocked – when there were no 
communications in the media, when it ceased even in the parliament . 
People took it to the streets, or as in antic times to the city square - the 
space dedicated for articulation of individual opinions. It took many 
centuries for city squares to be substituted by different institution (media).” 
(Blic, 10 Dec.2002, pg. 12) 
 
Following the events of 5 October 2000 the complete power takeover6 was 
achieved in two phases. In October 2000 the new federal (FRY) and local 
                                            
4
 Please see Appendix III for the OSCE public opinion poll data. 
 
5
 It seems appropriate to quote these finding in my research because I was part of the OSCE 
mission’s political department that commissioned and guided the work of the polling agency, 
which gathered and processed the quantitative data.  
 
6
 FR Yugoslavia was a federal state, consisting of republics of Serbia (90% of the Yugoslavian 
territory) and Montenegro. So there were three levels of government – local, republican and 
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authorities took over their responsibilities, but the election for republican 
(Serbian) parliament took place on 24 December 2000. The new republican 
government was sworn in February 2001. Immediately after the downfall of 
Milosevic, the two main political parties within the DOS coalition started with 
division of the “loot” – ministerial positions, ambassadorial posts, memberships 
in managing boards of public enterprises etc. In such arrangement, Vojislav 
Kostunica, leader of the conservative Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS), clung 
on to the predominantly ceremonial federal function, while the Republican Prime 
Minister Zoran Djindjic, leader of the reformist Democratic Party (DS), took the 
lead and responsibility for managing the whole process of transition in Serbia. 
The remaining small 16 DOS parties chose a strategy of siding with one or the 
other political pole, in exchange for political favors (again appointments to 
different functions). 
 
The original DOS manifesto, which united all the opposition parties against 
coalition of Milosevic’s Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) and Vojislav Seselj’s 
Serbian Radical Party (SRS), called for immediate return of the country into the 
international system, urgent constitutional reforms (both on republican and 
federal level), a quick start of economic reforms and privatization, combined 
with comprehensive welfare programs for much of the population exausted by 
13 years of life under Milosevic (Bujosevic, Radovanovic, 2003). 
 
Only the first proclaimed goal (return to the international community) was 
achieved promptly, while the rest became the source of permanent disputes 
among the anti-Milosevic coalition. It soon proved that those disputes were not 
only about the tempo of the reforms, but about their content too. As a result, the 
rivalry between the two leading parties - that can be ideologically viewed as the 
classic case of modernizing versus conservative political discourse - slowed 
down the tempo of transition, filtering through into the work of every state 
institution, from the Parliament, through judiciary, on to the executive branch. 
                                                                                                                                
federal. From 1997 Montenegro held strong reservations about its participation in the federal 
structures, and initiated the process of redefinition of relations among the two republics. 
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Even the international actors became concerned with Belgrade's lagging reform 
(ICG Europe Report No. 126). 
The ongoing dispute was also clearly visible in positions that the two sides had 
taken regarding the future of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia: Republican 
PM Djindjic had a good personal and working relation with the Montenegrin 
President Milo Djukanovic, who advocated independence for the southern 
republic, while keeping only minimal ties with Serbia. On the other side, FRY 
President Kostunica was in favour of maintaining stronger ties between Serbia 
and Montenegro, hoping to preserve the federation as the only subject/entity of 
international law. For his concept Kostunica had strong support from the 
Montenegrin Socialist Peoples Party (SNP), which was in opposition within its 
home republic, but participated in the federal structures that were completely 
shunned by Djukanovic.  
 
The European Union had mediated in the process of reforming the federation, 
and despite many deadlines set for finalizing the talks and preparation of the 
Constitutional Charter – it was agreed and passed only in February 2003, a few 
weeks before Djindjic’s assassination. The Council of Europe, another important 
association of the European states, viewed by many as the first step towards 
full EU membership, had postponed ascention of FR Yugoslavia into its ranks 
several times - awaiting outcome of the constitutional reform talks mediated by 
the EU.  
 
In such circumstances, the mandate of the incumbant Serbian president, Milan 
Milutinovic, who had been indicted by the International Criminal Court for 
Former Yugoslavia in The Hague during his term, was about to expire on 5 
January 2003. He was a member of the Socialist Party of Serbia, elected in 
1997 as a close associate of Slobodan Milosevic. Immediatley after his 
presidential term, immunity from prosecution expired, so Milutinovic volonteerly 
surrendered to the ICTY.7 His mentor, Slobodan Milosevic, had been extraditied 
to the ICTY by a brave decision of Zoran Djindjic’s cabinet on 28 June 2001.8 
                                            
7
 In 2008 Milutinovic was cleared of all charges by the ICTY and released. 
 
8
 Milosevic died in his prison cell in March 2006 before his trial was completed. 
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The extradition of Milosevic remained political and legal controversy in Serbia – 
something like a dividing line between the reformist and  the conservatives. 
 
The power to call (republican) presidential election in Serbia is vested with the 
Speaker of the Republican Parliament, and it can be done six months before 
expiry of the office holder’s term. President is elected by direct vote, with a two-
tear procedure. In the first round all qualified candidates may run. If nobody 
captures an absolute majority of votes, the second round of election is 
organized within two weeks, with only the top two contenders placed on the re-
run ballot. For the election to be valid, it is necessary to have 50%+1 turnout of 
all registered voters. If such turnout is not achieved, the results are declared 
invalid and a fresh election cycle must be called within 60 days. In such a case, 
the whole candidacy verification, campaign and voters registration starts again 
from the beginning. If a new president is not elected before expiration of the 
incumbent’s term, the Speaker of the Parliament becomes acting aresident, 
until the new one is elected.  
 
This is exactly what happened in Serbia, when the 2002 presidential election 
failed to deliver a winner, and such temporary arrangement lasted for almost a 
year and half. When in 2004 the election rules were changed, turnout of 50%+1 
registered voters abolished, Boris Tadic was elected. By that time Zoran Djindjic 
was already dead (killed in March 2003), and the previosly elected president 
Milan Milutinovic was in his prison cell at The Hague (ICG Europe Briefing no. 
32, 2004). The care-taker president, Speaker of the Parliament Natasa Micic, 
had steered the country through the state of emergency imposed after Djindjic’s 
assassination and paved the way for a proper election of the president. Due to 
the state of emergency and extraordinary parliamentary elections held in 
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5.0.2 The Media Environment 
The first cycle of presidential election that took place on 30 September 2002 
had ample voter turnout (circa 55,2% of all registered voters, or 3,6 million in 
absolute terms), but none of the 12 verified candidates could capture an 
absolute majority (50%+1 of all those who voted). The second round, which 
took place on 14 October 2002, had the two front-runners from the first round, 
but it was declared invalid due to insufficient voters turnout (45,5% of all 
registered voters, or in absolute terms around 300,000 votes short).9  
 
The second attempt at electing the Serbian president (still on time before formal 
expiry of the incumbent’s term) took place on 8 December 2002, but this time 
with participation of only three candidates, all of whom also ran in the first failed 
contest in September. This time, the election failed in the first round, with only 
45,2 percent of all the registered voters (slightly less than 3 million in absolute 
numbers) turning out, again around 300,000 votes shy of the required threshold. 
 
In contemporary democratic countries, voters rely on the media to acquire 
necessary information about the issues and candidates participating in 
elections. However, consumption of the media content requires a certain level 
of skill and knowledge on behalf of citizens/voters. Snjezana Milivojevic calls 
this media literacy, necessary for voters to decode the messages carried by the 
media :  
“The media always construct reality. The media products (outputs) are just 
another type of product, in the same manner as knitted jerseys, or printed 
books, where one can trace human work and hand. Raising of critical 
consciousness is aimed at recognition of certain type of human work, 
which should not be taken for granted and a priori trusted as truthful and 
correct. All types of information passed around are constructs of human 
creation, product that one needs to learn how to read (decode). That is 
why the media consumption requires high level of literacy.” (Blic, 10 Dec. 
2002, pg. 12) 
                                            
9
 All election statistics were acquired from the web-site of CESID, a Serbian NGO specialized in 
monitoring elections. Its web-site is: www.cesid.org 
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The response of the Serbian voters at polling stations proved that they are 
rather literate and articulate. The electorate digested election campaigns, 
candidates programs and promises – a deluge of media adverts and messages 
- and decided that they were not convincing enough. It seemed that the 
electorate correctly read the implicit message that the two leading parties were 
not interested in electing the president and called their bluff. This is why the two 
cycles of presidential elections in 2002 failed, as written by James Lyon in his 
report on Serbia for the International Crisis Group (ICG Europe Briefing no. 32, 
2004). Such a course of events also proved that the highly ceremonial post of 
president, with little executive power, was not something that voters considered 
important. The real power in Serbia was vested in the post of prime minister and 
his cabinet.10  
 
The Serbian voters correctly concluded that the state would not perish if the 
replacement president was not elected on time. When the leading party of the 
reform block, Djindjic’s Democratic party (DS) did not field own candidate for 
president,11 it certainly sent an obvious message to the electorate how 
meaningful the office of the president actually was. Only a year and half later, 
when DS went into opposition, the federal institutions ceased to exist and the 
election rules were changed, Djindjic’s successor as the party leader Boris 
Tadic ran and eventually captured the Serbian presidency (ICG Europe Briefing 
no. 32, 2004). 
 
By the time the 2002 presidential election was called, the work on reforming the 
media system had barely moved from the square one. From the proposed set of 
five media-related laws, only one had been passed - The Broadcasting Act, in 
July 2002. The second one, the Telecommunications Act, had only  been 
placed on the parliamentary agenda in December 2002, when the election cycle  
                                            
10
 This is also the reason why the incumbent president Milutinovic was politically irrelevant 
figure, whom everyone ridiculed for not interfering in his job. 
 
11
 The candidate who was half-heartedly supported by the Democratic Party was its first 
president Dragoljub Micunovic, whom Zoran Djindjic had gradually marginalized. Micunovic 
went on to set up his own political party Democratic Centre, which remained loosely associated 
with the Democratic Party. After Djindjic’s assassination, Micunovic re-joined Democratic Party 
as its honorary president, which he remains to this day.  
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finished in failure. Drafting of the three remaining laws from the package (Public 
Information Act; Access to Information Act; Advertising Act) was far from being 
finished at the time. 
 
In her analysis of the Serbian media and elections, political scientist Jovanka 
Matic explained the need to have clearly set rules of the media engagement 
during election times: 
“The need of precise regulation of media during election is especially 
important in countries without developed democratic culture and non-
existent tradition of autonomous media. It became unavoidable in post-
communist countries, at the times when first pluralistic and free elections 
were organized. The media regulation on one hand, must secure optimal 
education of voters, familiarize them with the main campaign topics, with 
variety of parties’ offers, with basic distinction in what is offered – in such 
way that the voters can decide to whom to entrust leadership of their 
country in future. On the other hand, the media must give equal chance to 
all the contenders - so they can persuade the voters about their advantage 
over the opponents.” (Matic, 2002) 
 
It seems that the first post-Milosevic (republican) presidential elections in Serbia 
were staged in a partially regulated environment, that could possibly endanger 
the proper, impartial and just role of the media during this time of heightened 
political tensions and mutual accusations of the competing (and even non-
competing) parties12. For example, despite adoption of the Broadcasting Act in 
July 2002, the independent broadcasting regulatory body had not been 
appointed for another nine months, although the election procedure legislation 
stipulates its important monitoring role during the whole election process. 
 
In one of her studies on democracy and the media, the former LSE and 
currently Harvard University professor Pippa Norris describes the notion of 
                                            
12
 Democratic Party (DS) of Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic did not have own candidate, 
and for that got accused of boycotting the election and quietly campaigning against the process 
by the Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS). DSS fielded their not very popular Vice-President 
Dragan Marsicanin as the presidential candidate in the first cycle, who was at the time the 
Speaker of the Serbian parliament.  
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public service broadcasting during election times by interpreting the words of 
the BBC’s first chairman Lord Reith:  
“[…In democratic theory the most basic function of news coverage of 
campaigns is to serve the public interest. In Lord Reith's classic phrase, 
the guiding mission of the BBC since 1922 has been to 'educate, inform 
and entertain'. he public service tradition in British broadcasting, embodied 
in regulation influencing the ethos and standards of all major television 
channels during election campaigns, emphasizes the provision of news 
and current affairs to enhance the quality of political debate (Blumler and 
Gurevitch 1995; Humphreys 1996). Yet critics charge that the news media 
fell far short of these standards in their coverage of the (1997 British 
general) election. Far from informing and mobilizing the public, 
commentators claim that news coverage encouraged public cynicism and 
political apathy.“] (Norris, 1998) 
 
If one makes similar accusations about the role of the media in  two failed 
cycles of Serbian presidential election in 2002 – she/he would be greatly 
mistaken. The failure to elect the president can only formally attributed to the 
insufficient number of voters casting their ballots and missing the census 
prescribed by the election rules. Although the environment for the media to fulfil 
their duty and enable politcal debate among the candidates was not institutinally 
finished, the media were actively involved in covering the campaigns and the 
issues. However, the media could not hide the real game plans of the major 
political parties, who only half-heartedly participated in the election. Blaming the 
messenger is often used trick  in politics, and it is certainly not a Serbian 
specialty. 
 
Public cynicism and apathy - resulting in low turnout and failure to elect the 
president - could be taken as a logical consequence of several factors: low 
public appreciation of the presidential office, unconvincing attitude of the major 
political parties and fielding weak candidates. The repeated electoral cycle, with 
the same candidates and pretty much same political discourse being offered 
again to the same (already bored and dissatisfied) voters could not motivate the 
citizens to come out in numbers required by the law.  
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5.0.3 Analysis Of The Media Activities 
One can argue if globalization of media, economic life, cultural and other values 
promotes democracy (Dalpino, 2001), or democracy represents just another 
fashionable buzzword. However, apart from Belarus, it seems that a great 
majority of European states, with Serbia as late addition, have some form of 
democratic government and fair electoral systems in place. The practice of 
international participation in monitoring elections, however, did not start with the 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and its 1975 Final Act in 
Helsinki, but only with its 1990s successor institution, the Organisation for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Such major change in 
international relations and practice was only possible after the remarkable 
changes in the former Soviet block. 
 
Elections in a post-communist states nowadays are not just the concern of the 
countries in question, but of the international actors as well. In addition to 
OSCE, many other organisations like the Council of Europe (CoE), European 
Union, diplomatic missions, domestic and international NGOs actively monitor 
elections in Serbia, but also in other parts of the world. It seems that only 
elections in countries like Belarus, North Korea and Cuba are still conducted 
without either domestic or international monitoring.  
 
Bearing in mind the recent undemocratic history and the beginning of the 
transition process, it is not surprising that several aforementioned organizations 
and institutions, alongside many NGOs keenly monitored the first post-Milosevic 
election proceedings in Serbia. Although the whole exercise in the end did not 
deliver the first post-Milosevic Serbian president, valuable empirical data were 
gathered, leading to inferences about the election procedures, voting patterns 
and the functioning of the media. 
 
The joint ad hoc OSCE / Council of Europe election monitoring mission, present 
during both attempts to elect the new president, gave elaborate explanation why 
they failed, as well as the evaluation of the role of the media. However, their 
main point of concern was legality of the election procedures/regulations, with 
concrete suggestions how to improve the election legislation in future. In this 
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work, I wanted to highlight only their findings regarding the media in the second 
cycle of elections on 8 December 2002:13 
   As required by the law, state-owned Radio Television Serbia (RTS) 
media outlets provided free time to all registered presidential 
candidates, and provided a range of predominantly balanced and 
neutral coverage of all the contestants. In general, the media were 
unbiased. However, the level of coverage of candidates and the 
campaign was much lower then in the previously staged 30 
September/14 October) election. 
   There were no amendments to the legislation regulating the media 
during the elections. It remains brief, lacks sufficient provisions to 
ensure equal access by candidates, and it is limited to the public media 
only. The mandate of the media supervisory body (Broadcasting 
Council) during elections must be clarified by law. 
   An agreement on the representation of candidates on the state-owned 
Radio Television of Serbia (RTS) was signed on 25 November 2002, 
two weeks after the legal deadline. Thereafter, the three candidates 
received equal access to free airtime and advertisements. However, the 
agreement did not regulate other media outlets. 
   Private electronic media generally gave a low level of coverage to the 
campaign and the candidates, often leading on other news items such 
as the activities of the Serbian Government and parliamentary sessions. 
When reported, the tone of the coverage was predominantly neutral, 
although candidate Kostunica received proportionally more coverage 
because of his current official role (Federal President). 
   The print media offered a wider variety of views and served as a more 
comprehensive source of information. Generally, the level of coverage 
was balanced, although candidate Kostunica was portrayed in a more 
positive tone than the other candidates. 
 
                                            
13
 This evaluation was based on the observation of 22 election experts of the OSCE – Office of 
the Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, based in Belgrade and three regional centres 
throughout Serbia, as well as Kosovo, who had been deployed since 17
th
 November 2002. It 
also incorporated the election day findings of121 short-term observers from 31 participating 
states, who reported from 621 out of 8,630 polling stations. 
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In evaluating candidates’ campaigns preceding the second failed election cycle, 
the international monitoring mission concluded: 
 Three candidates took part in the election, but they did not reflect the 
complete political spectrum in Serbia, and offered voters a limited 
choice. Important political interests did not field candidates, nor 
supported others, in effect discouraging their supporters to turn out and 
vote. 
 Despite all indications of significant public apathy towards the repeat 
elections, each candidate pursued a low profile campaign, with 
relatively few public meetings, advertising, or media appearances14. 
 All sides failed to motivate public interest in this election campaign. In 
advance of the holding of further repeat elections, the OSCE/ODIHR 
urge all the political parties and civil society to hold constructive 
dialogue in order to identify methods to strengthen public confidence in 
the democratic institutions of Serbia, and to ensure greater levels of 
public participation in future elections. 
 
The OSCE Mission to FR Yugoslavia, through its specialized media 
department, had monitored the output of main daily papers and principal TV 
stations during the second round of the first cycle of presidential election 
between 3 and 11 October 200215. The content analysis of the media coverage, 
which included TV and print media outlets warrant a conclusion that the media 




                                            
14
 In the second round of the first election cycle, in October 2002, the two candidates 
participated in a head-to-head live TV debate - first in the history of Serbian democracy and the 
media. In the December cycle of the elections, since there were three candidates, there was no 
debate. After the collapse of the first round, there was no second round and there was no 
attempt to organize a televised debate.  
 
15





If we consider the content analysis data of the Serbian print and TV media16 
during the two cycles of presidential elections in fall of 2002, it is clear that the 
media performed in a satisfactory way. The first failed cycle of the election was 
covered with a great detail, with an appropriate care and balance by both state 
and the private media outlets. However, when both the electorate and the 
media realised that the repeated election cycle would not be successful, a dose 
of fatigue and loss of enthusiasm was visible.  
 
Despite the lack of full media regulation – with only the new Broadcasting Act 
adopted, and without the Public Information Act17 - for the first time in political 
history of Serbia the media rose to the occasion and presented the citizens with 
an opportunity to hear, see and evalute the presidential candidates. The print, 
as well as the broadcast media, could finally operate in a non-prohibitive 
environment, where one centre of power did not dictate the rules, nor impeded 
political opponents from receiving an adequate coverage.  
 
The plurality of media outlets did not necessarily guarantee plurality of opinions, 
but plurality of competing political parties certainly guaranteed that no-one could 
excersize control, or censor the media. Once the media escaped from the iron 
grip of the previous regime, there was no going back. It took the media too long 
to acquire freedom, and it would be wrong to relinquish it at the very first turn. 
And that was true even for those media outlets which were not exactly 
independent and brave during the previous period – like daily papers Politika 
and Novosti, weekly Nin, or RTV Pink and TV BK. Some of the aforementioned 
media outlets used this oportunity to regain lost credibility and establish a new 
reputation as impartial and balanced.  
 
If we look at the data from the Appendix II, we can see that the coverage of the 
private media formerly associated with the regime of Slobodan Milosevic, like 





 The Public Information Act is the base legislation, which outlines the boundaries of the 
citizens’ rights to be informed and the work of the journalistic profession. 
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RTV Pink and TV BK, was exemplary unbiased and neutral. Same can be said 
for the election coverage of still not legally reformed state broadcaster RTS, 
whih was at the time receiving substantial technical aid and practical training 
from several international organisations in preparations for transformation into a 
public service broadcaster. 
 
The Appendix I brings content analysis of the print media. And again, it seems 
that the overall coverage of the election was balanced, impartial and fair to all 
the candidates. Formerly state-owned daily Politika, which was a key 
propaganda tool of the Milosevic regime, after the events of 2000 became a 
joint venture between German publishing house WAZ Media Group and the 
state of Serbia. The German partner decided to take care only of the economic 
(business) side of things in the joint stock company, while giving the Serbian 
partner full liberty to appoint editors and oversee the content. Early on, this 
seemed to be a functioning model, so Politika managed to regain credibility lost 
during the Milosevic era years. During the 2002 presidential campaign, Politika 
acted as an example of neutrality and balanced reporting.18 Same can be said 
of the daily Vecernje Novosti, which remained state-owned enterprise. Leading 
private dailies, Blic, Glas Naroda and Danas were also acting professionally and 
fairly, but in accord with their established political preferences - Blic being 
moderate rights wing oriented, Glas Javnosti leaning more towards the 
conservative nationalist cirlcles, while Danas stayed true to its roots of being 
liberal, pro Western and modernizing. 
 
Despite the absence of complete and clear media regulation in Serbia, the 
bottom line was  that the media performed well during the 2002 election period. 
Even the candidate, who pursued legal remedies against certain minor 
procedural mistakes (disorderly list of voters), did not question the role of the 
media, their impartiality and autonomy, and possibilities to get his message 
across to his voters. 
 
                                            
18
 Please see the data in Appendix I 
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Is it then fair to accuse the media for the failure of the election process in 
Serbia? To blame the messenger for the so-called “Television and Civic 
Malaise” as Pippa Norris (1998) calls it in one of her studies? Certainly not. In 
conclusion to this chapter on the role of the media during the 2002 Serbian 
presidential election, I’d like to revisit the aforementioned writings of Pippa 
Norris.  
“Popular commentators frequently blame television, and TV news in 
particular, for political coverage that produces a more cynical and 
disenchanted public and a half-empty ballot box. The growth of tabloid 
television has therefore commonly been singled out as a major problem for 
the health of modern democracy.” (Norris, 1998)  
 
The Norris’s findings about the media and voters’ behavior in the USA and 
Great Britain, and the data from Serbia actually converge. Only a superficial 
reading of the voters’ behavior and performance of the media during the two 
failed presidential election cycles in fall of 2002 could diagnose this as the “civic 
malaise”. On the opposite, the low turnout of voters was a logical reaction to the 
behaviour of the political parties, who underestimated the electorate. 
 
Norris maintains that the long-term effects of exposure and attention to 
television news are probably largely beneficial for civic engagement. People 
who regularly watch television news (in the UK and USA) posses above-
average political interest, efficacy and knowledge. The evidence which Norris 
presents, while far from conclusive, strongly suggests that we cannot blame the 
messenger for the symptoms of apathy and disengagement of voters. Here we 
see again the findings from her analysis of mature democracies and my findings 
from Serbia meet: 
 “In these nations (advanced industrialized societies), the more time spent 
 watching TV, the slightly lower the level of social trust, organizational 
 activism, political support for the regime, and political participation.  Yet 
 this pattern was not evident in developing societies. Moreover using this 
 evidence we could not establish whether this pattern was the effect, or 
 the cause, of watching television. After all, if we don’t trust other people, 
 if we don’t enjoy community meetings, if we’re bored by politics, it makes 
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 sense that we might well decide that we prefer to spend the evening in 
 the company of Frasier, Oprah and Seinfeld.” (Norris, 1998) 
 
Based on all of the above, it is important to note that after only two years in 
new, institutionally and legally still unfinished political and economic 
environment, the citizens/voters in Serbia adopted behaviour of citizens in 
mature democracies in regard to elections and the media as the main arena for 
political battles. After so many years in total political deprivation and heavily 
obstructed access to the sources of information, it seems that the Serbian 
citizens, or perhaps we should call them Schudson’s monitorial citizens19, have 
eagerly embraced the liberated media environment.  
 
Additionally, performance of the media during the 2002 presidential election 
points at one other interesting phenomenon. If the general socio-political 
atmosphere in society is optimistic than there is no need to coerce or police the 
media to perform their duty. And during the first two years of post-authoritarian 
life, the citizens of Serbia were still enthusiastic about the changes and goals 
that need to be reached. But they were not foolish to be manupulated by 
calculations of the main political rivals on the scene. On their own, the media 
very well understand the obligation to be objective and maintain standards of 
decency and respect in dealing with the political affairs. The media clearly 
understood that if they betrayed this duty, their own credibility and market 
position would at stake. Especially when they were trying to cater for such a 
politically articulate public, and when there were so many competing media 
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 I am referring here to the new model of citizenship proposed by Michael Schudson in his book 
The Good Citizen, which I discussed extensively in the Literature Review chapter of this work. 
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40 DAYS THAT SHOOK SERBIA 




Serbia’s transition towards democracy symbolically started on 5 October 2000. 
At that time, nobody could set a precise time frame for such a process; nor was 
a successful outcome by any means guaranteed. The political actors, as well as 
the citizens, were full of optimism that a new era had finally started. Everybody 
was hoping for a peaceful and calm transition, because too much history and 
drama had happened to the country and its citizens over the last decade of the 
XX century. Unfortunately, the events of 5 October 2000 were not the last 
dramatic moments of contemporary Serbian history, and smooth and speedy 
transition - with ascension into European Union membership as a symbolic 
approval that the process is finished - remained elusive. 
 
In this chapter, which is of purely historic nature, I examine the political events 
in Serbia which constitute the initial phase of transition - from Milosevic's 
departue on 6 October 2000 until the end of 2003 and extraordinary 
parliamentary elections. The key event which defines this phase is 
assassination of Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic (2001–2003). I argue that the 
process of transition had a coarse start, and eventually was further impaired by 
the event of 12 March 2003. This event certainly had a scale and implications 
only comparable to the ousting of Milosevic on 5 October 2000.  
 
In the second part of this chapter, I return to the main theme of this research – 
reform of the Serbian media - through the optics of how the media functioned 
during and after the times of national emergency. In forty days that shook 
Serbia1, the government priorities changed, while political disputes among DOS 
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 I chose the title for this chapter to describe atmosphere during the state of emergency declared 





coalition partners became irreconcilable, leading to extraordinary elections in 
December 2003. During the state of emergency, the media operated under 
restrictions and censorship, but came out of it stronger. 
 
Very soon after the first post-Milosevic cabinet in Serbia started its work in 
February 2001, it became apparent that the process of transition from a post-
socialist dictatorship to democratic capitalism would not go as smoothly as 
citizens hoped, and the outside world expected. Early enthusiasm of citizens 
and impression that Serbia had a great potential for fast forwarding transition to 
catch up with the rest of former socialist countries evaporated quickly - due to 
fragmented political scene and actors involved. The broad coalition DOS that 
ousted Milosevic was composed of 18 different parties from all sides of the 
political spectrum, with one goal in common - end of dictatorship (Bujosevic, 
Radovanovic, 2003). Unfortunately, that was not enough to keep DOS going for 
at least one full mandate (four years) – to clearly define and convert reform 
priorities into legislation and allow the government to implement it.  
 
Since the disagreement between former anti-Milosevic allies started as soon as 
they got in power, it is not surprising that the tempo of reforms was uneven, 
strategic planning absent and implementation reduced to partial and palliative 
measures. In that sense, promised quick reform of the media sector was also 
affected. Instead of putting the whole "Media laws package" on the agenda 
within one year and adopting them without further delay, this issue became 
another bargaining chip between feuding DOS partners. It meant delayed 
adoption of the necessary laws, which lasted longer than three years, and with 
final texts of legislations being diluted and changed to a great degree by the 
parliament. 
 
At the same time, reality could not wait, as RTV B92's Veran Matic stated, and 
the media had to function and secure their existence in difficult and not fully 
regulated market conditions. These conditions were inherited from the times of 
dictatorship and perpetuated unjust privileged positions of the Milosevic-era 





media outlets like TV Pink and TV BK, at the expense of independent media like 
RTV B92. Matic's open letter to the public in which he demanded from the new 
authorities not to delay reform of the media system carried a title "Legislate 
Now" (Matic, 2001). The open letter to the public was actually meant for PM 
Zoran Djindjic. 
 
Commenting on the 2001 public exchanges between Prime Minister Zoran 
Djindjic and RTV B92’s CEO Veran Matic, Djindjic’s party deputy Zoran Zivkovic 
explained his opinion in this debate:2 
“Some politicians were serious about media reform, some were not. The 
same can be said about other issues on the opposition’s (DOS) pre-
election manifesto. The media that remained independent and 
professional did not obstruct the government in its work. On the opposite, 
they were helping through pointing at problems which democratic 
government had failed to see. The media also pointed at certain cases of 
misuse of power by some officials of the new government. Unfortunately, 
there were very few media outlets of such kind. Majority wanted to cash in 
on their ‘participation in democratic revolution’ through blackmail.” 
 
Soon after the second unsuccessful cycle of presidential elections finished in 
December 2002, the country was thrown into major crises, with assassination of 
Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic on 12 March 2003. State of emergency was 
immediately declared, and lasted for 40 days. Still only partially regulated, the 
media had to function under the state of emergency, including calls for 
censorship, bans and other unpopular and undemocratic measures, which were 
justified by the need to apprehend perpetrators and their supporters. At the 
same time, two media laws3, which had been stalled within the parliament’s 
corridors for long time, were hastily adopted during the state of emergency – 
something that certainly is not a normal practice. 
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 This quote comes from the interview that Zoran Zivkovic gave to me for this research.  
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 Public Information System Act was passed on 22 April 2003, followed by the 





6.0.1 The Sour Fruits of Not So Decisive Victory In 2000 
 
The events preceding the assassination of the Serbian Prime Minister Zoran 
Djindjic on 12 March 2003, all the way back to 5 October 2000 warrant a more 
thorough explanation that would put clear perspective on various interlaced 
aspects and problems of the Serbian transition. 
 
Despite the victory in 2000 presidential election, the DOS coalition did not 
capture decisive majority in the Federal Parliament to end dominance of the 
Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS). Instead, DOS was forced to enter a coalition 
arrangement with the Socialist Peoples Party (SNP) from Montenegro. It was 
the very same party that until 24 September 2000 election had been a trusted 
coalition partner of Slobodan Milosevic and SPS. Aware that Milosevic was not 
a force to bet their survival on, SNP quickly switched their allegiance to DOS. 
Back home in Montenegro, SNP was not a dominant political force, but a 
minority in the republican parliament of Montenegro, where President Milo 
Djukanovic’s Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS) held power4. Djukanovic from 
1997 clearly distanced himself from Milosevic, and had steered his republic 
away from the Yugoslavian federation. He understood well that any liaison with 
Milosevic or FR Yugoslavia (FRY) would mean a death blow for his personal 
career and the future of Montenegro.5 
 
Aware of the dramatic changes in political outlook of Serbia that took place after 
5 October 2000, the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) agreed to a power sharing 
deal (interim government) with DOS on the republican level, until the 
extraordinary parliamentary election were held on 24 December 2000.  
 
                                            
4
 SNP actually was formed when the conservative socialists of Milosevic’s side-kick Momir 
Bulatovic clashed with the reformist wing of DPS, led by Milo Djukanovic, and following the losing 
battle for party leadership formed splinter Socialist Peoples Party. 
 
5
 Djukanovic maintained warm personal relations with Zoran Djindjic and his Democratic Party 
(DS), and helped him and some of DS activist hide in Montenegro from Milosevic’s prosecution 




Serbia’s parliamentary election on 24 December 2000 brought a sweeping 
victory to the DOS coalition, which won 176 out of 250 seats of the single 
chamber. It was a more than two-thirds majority, required to pass constitutional 
amendments. When the new cabinet of Zoran Djindjic took over from the interim 
government in February 2001, it looked as though the road towards Serbia’s 
transition was clear, especially with the comfortable parliamentary majority to 
rubber-stamp all the bills proposed by the government. 
 
However, there were some other political calculations present. New federal 
president Vojislav Kostunica and his Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) in the 
space of three months between his ascension to the federal presidency and the 
elections for the Serbian government grew enormously in popularity and 
membership. Being only a second fiddle to Djindjic’s DS did not appeal to the 
ambitions of DSS - especially after their membership grew exponentially from 
lowly almost cult-like 8,000 to ten time that figure within one year from October 
2000. The influx of new membership into DSS was a sign that former SPS 
supporters were quickly changing allegiances and trying to embark on the 
winning wagon. The conservative DSS agenda of promoting “Serbian values”, 
as something slightly different and even divergent from the reformist pro-
Western program of premier Djindjic, indeed appealed to many disappointed 
supporters of SPS, having a lot in common with the political discourse that kept 
Milosevic in power for 13 years (ICG Europe Report no.117, Sep. 2001). 
 
Djindjic’s openly cosmopolitan, reformist and pro-Western rhetoric, along with 
mercurial style and German educational background could not make him 
acceptable to a rural, conservative and nationalistic voter, who only recently had 
realised that Milosevic was crook and delivered poorly on promises of protecting 
the Serbian national interests (ICG Europe Report no.117, Sep. 2001). The 
negative effect of the NATO’s 1999 bombing and ten years of international 
sanctions could not be erased overnight from the memory of common 
people/voters. The main Milosevic’s explanation for ten years of losing battles, 




officially attributed to the Western complot/master plan to destroy Serbian 
nation6. Vojislav Kostunica, despite being too academically inclined and 
overeducated for the taste of rural and unsophisticated voters, was the only 
viable choice to contest and win against Milosevic, because he was using the 
similar, nation-oriented discourse. On the other hand, Djindjic’s brief record as 
the Mayor of Belgrade in 1997 was not perceived as success. Kostunica had 
impeccable reputation of honesty and not being corrupt, probably more to do 
with his absolute lack of any commercial or managerial experience, except 
involvement in the ivory tower world of academia. 
 
When DOS came to power following the 5 October 2000 events, Kostunica 
immediately proved to be not so naïve. In his inaugural speech he immediately 
proclaimed that no revenge would be pursued against those who were 
associated with the previous regime, and that the justice would be done through 
the existing legal system. Such a strict “legalistic” approach in practice meant 
blocking the so-called lustration (Politika, & Oct. 2000, pg. 1). Lustration is a 
political term referring to cleansing of the state institutions from compromised 
people who were part of or worked for the previous regime (Brahm, 2004)  
 
It also meant a stale mate in regards to imminent change of constitution, one of 
the primary goals of the once unified DOS. In the Serbian parliament elected on 
25 December 2000, Kostunica’s MPs blocked almost all proposals coming from 
Democratic Party (DS) and the other DOS partners, acting like internal 
opposition, despite being elected on the joint DOS list. 
 
Kostunica kept in service the notorious chief of the Milosevic’s secret police 
Rade Markovic for next six months; despite continues protests from his DOS 
coalition partners.7 The story was similar with the Milosevic’s Chief of the 
                                            
6
 Such fascination with “the great complot theory against Serbs” borders with paranoia, and most 
likely came into Milosevic’s discourse from the mind of his wife Mirjana Markovic. Her fanatical 
communist beliefs see the whole world in the light of ideological fight between socialism and 
capitalism, and Serbia as the last unconquered island of the communist world in Europe. 
 
7
 Following his removal, Rade Markovic had been initially arrested on charges for destroying the 
secret service files after 5 October 2000. However, Markovic was later tried and convicted on 





General Staff, General Nebojsa Pavkovic, whom Kostunica kept for next year 
and half. When in summer of 2002 Kostunica finally replaced Pavkovic, he 
managed to portray himself as a patriot and victim of a cruel political 
manipulation, and subsequently ran in the 2002 Serbian presidential election as 
an independent candidate.8 In addition to those key-figures, Kostunica 
surrounded himself with inner circle of advisors, with history of links with the 
previous regime. Until February 2003, when the Federal Republic Yugoslavia 
(FRY) officially ceased to exist, along with the position of federal president, 
Kostunica used his position9 to advance his party’s conservative ideology 
through quasi-patriotic rhetoric. Also, he took every opportunity to criticize the 
government of Serbia and his main political rival, Zoran Djindjic and Democratic 
Party. 
 
On the other hand, Djindjic had ended up with the most difficult and responsible 
job of prime minister, who had to present the voters with the unpaid bills from 
the past, and prescribe a therapy of bitter medicines on the long and winding 
road of reform and recovery. The average salary in Serbia at the time of 
Milosevic’s demise was around £ 30 per month, while two and half years later at 
the time when PM Djindjic was assassinated it rose to £ 100.10 
 
The secret Special Operations Police (SOP) unit, founded as the Milosevic’s 
own Praetorian Guard in the early 1990s for conducting clandestine operations 
in Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo, and allegedly responsible for many political 
liquidations in Serbia, was another major problem. On 5 October 2000, when 
the protesters from all over Serbia started to flood the streets of Belgrade in 
order to overthrow Milosevic, SOP apparently got demand from the boss to 
ruthlessly dispel the demonstrators, with all the necessary means. 
                                                                                                                                
 
8
 General Pavkovic had been indicted for war crimes committed during the 1999 Kosovo conflict, 
initially opposed arrest and extradition to ICTY, but eventually had to surrender and was 
transferred to The Hague. 
 
9
 Office of the Federal President is of a non-executive nature, with a few competencies regarding 
to the military and no responsibilities in economy. 
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Understanding that Milosevic’s time was up, the SOP commander Milorad 
Lukovic - Legija secretly had met Djindjic and gave him assurances that the unit 
would not go into action against the demonstrators. In exchange, Lukovic got a 
verbal promise from Djindjic that SOP’s inglorious past would not be scrutinized 
by the future government. The greatest fear of the SOP unit was that the new 
authorities would disband it and extradite its members to the ICTY (Vasic, 
2005).  
 
However, as the old proverb says, the wolf can only shed his hair, but cannot 
changes his nature. The gentlemen’s agreement with the SOP unit proved to be 
a pact with the devil, one that cost PM Zoran Djindjic his life in March 2003. It 
also took the nation into unprecedented 40 days of state of emergency. (Vasic, 
2005) 
 
There was no more “real work” available for the SOP-type of goon squad, which 
can exist only in oppressive regimes/states. The promised temporary immunity 
from prosecution, based on the 5 October 2000 gentlemen’s agreement, could 
work only if the unit understood the nature of changes and refrained from the 
old habits. However, the changes of 5 October 2000 to SOP meant only the 
change of master, while “methodology of work” would remain the same. In 
2001, despite its clandestine nature, the SOP unit displayed its dissatisfaction 
with the course of political developments in a much-publicized mutiny. It was 
subdued only after Djindjic’s personal visit to the SOP headquarters in Kula, 
and dismissal of the head of secret service - as demanded by SOP. This public 
display of insubordination, however, was a clear signal that in peaceful and 
democratic times such unit can become a threat to the government, and not its 
protector. Needless to say, Djindjic’s rival Kostunica declared that the SOP’s 
mutiny was an acceptable labour action/strike against employer, like SOP was 
some kind of a trade union. 
 
Despite delivering the top price – Milosevic – into the custody of ICTY on 28 




rewarded by the international actors11. Further conditions for much needed aid 
and investment packages were added instead. Kostunica used such course of 
events to accuse Djindjic of being unpatriotic – delivering fellow Serbs to the 
international tribunal and not even receiving the promised carrot (financial 
support). Such patriot/traitor discourse was routinely used by Milosevic during 
his years in power in order to castigate any opposition work, supported from 
abroad. Through his control over the military, Kostunica played another 
“patriotic card” by allowing the former Bosnian-Serb Army commander General 
Ratko Mladic to live in Belgrade peacefully for some times and to subsequently 
flee, despite outstanding international warrant for his arrest. 
 
At the end of 2002 Serbia was in the middle of nowhere. The constitutional 
reform of the Federal Republic Yugoslavia was being delayed beyond all 
promised, reasonable and prescribed dates; The economic reform process 
promoted by the Djindjic government was stalled; The legislative work in the 
Serbian parliament was blocked by the DSS opposition to DOS12; Unresolved 
murders, abductions for ransom, and drug-related crime continued to rise 
unchallenged.  
 
In early 2003, the work on new confederal arrangement between Serbia and 
Montenegro was finally completed through good spirit of understanding 
between Serbian Prime Minister Djindjic and Montenegrin President Milo 
Djukanovic. Adoption of the Constitutional Charter by both republican 
parliaments and the Federal parliament finally meant retirement of the name 
Yugoslavia and its federal structures - in favour of very different, loose and 
sparsely structured confederal union, called by the names of its members - 
Serbia and Montenegro.  
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 In this context, it means USA and the EU, as the main financial donors and possible investors 
into the economy of Serbia. 
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 Sound 176 DOS majority out of 250 MPs, proved to be a volatile and unstable majority of 132 – 
out of minimum 126 needed – due to Kostunica’s DSS behaviour. Such situation even prompted 
other DOS members to demand additional concessions from the Djindjic’s melting majority as the 





Just before this cornerstone event, Djindjic managed to prevent Kostunica from 
becoming the president of Serbia in December 2002 through shrewd election 
manoeuvring.13 With Kostunica out of the federal president’s office and his 
popularity rating substantially diminished due to the failed presidential election, 
and with the success of the new constitutional deal with Montenegro, in March 
2003 Serbian Prime Minister Djindjic was just about to re-launch his programs 
of economic reforms. At the same time Djindjic intended to finally address the 
problem of organized crime connected with the old security structures. These 
structures were refusing to undergo change of their modus operandi and defied 
attempts to be placed under civilian control.14  
 
However, the forces opposing Djindjic and his clean-up effort had been 
informed in advance about the imminent action prepared by the Djindjic’s 
government, and attacked first. There was a failed assassination attempt on 
Djindjic in February 2003, which the prime minister did not understand 
seriously. A truck driver tried to hit the premier’s motorcade on the freeway in 
New Belgrade. The driver had been arrested, but a few hours later released 
through a court order, pending trial for minor traffic violation and possession of 
forged vehicle documents. This was a major police blunder, because only minor 
charges had been pressed against Dejan Milenkovic Bagzi, known for having 
criminal connections. However, the release was blamed on the judiciary, which 
did not have legal ground to keep him in prison as an assassination suspect. 
Bagzi promptly disappeared without a trace15. 
 
Zoran Djindjic in the first instance did not understand the graveness of the 
situation and that it was an assassination attempt, telling the media that it 
looked to him like behaviour of an inexperienced driver who was intimidated by 
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 The failed 2002 Serbian presidential election is the subject of the previous chapter of this work. 
 
14
 Djindjic was aware of the fact that the SOP unit was involved in criminal activities including 
drugs distribution and abductions for ransom, in partnership with the Zemun criminal gang. A 
decisive action to tackle this problem was scheduled to begin in March 2003. 
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 The truck driver was Dejan Milenkovic “Bagzi”, a member of the Zemun criminal gang re-
surfaced three years later as protected witness of the prosecution in the court case against 




an escorted official motorcade. A few days later, when he was properly 
informed about the failed attempt at his life, he took it in stride and publicly said 
that he is not afraid, and even if he is killed the process of reforms in Serbia 
could not be stopped, nor reversed (Vasic, 2005). As a philosopher, he 
understood that a man has to do what he has to do, and that escape from fate 
was not possible. He was ready to continue, despite the risks involved, but also 
did not carefully review his own personal security arrangements and 
procedures.  
 
Just like in most other high profile political assassinations in the world, the 
killers, their informants and collaborators came from the inside ranks of security 
services. It was the case with the Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and the 
Egyptian President Anwar El Sadat in the past, and the same happened to 
Djindjic. Additional safety measures and bullet-proof vests in such case are of 
little use, and Djindjic bravely or carelessly refused to wear one. 
 
6.1 THE STATE OF EMERGENCY AND THE MEDIA 
 
On 12 March 2003, somewhat past mid-day, an event took place in the 
backyard parking lot of the Serbian Government’s main building. It has changed 
forever not only the political scene in Serbia, but its future direction. A single 
sniper bullet fatally wounded Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic when he 
exited his car at the back entrance of the government building. 
 
Only a day earlier, a relatively new and low circulation weekly magazine called 
Identitet (“Identity”), published by a reclusive group of businessmen who have 
became rich during the 1991-1999 conflicts in the region of former Yugoslavia, 
had carried a frightening headline: “Djindjic Targeted by the Bosnian-Serb 




false prophecy, “journalists’ duck”,16 or another gimmick aimed at increase of 
circulation. Actually, it was a public revelation of an action plan, which was soon 
fulfilled. 
 
Following the initial shock and disbelief, the Serbian Government held an 
emergency session on the day of assassination, and decided to ask the acting 
president of Serbia (Speaker of the Parliament) to proclaim the state of 
emergency. Such measures would allow the police, prosecution and judiciary to 
deal swiftly and adequately with this crime, since the previous parliamentary 
deliberations on appointments of judiciary and amendments of the criminal 
procedures and penal codes were stalled. It also meant that all the media (state 
and private) would be put under restrictions during the state of emergency. 
Duration of the state of emergency was not known, but it was referred to as a 
temporary and short-term. Despite a few isolated voices who immediately 
questioned legality of the state of emergency17, the acting President Natasha 
Micic in a live televised address to the nation decreed the state of emergency18. 
She asked the citizens for patience and not to be afraid of such extraordinary 
measures, since those were aimed at criminal gangs who organized the killing 
of prime minister, and were not meant to curtail any of the guaranteed individual 
and political freedoms, or human rights. 
 
In the next 40 days, the newly appointed Prime Minister Zoran Zivkovic19, 
managed to fulfil the promise of the acting president. The usage of the 
extraordinary powers would be with a measure of restraint and delicacy, only to 
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 Such expression is used in Serbian language when referring to the journalistic tricks of the trade 




 Professor Vojin Dimitrijevic, Director of the Belgrade Centre for Human Rights and the country’s 
leading intellectual, had voiced an argument against introduction of the state of emergency. 
However, nobody in the government or judiciary would consider his well-grounded concerns at the 
time, and preferred to reach for the “panic button”. 
  
18
 State of emergency did not cover the territory of Montenegro, which is a separate state, 
although participating in the confederative union with Serbia, following the constitutional 
restructuring of the former Federal Republic Yugoslavia in February 2003. 
 
19






uncover the criminals behind the murder and to deal a mortal blow to the 
Serbian underworld gangs through arrests and swift judicial prosecution of 
suspects.  
 
Under the scrutiny of the international community, and underpinned by the 
strong show of support (including financial assistance) from the United States of 
America and the European Union, in order to stabilize the whole project of post-
Milosevic rehabilitation and transition, the Zivkovic government indeed used the 
state of emergency wisely and efficiently (ICG Europe Briefing no. 49, April 
2003). The state of emergency was lifted before any significant claims of 
undemocratic curtailment of political life had been recorded or alarms raised. 
The promise of lifting the state of emergency no later than end of April 2003 
was fulfilled after 40 days, on time (22 April 2003) for the Orthodox Easter 
festivities. 
 
During the course of the state of emergency some 9,000 people were 
questioned by the police and 1,200 held in custody; the killer of the prime 
minister was arrested and confessed, but showed no regret for his act. Much 
delayed re-shuffle of Milosevic era judiciary and prosecutors were partially 
done, along with the overdue amendments to the criminal and penal codes 
passed. A whole network of criminals behind what was a plot to overthrown the 
regime was uncovered, and a majority of them arrested. (ICG Europe Briefing 
no. 49, April 2003) 
 
The dreaded Special Operations Police (SOP) unit, whose deputy commander 
confessed to murderer of Zoran Djindjic, was disbanded. In the wake of such a 
large investigation, several other major political murders from the past were 
finally solved20. Connections were uncovered between the parts of Milosevic’s 
security apparatus that remained intact after 5 October 2000, and the 
international narcotics distribution network, reaching as far as notorious 
Colombian cartels. 
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6.1.1 Government versus the Media 
During the state of emergency, the Serbian parliament finally passed two crucial 
media legislation – the Public Information Act and Telecommunications Act. The 
Broadcasting Act, adopted in July 2002, could finally be enacted through 
appointment of the Independent Regulatory Body. It took more than a year for 
the Parliament to adopt these acts since the expert working group had 
submitted their draft versions of the aforementioned legislation. The next in line 
for adoption was the Freedom of Information Act. It was eventually passed in 
2004.  
During 40 days of the state of emergency, there were several media-related 
events that merit attention. A handful publications were banned – the 
aforementioned weekly Identitet and daily Nacional; Belgrade daily Novosti was 
reprimanded; Municipality-owned TV Leskovac was fined; Distribution of 
Montenegrin daily Dan was suspended in Serbia, while its Serbian distributor 
was fined. The official justification was that those media outlets did not follow 
the government’s decreed guidelines how the media must operate during the 
state of emergency. The decree had stipulated that the media must transmit 
only official statements about the investigation, refrain from editorials and 
speculations. Additionally the media must not question the reasons, or legality 
of the state of emergency. The Ministry of Culture & Media was in charge of 
monitoring and enforcing the provisions. The Government’s Communications 
Bureau held daily briefings for the media - or in plain words gave orders and 
instructions to the editors (Politika, 15 March 2003). 
 
Ten days into the state of emergency (22 March 2003) the Minister of 
Information & Media, Branislav Lecic told Radio Television Serbia that the 
media had properly understood the serious nature of the situation in the 
country, and manifested their loyalty to the state. "The Serbian Government is 
pleased with the media conduct," the minister noted.21 
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However, there were incidents recorded between the government officials and 
the media, when over-diligent, arrogant and not very competent state officials 
managed to ignite public outrage with their clumsy statements and actions. The 
Minister of Culture & Media Lecic personally stated that in the effort to aid 
catching the perpetrators and planners of the prime minister’s killing, his 
Ministry would form an ad-hoc commission (made of experts and journalists) to 
analyze the media (mainly print) output during the coarse of previous two years. 
Daily paper Danas carried a statement from the Minister Lecic about the nature 
of the proposed commission: 
“We are not creating an Inquisition-type commission to meet behind close 
doors and prepare orders against journalists in secret. It shall be open to 
all forms of public communication.” (Danas, 2 Apr. 2003, pg.3) 
 
Lecic further admitted that the initiative to establish such a commission came 
from the Ministry of Interior. According to Lecic, the first concrete reason to set 
up a commission was the need to remove “rotten apples”, and identify 
journalists paid by criminals to wage a propaganda war. Secondly, he said, a 
commission of this kind may assist the investigation "since there are men who 
made public statements, carried by the media, which actually foreshadowed the 
events" (Danas, 2 Apr. 2003). In reply to criticism that establishment of such 
commission may be interpreted as an attempt to silence critical thinking, the 
minister maintained that fears of this kind were entirely unfounded. 
 
Reacting to the announced formation of the commission, Milica Lucic-Cavic, 
President of the Independent Journalists Association (IJAS) told Radio B92 that 
the initiative for that came from police, and as such it was not suitable for a 
democratic society: 
"In view of the state of emergency and in the light of newly acquired 
information and strong evidence provided by the police, revealing the fact 
that certain media were indeed financed by the mafia, we, in a way, 
understand the need to establish a commission of this kind. However, the 
risk we perceive at this point of time is the one of throwing the baby out 
with the bath water. Another potential danger is auto-censorship." (Radio 





Fortunately, nobody in right mind understood such a clumsy ministerial 
statement seriously, neither the Government acted in any way to support the 
words of its minister. His personal involvement in the opposition work during the 
years of the anti-Milosevic struggle as the master of the ceremony/speaker in 
numerous street protests did earn Mr. Lecic position of the Minister for Culture, 
but the public always treated him as a mere DOS mascot and not as a serious 
politician, whose words have any weight. When in a dramatic appearance on 
the city of Belgrade owned TV station Studio B, Lecic explained his ideas how 
to establish the commission, reminiscent to that of Senator Joseph McCarthy in 
the 1950s USA, it was met by both the media profession and public as a 
ridiculous action by a person who craves for public scene, way outside his own 
scope, context and competence. After his unsuccessful ministerial engagement, 
Mr. Lecic returned to his real profession – theatre and film, where he remains 
one of the most prominent Serbian actors. 
 
Another source of occasional strife and tensions between government and the 
media was much maligned advisor of Zoran Djindjic, Vladimir Beba Popovic. He 
served for two years as the head of Government’s Communication Bureau, and 
Djindjic’s personal “spin doctor”. During his period at the Bureau, Popovic 
understood his role as an unlimited license to engage in personal exchanges 
and settling of old scores with the counterparts22 from the Kostunica camp.  
 
In the wake of his government’s very low approval ratings in public opinion 
polls, Djindjic asked Popovic to take a leave of absence in November 2002, but 
never officially removed him from the Agency. Popovic returned to running his 
advertising business in Vienna. Among the advertising experts, Popovic’s work 
was always dismissed, since he managed to achieve terrible results with Zoran 
Djindjic - a personality that was advertiser’s dream – young, elegant, energetic, 
eloquent and always smiling.  
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However, Djindjic was personally indebted to Popovic for financing his party 
during the 1990s, and could not just send him away for gross incompetence. It 
is worth noting that Popovic’s rise to fame did not come through outstanding 
work in the advertising industry, but through personal connection with his boss, 
former director of a leading advertising agency, Milan Beko. It was Beko who 
appointed Popovic as his successor at the Belgrade branch of Ogilvy and 
Mather, when he took up the ministerial position in the government of Slobodan 
Milosevic. Zoran Djindjic and Milan Beko were family friends for many years, 
and through Popovic went their contact while the friends were on the opposite 
sides of the political scene. Prior to working for the Beko’s advertising agency, 
Popovic was a waiter and accordion player on the Belgrade night club circuit.  
 
After the assassination of prime minister, as Djindjic’s family friend and 
confidant, Popovic organized the state funeral, and personally carried Djindjic’s 
coffin, with a few other friends and political associates (Vreme, 20 Mar 2003, 
no. 637). Despite not being part of the (Democratic) party leadership, Popovic 
re-appeared at the helm of the Communications Bureau, and appointed himself 
as the almighty censor during the state of emergency. He personally handled 
the daily media briefings for editors. 
 
In one of rather comic blunders, the Communications Bureau briefed the editors 
how two main associates of the former head of Milosevic’s secret police Jovica 
Stanisic had been arrested in connection to the Djindjic murder investigation. It 
turned out that both retired men read about their arrest in the papers, and 
decided to visit their former company in order to ask if there was any problem. 
Their colleagues at the Security and Information Agency (BIA)23 told them over 
coffee that BIA indeed investigated various cases and took suspects into 
custody, but cannot be held responsible at all for wrong information 
disseminated by the Communications Bureau. When veteran security 
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correspondent Milos Vasic reported this in the weekly Vreme, it prompted the 
Bureau to issue a statement next day of neither denial, nor accepting 
responsibility for the fault. Instead, it lamented on the need that journalists must 
be more responsible during times of national crises, forgetting its own lack of 
professionalism and responsibility. 
 
The things got even worse for Popovic and his Bureau following an interview of 
the Deputy Prime Minister Nebojsa Covic with Gordana Susa for prestigious 
VIN, independently produced TV news program, on 18 April 2003. Susa 
claimed that she received a phone call from Popovic who "referring to her 
questions to the government Vice President, assaulted her with crudest, vulgar, 
disrespectful and insulting words, including overt threats", a leading news 
agency reported (Fonet, 20 Apr. 2003). The question that incited Popovic to 
react in such a way was about his sudden resurgence at the Bureau, after six 
months of absence and reported dismissal. 
 
Former Editor-in-Chief of the RTS and president of Independent Journalist 
Association of Serbia (IJAS), Gordana Susa is one of the country’s most 
eminent journalists and certainly not a person that would bow to such pressures 
from the government, especially when it was not professionally justified or right. 
The Alternative Network of Electronic Media (ANEM) immediately sharply 
protested the threats addressed at the VIN editor Susa. Vladimir Popovic 
denied that he had threatened Gordana Susa. Popovic told Beta News Agency 
that he would inform the public on the background for this assault on him and 
the Bureau, soon after the termination of the state of emergency. 
 
One day after the lifting of the state of emergency, daily Novosti, which was 
fined during this period, reported that Democratic Alternative – party of the 
Deputy Prime Minister Nebojsa Covic - strongly condemns pressures on the 
media. The party, at the same time, requested an inquiry into the incident, when 
a government official Vladimir Popovic threatened journalist Gordana Susa after 
her interview with the Deputy Prime Minister Covic. Democratic Center, another 




circumstances of the Susa-Popovic case should be examined and sanctioned, if 
necessary, said its spokesperson. 
 
The media section of the Independence Trade Union24 denounced the threats of 
a government official addressed at journalist Gordana Susa as menacing to the 
entire profession, and underlined that the least what the Government should do 
was to distance itself from the incident. Representatives of Otpor25 
communicated that threats to journalists were intolerable and any threats of 
such a kind constituted an attack on the state and democracy. This informal 
pro-democracy movement expected an appropriate and prompt reaction from 
the Serbian authorities, especially from the Ministry of Culture and Media.  
 
6.1.2 The Revenge of the Media 
 
Immediately after the state of emergency in Serbia was lifted, the media 
decided it was time to vent their frustration over how the Ministry of Culture and 
Media, and the Communications Bureau handled the situation. To the credit of 
the media in Serbia, they did not want to be too critical during the state of 
emergency, and showed due restraint when the state was indeed under 
pressure, needing support from decent citizens and not just criticism for the 
sake of quasi-democratic discourse. The constructively cautious stand adopted 
by the media was not motivated just to spare themselves from problems and 
possible punishment. The justification for their behaviour was that there were 
truly no major incidents of censorship, undue interference and undemocratic 
behaviour of the government, or political parties. Minor incidents mentioned 
earlier were more like a normal course of events.  
When a country has a mature journalistic profession, which trade possesses 
professional skill, integrity and courage, not every minor blunder should be 
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treated as alarming. Conversely, in such an environment the media cannot be 
intimidated or silenced by verbal abuses and threats coming from any 
government official. However, the restrained behaviour of the media during the 
state of emergency did not mean that mishandlings on behalf of the government 
and questioning the media’s professional integrity would be quickly forgotten.  
 
On 24 April 2003, chief editors26 of 15 leading media (print, electronic, private, 
and state-owned) in Serbia sent an open letter to the government, motivated by 
recent misunderstandings between members of journalistic profession and 
some government officials. These misunderstandings surfaced during the state 
of emergency. Therefore, the editors invited the authorities to join 
representatives of the media in discussing key media problems in a tolerant and 
democratic atmosphere. The proposed agenda for discussion with the 
representatives of Serbian Parliament, Government and other state bodies was 
following: 
 - The ramifications of adopting important media legislation under the 
state of emergency. This primarily concerned the Public Information Act and the 
appointment of members of the Broadcast Agency Council. 
 - The taxation policies applying to media; 
 - The practice of supplying information to media in briefing sessions 
under the state of emergency. The editors stated that it is important to examine 
all the problems that occurred during the state of emergency and their 
consequences; 
 - A review of unlawful actions taken against media during the state of 
emergency, or in disregard of democratic practices and principles; 
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 - Discussion of the attitude by certain government officials vis-à-vis the 
media, with a special focus on the threats which had been made to some 
editors; 
The editors also wrote what type of action they expected from the government: 
 Proposed amendments to the Public Information Act, which would 
repeal those provisions of the act agreed on by the Media Working 
Group which prepared the media legislation. This applied particularly 
to those provisions which were contributing to unfair competition, such 
as the provision which allowed the state to own and operate a news 
agency; 
 Support the demand of the media associations to dismiss two 
members of the Broadcast Agency Council, who were not appointed 
under the provisions of the law, while continuing to properly establish 
the Council itself; 
 Present proofs to support allegations made by certain government 
officials against some media outlets and journalists, or to apologize 
and provide compensation to those who sustained damage because 
of these claims. Responsibility for the resulting problems should also 
be established within the ranks of the government. At the same time, 
the editors stated their readiness to undertake an investigation of what 
had happened within their own profession; 
 Reduce taxation on newspaper sales, which is several times the level 
of tax in the rest of Europe and in neighbouring countries. Such 
measure had brought several publishing houses to the brink of 
bankruptcy. 
The 14 editors-in-chief signed off their open letter, confident that the Serbian 
Government and the relevant parliamentary bodies would agree to a dialogue 
on these topics and proposals. 
The Government reacted to the letter with a few days of delay, protesting that it 
was given to them through diplomatic channels, rather than directly. The new 
Prime Minister Zoran Zivkovic decided to meet the editors on 5 May 2003, 




and Media Branislav Lecic, as the government officials dealing with the media 
affairs. The government representatives insisted that the some sections of the 
Information Act, which caused protest by the media, had not been proposed by 
the government, but by the members of the parliament. They also argued that 
the government did not nominate controversial members of the Broadcasting 
Council.  
In the interview for this research, former Prime Minister Zoran Zivkovic admitted 
that illegal appointment of Nenad Cekic as the head of the Broadcasting Council 
was not exactly his primary concern during "Operation Sabre", which was the 
code name of the police action to apprehend the killers of Zoran Djindjic during 
the state of emergency.   
When the government and media representatives met, the editors demanded 
changes to decrees, which permit the government to own news agencies and 
ban distribution of publications. No promises were made, although Prime 
Minister Zivkovic did accept the suggestion that a special meeting should be 
organized to re-evaluate media taxation policy. Both sides agreed that candid 
nature of the talks was encouraging and that future meetings should be held to 
discuss any matters that were of concern to the media. 
Veran Matic, editor-in-chief of Radio Television B92, insisted afterwards that the 
government had not clarified their stance on the request to dismiss the two 
controversial members of the Broadcasting Council, stating simply that they had 
not nominated them. Matic said:  
 "They did not wish to discuss this issue because it's not under direct 
 government jurisdiction. We expected them to throw a hot potato to 
 somebody else, we did not expect a concrete decision here, but we 
 expected at least a clear stance from the government. I think it is a pity 
  was breached. It is a part of the process of creating trust between the 
 media and the government." (B92 News, 5 May 2003) 
But it wasn’t just the prominent media editors and the professional associations 
who protested against the way how two members of the Broadcasting Council 




organizations involved in drafting the media legislation, publicly expressed their 
concern, too. Special Envoy of the Secretary General of Council of Europe, 
Verena Taylor, said that although she was satisfied with the appointment of the 
Broadcasting Council, the legal procedure foreseen by the Law on Broadcasting 
had been violated during the appointment process. Taylor announced that the 
Council of Europe was not satisfied with the way that Broadcasting Agency 
began its existence - adding that her organization insisted on respect of the 
legal procedure. (Danas, 22 April 2003) 
Ambassador Maurizio Massari, head of the OSCE Mission in Serbia and 
Montenegro commented the situation to RTV B92: 
“We are aware of certain criticism regarding appointments to the Council 
and we know that the 30-day provision in the Law on setting up the 
Council was not, in this case observed. Respect for the legal procedures 
needs to be regarded - as the rule of law in any democratic country - 
including of course Serbia is paramount. In this specific case, however, we 
believe that the Serbian parliament tried in good faith and with the 
consensus of different political forces, to speed up procedures in order to 
break the deadlock, which has creating a serious obstacle to the 
implementation of the Law.” (B92 News, 25 Apr. 2003) 
However, all of the above proves that relations between the media and the 
government of Serbia were not bad – channels of communication were open, 
while disagreements and occasional shows of pride and stubbornness in 
defending own positions existed on both sides in a healthy manner. As any 
other government, the Serbian government showed from time to time a 
tendency towards implementing certain measures in a hasty and not completely 
legal way, but the media were certainly not controlled state agencies for 
dissemination of propaganda any more. It was evident that the media had 
enough space and influence to maintain independent and not necessarily pro-
government positions, and could even challenge government’s positions.  
The work on drafting and institutionalizing the frame for future development of 
the media, however, was far from finished. At this initial phase of Serbia’s 




which was commendable. Duress that the media had sustained during long 
years of fighting against dictatorship certainly helped them to build the 
rebellious and interrogative spirit – which constitutes the democratic nature of 
media. With adequately drafted media legislation and its practical 
implementation, the future should hopefully bring economic prosperity and more 
independence to the media sector and the journalist profession. 
6.1.3 Life after the State of Emergency  
In analyzing impact of the state of emergency on the politics and media in 
Serbia, it can be said that it did not have any long-standing negative, nor 
alarming effects. There was a consensus among the international actors 
(diplomatic missions, inter-governmental organizations like UN, Council of 
Europe, OSCE etc.) that the Serbian Government used extraordinary powers 
with a due restraint, and not to curtail any individual rights or freedoms of 
citizens, to interfere in political life of the country, nor on the operations and 
practice of the media. Prime Minister Zivkovic in interview for weekly Vreme told 
that he did not want to be anyone's hostage - but his own man in terms of 
formulating the cabinet's priorities and policies (Vreme, 29 May 2003, no. 647). 
Despite not being completely content with the procedure how the Broadcasting 
Council members were appointed, the OSCE ambassador in Belgrade Maurizio 
Massari evaluated the overall progress in reform of the media in a positive 
manner:  
“[…The OSCE Mission wishes to express its satisfaction for the recent 
appointment of the Broadcasting Agency's Council. This is crucial for the 
implementation of the OSCE - supported Broadcasting Act, and a 
substantial contribution to the transformation of Serbia's electronic media 
sector into a professional, modern and open market, in line with European 
and international best practices and standards.  
The Broadcasting Agency will have to play a fundamental role in the 
reform process. The OSCE calls on all Media operators to collaborate with 
the Agency, which should be granted the powers and independence it 




Several major polling organizations conducted their researches of public opinion 
during the state of emergency, in order to evaluate immediate impact of the 
events on the political scene, and a major shift in voters’ attitudes was detected. 
According to the Gallup’s Serbian franchise,27 the Democratic Party and its DOS 
coalition had a commanding lead and approval rate in excess of 30%, if an 
election was held at that moment28.  
 
This was not the case in the preceding two and half years. Former think tank, 
which turned into a political party G17+, led by the former Federal Deputy Prime 
Minister Miroljub Labus29, was second on the list, with around 15% approval 
rate. Vojislav Kostunica’s Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) had dropped in the 
ratings from two years of unchallenged lead to the third place and 13%. 
Slobodan Milosevic's Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) would barely pass the 
minimum census of 5% to enter parliament, while the most important opposition 
force associated with the former regime at the time was the Serbian Radical 
Party (SRS) of Vojislav Seselj, although with much diminished rating than 
previously, at around 7%. All other political parties, including former warlord 
Arkan’s Serbian Unity Party (SSJ) would not pass 5% census necessary to 
enter parliament, despite holding 12 seats in the first post-Milosevic parliament 
elected in December 2000.30  
 
Such ratings also indicated that the citizens were very content with the work of 
the government after the assassination of PM Djindjic, and that quick 
apprehension of culprits and fight against organized crime enjoyed strong 
support. Only six months earlier, in December 2002, Kostunica’s DSS was the 
most popular political party with 25% support, while Djindjic personally and his 
DS could manage barely 12%. 
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However, Prime Minister Zoran Zivkovic did not want to capitalize on the greatly 
enhanced ratings of his Democratic party, based on voter’s sympathy for 
assassinated Zoran Djindjic and the government’s good record during 40 days 
of emergency. If Zivkovic had used the opportunity to call extraordinary election 
during summer of 2003, it could have made Democratic party the most powerful 
political force on the scene, while it would also mean drastic fall in popularity of 
the main rivals, Kostunica’s Democratic Party of Serbia. Instead, Zivkovic 
continued to lead the cabinet composed from the DOS parties by his 
predecessor, but soon faced the same problems Djindjic had had.  
 
Some of the smaller parties like G17+ and Social Democratic Party thought that 
their share of power was not adequate and started flirting with DSS, while some 
members of the cabinet got involved in scandals and controversies.31 Within the 
next six months Zivkovic did call extraordinary election in December 2003, tired 
of blackmail from his minor coalition partners. However, the pendulum of the 
Serbian political scene had unexpectedly swung again towards the conservative 
forces – and Vojislav Kostunica and his DSS came out victorious. Kostunica 
formed the new nation-centric government coalition in March 2004 and became 
prime minister. After doing poorly at general election, Zivkovic subsequently lost 
the party leadership battle to Boris Tadic. From the ranks of opposition Tadic as 
the president and candidate of out-of-favour Democratic party in summer of 
2004 managed to get elected as the first post-Milosevic era president of Serbia. 
 
 
After the state of emergency, which prompted the Serbian parliament to finally 
put into life Broadcasting Act through controversial appointment of regulatory 
body, and through adoption of the Telecommunications and Public Information 
Act, the scene was set for the real reform of the Serbian media to begin. No 
witches were caught, or burned by the Minister of Culture and Media, nor was 
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his McCarthy-style commission ever mentioned again. The media could 
continue to lead normal life again, with only part of the media regulatory 
package in place. How much freedom would the media grasp, it was entirely 
dependent on their own initiative, since the environment created for their work 
was permissive. The market forces would eventually determine level of their 




If other former socialist countries did not have such turbulent course of history 
after embarking on the path of transition, Serbia became unique in that sense 
too. What is worth noting, during times of election33 (which is the normal mode 
of operation in democratic societies), and state of emergency (which is as far 
from normal as possible) the Serbian media operated professionally and without 
major faults. Occasional incidents under given circumstances were isolated and 
irrelevant episodes, and could not be labelled as malfunctioning of the media 
system in general. From the events in Serbia during 40 days of the state of 
emergency in spring of 2003, one could see how the media were forced to 
operate in a very volatile and normatively unfinished environment. However, 
after surviving the Milosevic years, it was not an impossible task for the media. 
 
When asked to evaluate the role of media in the new post-authoritarian 
environment, created partly during his tenure, former Prime Minister Zoran 
Zivkovic displayed very old-fashioned perception of the media – fascination with 
television and its power:34  
“Television is the dominant medium and someone who can influence the 
programming (I mean news programs) directly creates public perception of 
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the events. Some of the TV stations in such a way directly shape thinking 
of the largest number of people, especially those who are prone to 
manipulations. It used to be like that, and it is now. I suspect it is the same 
case in other countries, too.“ 
 
Although the reform of the media sector was a priority at the beginning of the 
Serbian transition towards democracy, the tempo and quality of legislative 
activity by the new authorities was far from impressive. From the Zivkovic’s 
views, we can see why – the politicians are only concerned with power, and 
making the media truly independent is hardly something that they would like to 
achieve. Instead, they contemplate how to retain a certain kind of invisible 
control mechanisms over the media, while on the outside it looks like the new 
media system has been implemented in accordance to contemporary 
democratic practice and expectations of the public.  
 
To his credit, Zoran Zivkovic as prime minister did accept the challenge from the 
group of leading media editors and agreed to discuss the problems, in an act of 
rarely seen political generosity. His promise to make such meetings with the 
representatives of the media a regular exchange of views, however, did not 
materialize. Soon after the initial meeting, he became entangled in battles with 
the conservative camp and within six months lost the extraordinary election he 
called to solve the political impasse. 
 
When faced with a situation of censorship and undue pressure from the 
government during the state of emergency, the media showed several new 
qualities. They did not bow to such pressures, remained professional and 
compliant with the temporary restrictions, but when the state of emergency was 
lifted, the media immediately confronted the government with the problems 
encountered and demanded dialogue. Such a move was unimaginable during 
the old times, and testifies how the Serbian media matured professionally and 
had acquired inner strength and self-confidence during the 1990s.  
 
The behaviour of some government representatives during the state of 




believes that they can run and censor the media, just like their predecessors 
did. Fortunately, it is not true, and a return to the old era when the government 
controlled and the media is not possible. Additionally, both private and state-
owned media showed remarkable professional solidarity when they jointly 
requested dialogue with the government about the media problems. 
 
Finally, looking at the Serbian media three years into the transition process, it 
seemed that they were much closer to the ideals and standards of mature 
democratic societies. This is in sharp contrast to the ever-quarrelling Serbian 
political parties/elites, who are supposed to lead the nation towards better life 
and stable social and economic order, but always choose own interest over the 
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In this final chapter, I want to sum up my research about the reform of the 
Serbia’s media from 2000 until 2006, and to consider if the findings can indicate 
a direction of future developments.  
 
This thesis started with an assumption that reform of the Serbia’s media system 
and institutions after 5 October 2000 could positively affect the overall process 
of transition from dictatorship towards democracy, based on consensus among 
the new political elite, the journalistic profession and the citizens to modernize 
the country and prepare it for future membership in the European Union. In 
such a way, the risk of Serbia falling back into the darkness of 1990s would be 
eliminated.  
 
The extent to which the media are able to actively shape the political process, 
or conversely - remaining in subordinate position by being subjected to the 
interests of political elites - depends on the effectiveness of the new political 
institutions writes Voltmer (2006). The Serbian case absolutely proves such a 
claim.  
 
Overhaul of the media system had been identified as necessity and one of 
priorities by the Serbia’s opposition politicians, pro democracy activists and the 
members of journalistic profession long before the events of 5 October 2000. It 
was generally perceived that such a task could be achieved in a relatively short 
period of time, with improvements of the old structures and institutions and the 
creation of new ones, modeled after those which function well in mature 
democracies. Advisory help and guidance from the international actors in 
drafting the new legal framework for the media sector was available. However, 





7.0.1 Research Notes and Findings 
 
The most recent data on the media development in Serbia, published by 
Freedom House on 3 May 2010 (the International Freedom of Press Day), are 
found in the organisation's annual report for year 2009. In the report Serbia 
holds no. 78 position, which is only behind Slovenia from all ex-Yugoslavian 
states. Since Slovenia is currently the only EU member hailing from the old 
federation, this position of Serbia - ahead of Montenegro (no.80), Croatia (no. 
85), Macedonia (no. 94), Bosnia and Hercegovina (no. 97), and finally Kosovo 
(ranked for the first time as an independent state at no. 108) - is certainly an 
achievement, bearing in mind the recent history and Serbia's delay in starting 
the transition. Daily Politika's report on development of the media in Serbia 
published on 15 April establishes that some 46,8% of households in Serbia 
have computers and Internet access, with 39,5% being broadband connections 
- which is a great improvement in comparison with the situation in 2000 when 
the Serbian transition began. 
 
In order to adequately summarize my research findings and the thesis as its 
product, I felt fitting at this point to bring up several research related notes and 
remarks. I hope these remarks can illuminate the research process and answer 
some questions in terms of methodology and references used. 
 1) First of all, the academic discipline in which I had positioned this work 
is contemporary political media history. As in any other discipline, its findings 
must be based on certain theoretical anchors/concepts, but still this work relies 
on narrative interpretation of actual events. As such, every interpretation, 
including this one, is personal and runs risk of being biased and/or subjective. 
However, the presented evidence should dispel such clouds. 
 2) As a former journalist/writer, I am aware of the cardinal rule is that one 
must not involve or incorporate him/herself in his work and write in first person 
(I). That is unless the piece is an opinion/editorial piece, which the media 
consumers need to distinguish clearly from news features, which are supposed 
to be objective/neutral. Nevertheless academic work requires taking stands and 
opinions, which includes the use of first person (I) in discussion of certain 
theoretical positions. These two rules (of journalistic and academic writing) 
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seem to be in conflict, which was peculiar to me, until I had the transfer 
interview meeting with our department's research supervisory body. The 
supervisory committee told me that in a work like this - where I was journalist, 
researcher and citizen/participants in historic events at the same time - writing 
in first person and giving personal accounts/interpretations of historic events is 
not wrong, but necessary and acceptable.  
 3) The most unique feature of my research work was my privileged 
access to the sources of information - from actual policy makers and actors of 
the transition process, to various public and classified documents. Being able to 
speak directly, frankly and on equal terms with the people who had actually 
shaped the Serbian transition process is something that any researcher can 
only dream of - and I was in position to do so because of my previous work in 
the media (both Serbian and UK) and employment with OSCE and the 
International Crisis Group - as much as being an opposition political activist 
during the years preceding 2000. 
 4) In working as a journalist, one tries to have confidential and exclusive 
sources that may be only revealed to the editor if necessary and the law protect 
this privileged position of a journalist. In academic writing, one has duty to 
properly identify and source every quote and citation - which is again opposite 
to the journalistic method. During the work on my thesis, I had to balance 
between these two principles - because some of the exclusive material1 came 
from people who did not want to be identified, but are by all means credible and 
trustworthy sources. Additionally, some of the interpretations and quotes came 
from my own diaries, notes, published and unpublished pieces during the 1987-
2008 period. For such reasons some portions of the work look as not properly 
referenced.  
 5) The use of academic literature (and especially the chapter with review 
of the literature) was an issue on which I tried to take an original angle: At the 
very beginning of my research, back in 2001, there was not much academic 
output on media transitions in other post-socialist countries. By the time I 
finished the research and started writing up in 2008 - the volume of literature on 
the subject (apart from Serbia) grew exponentially. My early literature list 
                                            
1 For example the two insiders who gave me data on RTV Pink, and also some of confidential diplomatic sources and documents I could obtain and use 
while working for OSCE and ICG. 
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included general democracy, international relations, citizenship and media 
works that I used as intellectual foundation of my work and research. The early 
media in transition works which inspired and guided my work were Slavko 
Splichal's 1994 book "Media Beyond Socialism", Sparks' 1998 volume 
"Communism, Capitalism and The Mass Media", Robert McChesney's 1999 
book "Rich Media, Poor Democracy" and "Revolutions For Freedom - The Mass 
Media in Eastern and Central Europe" 2000 volume edited by Al Hester and L. 
Earl Reybolds from the University of Georgia (USA).  
 6) At an early point of my work I discovered an absolute marvel of a 
case/country study - Peter Gross' 1996 "Mass Media In Revolution And National 
Development - The Romanian Laboratory". I was amazed by Gross' finding and 
the trajectory of post-communist development of the media in Romania, which 
reminded me of Serbia and its socio-political diagnosis. At that point I made a 
conscious decision to stay away from other people's case studies and findings 
until I finish my research process and come up with own findings - in order to 
preserve originality and freshness, and not to be prejudiced in advance. This 
proved to be good strategy - because once I finished the research part of the 
work several years later and drafted initial findings - I could go back to the vast 
and newly emerging body of literature on media transition and compare other 
authors' findings and case/country studies with mine. At this point of the thesis 
writing I included citations from many works by such outstanding scholars like 
Karol Jakubowitz and Peter Gross again - the two authors who have produced 
the most valuable and inspiring analysis of the complex transition process and 
theories - to put it in perspective. 
 7) The last, but not the least important note here is regarding the 
question of originality in academic work. My work is political history of the 
Serbian media in transition 2000-2006. Although several Serbian scholars (and 
very few international ones) have written on various specific issues of the 
Serbian media in transition, my work tries to give a general 
perspective/overview on this still unfinished process. Previously uncovered case 
study is a contribution to academic theory per se - although my work is not of 
strictly theoretical nature. Political history is not exactly a theoretical discipline, 
but has a rather interpretative and subjective dimension. However, I tried to 
include current theoretical views and angles in discussions about the transition 
of the Serbian media - and hoping that my findings prove that the Serbian 
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trajectory is in some aspects similar and in others different from other cases of 
post-socialist transitions. I hope all of the above makes this work useful and 
open for further discussions on the nature and trajectories of media transitions, 
initiating and warranting further research.  
 
By far the most valuable source of primary data for this research came from 
interviews that I conducted with politicians, experts, diplomats and media 
professionals. I devised a standard questionnaire with ten topics/questions to 
which they agreed to reply. I tried to select individuals that directly participated 
in or influenced the process of Serbian media reform through their work in 
government, parliament, international organizations, think-tanks and the media 
profession 
 
Statements and interviews by various politicians and experts were also used as 
a secondary source of data to discuss and put into perspective many 
controversial issues concerning the Serbian media reform. They came from 
interviews given to various media, statements and public speeches carried by 
the media - these are clearly referenced as such throughout the chapters of this 
work.  
 
The question on the relationship between politicians and the media was aimed 
at obtaining a general overview from the interlocutors. Natasa Milojevic, former 
member of the parliament and leader of the Social Democratic party caucus 
(2000–2003) replied: 
 ”The media in Serbia were always tools of the ruling structure, and that is 
 not unique for a certain epoch, or a particular person’s rule. Perhaps 
 something has changed in governing methodology, bearing in mind the 
 emergence of private media in addition to state-owned, but all of them 
 are subservient to the ruling structure and that remained the same. And 
 there is no big difference between the state-owned (public service 
 broadcasters) and private media outlets. If the question is if the media 
 are tools of governance, or the means of preserving the power – the 




American diplomat and visiting lecturer at Harvard University, Milan Sturgis, in 
his analysis of the events that precipitated Milosevic’s downfall gave the new 
media outlets a lot of credit for preparing the environment in Serbia for changes: 
 “The proliferation of technological advances has completely 
 revolutionized the media landscape, a landscape which totalitarian 
 regimes have been unable to keep pace with as demonstrated in 
 Yugoslavia in 2000. The inability to grasp the power of the internet, 
 telecommunications and mobile technology left the state with the control 
 of standard media outlets, which were not speaking to the masses 
 behind the  regime change.” 
 
When addressing the same question on the impact of new technologies and 
media as crucial in awakening of the Serbian public and giving them 
alternatives to the state-owned media propaganda, Zoran Zivkovic, former 
Prime Minister, and Natasa Milojevic disputed their overwhelming impact. They 
argued that too few people could understand news programs in foreign 
languages, while computers and access to internet had been limited to a small 
number of people – those who were against the old regime anyway. The battle 
for democratic Serbia was the battle over control of the mainstream media and 
television in particular. Only when the opposition managed to take municipal 
power from Milosevic and his party in 1997 and gained control of the municipal 
media outlets was real progress made and the socialist’s power seriously 
challenged. 
 
In evaluating the role of the independent media as partners with the opposition 
parties in bringing down Milosevic and their expectations afterwards, Natasa 
Milojevic - a political scientist by education and former journalist - admitted 
something that other politicians would never acknowledge:  
 “Yes, the independent media were indeed partners with the political 
 opposition. In some situations and in the processes they were crucial 
 actors. That is because they knew that ‘the commissar’ would change 
 and because they wanted changes in the media system. However, some 
 of them paid the price for being mistakenly naive. Others (the media) got 
 rewards for their contribution. Those from the first group subsequently 
 became awakened and aware, the others later became losers.”  
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Once the change of the regime was achieved, the marriage of convenience 
between the opposition political parties (now in power) and the media became 
acrimonious. James Lyon, one of the leading American experts on Balkans and 
Serbian politics and history, explains the background of such development: 
 “After ousting Milosevic, the DOS leadership appeared to understand the 
 role that state-controlled media played in maintaining power, and 
 immediately began to try and co-opt the media for itself. This meant that 
 the new DOS government now viewed the media as a potential enemy 
 and acted accordingly. On the other hand, the numerous tabloids and 
 conservative nationalist media (such as weekly NIN) continued to push 
 the old Milosevic-era way of thinking. This placed the DOS government 
 in a position where it lacked sympathetic media.” 
 
What did the new Serbian political leaders think about the media independence 
and their role in democratic society? Were the commitments to democracy and 
endorsement of the media independence something they truly believed in? 
Zoran Zivkovic, who became Federal Minister of Interior after 5 October 2000, 
and later succeeded assassinated Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic in 2003, has 
expressed his view on this issue: 
 “The media, which remained independent and professional after 5 
 October 2000, did not obstruct us in governing the country. Nevertheless, 
 they were helpful through highlighting problems which the new 
 authorities had not noticed and they pointed at wrongdoings of certain 
 individuals belonging to the new authorities. Unfortunately, there were 
 only a handful of such media outlets."  
 
Jasmina Milutinovic, attorney at law and former chief of staff (2001–2002) to the 
Speaker of the Serbian Parliament Natasa Micic, has very a specific view of the 
relationship between the new authorities (and Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic in 
particular) and the media. She believes that the opposition politicians who had 
formed DOS coalition were sincere when they promised reform of the media. 
However, only after they rose to power they realized how deep Serbian society 
was in the gutter in all aspects, including the media. When Djindjic saw how 
many things must be changed, he chose the quick route, which for him 
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personally turned out to be tragic path of not changing the system immediatley, 
but being accused of using it for own objectives. This is where free and 
independent media did not fit, so Serbia at the time had a rather strange mixture 
of freedom and slavery in the media sphere.  
 “I believe that Djindjic’s biggest mistake was to substitute speed for 
 progress, but without overhauling the old system, and by keeping the 
 levers of power which Milosevic had been using. I honestly believe that 
 Djindjic contemplated delivering on pre-election promises in the near 
 future and overhaul the system from its roots. At the decisive moment 
 when he was about to embark on such a task - he was killed. On the 
 other hand, the media were not up to their task during such a historical 
 period, and had contributed a lot to Djindjic’s satanization and eventual 
 killing. Even those so-called independent media,” claims Milutinovic. 
 
Belgrade-based correspondent for German international radio and television 
station Deutche Welle, Ivica Petrovic, maintains that symbiosis between the 
politicians and the media is not natural and could be justified only by the forced 
reality of life under Milosevic. His claim was proven correct immediately after 5 
October 2000, because old patterns of “friendly chat” between (former 
opposition) politicians and the media did not function any more. Those were 
sobering moments for many journalists and media outlets, but also for the new 
authorities that were faced with critically minded media, which had become 
more self-assured and toughed during the years of anti-Milosevic struggle. 
 “The authorities after 5 October 2000 tried to counterbalance the critical 
 edge of the media through employment of a number of prominent 
 journalists, who were appointed as directors and editors of state-owned 
 media outlets, chiefs of cabinets to ministers, ambassadors, advisors etc. 
 Instead of having critical distance from authorities, many journalists 
 became civil servants which, in my humble opinion, is the greatest 
 danger for unbiased reporting and independent status of the media,” 




It was certainly odd to see some of the leading journalists joining the ranks of 
the government - but that was certainly not a seal of approval, or gratitude for 
their services to democracy, citizens and society’s wellbeing.2 The new political 
elite just wanted more sophisticated and uncompromised advisers and aides to 
help them with governance. And after so many years spent under persecution 
of the former regime, with poor material position and insecure sources of 
income, it was not surprising that some of the great names of Serbian 
journalism succumbed to the appeal of secure government jobs and higher 
social status – it was only human to do so. However, the rank and file of the 
journalistic trade did not approve of such transformation by some of their 
colleagues – from belonging to a supposedly independent profession into civil 
servants. Journalist Ivica Petrovic views the relationship between the politicians 
and the media in Serbia with a sense of cynicism and pessimism. He maintains 
that the relationship between the government and the media after 5 October 
2000 requires a thorough analysis, and suspects that the intention of the new 
authorities was to maintain dominance over the media - which continues to the 
present day. When the process of drafting new media legislation began, media 
professionals and experts started to play on both sides of the net – on the side 
of experts, and on the side of the government which approves the drafts and 
places them into parliamentary procedure. This could explain why draft 
legislations were delayed in passing, diluted in content and ignored in 
implementation. 
 
New media laws were passed and changed again and again, as late as 2006, 
which points at the authorities’ lack of desire to provide an appropriate milieu for 
independent and democratic media. Ivica Petrovic is afraid that control over the 
media has only evolved into new legalistic forms and that it would be difficult to 
fully liberate the media from covert and subtle control by the state. Once again, 
Natasa Milojevic, as former head of the Social Democratic Party parliamentary 
                                            
2 Former RTS evening news anchor from 1980s Mihajlo Kovac was appointed ambassador to Austria, chief editor of the weekly magazine Nin was 




caucus,3 candidly explains the nature and the inner working of parliamentary 
procedure for adoption of legislations: 
 “Laws arrive to the parliament as drafts. Changes in draft texts usually 
 appear because of certain political concessions trade-offs and even the 
 stupidity of those who participate in such work. The key figure in such 
 dealings on behalf of Democratic Party4 was Goran Vesic. As far as the 
 media legislations were concerned, the key person was Zarko Korac 
 (Deputy Prime Minister), who was notorious as a self-proclaimed expert 
 for everything. However, Korac only operated within the limits of his 
 orders. Therefore, it is not surprising that he did everything to insulate the 
 government’s position vis-à-vis the media from the influence of the civic 
 sector (non-governmental organizations) and honest professional media 
 experts. If things were done in a different way, as I said earlier, perhaps 
 Zoran Djindjic would still be alive.”  
 
From his perspective as the main political advisor to the head of OSCE mission 
in Belgrade, Milan Sturgis has slightly different take on reasons for delays and 
watering-down of the proposed media laws:  
 “Politics, politics, politics! Unfortunately, the revolution of 5 October 2000 
 did not change the way things were done, and the media was no 
 exception. This, combined with the various and often contradictory 
 advice given by the international community such as OSCE, US 
 Embassy, EU, OECD, CoE, BBC as well as NGO’s such as IREX and 
 Open Society, combined to offer a legal cocktail of contradictory and 
 often confusing advice.”  
 
From these words of Milan Sturgis, it is clear that the international help and 
advice provided to the Serbian media and parliamentarians, in order to reform 
the media system, was not consistent, coherent, nor coordinated and in the end 
created further confusion. It also reveals why there was not a single and 
                                            
3 The Social Democratic Party (SDP) was part of the ruling DOS coalition during the first post-Milosevic Serbian parliament (2000 – 2003). It had five 
MPs, and its dispute with Democratic Party over certain privileges for their leading members effectively brought down the cabinet of Zoran Zivkovic and 
triggered extraordinary elections in December 2003. 
 





coherent regulatory model suggested for reform of the media, but a mixture of 
different ideas and institutes from several countries and legal systems. The 
Serbian lawmakers, who lacked extensive experience or knowledge of media 
regulation, ended up being blamed by the media for all the shortcomings of the 
adopted texts and problems in implementation.  
 
The approach of the international actors in the Serbia’s media reform, on the 
other hand, suffered from lack of coordinated strategy, confusingly high number 
of various implementation agencies and no follow-up mechanisms. The 
international training programs for journalists and other media workers were 
valuable and continue to this day, as well as various donations of technical 
equipment. Nevertheless, in terms of fostering a new media culture, not only 
among the media professionals, the international involvement was not 
successful.  
 
Here we can see the difference between the interventionist approach (Monroe, 
Thompson, 2002) of the international actors, like in Bosnia and Kosovo, vis-à-
vis the advisory presence that the international actors had in Serbia. The 
proponents of intervention tend to disregard the local culture, habits and needs 
of the society where they come in and impose their models. However, when 
their measures fail to deliver satisfactory results, like it happened in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (Chandler, 1999) those who had initiated such exercise in social 
engineering are long gone to some new experimental location. 
 
The question which inspired the interviewees for most philosophical replies and 
intellectual insights was on the very notion of “independent media”, and the 
prospect of having such media in Serbia. Zoran Zivkovic5 admits that this is the 
crucial issue and that in Serbia it will not be possible to have independent media 
for a very long time. In order to have real independent media, he claims, it is 
necessary that they operate according to high professional standards which can 
not be reached soon in Serbia. The media must be financially independent – 
unlike nowadays when they are dependent on income from state companies, 
                                                                                                                                
 





para-state companies, or tycoons. In addition to those preconditions, 
independent media require citizens who posses a clear system of values, 
developed moral judgment and intellectual capacity. For Serbia, and not only for 
Serbia, says Zivkovic, such a prospect looks like somewhat distant future. This 
is a rather gloomy view of contemporary Serbia, coming from someone who 
was in position to have view from the top. 
 
Canadian political activist and Internet portal founder of Serbian origin Miroslav 
Antic6 is brief and direct when talking about the notion of media independence. 
He says that independent media do not exist anywhere. It does not mean that 
all the media are necessarily corrupt, but that they must have “understanding” 
towards the paymaster/owner. We can argue that total media independence is 
an ideal, and that even in established democracies the media are not absolutely 
neutral, unbiased and independent. Even the model public service broadcasters 
like BBC are not completely independent from government influence, as it was 
seen during the 2004 Gilligan affair and forced resignation of the BBC’s Director 
General Greg Dyke. The question here is whether the media have enough 
institutional strength, guaranteed by appropriate legal provisions, to serve the 
interests of the public and provide platform for opposing views - even if the 
government tries to put them under pressure. The answer is certainly yes if we 
look at the BBC or its Canadian counterpart CBC, whose work in particular 
Miroslav Antic had in mind when he expressed his opinion on the notion of 
media independence. But in Serbia, as much as in other post-authoritarian 
states, the institutions are still either weak or in making, so they cannot 
adequately support independence of the media in its ideal version. 
 
Natasa Milojevic maintains that the media cannot be independent because it is 
against their operating mode, existence and financing. Money is coming from 
somewhere, the only issue is if those who give money are capitalists, political 
organizations, foreign political entities, domestic scumbags, or perhaps wealthy 
individuals who create the world media picture – Turners, Murdochs or similar. 
                                                                                                                                
 
6 From the beginning of the Kosovo crisis in 1998, Miroslav Antic has been operating a political news internet portal - Serbian News Network - SNN, 
which carries the world media output on ex-Yugoslavia. When he started the portal, he thought that it would last for a few months, if not years, until the 




Perhaps the paymasters are Coca Cola, Unilever, Credit Agricola Bank, or 
businessmen like Vojin Lazarevic, Vuk Hamovic, Milan Beko7 and others.  
 “The reason why the notion ‘independent media’ is contradictory is 
 because everyone wants to control the media. Especially those that have 
 IQ higher than average. They know very well how much damage or 
 benefit the media can produce,” claims Milojevic.  
 
It is interesting to note that Natasa Milojevic was a member of the DOS’s 
creative team in charge of the 26 September 2000 election campaign. On the 
same subject, Milan Sturgis holds an opinion that synthesizes most of other 
interviewees’ positions: 
 “The term independent must be qualified in light of reality. Independence 
 must be funded from someone and that money must come from 
 somewhere. In the US, Fox News is considered an arm of the 
 Republican Party, while CNN is termed an agent of the Democrats. 
 Therefore, to say the media are completely independent is naive at best 
 and just wrong at worst. Having said this, the media must continually 
 walk that thin line between advocating a position for a possible 
 benefactor and taking a stand for fair and balanced reporting.” 
 
One of the questions that drew a lot of attention from most of the interviewees 
and elicited detailed answers was about introduction of the independent 
regulatory body (Broadcasting Council) into the new media system. From the 
first day of its inception in 20038 and protracted controversy with appointments 
of its members, to this day (September 2008) the council and its work proved to 
be fuel for constant political friction between the government and the opposition.  
Zoran Zivkovic immediately took defensive position, saying that the members of 
the first Broadcasting Council, including its chairperson Nenad Cekic, were 
appointed by the parliament in March 2003, during the state of emergency, 
                                                                                                                                
 
7 The above-mentioned Serbian entrepreneurs are players on the international scene, who also appear on domestic market as investors and brokers in 
various business ventures, especially privatization. 
 
8 Broadcasting Council as independent regulatory body for electronic media is an institute borrowed from British legal tradition and practise. It was 




while his government was busy with the “Operation Saber”, a sweeping police 
action to apprehend the assassins of Zoran Djindjic. 
 “This is certainly not an excuse for appointing people like the Council’s 
 president Nenad Cekic – it is just an explanation. Nenad Cekic survived9 
 because he is prone to all kinds of political pressures. Unfortunately, 
 Serbia is far away from being ready for ‘independent regulatory body’ in 
 any sphere of life,” says Zivkovic. 
 
The International Crisis Group’s former special Balkans advisor, Dr James Lyon 
maintains that Serbia can have an independent regulator. Bosnia has one, so 
does Croatia, says Lyon.10 It is a matter of political will. However, it is unlikely 
that this will happen anytime soon, as the government likes to maintain control 
over the media, and there is also a lot of money to be made by certain oligarchs 
from exploitation of such relations. 
 
Attorney Bratislav Stamenkovic makes a parallel between independence of the 
regulatory body for media and independence of judiciary in Serbia – which in 
theory should be another corner stone of democracy. 
 “A notion of independent regulatory body for media should not be used in 
 this context exclusively. The same principle must be valid for the judiciary 
 too. Unfortunately, the government shows awkwardly how they seek 
 control over everything, just like during the Tito’s era and later under 
 Milosevic. Except, such a government’s attitude is now disguised under 
 some new legal frame. I believe that we can safely say that within 
 Serbian governing circles there is no proper understanding of 
 contemporary democratic institutions and procedures.”  
 
Finally, Natasa Milojevic cleverly summarizes the core of the problem both in 
philosophical and practical terms: 
 “Independent regulatory body is a great challenge for a democracy in 
 diapers. Simple introduction of some successful foreign experience or 
                                            
9 Nenad Cekic kept his post after Zivkovic’s reformist cabinet handed over the power to Kostunica’s conservative coalition in 2004, following December 
2003 election. 
 
10 Quoted from the interview given for this research. 
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 institute into a society in transition can only produce its surrogate and 
 caricature of the intended results. In almost all corrupt societies, those in 
 power read such situation as opportunity to have 'our man inside". Before 
 we can meaningfully introduce such institutions into the Serbian legal 
 system, the party-dominated society must be restructured into political 
 society, the media sphere into professional arena, the tycoon-dominated 
 economy into competitive market economy. Finally, it is time for all of us 
 to pose the crucial question: Where do we want Serbia to go? Only then 
 we can talk about the real answer.” 
 
Through such direct, candid and very personal answers by majority of the 
interviewees, most of controversial issues about media reform and the overall 
process of transition in Serbia have been touched or at least partly illuminated. 
The process of reform is still far from finished, but the initial results and general 
patterns are visible.  
 
 
7.0.2 Results and Shortcomings 
 
 
If we carefully examine the preparations for the reform of the media in Serbia, 
the actors involved and the subsequent legislative output, it seems that a 
genuine effort was made and substantial improvements achieved, as it is 
reflected in Freedom House's annual reports on freedom of the media around 
the world. Whether the results are close to the theoretical ideals and 
expectations of some of the actors (especially the journalistic profession) - it is a 
different question. One has to bear in mind the overall political culture and lack 
of democratic practice in Serbia before 2000, which were limiting factors not 
only for the reform of the media, but also for the transition in general. It was 
impossible to start the process of transition in Serbia, including the media 
reform, through shock doctrine and “clean slate”, as described by Naomi Klein 
(2007) in her eloquent condemnation of the neoconservative model of economic 




Once the big achievement - removal of the previous regime - was completed, 
the citizens/voters took a back seat, expecting the actors in the political arena - 
political parties, trade unions, non-governmental organizations and international 
community through various governmental and non-governmental institutions – 
to lead, guide and shape the transition of Serbia towards economic prosperity 
and stable democracy. Even the informal political movement Otpor, which was 
the key factor in uniting the eternally divided Serbian opposition political parties 
for the final showdown with Milosevic in 2000, gradually dissolved.11  
 
The Serbian voters, much in the tradition of monitorial citizen (Schudson, 1997), 
were quite content to participate in democratic elections and allow their 
representatives to take responsibility for the state affairs and debate the present 
and future of Serbia in the parliament and the media. Unfortunately, the present 
and future in everyday political discourse of Serbia were only secondary to the 
past. The Serbian politicians most of the time debated issues of the past – 
ranging from the Kosovo battle in 1389, the Second World War to the 1990s 
civil conflicts in former Yugoslavia.  
 
The reaction of the citizens to such behaviour of the politicians reflected through 
turnout at elections. From 2000 until 2008 there were four parliamentary 
elections, two failed and two successful presidential elections and several local 
elections, in addition to the 2006 referendum to adopt the new constitution.12 
Depending on the real importance of such elections, the citizens either 
answered the election calls with low turnout, like in the two failed 2002 
presidential elections, or came out and voted in larger numbers when the 
impasse in political battles among the reformists and conservatives threatened 
to slow down the whole process of transition.  
 
                                            
11 The key figures from Otpor either joined the mainstream political parties, or returned to their professional lives. Majority of young Otpor leaders like 
Slobodan Homen, Srdjan Milivojevic, or Oliver Dulic joined Democratic Party, while the intellectuals like Professor Cedomir Cupic, painter Bogoljub 
Arsenijevic – Maki, or rock drummer Dragolub Djuricic continued their successful careers. 
 




Both political camps13 got their chance twice to form cabinets and display to the 
voters their political philosophy and governance skills. Finding an optimal and 
sustainable path towards prosperity and better life was the task given to the 
politicians by the voters. After many years of meandering and ideological 
debates, it seems clear that the only available option for Serbia is the path 
towards full integration into the European Union.14 Virtually all of the political 
parties associated with the former DOS coalition do not question such a 
direction, although debates were held on the issue how to achieve it. With the 
condition of full cooperation with the ICTY and the independence of Kosovo still 
unresolved both in Serbia internally and on the international front within the 
United Nations, such debates only impeded faster transition. When forced by 
the elections15 to endorse either the “patriotic” option, which puts the Kosovo 
question before EU membership, or the “pragmatist” option of joining the EU 
first and then trying to find a long-term solution for Kosovo, the citizens 
decisively chose the latter.16 
 
If we want to evaluate the real achievements and shortcomings of the media 
reform in Serbia, the previously outlined political context is of crucial 
importance. The reform process began indeed in 2000, and it took the members 
of the parliament quite some time to discuss, amend and adopt the legislation. 
The media in Serbia now function in a very different environment indeed, 
compared to the pre-2000 era.  
 
One great change in the way how the media operate in Serbia after 2000 was 
achieved even before the legislative work was completed. As we have seen 
during the 2002 presidential election and during the state of emergency in 2003, 
both the untransformed state-owned media RTS, along with dailies Politika and 
                                            
13 I mean here the reformists headed by the Democratic Party and the conservatives headed by the Democratic Party of Serbia. 
 
14 Serbia will submit its formal candidacy for the EU membership in 2010, once it fulfills the requirements of the Stabilization and Association treaty. 
Then there is a period of adjustment of the legal and economic system, before the EU can accept it into its ranks. Realistically, Serbia can not become an 
EU member before 2015. 
 
15 The UN led negotiations over the Kosovo’s status (2006-2007) and its unilateral declaration of independence in February 2008, virtually initiated two 
extraordinary parliamentary elections in Serbia – in 2007 and 2008. 
 
16 In all the post-2000 elections, the Serbian voters were faced with the choice of returning to the past and giving the mandate to the parties associated 




Novosti, weekly Nin, and the private commercial outlets like dailies Danas, Blic, 
Glas Javnosti, weekly Vreme and the electronic broadcasters like RTV B92, 
RTV Pink and TV BK, operated in a satisfactory manner.  
 
If we reduce the functions of the media in a democratic society to providing the 
citizens with adequate information and alternative views to participate 
meaningfully in the political process, then the majority of the Serbian media 
could earn satisfactory marks for their work. This was also a testimony of 
maturity, professionalism and responsibility of the journalistic profession, which 
demonstrated its ability to operate in the new environment, even before the 
formal legal framework was set. The exchanges between the media and the 
government, before, during and after the state of emergency can only be 
labeled as a new and healthy feature of democracy in making.  
 
Print media in Serbia17 are left to compete on the market, without much 
interference of the state, while the journalistic profession is self-regulated. There 
is no censorship, but occasionally, in the heat of battle for circulation and the 
market share, certain print media outlets cross the boundaries of good taste, 
personal integrity, privacy and protection of children and minority groups.18 
Because of that, there were a few incidents of excess in the media after 2000, 
mainly in the tabloid press. They could be attributed to the deficiencies of 
unreformed judicial system - another reflection of the unfinished process of 
transition. The Serbian judicial system is still not efficient in applying the existing 
norms for protection of the above-mentioned values and preventing incidents of 
media excess. In absence of court decisions awarding punitive damages to 
those whose integrity had been jeopardized by the media, such incidents 
happen occasionally.  
  
The transformation of Radio Television Serbia (RTS) into a public service 
broadcaster was not successful, although it is hardly the old-fashioned state-
                                                                                                                                
 
17 The print media in Serbia were pretty much left out of this research, which was primarely aimed at the broadcast media. The reason for this omission 
was the format and size of the research project, so the print media are only mentioned in passing reference. 
 
18 Private daily newspaper Kurir was reprimanded by the Ministry of Culture and Media in 2008 for several gross intrusions on privacy and offending the 
public through carrying disturbing photographs. 
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owned and controlled propaganda outlet any more. It seems that the chosen 
normative model (PSB) was not well understood by the legislators. This new 
and foreign model was recommended, if not imposed, on them by the 
international actors and the journalistic profession.  
 
When I discussed the input of the international actors and the preparations 
made for the overhaul of the media system before the events of 5 October 
2000, I underlined that it was up to the journalistic profession to educate 
politicians/legislators and citizens/voters about the advantages of public service 
broadcasting versus the old system. The lack of systematic promotion of the 
principles and ethos of public service broadcasting left the legislators in 
confusion. Coupled with their rather narrow-minded understanding of the role of 
media in a democratic society, such a situation resulted in the adoption of 
legislation that is half way between public service broadcasting model and 
commercial model.  
 
If we want to point out the unique features of the new Serbian media system, it 
can be described as a hybrid between the European public service 
broadcasting model, and the commercial model as found in the USA. It was 
adopted under guidance of certain international actors, which provided help in 
remodeling the Serbian media environment in order to secure successful and 
sustainable transition to democracy. There were several international actors 
involved and the expertise provided to the Serbian legislators came from 
different intellectual and legal traditions. Adoption of such mixed regulatory 
model only reflects the plurality of actors that influenced the process of drafting 
and parliamentary deliberations, as much as it reflects the plurality of ideological 
and political positions among the Serbian political forces.19  
  
However, the theoretical purity of the chosen normative model is not an issue 
here, but its practical consequences and the level of freedom that the adopted 
model provides to both state and private media outlets to function. Despite 
                                            
19 It is interesting to observe how the neo-liberal political party G17+ switched its initial allegiance from Djindjic’s left-leaning Democratic Party, to 
conservative nationalists of Vojislav Kostunica and his Democratic Party of Serbia in 2003, and back to now Tadic’s Democrat ic Party in 2008. The two 




awkward introduction of another foreign model into the Serbia’s legal system – 
independent regulators like the Broadcasting Council and RATEL - it seems that 
the broadcast media could navigate and find their way and secure own 
economic existence. At least that can be said of the commercial media outlets 
like RTV B92 and RTV Pink, despite the strong competition which they 
encountered from the state-owned RTS which was given privileged access into 
the commercial arena. However, it seems that the other state-wide broadcasting 
license holders (TV Avala, TV Fox, TV Kosava/Happy) have problems securing 
their financial base and welfare. Nevertheless, it is a matter that should be left 
to market forces to resolve. In my opinion, the number of state-wide 
broadcasting licenses is too high and the troubled commercial stations will have 
difficulties in securing their bare survival. In August 2008, after only two years of 
having the TV Fox franchise in Serbia, the News Corporation indicated that it 
wants to sell it (Dnevnik, 29 Aug. 2008, pg.8). Nevertheless, it seems that 
Rupert Murdoch intends to pull out of several of his Eastern European TV 
ventures. 
 
The adopted regulatory model shows deficiencies in providing and securing 
wellbeing of regional and local broadcasters. With enormous advertising time 
allocated to both the state-owned RTS (10% or six minutes per hour) and 
commercial broadcasters (20% or 12 minutes per hour), the advertising revenue 
seems to be totally absorbed by the state-wide broadcasters. Such situation is 
visible in delayed privatization of the media outlets owned by the municipalities. 
The legislators several times postponed the deadline set by the Broadcasting 
Act to privatize state-owned media by 2003. Hardly anyone would spend money 
on buying commercially untenable local or regional media outlets. Even a 
management/employees buyout at a symbolic price is hard to imagine in such 
circumstances. 
 
7.0.3 Future of Media and Democracy in Serbia 
 
 
After the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989, and following the prolonged 
fragmentation of former Yugoslavia, which lasted throughout the last decade of 
the 20th century, the map of Europe nowadays has distinctly different look. In a 
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political sense, the former socialist block has completely disappeared, while 
many independent states have emerged. At their own different paces, and with 
different traditions and heritage, most of these new states are passing through 
the difficult phase of transition towards democracy. Some of them have more or 
less finished this phase and successfully joined EU, while others, like Serbia are 
still going through it. 
 
Cynics say that socialism is a long and winding road from capitalism into 
capitalism. However, the process of transition has more than just economic and 
legal aspects – it incorporates acceptance and understanding of democracy and 
its values by all social groups participating in a country’s political life – the 
political parties, trade unions, special interest groups, media profession, as well 
as the citizens. This unquestioned set of values in the Western world is a typical 
political paradigm, which needs explaining and adequate promotion in order to 
become widely accepted and understood by the people of former socialist 
countries who had very little, if any, prior experience with democracy. 
Democracy is not just a possibility to consume previously unavailable brand 
name products, as seen on television or movies, or to have the Rolling Stones 
play a concert in your country, nor the possibility to travel abroad – as it had 
been perceived by the people living for almost 50 years behind the so-called 
Iron Curtain. 
 
Most of the former Eastern block countries had some kind of rudimentary 
capitalist order20 prior to becoming - against the will of its people - part of the 
now defunct socialist world21. Nevertheless, almost none of them had a 
functional democratic order. Moreover, the capitalism that they had previously 
experienced was very different from its contemporary form. Therefore, the 
practice of going through transition towards capitalism and democracy has 
brought new, strange and unimaginable situations and challenges to all these 
                                            
20 Capitalistic economic order, but in most case authoritarian political order. 
 
21 The division between the eastern (socialist) and the western (democratic) blocks in Europe after the Second World War, came as a consequence of 
the 1945 Yalta agreement between the US president Franklin Roosevelt, Soviet leader Joseph Stalin and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill. Such 




societies. The relationship between politics and the media is at the very core of 
a democratic order.  
 
It was the countries of the EU with a long democratic tradition that provided and 
committed their own experience, financial resources and expertise to their 
previously politically deprived and economically backward neighbors to embark 
on the road to transition. The European Union, with its still developing network 
of institutions and legislature, is envisioned as an association of all European 
states. For its own sake, the EU needs to support and reinforce the transition 
processes in former socialist countries. The ultimate test of successful transition 
is accession into full membership of the European Union. Some of the former 
Eastern European states22 have already met the prescribed standards, and 
starting from 1 May 2004 became full members, while others are working on 
different schedules23, determined by their advance in achieving both economic 
and political criteria. 
 
At this point, it is interesting to compare the Serbian transition experience with 
other ex-socialist countries that started their reforms after 1989. We need to 
look no further then the region of Balkans, because of similarities in history, 
economic and political development, and shared culture. Strangely enough, the 
Serbian transition is more similar with its neighbor Romania, rather than with 
Slovenia, Croatia or Bosnia and Herzegovina - countries with whom Serbia had 
lived together for more than 70 years within former Yugoslavia. 
  
The similarities between the Romanian experience in media reform and the 
Serbian case comes from their authoritarian past, as well as the culture 
permeated with the Orthodox Church tradition and values. Despite being 
extremely poor and institutionally deficient in 1989, Romania managed to 
complete its transition within 18 years to a degree that the European Union 
admitted it into its membership in 2007, along with Bulgaria, another Balkan 
country with similar geo-political and cultural features.  
                                            
22 Poland, Check Republic, Slovakia, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Slovenia and Hungary. 
 
23 Bulgaria and Romania became full EU members on 1st January 2007, while Croatia is going to be admitted in a relatively short time, since it made 





In his study of the Romanian media written in 1996 (seven years into the 
process), eminent Romanian media scholar based in USA Peter Gross pointed 
at 15 key problems of the media transition. In looking at the research literature 
relevant for this research project, I was pleasantly surprised with Gross' 
findings, which looked to me like they originated from Serbia. The position of the 
state and private media in Serbia, the political culture, as well as the trajectory 
along which the reform process was going after the ousting of Milosevic looked 
remarkably similar, if not identical to the Romanian case. When the Romanian 
communist dictator Nicolae Ceauşescu fell in December 1989, the level of 
economic decay was similar to the one to which Serbia dropped 11 years later 
in 2000, when it finally managed to bring down Slobodan Milosevic.  
 
The Milosevic legacy of armed conflicts with neighbors who had previously 
been partners in former Yugoslavia, and its final episode with the 77-days 
military conflict with NATO over Kosovo in 1999, reduced Serbia to the level of 
post-Second World War poverty. Before the Berlin wall fell in 1989, the 
countries of the former Soviet block could only envy the relative affluence and 
standard of living in former Yugoslavia. From the similar starting position,24 
Slovenia went at full speed ahead in 1991, while Serbia under Milosevic went 
backwards for the next nine years. 
 
Following its independence in 1991, Slovenia quickly detached itself from the 
legacy of former Yugoslavia and managed its transition successfully - becoming 
a full EU member with the first wave of former communist countries in 2004. 
The Slovenian culture and work ethic, under the strong tradition of Catholicism 
and similar to neighbors like Austria and Italy, proved a major asset in fulfilling 
the EU membership criteria and de facto completing the process of transition. 
On the other hand, Bosnia and Herzegovina after the Dayton Peace Accord in 
1995 still functions as UN protectorate, with the legal and media system 
                                                                                                                                
 
24 Here I mean the political order of former SFR Yugoslavia and common legal system. In terms of economy, Slovenia was the leading ex-Yugoslavian 





imposed by the international authority mandated to govern the still volatile 
country.  
 
Peter Gross examined the Romanian media scene once again in 2008, in the 
light of the country’s 2007 ascension into the European Union. His findings are 
not exactly encouraging:  
 “Romania's accession to European Union membership in January 2007 
 did not inhibit the country's corrupt political and media elites from turning 
 back the clock on the already disappointing evolution of the media 
 system and the laws, values, attitudes, and behaviors that underline its 
 daily functioning.” (Gross, 2008, pg.141-152) 
 
In this article, Gross concludes that no major alterations to the media system 
and its functioning would occur until the culture of the political elites, media 
owners, and the citizenry evolves in a more liberal, democratic direction.  
 “Romania's media will continue down a path that began in feudal times 
 and will seek to adjust to the twenty-first century only at some later date”, 
 asserts Gross.  
 
Such pessimistic findings point at another possible problem of transition, not 
only in Romania, but also in any other transitional country, including Serbia. 
One country’s membership in the EU, no matter how well prepared through 
legislative and institutional changes, does not by definition guarantee the advent 
of democratic order and functioning of the media. The formal criteria for 
membership set by the EU bureaucracy in Brussels cannot be an insurance 
policy against lack of democratic culture among the political elites in new 
member-states. Instead of embracing the democratic values and practices, the 
politicians in candidate and new member states are capable of producing a 
theatrical display of democracy for the eyes of the EU bureaucracy. In real life, 
they continue with their old ways of trying to instrumentalize and control the 
media to serve their ends. 
 
Politicians in Serbia, just like everywhere else, like to be in the media and 
influence, use, possibly even manipulate, spin or control them according to their 
self-promotional needs. But when things go wrong, the media are always handy 
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scapegoats and easy targets - like if they (the media) formulate and implement 
flawed policies, or neglect to do so.  
 
In its 2002 annual report on media freedoms around the world, the American 
media think tank Freedom House assessed the media on the territory of ex-
Yugoslavia as partially free. Only the media in Slovenia were described as truly 
free, while in other ex-Yugoslavian republics25 politicians and public figures 
brought the media to heel by filing private complaints or bringing charges 
against them. According to the Freedom House report, the situation of 
Macedonian journalists was the worst of all. Although there were many 
obstacles remaining from the pre-2000 era, the media freedoms in Serbia (and 
Montenegro) continued to improve, as the Freedom House report for 2002 
asserted:  
 "In the period following the overthrow of the Milosevic regime, the media 
 exercise their rights guaranteed in the Constitution. Though the state 
 does not directly interfere in editorial policies, state officials often file 
 complaints for libel as a reaction to critical reporting. This is why some 
 journalists use self-censorship.” 
 
The US-funded NGO/think-tank IREX, which evaluates the work of the media in 
transitional countries through its “Media Sustainability Index”, said in its 2007 
annual findings26 that the overall index across the South-Eastern Europe is 
lower than in 2006. This index, compiled from five media-related angles, is 
prepared for 21 countries, based on inputs from the local media experts. The 
index synthesizes the following parameters: freedom of speech, professional 
standards, and transparency of information sources, economic sustainability 
and support to the institutions.  
  
IREX consultant Dragan Kremer pointed out that during 2007 in Serbia the 
media experts criticized poor implementation of the existing media legislation, 
                                            
25 Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Macedonia were the six republics – now independent states - of former Socialist 
Federal Republic Yugoslavia (SFRY). 
 
26 IREX media experts Goran Cetinic and Dragan Kremer held a press conference on 18 September 2008 at the Belgrade Media Centre, to announce 




especially allocation of the broadcasting frequencies, and the state’s continued 
failure to discover and put on trial the killers of journalists Slavko Curuvija 
(2000) and Milan Pantic (2002). He also pointed out that the plurality of the 
media outlets in Serbia does not mean that all views are adequately 
represented, and criticized the media profession for uncritically conveying the 
news agencies’ bulletins and political parties’ statements at their face value. He 
also added that low salaries in journalism could open doors for corruption.  
 
The other IREX expert Goran Cetinic commended the improved business 
viability of the Serbian broadcast media in 2007, because of the increasing 
advertising revenue. He also gave high marks to the Serbian professional 
media associations, printing facilities and distribution of press, but pointed out 
as the major deficiency the absence of effective media trade unions. Overall, 
Serbia took the fifth position on the IREX’s Media Sustainability list, out of 21 
countries in South-Eastern Europe. Ahead of Serbia during 2007 were Bulgaria, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Romania and Croatia. 
 
In one of his first major interviews27 after taking up the post of Minister for 
Culture and Media of Serbia, in summer of 2008, theatre director Nebojsa 
Bradic admitted that his ministry is preparing several new laws about the media. 
In other words, the minister has admitted in public that the reform of the media 
since 2000 has not been completed, nor conducted in a satisfactory way. The 
process of reform has certainly changed the media environment in Serbia 
forever, some of the standards and regulatory models have been accepted and 
implemented, but there are still many aspects to be considered, revised and 
adjusted. By 2010, the Ministry of Culture and Media has put forward a new 
media reform strategy for public debate, ahead of forthcoming review and 
revisions of all media legislation (RTV B92, 2 Sep. 2010). 
 
A distinguished journalist and the former president of IJAS Nebojsa Bugarinovic 
is not worried by the constantly changing legislative framework for the media:28 
                                            
27 Interview given to RTV B92 on 1 September 2008. Transcript available on www.b92.net under the program name “Prelistavanje” for the above quoted 
date. 
 




 “I try to be an optimist and view at such course of events as the birth-
 labor of a democracy in making. The civil servants still do not understand 
 the fact that Serbia in 2000 had embarked on the road from which there 
 is no going back. Not only that the normative frame needs to be fully 
 synchronized with the European standards very soon, but these norms 
 must be implemented.”  
 
On the opposite, lawyer Jasmina Milutinovic does not hold such an optimistic 
view about the continued process of updating the media legislation.29 All those 
constant changes of the media regulation are the consequence of political 
trading, or dictates coming from either outside or from the internal forces who in 
that moment can do so, just like in other segments of life. Nothing in media 
regulation is specific in comparison to other spheres, except it is instantly 
visible. It is pure political trading, political promotion, personal promotion, dictate 
– or all of that to a certain degree. None of it is premeditated; it is the matter of 
opportunity – if it suits me or us today, or at this moment. Why the media sphere 
would be different than the other aspects of social life in Serbia, which have not 
seen adequate changes, wonders Milutinovic. The same must be done with the 
judiciary, for example.  
 “The problem is that we (the Serbian society) have not solved yet the 
 certain issues going back to the Second World War, as well as the 
 problems that accumulated during the 1960s. We need to come out of 
 the past, but in a way to understand and accept it as it actually had 
 happened – as a prerequisite for a modern society. For such thing to 
 happen, it is necessary to have a consensus of the intellectual elite. It is 
 difficult to have a contemporary media system while in our country war 
 criminals are still walking free, along with the warmongers and arch-
 enemies of anything modern and independent. I wonder if anyone in 
 Serbia nowadays has moral and any other credibility, as well as the 
 courage to confront such problems,” reflects Milutinovic. 
 
                                                                                                                                
 




In his overview of the problems which the reform process of the media system 
in Serbia has encountered, Milan Sturgis underlines once again that an 
immature democracy has many faults and missteps. This immaturity manifests 
itself many times in inaction, the inability to identify priorities and act upon them. 
However that is certainly not a peculiarity of the Serbian case. 
 
 
7.1 CONTRIBUTION TO THEORY 
 
 
Devising a grand new theory from the study of the media reform in Serbia was 
certainly not a realistic expectation, neither the purpose of this research project. 
When I set out on this research, my idea was to follow and analyze the process 
of transition as it unfolds, and to put the Serbian experience in perspective with 
other former Eastern European countries that have either finished, or are still 
working on their post-communist transition. This was because Serbia was 
mainly left out of all previous studies and academic research, due to its late 
start of transition in 2000. Transition of other former East European countries 
since 1989 has attracted a lot of attention of researchers both from the region 
and from West, providing theoretical explanation of the process. At the end of 
this research it is necessary to address if the existing theoretical concepts were 
adequate to explain the Serbian transition trajectory, or some new theoretical 
angles need to be put forward. 
 
The general "transitology" paradigm seemed appropriate in terms of marking 
the beginning of the transition process. The events of 5 October 2000 in Serbia 
certainly meant the start of substantial social-economic transformations of the 
society, which spent the previous long period in an authoritarian environment. 
The media in this process had very prominent role, but certainly not central. As 
much as the media were the catalyst for change of the old regime, in new socio-
political environment the media also needed to assume new role, as one of 
corner stones of democracy in making.  
 
What the existing theories of transition could not predict, was the time frame 
necessary to achieve the goal - establishment of fully developed liberal 
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democracy and market economy. Also, the final outcome of the process is not 
guaranteed, as the transition theory may suggest. Critics of the "transitology" 
school Dauderstadt and Geritts (2000) note that the processes of change may 
take quite different directions, and may have dramatically dissimilar outcomes in 
different countries. The developments in Serbia confirm that the process has no 
set time frame, and that the final shape of socio-political relations may not be 
liberal (or bourgeois) democracy in its pure form. If we refer back to 
Balcerowicz's (1996) definition of transition as a shift from one stable state of 
society to another potentially stable state, we can acknowledge how unstable 
new and emerging socio-political relations during the process are and how 
prognosticating the final outcome of it is not reliable. 
 
The theory of elite continuity put forward by Colin Sparks (2008) as an 
alternative to the traditional theories of transition, seems to be adequate to a 
great degree in Serbian case.  When we look at the case studies of RTV Pink, 
and how one of the Milosevic-era media magnates accomplished a remarkable 
changeover and managed to even expand his operations after 2000, one has to 
be worried if all transitions are just a case of old elites shedding their skins and 
becoming bona fidae democrats and capitalists. With the case of Aleksandar 
Tijanic, who was Information minister at the height of the Milosevic 1990s era, 
and nowadays continues to be General Manager of RTS under two 
administrations of Milosevic's main political opponents (Democratic Party of 
Serbia and Democratic Party), Sparks' theory seems even more true.  
 
However, one must not forget that not all of the media outlets and operators in 
Serbia function in the same manner. One of the leading Milosevic-era media 
magnates Bogoljub Karic did not manage to survive in the new era, while his 
media and other business enterprises collapsed in 2005. Karic fled the country 
after criminal charges against him were pressed, while nobody turned their 
head at his pleas that he was a victim of political persecution. Also, the bright 
example in Serbia is RTV B92, which shows that it is possible for a new 
generation of media workers and entrepreneurs to succeed and achieve 
success without relying on the old power structures and resources. So Sparks' 
theory is applicable to a certain degree, but cannot be used as an general and 




It seems that the institutional approach in understanding the transition process 
in Serbia is appropriate. Except, it takes time for new institutions to be 
established, or for the old ones to be reformed to adequately serve the new 
socio-political relations. As Offe (1996) notes, in addition to the fact that state 
communist institutions have failed to generate socialist preferences, they have 
as a rule, generated a state of mind, a set of assumptions and expectations that 
now often turn out to be inimical to the growth of market capitalism and 
democratic institutions. This state of mind regardless of whether it has been 
cultivated by the previous fifty years of experience of state socialist institutions 
or the cultural or political inheritance of the last five hundred years of precarious 
and often failed modernization process, is described by several authors30 as a 
combination of apathy, depletion of communal bonds, passivity, unwillingness to 
accept responsibility, atomization, lack of respect for formal rules, ‘short 
terminism’ and pervasive ‘grab and run attitude’ towards economic gain. Here 
we step on the slippery terrain of political culture, which takes time to change 
from old to new, and to become widely accepted by all the members of society. 
 
The American scholar and expert on transition of the media in former Eastern 
Europe, Monroe Price, has described the purpose of his consultancy work in the 
region of Balkans as to provide a context in which the idea of “media reform” 
can be more meaningfully analyzed. Such open-ended approach certainly 
provides more space for a case study to focus on specific empirical findings – 
instead of insisting on rigid theoretical notions and paradigms. Nevertheless 
Price’s advisory work in the Balkans region, however, was not of experimental 
or theoretical nature, but rather implementation of pre-designed models and 
policies, in line with the policy of intervention in the state-building of post-conflict 
nations. As we have seen in the case of Serbia, the international actors chose 
not to use the interventionist approach, but to stand by the Serbian transition in 
advisory role. Such approach, however, brought only limited results, although 
the pro-active (interventionist) approach in the neighboring Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and Kosovo did not install the desired liberal media model. 
                                            





So if we try to theorize the trajectory of the Serbian general and media 
transition, we need to combine several theoretical and practical approaches in 
order to adequately illuminate the still not finished process. On one hand the 
process is similar to the other post-communist transitions in former Eastern 
Europe, while on the other hand it has distinct features and characteristics that 
makes it impossible to fit the Serbian case into a single theoretical pattern. 
 
In his summary of the media transformations across the former Eastern block 
Karol Jakubowicz (2005) elaborates what he calls five rude awakenings that the 
citizens of transitional countries had to go through: 
 1)  The removal of the communist system does not solve all problems, 
but creates many new ones; the former opposition leaders are nothing but 
quarreling politicians, prone to corruption and arrogance; Democracy is a 
system of constant conflicts, instead an instrument of national consensus and 
unity. 
 2) The ideas and ideals that had kept the opposition alive and served as 
an inspiration to rise up against dictatorship, had to be abandoned overnight as 
impractical and useless.  
 3) The true nature of capitalism soon showed its not so pleasant face. 
 4) The process of association with the European Union proved to be a 
tedious, often humiliating process, instead of blissful embrace of long-lost 
brothers.  
 5) “Westernization” is the best that the people of former Eastern Europe 
could hope for, because Western Europe seems to think that Central and 
Eastern Europe have nothing to contribute, except to open their markets for 
consumer products.  
 
The title of this work is “Unrealistic Pledges - Deficient Results”, where I refer to 
the reform promises by politicians to the media profession in Serbia and the 
citizens immediately before and after the events of 5 October 2000, and the 
actual results that were achieved. Politicians everywhere have a habit of 
promising a lot, and delivering little – so their results in Serbia are only 
predictable. The citizens, as well as the media profession, should not have been 
so naïve to believe everything politicians had said, especially with the 
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experience they had during the times of dictatorship. However, from a 
comparative perspective, it seems that the Serbian case and results are neither 
better, nor worse than in other countries.  
 
My research has actually covered only the beginning of reshaping of the 
Serbian media system (2000-2006), with the initial legislative output and first 
results of the implementation. According to Jakubowitz and Gross, even the 
countries that have formally become members of the European Union and 
completed the transition phase, still have a lot of work to do in order to be 
considered stable and mature democracies. 
  
As Slavko Splichal (1994) has correctly noted in his study “Media Beyond 
Socialism”, there is not one way or prescribed path to proceed in transition. 
Although Splichal’s reflections on theory and practice of the media in former 
Eastern European countries came so early – in case of his home country 
Slovenia barely three years into the process of transition – they proved so true 
and applicable even to the Serbian media transition, which started many years 
later. Splichal has also spotted that developments of the new media legislation 
and environment in many former socialist countries, including Serbia, resemble 
more Italian political practice and culture, rather than Anglo-Saxon or Nordic 
models of democracy. I would add that it is because the Italian (and/or 
Medittaeranian) mentality and sensibility have much in common with the 
Serbian. But based on my research, I believe that there is no danger of 
"Berlusconisation" of the Serbian media environment. One Serbian media and 
business magnate, Bogoljub Karic, who thought that he could embark on a 
successful political career in the manner of Silvio Berlusconi, became victim of 
his own unrealistic ambitions and chose to flee the country in disgrace. 
 
At this point it is important to note what is specific and new about the Serbian 
case, in comparison with the other cases of transition. It is certainly the mixed 
(hybrid) model that the Serbian legislators adopted for transformation of the 
state-owned broadcaster RTS. Their deliberations and amendments to the 
original proposal for adoption of the public service broadcasting model, along 
with interventions into the setup and mandate of independent regulatory bodies, 
certainly had great impact on functioning of the new media system. 
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Nevertheless, as I pointed out earlier, the failure of the Serbian legislators to 
deliver a theoretically pure model of regulation did not mean that the result of 
their work spelt danger for the emerging democracy, as long as the media serve 
the purpose of providing adequate information to the citizens and enable 
meaningful debate about relevant issues in society.  
 
In that sense, debating the virtues of PSB versus the commercial model is futile, 
because both models are possible in democratic societies, and from the 
Serbian case we see that a mixture of both can function. Comparative 
experiences from other former communist countries where PSB model was 
used show that the final result in any of these countries could not match the 
theoretical ideals. The current situation in Serbia is not perfect by all means, but 
it is a sound base for further improvements. Bearing in mind the statement by 
the Serbian Minister for Culture and Media from September 2008, it is clear that 
policy makers are aware that the existing system requires further refinements 
and amendments. 
 
An important finding of this research is that the media can operate well, at least 
within limited period of time, without formal and institutional frame in place. The 
first post-Milosevic presidential election in 2002, when the legal norms 
governing the media were not passed yet, show that both the old state-owned 
media outlets and the emerging private and independent media executed their 
news and information providing duties well during the election period. Pretty 
much the same can be said of the 2003 state of emergency period following the 
assassination of prime minister, when the media did well under state-imposed 
censorship and limits. This proves that political (democratic) culture is not a 
product of the legal system alone, but shared sense of duty and values that the 
media, as well as the citizens and political actors need to have in order to 
transform a society. If the norms (legislation) do not quickly follow and reflect 
the state of mind and political culture in society, there is a danger of 
undermining and permanently compromising such values. It is 
institutionalization that eventually anchors and underpins the political culture 





The reform of the Serbian media system and the overall transition process is far 
from over, not only at the cut-off point of my research (2006), but for many 
years ahead - until Serbia is accepted into the ranks of the European Union. 
And even those countries that have already become members, as Jakubowitz 
and Gross assert, have a lot of work to do. Jakubowitz (2008) goes on to list 
three major difficulties in managing future media development and policy that 
the former Eastern European countries, now EU members, will face in near 
future. Serbia is still far away from that level of development. 
 
“The new media scene is surely much better than it was, let’s say, ten years 
ago,” claims Hungarian media scholar Galik (2003), in reference to the state of 
the media in Hungary. It can also be said of the Serbian situation. 
 
At the very end of this work, I would like to return to the research question I had 
formulated at the beginning, which guided, inspired and illuminated this work:  
 Can the reformed Serbian media sustain democracy in the making, 
 empowering the citizens to become responsible and participating 
 voters, and prevent undemocratic developments in future?  
 
The answer to this question is certainly yes, and I hope that the satisfactory 
evidence for such positive answer has been provided. The alternative research 
question I that I had proposed was:  
 Can the media be a major catalyst in facilitating Serbia to bridge 
 institutional and economic deficiencies and effectively speed up the 
 process of democratic transition?  
 
The answer to such a question is not a simple yes, or no. The media are 
certainly a key feature of any democratic society, but the media are not the 
agents that influence the tempo of social changes. It is always the political 
actors, under the scrutiny of the citizens and the media, who formulate, legislate 
and implement the order. The media certainly have a role as a catalyst of such 
process. In Serbia after 2000, the media rose to the occasion and started to 
fulfill the function of the Fourth Estate, but still have a long way to go towards 
full transformation, as much as the rest of Serbian state and social institutions 




Estonian academic Epp Lauk (2008) eloquently summarizes complexity of 
transition in the article on media systems and journalism culture in post-
communist countries:  
 "Post-communist development has only lasted nearly two decades, the 
 societies are in permanent flux, simultaneously fighting legacies of the 
 past and searching for successful ways of building up the states on the 
 rule of law, as well as civil societies. Media systems and journalism 
 cultures are an integral part of this development and they reflect the 
 character and level of political culture and economic progress that each 
 of these societies has been able to achieve. These societies have yet to 
 achieve the stability and balance that have been preconditions for the 
 development of Anglo-American journalism model." 
 
I would like to end this work with the words of Karol Jakubowitz (2005): 
 “This is not the end of history. The people of Central and Eastern Europe 
 are only beginning to come out of the trauma of change and to gain the 
 self-awareness and confidence they need to begin to act. So far, they 
 have relied on the guidance of others: opposition leaders, new political 
 leaders of the post-communist period, Western governments and 
 advisors. Sooner or later, however, they may begin to act of their own 
 volition, based on their own appraisal of reality. If and when that 
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Quality of coverage of presidential candidates in pre-election campaign 
 
-  Neutral 
-  Slightly Partial 
-  Partial 
-  Very Partial 
 
 
I. DAILY NEWSPAPERS 
 





No analytical pieces today. The front-page apostrophes a possible coalition 
between DAN and Miodrag Isakov's Vojvodina Reformists. The second page 
contains information about the campaigns of both candidates in the second 
round, although Labus's appeal to voters and further campaigning strategy 




B. GLAS JAVNOSTI 
 
Tone of reporting similar to Blic daily. More balanced report on the statements 
of both election teams ahead of the new round of campaigns for the second 






Front page focused on possible restructuring of DOS coalition ahead of second 
round of elections and the offers for TV duels to presidential candidates. A 
selection of articles highlighting Labus's appeal to citizens to come out and vote 
in the second round and PDS's accusation that the boycott was instigated by 
DSS, with more accusations on Kostunica's political partnerships tip the balance 
of reporting in Labus's favour. A column by Mihail Ramac openly suggests that 
voters from Vojvodina always made the right choices in previous elections, 
which they did once more by voting for Labus. 
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Politika summed up the results of the elections and the behaviour of political 
figures and groups in their aftermath. There were no comments favouring either 




E. VECERNJE NOVOSTI 
 
Summary of election results and political strategies ahead of the second round 
of elections. Citation of Djindjic's statement indicating that he would not be 
dissatisfied with a repeat of the elections, criticising Kostunica at the end of his 
statement. Batic states he would advise supporters to boycott elections while 
Nebojsa Mandic from PDS said the citizens "should come out and vote, even if 
Kostunica ends up as the winner".  
 




A number of articles and commentaries pro-Labus options (DS, Canak, Dusan 
Mihajlovic) could be interpreted as partial coverage in favour of Kostunica, 
although the front page headline says "Seselj Offers Deal to Kostunica", but the 
article basically suggests, based on anonymous sources from the DSS 
leadership, that Kostunica would not strike a deal with Seselj in return for his 
share of voters. 
 








II. DAILY NEWSPAPERS 
 






 Blic daily brings statements from Kostunica's press conference on his 
election campaign, criticism of Zoran Djindjic (in regard with Parliament 
and manipulation of Labus). Attempt to create a rift between Labus and 
Djindjic. Neutral citation of Kostunica's words. 
 
 Announcements of boycott by several candidates that dropped out of 
the race after the first round of elections 
 
 Appeal from Patriarch Pavle to citizens to come out and vote 
 
 Isakov statement on indications from OSCE that DSS Parliament 
mandates would be restored, DS denial of these claims 
 
Slightly Partial Coverage (=>Kostunica) 
 
B. GLAS JAVNOSTI 
 
 Kostunica statement "We Need Labus" on front page, excerpts from 
press conference similar to Blic 
 
 Quotes from Dan daily (Podgorica), alleging that Djindjic will support 
Kostunica in order to stay in power 
 
 Calls for turnout from Patriarch Pavle, for boycott from defeated 
presidential candidates 
 




 Kostunica's and Labus's statements presented in balanced and neutral 
tone 
 
 Two analyses (Parliament and Reforms) also reflect focal points of 
remaining presidential candidates 
 
 Patriarch Pavle statement treated with less importance than in the rest 






 Balanced reports on both candidates, general support for a sufficient 






E. VECERNJE NOVOSTI 
 
 Election related articles focused on statements of candidates defeated 
in first round of elections and whether they would support or boycott the 
elections (Seselj, Pelevic, Zivojinovic, Ivkovic are boycotting, the rest are 
still undecided).  
 
 Lead articles - Patriarch Pavle appeals to citizens to come out and vote, 
Kostunica calls for vote,  
 
 Labus claims he did not like Djindjic's speech at the final meeting in 






 Article: PDS accuses Kostunica of being behind the trial against 
Momcilo Perisic 
 
 Kostunica's press conference: praise of Labus as economist and 
reprimand for teaming up with Labus 
 
 Headlines: Seselj to boycott elections 
 
 Labus camp accuses Kostunica of being after Seselj's voters, Velimir 
Ilic DSS official Jovasevic replies that their were not supported by Seselj 
 







III. DAILY NEWSPAPERS 
 






 Election related articles focused on the TV duel between Kostunica and 
Labus, reports on pre-election campaigns and statements, pro et contra, 
on the initiative for boycott. 
 
 Extensive article on the AGB Strategic survey on financing campaigns 




B. GLAS JAVNOSTI 
 
 Balanced coverage of statements from both pre-election candidates 
 
 Statement by LSV leader Canak that Kostunica tried to make a deal 
with Seselj and a reply from Marsicanin denying allegations 
 







 Danas has put less emphasis on election related issues than other 
dailies 
 
 The topics that also received attention were the TV duel and the  debate 
over OSCE stand on DSS mandates 
 
 An article on the new book by political analyst Vladimir Goati with the 







 Slim coverage of election related issues 
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 Front page gives article on calls by both candidates for a sufficient 
turnout in the second round of elections 
 




E. VECERNJE NOVOSTI 
 
 Article commenting on the strategies of candidates ahead of second 
round 
 






 Articles and comments in traditional sensationalistic style focus on 
alleged conflicts in Labus's camp (Djindjic's criticism of Labus, headline 
"Dinkic Begins an Open Campaign against Djindjic"), Canak's accusations 
regarding an alleged Kostunica-Seselj pact and Marsicanin's denial of 
these allegations. 
 
 Although the sum of negative articles against both candidates are 
slightly in Kostunica's favour, the final impression is that Nacional tends to 
criticise both candidates and discourage the public from voting for either 










IV. DAILY NEWSPAPERS 
 






 Article with statements from all political leaders on the issue of early 
legislature elections and when they should be scheduled, balanced article 
without biased comments 
 





B. GLAS JAVNOSTI 
 
 Front page headline focused on issue of DSS mandates, articles carries 
statements and opinions of DC MP Veselin Simonovic and DSS MP 
Djordje Mamula, who, in brief, said the mandates would have to be 
returned 
 
 Statements from Micunovic, Labus who accept that the mandates were 
legally revoked, but the act was not legitimate 
 
 Labus denies conflict with Djindjic, but says there is a divergence in 
opinion 
 
 DSS Vice President Zoran Sami states that Kostunica will be victorious 
in second round 
 




 TV Duel between candidates  received most attention, reporting in 
neutral tone 
 







 Balanced reports on TV Duel, election campaign activities of 





E. VECERNJE NOVOSTI 
 
 Balanced reports on TV Duel, election campaign activities, statements 






 Headline - Neither Labus nor Kostunica are Showmen.  
 
 Article on Canak's accusations implying that Kostunica is offering Seselj 
the Prime Minister's seat in a new Government 
 
 Batic's (DHSS) statement on regularity in revoking DSS mandates 
 
 Nacional still gives equally negative coverage of both presidential 
candidates and apostrophes Seselj's complaints against the regularity of 
elections 
 





V. DAILY NEWSPAPERS 
 





 Blic brought extensive interviews with both presidential candidates, who 
gave their views on the political situation, prospects for victory in the 
second round of elections and future plans, neutral coverage 
 
 Other articles from the domains of politics and economy do not have 
direct reference to the presidential candidates 
 
Neutral Coverage 
B. GLAS JAVNOSTI 
 
 Glas javnosti also brought an interview with both presidential candidates 
with similar topics as the interviews in Blic daily 
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 Other reports included Marsicanin's provocative statement suggesting 
Miroljub Labus's support to Kostunica in case the second round fails after 
Dinkic's said one candidate should withdraw in support of the other in such 







 Presidential candidates give their views on how Yugoslavia should join 
the EU, the question was posed by the European Movement in Serbia 
 
 Dinkic and Marsicanin exchange on support to other democratic 
candidate in case elections fail 
 
 Miodrag Isakov and Dragan Veselinov exchange on Isakov's support to 






 TV Duel, European Movement interviews, other minor news 
 




E. VECERNJE NOVOSTI 
 
 Novosti interview both candidates 
 
 Dinkic - Marsicanin exchange on support to other candidate 
 
 Miroljub Labus and British Secretary of State for International 
Development Clare Short, praise to reforms in Serbia 
 




 Nacional has maintained a selection of articles that criticises both 




Balanced Negative Coverage against both Candidates 
 
 
VI. DAILY NEWSPAPERS 
 





 Blic daily reported on the TV duel between presidential candidates 
Vojislav Kostunica and Miroljub Labus in a neutral fashion, but focused 
their report on the candidates' discussion over Serbian Prime Minister 
Djindjic 
 
 Other articles and statements give positive spin to voting in the second 




B. GLAS JAVNOSTI 
 
 Glas javnosti also focused on TV Duel, more extensive report on the 
event 
 
 Other articles related to elections report on the DS - DSS dispute over 
the Constitutional Court getting involved over the issue of DSS mandates 
in Parliament 
 









 TV Duel in centre of attention, detailed report on statements of the 
candidates 
 












E. VECERNJE NOVOSTI 
 
 Neutral report on TV Duel  
 
 Results of public opinion survey by "Medijum" agency, big article on 
page - predicts Kostunica's victory in second round of elections 
 




 "Medijum" agency report predicting Kostunica's victory if second round 
succeeds 
 
 Selection of articles maintaining attitude that the second round will 
probably fail 
 








VII. DAILY NEWSPAPERS 
 






 Blic had only one article related to the elections - a comment observing 
there were problems with the lists of voters with remarks that a news 
system would have to be introduced to eliminate the problem; the 




B. GLAS JAVNOSTI 
 
 Calls from OSCE and EU to citizens of Serbia to come out and vote 
 
 News on a G17 founder leaving the organisation after indications that it 






 Danas daily gave balanced coverage with reports on viewer ratings of 
the TV Duel, EU and OSCE calls to Serbian citizens to vote and a 
comment claiming that the electorate has already made up its mind and 






 TV Duel viewer ratings, calls to citizens to come and vote - as usual, 




E. VECERNJE NOVOSTI 
 





 Short report on election silence, other articles maintain their regular 





TV COVERAGE CONTENT ANALYSIS 3-11 OCTOBER 2002 
 
TV Newscasts / Coverage of Election Related Issues 
 
3 October 2002 
 
 RTV Pink  (InfoTop) 18:15 - 18:30 
 
  Government's campaign "Proud of Serbia" was presented through live 
broadcast from the Ministry of Trade and Tourism. The time slot lasted 2 
minutes.  
 
 The presenter announced Miroljub Labus's press conference saying 
that Labus called for large turnout in the second round while some other 
candidates and parties go for the boycott. The slot lasted for 2 minutes 
and the tone was neutral.  
 
 DHSS press conference coverage lasted for 1 minute with Vladan 
Batic's urging for the elections' boycott. The statement was not followed 
with comments. The newscast was not interrupted with commercial clips.  
 
BKTV (Telefakt 4) 18:55 - 19:25 
 
   A three-minute report was dedicated to the Serbian Government's 
campaign "Proud of Serbia". The footage of press conference held in the 
Ministry of Trade and Tourism was presented without comments.  Serbian 
Minister for Trade and Tourism Slobodan Milosavljevic appeared live 
immediately after the coverage. Minister's live appearance lasted for three 
minutes. The presenter did not ask the Minister provocative questions.  
 
  BK TV broadcast three-minute footage of Stojan Stamenkovic's press 
conference (introduced as one of leading Yugoslav economists) where he 
said that if DSS's electoral paroles came into force, the transition process 
would be seriously disrupted.  
 
 Elections 2002 time slot (six minutes) - press conferences of Miroljub 
Labus and Democratic Center and statements of Rasim Ljajic and Vladan 
Batic were broadcast without comment.  
 
 The statements by RTS and BK followed, offering both presidential 
candidates the possibility of live TV duel. This was the first mention of 
Vojislav Kostunica in the newscast. 
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Radio & Television of Serbia  (the TV Belgrade Prime Time Newscaster) 
19:30 - 20:00 
 
 RTS dedicated 10 minutes of its program to the elections. The RTS 
presenter introduced the election block wondering whether the elections 
would succeed at all. The comment was not biased towards any political 
block but have echoed the words of Christopher Forsythe, law expert from 
Cambridge who said that present electoral law was not efficient. 
  
 Miroljub Labus and Dragan Marsicanin's statements were presented 
equally in length, but Labus's statement was presented as video footage 
while Marsicanin's words were aired as the phone report with still image. 
Other parties' statements were broadcast in short, without comments, in 
neutral way.  
 
 RTS announced its offer to the both presidential candidates to 
broadcast their TV duel (note - only Labus's video footage was included in 
the report).  
 
 RTS reported on Vojislav Kostunica and Miroljub Labus's return to the 
campaign. Only still image of Vojislav Kostunica was presented.  
 
 Zoran Djindjic's statements on the Government's campaign 'Proud of 
Serbia' and presidential candidates followed (editorial treatment). The 
statement's presentation included Zoran Djindjic's video appearance.  
 
 The Serbian Government's campaign 'Proud Serbia' was presented in 
neutral way, covering the Ministry of Trade & Tourism's press conference.  
 
Studio B (News at 10) 22:00 - 22:30 
 
 Studio B announced Vojislav Kostunica's return to the campaign after 
the news on his presidential activities (audio only).  
 
 Miroljub Labus's statement on the second round followed. Studio B only 
presented Labus's words that he believes to gain more than 40% of votes 
on October 13. His statement was presented with video footage.  
 
 The report on Labus lasted for two minutes while the news on Kostunica 
gained less than a minute of time.   
 Studio B aired statements of several parties, on the issue of the turnout 
success - DHSS (audio and video footage), SRS (audio only), SPS (video 
only), and SPO (by presenter).  
 
 Studio B dedicated three minutes to the news on possible new 
coalitions inside DOS. All the statements were presented shortly and in 
equal way (audio) without comments.  
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 The Serbian Government's campaign 'Proud Serbia' was presented at 
the end of the newscast. The report lasted three minutes and included 
several Minister of Trade and Tourism statements as well as presenter's 
words, without comment. 
 
4 October 2002 
 
 
TV Pink (Infotop) 18:00 - 18:30 
 
 RTV Pink reported on Vojislav Kostunica's press conference, without 
comment. Kostunica's original statement was aired. He praised Miroljub 
Labus as economical expert. Time: 3 minutes.  
 
 Serbian Radical Party's call for election boycott was presented with 
Vojislav Seselj's full statement. Time: 45 seconds.  
 
 The RTV Pink aired SSJ's (Party of Serbian Unity - Borislav Pelevic) call 
for boycott (presenter's words only). Time: 20 seconds. 
  
 SPS's statement lasted for 1 minute and was presented with video 
footage and presenter's voice except on one occasion (comment on 
Slobodan Milosevic).  
 
 The statements by SPO and GSS followed, presented by newscaster's 
voice and video footage. Time: 15 seconds each.  
 
 RIK's information on turn-off was presented in neutral way. Time: 1 
minute.  
 
 The TV Pink paid attention to the split in RV (reformists of Vojvodina, 
Mile Isakov's party), caused by high party official who decided to step 
away the party after Mile Isakov openly backed Vojislav Kostunica. No 
comments followed regarding the report. Time: 30 seconds.  
 
 The TV Pink broadcast the news on the meeting between Vojislav 
Kostunica and Dragoljub Micunovic, claiming that two politicians agreed 
that Federal Constitutional Court should rule in favor of the return of DSS 
deputies back into the Assembly. The TV Pink reported that Vojislav 
Kostunica urged for this decision to be brought into the open next week, in 
order to gain more political points. The news source was not mentioned. 
Time: 2 minutes (presenter only).  
  
Partial Coverage (Labus) 
 
BKTV (Telefakt 4) 18:55 - 19:25 
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 The BK TV reported on debt amortization deal between Yugoslavia and 
Switzerland, with Miroljub Labus's statement included (audio and video 
coverage). Labus was titled Federal Deputy Prime Minister. Time: 3 
minutes.  
 
 Vojislav Kostunica's statement on turn-off and Miroljub Labus opened 
the electoral block. The statement lasted 3 minutes and was presented by 
still picture and newscaster's voice.  
 
 SRS's 30-second statement on election boycott followed, with Vojislav 
Seselj's words included in brief. His appearance was interrupted by 
analyst Srdjan Bogosavljevic, who explained that turn-off success was 
under question. 
  
 BK TV presented GSS's statement with the voice of a newscaster. 
Time: 20 seconds.  
 
 The Patriarch Pavle's appeal for citizens to take a stand in the runoff 
was treated with video footage and newscaster's voice. Time: 2 minutes. 
  
 BK TV presented the Media center's offer for the TV duel of presidential 




Radio Television of Serbia (Dnevnik 2) 19:30 - 20:00 
 
 Lead news - SRS's call for elections boycott, with video footage but 
without original words (newscaster's words only). Report lasted 30 
seconds.  
 
 RTS reported on Vojislav Kostunica's press conference with video and 
audio, including Vojislav Kostunica's comments on Miroljub Labus, the 
success of turn off and the TV duel. Time: 3 minutes.  
 
 Report on Vojislav Kostunica's campaign followed immediately, read by 
the presenter, without video or photo. Time: 30 seconds. 
 The press conference of Miroljub Labus's team was presented mostly 
by newscaster and with short-lasting video. Time: 45 seconds. 
  
 Several parties' reactions (SRS, DC, GSS, SD, SPS) regarding the 
turnoff followed, presented in brief, with newscaster's voice and video for 
each party. Time: 1 minute.  
 
 RTS reported on Patriarch Pavle's appeal in short, with still picture and 
newscaster's voice. Time: 20 seconds.  
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 In the second part of the Dnevnik 2, RTS reported on Miroljub Labus's 
activities as the Federal Deputy Prime Minister, as he signed the deal on 
debt amortization with Swiss Ambassador. The report was presented in full 




TV Studio B (News at 10) 22:00 - 22:30 
 
 Studio B reported on the debt amortization deal between Yugoslavia 
and Switzerland, airing Miroljub Labus's statement in full, without 
comment. Time: 2 minutes. 
 
 The electoral campaign video clip 'Serbia knows - Vojislav Kostunica' 
followed immediately. Time: 20 seconds.  
 
 Studio B reported on latest RIK's activities with video and newscaster's 
voice in neutral way. Time: 30 seconds.  
 
 Vojislav Kostunica's activities - visits to Irig and Sid - were presented 
with video and newscaster's voice, in neutral way. Time: 2 minutes. 
  
 Patriarch Pavle's appeal was presented with still picture and 
newscaster's voice. The brief version of statement was aired. Time: 15 
seconds.  
 
 Statements by SRS and SPS followed. Both statements were covered 
with video and audio, including original statements by Vojislav Seselj and 
Branko Ruzic. Time: 30 seconds each. 
  
 Presidential candidates' electoral teams reacted on SRS's call for 
election boycott. Their reactions were presented with video and 
newscaster's voice. Time: 30 seconds for Kostunica's team and 45 
seconds for Labus's team. 
 
Partial Coverage (Kostunica) 
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7 October 2002 
 
 
TV Pink (Infotop) 18:00 - 18:30 
 
 RTV Pink reported on Vojislav Kostunica's press conference, without 
comment. Kostunica's original statement was aired. He praised Miroljub 
Labus as economical expert. Time: 3 minutes. 
  
 Serbian Radical Party's call for election boycott was presented with 
Vojislav Seselj's full statement. Time: 45 seconds.  
 
 The RTV Pink aired SSJ's (Party of Serbian Unity - Borislav Pelevic) call 
for boycott (presenter's words only). Time: 20 seconds. 
  
 SPS's statement lasted for 1 minute and was presented with video 
footage and presenter's voice except on one occasion (comment on 
Slobodan Milosevic). The statements by SPO and GSS followed, 
presented by newscaster's voice and video footage. Time: 15 seconds 
each.  
 
 RIK's information on turn-off was presented in neutral way. Time: 1 
minute.  
 
 The TV Pink paid attention to the split in RV (reformists of Vojvodina, 
Mile Isakov's party), caused by high party official who decided to step 
away the party after Mile Isakov openly backed Vojislav Kostunica. No 
comments followed regarding the report. Time: 30 seconds.  
 
 The TV Pink broadcast the news on the meeting between Vojislav 
Kostunica and Dragoljub Micunovic, claiming that two politicians agreed 
that Federal Constitutional Court should rule in favor of the return of DSS 
deputies back into the Assembly. The TV Pink reported that Vojislav 
Kostunica urged for this decision to be brought into the open next week, in 
order to gain more political points. The news source was not mentioned. 
Time: 2 minutes (presenter only).   
 






BKTV (Telefakt 4) 18:55 - 19:25 
 
 The BK TV reported on debt amortization deal between Yugoslavia and 
Switzerland, with Miroljub Labus's statement included (audio and video 
coverage). Labus was titled Federal Deputy Prime Minister. Time: 3 
minutes.  
 
 Vojislav Kostunica's statement on turn-off and Miroljub Labus opened 
the electoral block. The statement lasted 3 minutes and was presented by 
still picture and newscaster's voice.  
 
 SRS's 30-second statement on election boycott followed, with Vojislav 
Seselj's words included in brief. His appearance was interrupted by 
analyst Srdjan Bogosavljevic, who explained that turn-off success was 
under question.  
 
 BK TV presented GSS's statement with the voice of a newscaster. 
Time: 20 seconds. 
  
 The Patriarch Pavle's appeal for citizens to take a stand in the runoff 
was treated with video footage and newscaster's voice. Time: 2 minutes. 
  
 BK TV presented the Media center's offer for the TV duel of presidential 




Radio Television of Serbia (Dnevnik 2) 19:30 - 20:00 
 
 Lead news - SRS's call for elections boycott, with video footage but 
without original words (newscaster's words only). Report lasted 30 
seconds.  
 
 RTS reported on Vojislav Kostunica's press conference with video and 
audio, including Vojislav Kostunica's comments on Miroljub Labus, the 
success of turn off and the TV duel. Time: 3 minutes.  
 
 Report on Vojislav Kostunica's campaign followed immediately, read by 
the presenter, without video or photo. Time: 30 seconds. 
  
 The press conference of Miroljub Labus's team was presented mostly 
by newscaster and with short-lasting video. Time: 45 seconds. 
  
 Several parties' reactions (SRS, DC, GSS, SD, SPS) regarding the 
turnoff followed, presented in brief, with newscaster's voice and video for 
each party. Time: 1 minute.  
 RTS reported on Patriarch Pavle's appeal in short, with still picture and 
newscaster's voice. Time: 20 seconds.  
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 In the second part of the Dnevnik 2, RTS reported on Miroljub Labus's 
activities as the Federal Deputy Prime Minister, as he signed the deal on 
debt amortization with Swiss Ambassador. The report was presented in full 




TV Studio B (News at 10) 22:00 - 22:30 
 
 The Studio B reported on the debt amortization deal between 
Yugoslavia and Switzerland, airing Miroljub Labus's statement in full, 
without comment. Time: 2 minutes. 
   
 The electoral campaign video clip 'Serbia knows - Vojislav Kostunica' 
followed immediately. Time: 20 seconds.  
 
 Studio B reported on latest RIK's activities with video and newscaster's 
voice in neutral way. Time: 30 seconds.  
 
 Vojislav Kostunica's activities - visits to Irig and Sid - were presented 
with video and newscaster's voice, in neutral way. Time: 2 minutes. 
  
 Patriarch Pavle's appeal was presented with still picture and 
newscaster's voice. The brief version of statement was aired. Time: 15 
seconds.  
 
 Statements by SRS and SPS followed. Both statements were covered 
with video and audio, including original statements by Vojislav Seselj and 
Branko Ruzic. Time: 30 seconds each. 
  
 Presidential candidates' electoral teams reacted on SRS's call for 
election boycott. Their reactions were presented with video and 
newscaster's voice. Time: 30 seconds for Kostunica's team and 45 
seconds for Labus's team. 
 













TV Pink (Infotop) 18:00 - 18:27 
 
 Information on the TV duel between Labus and Kostunica. Time: 2' and 
15''. 
 
 Report on DSS mandates: Kostunica's statement (time: 25 seconds), 
Batic's statement (30 seconds). 
 




BK TV (Telefakt 4) 18:55 - 19:30 
 
 Vice President of Federal Government Labus's statement on regional 
cooperation in Europe.  
 
 Information on the TV duel between Labus and Kostunica and DSS 
mandates. Batic's statement on mandates (against DSS). Time: 5 minutes. 
 
 Report on the Kostunica's campaign. Time: 1' and 15''. 
 
Slightly Partial Coverage    Labus 
 
RTS (Dnevnik 2) 19:30 
  
 Information on the TV duel between Labus and Kostunica. Time: 3 
minutes. 
 
 Report on Labus's campaign. Time: 1 minute. 
 
 Report on the Kostunica's campaign. Time:  55 seconds. 
 





TV Studio B (News at 10) 22:00 
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 Information on the TV duel between Labus and Kostunica. Time: 1' and 
40''. 
 
 Report on the Kostunica's campaign. Time: 1' and 35''. 
 
 Report on Labus's campaign. Time: 1' and 35''. 
 
 Vice President of Federal Government Labus's statement on regional 





9 October  2002 
 
 
TV Pink (Infotop) 18:00 - 18:28 
 
 Dinkic's and Marsicanin's comments on possible third round of elections 




BK TV (Telefakt 4) 18:55  
 
 Micunovic's, Dinkic's, Marsicanin's, Covic's and SDP's comments on 
possible third round of elections and low turnout. Time: 2 minutes and 25 
seconds. 
 






RTS (Dnevnik 2) 19:30  
 
 Dinkic's and Marsicanin's comments on possible third round of elections 
and low turnout. Time: 55 seconds. 
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TV Studio B (News at 10) 22:00 
  
 President of the FRY Kostunica met British Minister Claire Short. Time: 
25 seconds. 
 
 Dinkic's and Marsicanin's comments on possible third round of elections 
and low turnout. Time: 1' and 50''. 
 




10 October 2002 
 
 
TV Pink (Infotop) 18:05 
 
 Djindjic's statement on the presidential elections and the TV duel 
between Labus and Kostunica. Time: 1' and 35'' 
  
 Batic's statement on the TV duel. Time: 40 seconds 
 
 Protic's and Seselj's statements on the presidential elections (call for 
boycott). Time: 2' and 15''  
 
 Otpor's statement on the presidential elections. Time: 25 seconds 
 
 Serbian Government's statement on Kostunica's statement on new laws 
(denial of Kostunica's statement). Time: 30 seconds. - Later in the evening 
Labus repeated it, during the TV duel 
 
 All the statements (1-4) related to the TV duel and presidential elections 
underestimated their importance, except Otpor's statement. 
 
Slightly partial coverage     Labus 
BK TV (Telefakt 4) 18:55  
 
 Djindjic's statement on the presidential elections and the TV duel 
between Labus and Kostunica. Time: 1' and 20'' 
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 Micunovic's, DHSS's, PDS's, Seselj's and the Patriarch's statements on 
the presidential elections. 




RTS (Dnevnik 2) 19:30 
  
 Information on the TV duel between Labus and Kostunica. Time: 3 
minutes 
 





11 October 2002 
 
 
TV Pink (Infotop) 18:00 - 18:20 
 
 Yugoslavian President Kostunica denies that VJ helps the Iraqi regime. 
Time: 20'' 
 
 Serbian Prime Minister Djindjic will participate in the Churchill 
Conference in Zurich. Time: 20'' 
 
 Information on pre-election silence and the second round of the 






BK TV (Telefakt 4) 18:55 
  
 Information on pre-election silence, the second round of the elections 
and the TV duel between Labus and Kostunica. Time: 8 minutes 
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RTS (Dnevnik 2) 19:30 
  
 Presidential candidate Kostunica in Senta. Time: 40 seconds 
 
 Presidential candidate Labus will participate in the Studio B TV 
program. Time: 10 seconds 
 
 Information on the second round of the elections and the TV duel 




Studio B (News at 10) 22:00 
  
 Information on pre-election silence and the second round of the 
elections. Time: 3 + 2 minutes 
 
 Presidential candidate Kostunica in Vojvodina. Time: 1' and 30'' 
 






MEDIA IN SERBIA 
 
PUBLIC OPINION POLL 
November 2002 
 
Commissioned by OSCE Mission to FR Yugoslavia 





The public opinion polling was conducted on behalf of OSCE Mission to FR 
Yugoslavia, in the period from 7 to 15 of November 2002, on the entire territory 




The research was conducted in 38 municipalities of Serbia: Palilula, Rakovica, 
Sopot, Voždovac, Zvezdara, Subotica, Zrenjanin, Sečanj, Kanjiža, Pančevo, 
Kovin, Apatin, Novi Sad, Bač, Stara Pazova, Šid, Mali Zvornik, Valjevo, 
Smederevo, Smederevska Palanka, Golubac, Kragujevac, Kladovo, Knjaževac, 
Boljevac, Čajetina, Prijepolje, Ivanjica, Kraljevo, Novi Pazar, Kruševac, 
Varvarin, Niš, Ražanj, Prokuplje, Babušnica, Leskovac and Bosilegrad,  
 
The research covered the sample of 1200 respondents (18 years and over). 
Three-staged random stratified sample was used in the research. 
 
The field research part was conducted by face-to-face interviews in 
respondents’ homes. The sample was formed to be representative for the entire 
population of Serbia (excluding Kosovo), according to the characteristics such 
as respondents’ age, gender, level of education, nationality and region of 
residence. When needed, a post-stratification was prepared according to the 
characteristics that differ from the population parameters. 
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After the completion of the field part of the research, the sample proved to be 
the true representative of the population in Serbia according to all the relevant 




Results of the research are presented in charts. Answers to each question are 
reported. 
 
Differences according to demographic variables are not shown in charts, but are 
described in the text, for all relevant variables. 
 
To almost all the questions in the questionnaire, all the respondents provided 
answers. For those questions to which not all the respondents provided 
answers, a special remark was made below respective Charts.  
 
At the end, there is an Appendix, which shows demographic characteristics of 

























Out of all the electronic communication appliances, the majority of Serbian 
citizens uses a TV set and a radio. Video recorder is also used by more than 
one half of respondents, while other communication appliances are used by 
less than one half of respondents.  
 
Computer is used by one fifth, and the Internet by 13% of respondents. 
 
Mobile telephones are used by almost two thirds of younger respondents 
(bellow 30), while the number of users decreases with age. In town, mobile 
phone is used by one half, and one third of respondents use it in villages. As far 
as region is concerned, Belgrade has the majority of mobile telephone users 
(56%), Serbia proper the least number of users (37%). Also, with the increase in 
education level, there is a drastic increase in the number of mobile telephone 
users - less than 15% of respondents with lower education and almost 70% of 
respondents with the highest level of education use mobile telephones. 
 
This pattern is repeated when computer and the Internet are concerned, but the 
number of users is smaller – better educated, younger, town respondents, 
Belgrade citizens use computer and the Internet much more than the less 
educated, village inhabitants, older and Serbia proper citizens. For instance, 
28% of respondents in town use computer comparing to only 12% in villages. 
As far as Internet is concerned, the number of users in non-urban environment 
is insignificant (less than 5%), while one fifth of all respondents use it in urban 
environment. Respondents with a lower education almost do not use the 
Internet or a computer. It is interesting that even among the members of the 
category of respondents with a university degree, only 40% of them use the 
Internet – which is far below the European standards. 
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4.8 16.6 29.3 47.8
14.4 34.3 48.7
26.7 40.7 21.2 10.8
22.8 47.4 21.1 8.4







Would you say that you acquire information from:
Regularly Occasionally Rarely Never Don't know
Chart 2 
 
The majority of respondents is informed through television and newspapers, 
while political radio programs, and especially political magazines, are not used 
much – almost one half of respondents never use these media. 
 
Political TV programmes are followed more by the older respondents than the 
younger ones (only 7% of respondents from the youngest category, and more 
than 40% of respondents from the oldest category regularly follows these 
programmes), and they are generally more followed by men  (18% regularly) 
than women (17%). 
 
Newspapers are more read by the respondents of middle age, and by the 
respondents in towns. However, as can be seen from the chart, only one 
quarter of Serbia's citizens regularly reads newspapers. Also, the majority of 
respondents from Belgrade regularly read newspapers (more than one third), 
while the smallest number of respondents from Serbia proper is informed from 




With the increase of education level the number of those who regularly read 
newspapers also increases – more than 40% of those of the highest education 
read newspapers regularly. 
 
Men read newspapers on a daily basis twice as much as women do (34% 
opposed to 19%). 
 
Political magazines are read the most in Belgrade, and the least in Vojvodina. 
More educated respondents read them at least sometimes, while the number of 
younger respondents and those with lower education who read political 
magazines is practically insignificant. 
 
























 In general, do you pay attention to news about:
Pays attention Doesn't pay attention Don't know
Chart 3 
 
Our respondents pay most attention to the news that are most important to 
them – social issues, such as education, health care, poverty. The issues that 
are not in connection with respondents’ lives, but are “traditionally” interesting, 
follow by popularity - and those are sport news (it should not be forgotten that 
the majority of respondents are proud of our country's achievements in sports; 
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therefore sport news are an important aspect of life) and “the black chronicle” 
news. 
 
The least important news are those concerning foreign affairs and the news 




DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SAMPLE 
 
 
Table 1. Age groups 
  Frequency Percent 
18-29 246 20.5 
30-44 373 31.1 
45-59 344 28.7 
60 and more 237 19.8 
Total 1200 100.0 
 
Table 2. Gender of respondent 
  Frequency Percent 
Male 614 51.2 
Female 586 48.8 
Total 1200 100.0 
 
Table 3. Region 
  Frequency Percent 
Belgrade 290 24.2 
Vojvodina 330 27.5 
Serbia proper 580 48.3 




Table 4. Type of community 
  Frequency Percent 
Urban 700 58.3 
Other 500 41.7 
Total 1200 100.0 
 
Table 5. Size of community 
  Frequency Percent 
Village 500 41.7 
Town - up to 40.000 inhabitants 230 19.2 
Town - 40.000 to 100.000 70 5.8 
Town - 100.000 to 1,000.000 160 13.3 
Belgrade - over 1,000.000 inhabitants 240 20.0 
Total 1200 100.0 
 
Table 6. Level of education 
  Frequency Percent 
No education 19 1.6 
Incomplete elementary school 71 5.9 
Elementary school 177 14.8 
Vocational school 195 16.3 
High school 516 43.0 
College (higher education) 116 9.7 
University degree 106 8.8 
Total 1200 100.0 
 
Table 7. Marital status 
  Frequency Percent 
Single 265 22.1 
Married - living with partner 778 64.8 
Divorced – separated 43 3.6 
Widowed 110 9.2 
Refused 4 0.3 





Table 8. Working status 
  Frequency Percent 
Full-time employed 487 40.6 
Part-time employed 92 7.7 
Self employed 87 7.3 
Retired-pensioned 218 18.2 
Housewife not otherwise employed 144 12.0 
Student 79 6.6 
Other-Not employed 93 7.8 
Total 1200 100.0 
 
 







 Frequency Percent 
Employer-manager of establishment with 10 or more 
employees 
43 3.6 
Employer-manager of establishment with less than 
10 employee 
71 5.9 
Professional worker: lawyer, accountant, teacher, etc 125 10.4 
Supervisory office worker: supervises others 47 3.9 
Non-manual office worker: non-supervisory 157 13.1 
Foreman and supervisor 30 2.5 
Skilled manual worker 244 20.3 
Semi-skilled manual worker 29 2.4 
Unskilled manual worker 35 2.9 
Farmer: has own farm 47 3.9 
Agricultural worker 41 3.4 
Member of armed forces, security personnel 17 1.4 
Never had a job 181 15.1 
Don’t know 133 11.1 
Total 1200 100.0 
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Table 10. Is respondent the head of the household? 
  Frequency Percent 
Yes 593 49.4 
No 607 50.6 
Total 1200 100.0 
 
Table 11. Occupation of the head of the household 
(Only for respondents that are NOT heads of the household) 
 
Table 12. Perception of social class 
  Frequency Percent 
Upper 5 0.4 
Upper Medium 76 6.3 
Medium 600 50.0 
Lower Medium 306 25.5 
Lower 154 12.8 
Don’t know 59 4.9 
Total 1200 100.0 
 Frequency Percent 
Employer-manager of establishment with 10 or more 
employees 
27 4.4 
Employer-manager of establishment with less than 
10 employee 
29 4.8 
Professional worker: lawyer, accountant, teacher, etc 48 7.9 
Supervisory office worker: supervises other 37 6.1 
Non-manual office worker: non-supervisory 69 11.4 
Foreman and supervisor 28 4.6 
Skilled manual worker 174 28.7 
Semi-skilled manual worker 12 2.0 
Unskilled manual worker 9 1.5 
Farmer: has own farm 56 9.2 
Agricultural worker 47 7.7 
Member of armed forces, security personnel 12 2.0 
Never had a job 6 1.0 
Don’t know 53 8.7 
Total 607 100.0 
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Table 13. Personal monthly income 
  Frequency Percent 
Has no personal income 206 17.2 
Up to 3000 dinars 72 6.0 
3001 - 5000 dinars 143 11.9 
5001 - 10000 dinars 318 26.5 
10001-15000 dinars 180 15.0 
15001-20000 dinars 68 5.7 
More than 20000 dinars 21 1.8 
Don’t know 57 4.8 
Refused 135 11.3 
Total 1200 100.0 
 
Table 14. Does respondent belong to a particular religion? 
  Frequency Percent 
Yes 900 75.0 
No 264 22.0 
Don’t know 36 3.0 
Total 1200 100.0 
 
Table 15. Religion  
(Only religious) 
 
  Frequency Percent 
Serb Orthodox 792 88.0 
Other Orthodox 10 1.1 
Roman Catholic 78 8.7 
Protestant 4 0.4 
Muslim/Islamic 10 1.1 
Other 3 0.3 
Don’t know - refused 3 0.3 







Table 16. Importance of religion in respondent’s life 
(Only religious) 
 
  Frequency Percent 
Of great importance 324 36.0 
Some importance 418 46.4 
Only of little importance 125 13.9 
Don’t know 33 3.7 
Total 900 100.0 
 
Table 17. Number of persons that permanently live in household 
  Frequency Percent 
One person 97 8.1 
Two persons 213 17.8 
Three persons 264 22.0 
Four persons 343 28.6 
Five or more persons 283 23.6 
Total 1200 100.0 
 
Table 18. Number of persons under the age of 18 that live in household 
  Frequency Percent 
No children under 18 662 55.2 
One person 292 24.3 
Two persons 222 18.5 













Table 19. Total monthly household income 
  Frequency Percent 
Up to 3000 dinars 38 3.2 
3001 - 5000 dinars 77 6.4 
5001 - 10000 dinars 188 15.7 
10001-20000 dinars 306 25.5 
20001-30000 dinars 169 14.1 
More than 30000 dinars 77 6.4 
Don’t know 184 15.3 
Refused 161 13.4 
Total 1200 100.0 
 
Table 20. Number of respondents owning:  
 Frequency Percent 
Laundry washing machine 1112 92.7 
Refrigerator 1189 99.1 
Electric stove 1157 96.4 
Wood stove 804 67.0 
Freezer 1084 90.3 
TV set 1182 98.5 
Dish washing machine 96 8.0 
Fixed phone 874 72.8 
Cordless phone 292 24.3 
Microwave oven 123 10.3 
Camera (VHS, digital...) 75 6.3 
Audio system 612 51.0 
DVD player 96 8.0 
Vacuum cleaner 1101 91.8 
Registered car 702 58.5 
More than one car 84 7.0 
Satellite/cable TV 303 25.3 
Computer 233 19.4 
Video 700 58.3 





LIST OF INTERVIEWEES 
 
1) Zoran Zivkovic  
Prime Minister of Serbia (2003 – 2004) 
 
2) Natasa Milojevic  
Leader of the parliamentary caucus for the Social-Democratic Party (2000 – 
2003),  
 
3) Dr Milan Sturgis 
Senior Political Adviser with the OSCE Mission to FRY; US State Department 
official  
 
4) Dr James Lyon  
International Crisis Group’s Senior Balkan Advisor  
 
5) Ivica Petrovic  
Radio Deutche Welle correspondent (2000 – 2008) 
 
6) Nebojsa Bugarinovic 
Editor-in-chief Radio BETA-RFI; President of Independent Association of 
Serbian Journalists (2004–2006); Radio Free Europe correspondent (2000 – 
2007)  
 
7) Jasmina Milutinovic  
Chief of Cabinet to the Speaker of the Serbian Parliament (2002 –2003); 
attorney  
 
8) Bratislav Stamenkovic  
Director of TV Nis (2001 -2004); attorney at law 
 
9) Miroslav Antic 
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Political activist and internet forum moderator from Canada 
 
10) Zoran Tomasevic 





Political History of the Serbian Media in Transition 




The questions posed below are used exclusively for research purpose and not 
for publication (except as part of doctoral research/thesis). The research 
questionnaire is tailored for obtaining replies from politicians, media workers 
and other professionals who were directly involved in the process of democratic 
transition of Serbia – as “decision makers“, or experts. The replies obtained 
from those individuals represent their personal views and not positions of their 






1) How do you see the role of the media after 5 October 2000? Would you 
say that "state-owned media" were governing tools, or instruments for keeping 
the power? 
 
2) Can we say that the technological revolution from early 1990’s (advent 
of cheap satellite receivers, access to international news programs, computers, 
internet, mobile telephony, mass emergence of private broadcasting and 
publishing outlets) completely change the old (“party commissar”) style of media 
control/management used by the regime? 
 
3) What was the role of “independent media” in bringing down of the 
Milosevic regime? Is it correct to say that they (independent media) were 
partners with the opposition political parties in that process? 
 
4) Comprehensive regulatory reform of the media sector was part of the 
opposition’s election manifesto in September 2000. Do you think that the 
politicians honestly supported such action, or they realized after Milosevic was 
removed that independent media, as partners in their plight against the tyrant, 
may become obstacle in governing? Can we say that the expectation of the 
independent media were unrealistic? 
 
 366 
EXAMPLE 1: Public polemic from 2001 between Prime Minister Zoran 
Djindjic and RTV B92 CEO Veran Maric about “medals for past 
achievements and no privileges for future”.  
 
5) How was it possible that the “media magnates” from the Milosevic era 
(like Zeljko Mitrovic - RTV Pink and Bogoljub Karic - BK Telekom) could keep 
their positions and even become stronger after October 2000? 
 
6) Why was adoption of the so-called “set of media laws” delayed, 
although it was prepared by a joint government and media professionals expert 
group within a year? Why were the draft texts drastically changed during the 
parliamentary debates in 2002 and 2003 when some pieces of legislations were 
finally passed? Was the government’s self-appointed “media expert”, Deputy 
prime minister Zarko Korac, given brief to delay, dilute and procrastinate any 
initiatives that would make the media regulated in a modern and independent 
manner – in order to maintain dominance of politics over the media? 
 
7) Is it possible in Serbia (or anywhere else) to legislate and institutionally 
establish independence of the media – or such notion is problematic and 
contradictory? 
 
EXAMPLE 2: Misuse of proclaimed media freedoms to attack PM Djindjic 
with impunity during 2000 -2003 period by the media under control of his 
political enemies, parts of secret services and criminal gangs. 
 
8) Do you have an impression that the management of the media by the 
governments’s Communicatons Bureau during 2003 state of emergency was 
clumsy, incompetent and counter-productive? Was it necessary for the Bureau 
to alienate the media and create enemies who would turn against the 
government the minute state of emergency was suspended? 
 
9) The manipulations and games with appointment of the independent 
regulatory body (Broadcasting Council) were present from its inception during 
times of reformist PM Zoran Djindjic, continued under his replacement Zivkovic 
and subsequently during conservative PM Kostunica. How can a person like 
Nenad Cekic be elected for chair, survive all changes and what was the 
reasoning for such choice? Is it possible to have “independent regulatory body” 
in Serbia, which is still not mature for such mechanism, or this was another 
case of international pressure to introduce an institute from mature democracies 
into environment that is not ready for it? 
 
10) How do you view constant amendments of the recently adopted media 
acts, the president’s refusal to sign such amendments and the parliament’s 
second adoption of such acts? 
